Iran’s Ballistic Missile Retaliatory Strikes and Escalation Dynamics

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t approximately 08:10 am on 28 February 2026, the US and Israel launched targeted and comprehensive air strikes against Iran. It is understood that in the initial phase of the attacks, public buildings in Tehran were targeted by Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from US warships in the Mediterranean. Indeed, footage of Tomahawk cruise missiles in motion along the Iraq-Iran border emerged in open-source media during the morning hours.

Furthermore, in the initial phase of the attacks targeting Tehran, air-launched ballistic missiles were employed. In this context, it has been assessed that the ballistic missiles named ROCKS and Blue Sparrow—previously known to have been launched by F-15 fighter jets—were the munitions used in the assassination of Supreme Leader Khamenei. In the first phase of the attack, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a targeted air strike at the Leader’s residence. However, this assassination and Khamenei’s death were not announced until later that night.

Although this development was announced late, Iran’s retaliatory strikes—which differed in terms of intensity and scale—were assessed as a key indicator supporting the view that the assassination took place during the initial phase of the Israeli and US air strikes. Compared to Iran’s previous retaliatory attacks, the fact that it simultaneously targeted US bases in the region and Israel marked a significant difference in the scale of the retaliation’s scope and intensity. On the other hand, this situation has been assessed in the literature as a horizontal escalation of the conflict. Conversely, the air strikes by the US and Israel have been characterised as vertical escalation. Indeed, this distinction could be explained by the consequences of the attack suffered by Iran.

As with its previous asymmetric retaliatory attacks, Iran has named these retaliatory strikes ‘True Promise’. Once again, in line with its previous retaliations, it has employed ballistic missiles and kamikaze UAVs as part of these asymmetric attacks. Iran has thus moved into the fourth phase of the “True Promise” retaliatory attacks, alongside the asymmetric retaliatory attacks it launched against Israel between April and October 2024 and since June 2025.

In this respect, the conflict in question is a continuation of the conflict known as the 12-Day War and represents a new and deepening example of asymmetric warfare. Indeed, Iran’s re-designation of its retaliatory attacks as ‘True Promise’, and Israel’s similar use of the name ‘Lion’ for its attacks, point to the ongoing nature of this conflict. This situation can be assessed as a continuity on the part of both conflicting sides, including in their operational nomenclature.

Horizontal escalation

Iran’s resort to horizontal escalation and retaliation attacks can be grounded in consistency and coherence with the capabilities previously tested in its arsenal. Indeed, during the one-month conflict, in high-value strategic targeting of US military bases in the region and Gulf states, it has been observed that Iran has increasingly relied on the asymmetric capabilities it has developed across the region—including through proxy forces—since the 2019 Aramco attack.

In this context, the Toufan kamikaze UAV—which features a delta-wing design and cost-effective characteristics and was first used in the Aramco attack—has demonstrated a consistent profile in effective attack scenarios, evolving subsequently into the Shahed-136, a loitering munition and kamikaze UAV derivative. Furthermore, the Fateh-class ballistic missiles (200–800 kilometres), characterised by high strike accuracy and short range, have also yielded effective results in these targeting operations.

Indeed, open-source reports indicate that the Shahed-238 kamikaze UAV, a newly developed variant of the Shahed-136, has been used in effective attacks against the AN/TPY-2 long-range THAAD air defense radars, AN/FPS-132 early warning systems and AN/MPQ-65 Patriot air defence radars in the region. Furthermore, solid-fuelled short-range ballistic missiles with precision strike capabilities, including the Fateh-110, Raad-500, Fateh-313 and Qiam/Zolfaghar variants, have demonstrated effective capabilities in targeting operations against Gulf states.

The effective and precision strike capabilities of this short-range class, despite air defence systems (Patriot ADS), have demonstrated consistency with previous usage examples. Indeed, Iran has deployed its Fateh-class short-range ballistic missiles against various targets, primarily in Iraq (Ayn al-Asad Airbase in 2020, Erbil Ballistic Missile Strikes in 2022), and within the context of these attacks, it has been observed that variants of this class possess the capability to carry out precision strikes and that their hit rates are relatively high.

