The 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 17, 2019 and will continue until the 30th. Following the first day of the high-level General Debate held on Tuesday, the 24th September 2019, some other high-level events have also started to take place in New York.

Without going into much detail of this years’ specific events, it is no doubt valid to elaborate upon the increasing loss of the UN’s global effectiveness and its purpose. As pointed out by some, the UN is losing its already limited global influence, in particular after the U.S. circumvented the global institution in order to conduct its war on Iraq in 2003.

Nevertheless, the gathering of the annual general assembly once again raises the long debated call for a reform of the United Nations Security Council, the UN’s most important organ.

The Security Council is charged with ensuring international peace and security, although this is hindered due to its complicated formation, the disagreements among its members, which consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members, as well as the general lack of willingness particularly by the so-called “great powers” to fulfil their duties in a manner consistent with the demands of the General Assembly.

For approximately twenty-five years, an increasing number of countries such as Germany, Japan, South Africa, Canada, Brazil and Turkey, have insisted on a reform of the Security Council. Several movements were established for this, some called for the expansion of the permanent seats such as the G4 nations of which Germany and Japan are members. While the “Uniting for Consensus” (UfC) movement, of which countries such as Italy, Spain, Argentina and Turkey are members, oppose the call to expand the Security Council with new permanent seats, and instead suggest a principle of rotation for the Council’s membership and a rejection of the “veto” privilege of certain states.

Without a doubt, the permanent members of the UN Security Council are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats.

It is important to highlight the main positions of some countries. Without a doubt, the permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S., France, Russia, China and the United Kingdom, are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats in the Security Council. A privilege they were given due to their victory over the Nazi Germany and Japan in the Second World War.  

While countries such as France have been open to support the Germany’s call to expand the number of permanent seats, a position that Germany seeks for itself, it does not actually seem realistic to expect such a development. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that all of the permanent members act rather in terms of national interest instead prioritizing global security and peace.

If one looks at Germany’s position regarding Security Council reform, one notices an increasing insistence. As a country which was able to become a non-permanent Security Council member seven times—a huge success for a country considered a former “aggressor” prior to 1945— Germany is currently calling for a permanent seat, pointing to its global acceptance and successful economic performance. However, it is rather unlikely that an option for a  permanent seat will become true.

In comparison, Turkey calls for a comprehensive reform regarding the structure of the Security Council, stressing its fundamental statement that “the world is bigger than five”, as President Erdogan once again addressed during his speech at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. As a member of the UfC movement, Turkey’s expectations of a new rotational format within the Security Council without increasing the numbers of permanent members, seems to be more realistic.

The current conditions within the UN demonstrate its gradual and unfortunate loss in its global significance, and it is seen instead as a dialog platform between world leaders. Countries seeking reform of the UN can use occasions such as the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly to make their call for a reform of the UN and specifically the Security Council. By this, closely allied countries such as Germany and Turkey should continue to stress their requests and perspectives on the UN reform, despite basic differences and expectations in how it should be done.

Under the circumstances stated in the first section of this article, where by the international arena is transitioning from a unipolar to multipolar system, the United Nations Organization is condemned to the role of a bystander – a more or less impartial observer of the power struggle among its leading members – and potentially as a forum for the deposition of demands of the powerful and the grievances of the weak, but mainly a forum for international public relations or “public diplomacy” in dialogue with international civil society.

The reasons for this imposed “passivity” are structural. In its present form, the UN Charter cannot serve as blueprint, or organizational framework, for the international rule of law and global peace. The Charter is based on the power balance of a bygone era. The entire system of enforcement of international law embodied in the provisions on collective security, the central piece of the Charter, is built around the privileges of the most powerful countries of 1945, at the expense of all other member states. The over-representation of the Western world – with three out of five permanent seats in the Council – makes this more than evident. It also explains the increasing legitimacy problem of the world organization vis-à-vis the vast majority of member states. Thus, in the present transitory phase, the UN cannot in any way guarantee an “orderly transition” from unipolarity to multipolarity, and for two distinct reasons:

(1) Realistically, the Charter cannot be adapted to the newly emerging realities because this would, according to Article 108, require the consent of the powers of 1945. Frankly, why would countries that lost their global status give up a privilege that represents that very status? This is indeed the “vicious circle” of the veto that was written into the Charter by its founders. Thus, the Security Council architecture – with the institution of permanent membership in its present form – cannot accommodate changes in the power balance, meaning the inclusion of new member states from Africa, Latin America, or the Muslim world. Under these conditions, enlargement of the Security Council is not a realistic option because this would oblige the existing permanent members to share their special privilege with other countries and other regions.

