T
he war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:
– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years
– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent
– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)
– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities
– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries
However, Iran sought full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, including control of transit fees, international recognition of its right to enrich uranium, a five-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, dilution of uranium enriched to 60 percent instead of handing it over, $270 billion in compensation for damage to critical infrastructure, release of $120 billion in frozen Iranian assets, inclusion of China and Russia in the process as guarantors of the new agreement, and complete lifting of sanctions.
U.S. demands from Iran
The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:
– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years
– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent
– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)
– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities
– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries
Following the talks, US Vice President JD Vance stated that the Iranian delegation appeared more reasonable and flexible than in the past. Yet, he criticized the Iranian side for not acting in a manner willing to reach an agreement or focused on a solution. In response, Foreign Minister Iraqchi, one of the lead Iranian delegation representatives, stated that the US side was greedy and had made unacceptable demands. These statements highlighted that the parties had failed to reach an agreement and that the expected outcome of the talks had not been achieved.
Iran’s losses and survivors
Upon examining the negotiation process in question, it is evident that there is a prevailing consensus among U.S. officials, with no apparent divergence of opinion or division. Although many Americans have criticized the initiation of the war and the management of the process, which has even caused unease within the US military, securing as many concessions as possible from Iran at the negotiating table is clearly seen as a historic opportunity that no one would turn down. However, the situation was far different for Iran, which suffered heavy destruction and losses throughout the war. The most devastating loss was the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the leader who held absolute authority in the country for 37 years.
While serving as Iran’s supreme leader, Khamenei held a position of authority and influence that allowed him to make final decisions on everything from minor issues to long-term strategic planning and policymaking processes. This was thanks to his unifying power over all state institutions and the absolute obedience he commanded. Although he was perceived as open to consultation, he insisted on critical decisions regarding the nuclear and missile programs and policies toward Syria and Iraq. This stance often prevented dissenting voices from emerging across all levels of the administration. The removal of such a powerful and influential leader was bound to create a distinct leadership vacuum in the country. Indeed, events have unfolded in this direction, and it is now clear that this vacuum has led to serious consequences within the administration and on the ground.
Thanks to its multi-layered political and military system, which has been intertwined with religious and ideological beliefs for decades, Iran was able to avert a serious crisis that could have triggered its collapse. The expected collapse did not materialize. However, there are signs of a deadlock in the decision-making process regarding the ongoing ceasefire and negotiations, as well as power struggles and divisions.
The Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters
One of the clearest examples of this is the statement by the Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters, one of the IRGC’s most important centers, that “passages will remain closed as long as the enemy’s hostile attacks continue,” following Iraqchi’s announcement after the first round of talks that limited and authorized passages through the Strait of Hormuz would be permitted. Headlines in Keyhan, a hardline conservative newspaper formerly close to Ali Khamenei, have targeted Muhammad Bakir Galibaf, a member of the negotiation team, and the negotiation efforts. Similar broadcasts by Iranian State Television have criticized Galibaf and the negotiations with the US.
It should be noted that Galibaf is one of the regime’s iconic figures. A former high-ranking commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), he wields significant influence and power in both the military and politics. Although he is associated with conservative figures, Galibaf’s stance and policies can adapt to the conditions of the time. During the war, he survived an environment in which key figures such as Ali Khamenei, Larijani, and Shamkhani were eliminated. By conducting negotiations with a moderate approach, he established a presence on the international stage. His desire and efforts to rise in politics, despite having run for president twice and having a military background, may have also played a role in this process.
Trump’s remarks from the outset that “there are alternative leadership options within the regime” and his statement at the end of the war that “we are in contact with reasonable figures” drew attention to Galibaf. Opposition media in the diaspora claimed that Galibaf was one of these “reasonable figures” from the beginning and even before the war began. Therefore, he was deliberately spared from being targeted.
While it is difficult to assert that these claims are part of a long-term, premeditated plan, Galibaf’s ambition for the top spot is well known throughout his political career. Notably, unlike many other IRGC commanders, he has adopted a more moderate stance following the destruction wrought by the war and the successive removal of high-ranking figures. One could argue that this approach is based on the desire to keep the regime afloat through controlled normalization with the U.S. and secure the top of the power pyramid by outmaneuvering rivals in the emerging new balance of power.”