Targeting and escalation trends

On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel expanded their attacks aimed at crippling Iran’s second-strike capabilities, this time targeting the southern region in addition to the western region. The western region emerged as one of the key focal points in both the 12-day conflict and the 28 February US-Israel and Iran clashes. In this context, it is possible to categorize the US and Israeli targeting into four main categories: public buildings and civilian infrastructure, nuclear facilities, military bases and installations (land, sea, air and space), and high-ranking religious, political and military figures.

Consequently, specific and priority targets have included military bases, production centres, silos and depots within Iran’s ballistic missile and UAV programmes. In contrast, Iran has struck various mobile or fixed long-range radar and early warning systems at military bases in the region, as well as high-value military and strategic assets (KC-135 and E-3 AWACS aircraft).

By the second week of the conflict, the US and Israel had begun striking civilian infrastructure in Iran. In this context, they targeted oil tankers in Tehran, Karaj and Bushehr. During the second and third weeks, around mid-March, the US and Israel both escalated attacks on civilian infrastructure and carried out strikes against the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility, the Arak Heavy Water Reactor and the Bushehr nuclear facility. In response, Iran has also escalated its actions, gradually beginning to target industrial zones and energy facilities in Gulf countries and Israel. The parties have rapidly escalated the conflict to a high level, mutually expanding the scale of violence and targeting.

This situation has led to a tendency to target each other’s nuclear facilities (Iran/Natanz – Israel/Dimona and the Negev Nuclear Research Centre) and has caused the escalation to develop within the nuclear domain as well. In other words, the parties, having begun the escalation at the highest level, rapidly exhausted all stages of escalation within a month. This reinforces the conclusion that the escalation in this conflict is showing signs of spiralling out of control.

Iranian ballistic missile retaliatory strikes

On Saturday, 28 February 2026, at approximately 11.10 am, Iran launched retaliatory strikes using ballistic missile salvos in response to targeted air strikes by the US and Israel. The first salvo, launched with approximately 30 ballistic missiles, was followed by a second salvo at around 11.28 am, after which approximately 44–45 salvos continued intermittently until late into the night. The ballistic missile and kamikaze UAV attacks, carried out in approximately 87 waves over the month since the conflict began, have been designated as Operation ‘True Promise-4’.

According to open-source information, some launch sites can be listed as Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, Damavand and Fardis/Alburz. Based on sources from the US, Israel, Gulf states and Iran, it can be inferred that approximately 1,300 or more ballistic missiles were used in these attacks, targeting Israel, Jordan and the Gulf states. Furthermore, it can be argued, based on various open-source reports, that approximately 4,000 or more kamikaze UAVs were deployed.

Furthermore, according to Israeli sources, approximately 540 ballistic missiles were fired at Israel during the one-month conflict. The missiles that hit their targets were frequently warhead types carrying submunitions such as Ghadr-F and Khorramshahr-4, which carry submunition/fragmentation warheads (42 missiles – 230 distinct impact points), as well as the solid-fuelled Kheibar Shekan/Fattah and the liquid-fuelled Shahab-3 derivative Emad, which created 54 impact zones with 12 hits, based on open-source assessments. In response to these retaliatory strikes, Israel employed medium- and high-altitude air defense systems, including the Arrow-2/3, David’s Sling, THAAD and other defense systems.

In this regard, it can be said that Israel demonstrated a tendency to use Arrow-3 interceptor missiles quite selectively throughout the month-long conflict. Instead, it is assessed that Israel relied more heavily on lower-tier interceptor missiles, which are relatively low-cost and easier to produce and procure. Another observation concerns the engagement of medium and high-altitude air defense interceptor missiles with the separated fragments and first stages of the ballistic missile rather than its warhead. This situation likely resulted from the air defense system’s inability to distinguish the warhead due to inoperable or ineffective radar (sensors damaged- hit by missile/kamikaze UAV), leading to target selection issues.

These vulnerabilities in the defense system were also observed within two impact zones located very close to the Negev Nuclear Research Centre. It appears that Fattah-1/2 (21 March 2026 – Wave 73) and Emad (25 March 2026 – Wave 81) ballistic missiles were used in these impact zones.

Based on images of missile debris reflected in open-source materials, it has been assessed that each Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missile carries 80 warheads, each weighing 18 kilograms. The Khorramshahr-4 (Kheibar) ballistic missile has been identified during both the launch phase and the terminal phase of atmospheric re-entry (5 March 2026, True Promise-4/Wave 19/Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport/Waves 22-23-43-44/Northern and Central Regions of Israel).

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)