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(2) As regards our initial question about a stable political system, the United Nations cannot be the guarantor of a rule-based global order because it embodies the supremacy of power over law. This is obvious if one reads not only the idealistic phrases of the Preamble, but also the specific procedural rules of the Charter. The fine print of legal texts is often overlooked, which creates false expectations and illusions about the role an organization can actually play. This is particularly so with the UN Charter. The P5 enjoy de facto immunity for their behavior. The prohibition of the unilateral use, or threat of the use, of force (Article 2[4] of the Charter), including wars of aggression, does effectively not apply where the actions of permanent members are concerned, and for two interconnected reasons: (a) Those countries can veto any condemnation or coercive action by the Council against themselves and their allies. (b) According to the wording of Article 27(3) of the Charter, they are not obliged to abstain from voting in cases where they are themselves party to a dispute (e.g. the aggressor). Though the latter provision applies to all members of the Council, in connection with the veto it becomes a veritable tool of “power politics without regrets.” In view of the effective lifting of legal constraints on the use of force by the most powerful actors, one might even say that the UN Charter incentivizes such behavior, allowing the great powers to hide behind lofty principles while actually pursuing a policy of national interests.

The Security Council is not a realistic option because this would oblige the existing permanent members to share their special privilege with other countries and other regions.

Thus, when using its power to defend its dominant position, in whichever region of the globe, a hegemonial power, together with its allies, does not need to address any concerns about the legitimacy of its actions. Under UN rules, it cannot be condemned – or reigned in – under any circumstances whatsoever. Unhindered by legal constraints, such a country will indeed feel encouraged to pursue an agenda of power politics whenever its interests so dictate. This is nothing new, however. Since the colonial era, the great powers have acted according to the maxim of divide and impera (divide and rule). This has been particularly obvious in the policies concerning Palestine since the period of the British Mandate, but also concerning the Kurdish issue –­ whether secret or open – since the 1970s, or, more recently, in the positions taken concerning the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. To a considerable extent, those upheavals were triggered by the United States’ illegal military intervention in Iraq in 2003.

Since the colonial era, the great powers have acted according to the maxim of divide and impera (divide and rule). This has been particularly obvious in the policies concerning Palestine since the period of the British Mandate, but also concerning the Kurdish issue –­ whether secret or open – since the 1970s, or, more recently, in the positions taken concerning the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

Under these geopolitical circumstances, the only chance for the United Nations to regain its relevance – after the stalled reform efforts of the 1990s, shortly after the end of the Cold War – would be a development not primarily at the level of norms and procedures, but in the world of realpolitik. Only a change in the global power constellation towards a genuine multipolar order will enable emerging powers on all continents to convince the current hegemon – and also the existing P5 – that the political and economic price for insisting on a perpetuation of their statutory privileges in the UN will ultimately be too high, and that consent to a reform of decision-making rules will better serve their national interests in the long term. Normative declarations or appeals before a change in the power constellation will only have a marginal effect.

In the meantime, the risk of a collapse of the existing fragile order, indeed a system of unenforceable rules, is real – with all that this entails for zones of geopolitical tension where the assertion of power by a defensive hegemon may exacerbate conflicts and trigger a wider confrontation on a global scale, condemning the United Nations Organization to the role of a mere bystander.

In the public realm, order, as condition of peace, requires the rule of law, a set of norms the enforcement of which is guaranteed – domestically – by the authority of the state with its monopoly of force (as defined by Max Weber) and on the basis of a separation of powers. If this system collapses, one may speak of a “failed state,” a situation of anarchy, or lawlessness, where everyone is at the mercy of the other and the law of force has replaced the force of law.

No such system of order exists yet internationally, in relations between sovereign states. This has been true for the post-World War I era of the League of Nations as well as for the post-World War II period of the United Nations Organization. Internationally, the rule of law means a universal and consistent system of norms regulating relations between states, but also determining domestic state behavior in regard to treaty obligations. Those legal norms, agreed-upon among UN member states, exist. However, the United Nations Charter does not provide the adequate organizational framework for their implementation. We shall explain in more detail why this is the case.

The United Nations Charter does not provide the adequate organizational framework for their implementation.

In the absence of efficient mechanisms of enforcement, what has, all through history, guaranteed order in relations between states is a balance of power between the most influential actors. This means interaction between states on the basis of the pursuit of mutually accepted self-interest. The solemn proclamations of Purposes and Principles in the UN Charter notwithstanding, the pursuit of national interests on the basis of mutuality has been the maxim of realpolitik also in the framework of the United Nations. In terms of military power, this has meant “mutual deterrence,” which implies the fear of disadvantage (in the extreme case, destruction of the state) in the case of hostile action against another state.

In the period of the Cold War, this particularly related to the nuclear capacity of the two superpowers. More than the norms of international law, it may have been the fear of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD) that preserved peace at the global level. As disillusioning as this may be: as long as legal principles and rules – such as the prohibition of the use of force – cannot be universally and consistently enforced, the mechanisms of realpolitik, as expressed in the interest-based concept of deterrence, are the only efficient precautions against all-out war – and, thus, also for a stable, though precarious, world order.

In the era after World War II, the victorious powers agreed to organize international relations in the spirit of equal cooperation among themselves – and themselves alone.