Opponents within Iran
Considering Galibaf’s position and importance within the system alongside all this, the reasons behind the internal reactions directed at him and the negotiation process he is leading become clear. As opposition to the negotiations grew from government loyalists and within the IRGC ranks, Galibaf felt the need to issue a statement. On April 18, he published a video recording to inform the Iranian public about the war and the negotiation process. In the video, he emphasized the need for a realistic and rational assessment of events. He noted that, although they were the victorious side in the war, they had been unable to eliminate the power of the U.S. and Israel and had suffered serious setbacks.
From Galibaf’s words and the statements of the reformist faction defending his approach, it is clear that keeping the country afloat is a priority. The country has suffered severe military, economic, and infrastructural blows, as well as significant destruction. For this reason, negotiations must not be avoided.
The opposing side, however, views negotiations as squandering the revolution’s gains. This side comprises certain ranks of the IRGCh, a significant portion of the regime supporters who fill the streets every night, and the “Front of the Defenders” led by Saeed Jalili. They argue that they are the victors of the war. Consequently, they argue that negotiations cannot be held with a power that killed their leaders and that the US’s demands must not be met.
Led by Saeed Jalili, who played a significant role in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy processes for many years, particularly during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the anti-negotiation group views the US demands to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and its proxy forces as an attempt to strip them of the power built up over decades at a cost of trillions of dollars. Recalling Ali Khamenei’s lifelong resolute stance of “resisting arrogance and refusing to bow down,” the group argues that this must be continued without compromise.
However, reformists criticize this stance as being detached from the realities on the ground and the complex conditions facing the country. In this context, Javad Zarif’s article, published on April 3 in Foreign Affairs, is notable. Zarif, a former foreign minister and a key figure in the reformist camp, argues for the necessity of returning to negotiations and securing cooperation through lasting peace. The article has generated significant attention within Iran and on the international stage. Zarif’s moderate perspective, which envisions an Iran integrated with the West and the wider world, angered certain conservative, regime-aligned circles so much that they accused him of treason.
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Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr
Another key figure who remains out of the media spotlight but holds a position within the decision-making apparatus and has disagreed with Galibaf is Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, secretary of the National Security Council. A former Revolutionary Guard commander known for his intelligence activities, Zolghadr is recognized as one of the most hardline Revolutionary Guard commanders.
Mojtaba Khamenei appointed Zolghadr, who was cited in opposition media within the diaspora as one of the figures aligned against Galibaf during the negotiation process, alongside IRGC commander Ahmed Vahidi. However, Zolghadr and Vahidi have kept a low profile, not appearing in public due to the risk of assassination by Israel. They have not issued a statement in response to these rumors. Even if they were to issue a statement, they would undoubtedly deny these claims to avoid appearing weak or divided.
As for the opposition in Iran, those seeking the regime’s downfall, as seen in the January protests, oppose any scenario that would preserve the status quo, such as the ongoing negotiation process. However, Trump’s threats to completely destroy Iranian civilization and infrastructure in the final days of the war have instilled fear and deep anxiety in the vast majority of Iranians. Although there have been significant changes in the regime’s upper echelons, most opposition figures believe the old approach to governing persists and do not hold out hope for comprehensive reform.
Consequently, from their perspective, holding negotiations and establishing a lasting peace would not be a success for the Iranian people. Recent statements by Director-General of Public Security Ahmed Rıza Radan, such as “We will hold them accountable” and “We will find those who have sold out their country,” are also interpreted as signals that repression will intensify.
In conclusion, while some may view the assassination of Ali Khamenei as the untangling of a knot within the system, the absence of such a powerful, central leader has created a vacuum. Coupled with the uncertainty surrounding Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership, this has led to confusion, a cacophony of discourse, and a power struggle between the state and its people. Despite visible differences of opinion among state officials, it is possible to observe that they are attempting to project an image of unity by denying the existence of any conflict. This is an attempt to prevent the impression of crisis, conflict, and division.