In the era after World War II, the victorious powers agreed to organize international relations in the spirit of equal cooperation among themselves – and themselves alone. This is the reason for the special privileges of the P5, the five permanent members on the Security Council (United States, Soviet Union [now Russia], China, United Kingdom, France). In the initial phase, this meant that an, albeit fragile, balance of power among those states guaranteed world order. Those five countries – the sponsoring governments of the UN (except France) – saw themselves as the enforcers of the rule of law and, thus, international peace, while effectively putting themselves above the law by means of their veto right (enshrined in Article 27[3] of the UN Charter).

Within a few years after the organization’s founding, the multipolar constellation among the P5 evolved towards a bipolar struggle between the then two nuclear powers, the USA and the Soviet Union (USSR) (the latter having acquired nuclear capacity in 1949). As a result of this development, the United Nations was effectively sidelined – indeed marginalized – and became the stage for the global power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of the mutual blockage due to the US and Soviet veto, the Security Council was paralyzed. What prevented World War III was indeed deterrence, i. e. each antagonist’s interest in self-preservation. This was the era of proxy wars along the fault lines of the East-West Conflict – in its direct geographical and wider ideological and geopolitical meaning. The rivalry triggered catastrophic domestic and regional conflicts such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, but did not result in a direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

What prevented World War III was indeed deterrence, i. e. each antagonist’s interest in self-preservation. This was the era of proxy wars along the fault lines of the East-West Conflict.

The collapse of the Soviet empire after 1989, with the demise of the USSR in 1991, made – for around two decades – the United States the sole hegemon. The end of bipolarity indeed signaled the collapse of the balance of power at the global level. In the resulting unipolar constellation, there existed no checks and balances restraining the behavior of the most powerful global actor – neither those ensured by legal mechanisms and procedures of the UN nor those resulting from the counterweight of other sovereign states. As a consequence, the international community had to cope with the arrogant assertion of interests by the only remaining superpower.

All through history, hegemons have tried to “eternalize” their privileged position. The United States has pursued such an agenda through unilateral uses of force, which it could carry out without fear of the law and without worrying about repercussions in terms of realpolitik. The wars of aggression since the late 1990s, with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as the most striking example, are clear evidence of this.

In a short period after 1990, the only superpower was able to use the Security Council for its own strategic purposes. The loss of the power balance among the P5, around which the world organization was originally built, made this possible. The resolutions that preceded the Gulf War of 1991 are the most obvious example. However, the much-praised unanimity among the permanent members was not only short-lived, but an illusion from the outset. It did not reflect an alliance by conviction, but it was due to their military, economic and political weakness at the time that neither Russia nor China raised objections in the Council. The strategic imbalance was also obvious in another respect. While, in the case of the war against Iraq in 1991, the justification was multilateral (by means of Council resolutions), the action, i.e. the implementation of the resolutions, was effectively unilateral, solely determined by the United States and her allies.

Although later, after the Kosovo war of 1999, the consent of the two non-Western permanent members was not as easy to obtain as in the initial decade after the end of the Cold War, the continuing unipolar constellation made the predicament of the UN even worse. Not anymore counting on the endorsement of its actions by the Council, the most powerful member state felt no need even for a semblance of legality in its unilateral use of force against Iraq in 2003.

Illegal “humanitarian” interventions, carried out in the name of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, had profoundly negative results on the international order in several major respects:

1. They triggered a process of destabilization in major global regions, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa. The resulting political vacuum in countries such as Iraq and Libya was quickly filled by groups acting in the name of a so-called “Islamic State,” and the chain of destabilizing events – leading to widespread state failure in the Middle East – has now even reached the gates of Europe, with the refugee crisis threatening political stability in core countries of the European Union and endangering the cohesion of the Union itself.
2. The lawlessness of the dominant country and its allies in their international behavior has brought about a deep demoralization and disillusionment about the policy of double standards within the global community. Why should a state respect the rules if what ultimately counts is overwhelming power?
3. An unintended consequence (under the perspective of the dominant power) has been the increasing resistance against this hegemonial agenda in geopolitically sensitive regions. The leading power is more and more confronted with the effects of “imperial overstretch” (to use the words of Paul Kennedy), which unavoidably means an ever more unstable global order. Even the late Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most influential geopolitical strategists of the United States, began to address the need for a “global realignment” that would require a redefinition of the role of the United States as strategic partner of China and Russia.
4. All of these developments contributed, at different levels, to the gradual development of a new multipolar balance of power, with China – because of its enormous economic weight – as one of the main challengers of US hegemony. New regional groupings of states (such as the African Union, the Eurasian Union or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and global forums (such as BRICS or the G-20) may become the cornerstones of this emerging global architecture.

The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity will bring a prolonged period of instability and regional proxy wars, with the threat of a major global confrontation. The risk of a collapse of world order cannot be entirely excluded as long as the rules-based system of international relations, represented by the United Nations, is not functioning efficiently and international politics is essentially based on the pursuit of national interests, not on international law. If, in this transitory phase, the fate of the world is indeed left to an unrestrained power struggle between sovereign states (regionally as well as globally), the so-called “Thucydides trap” is not an improbable scenario. Comparing the present constellation between the United States and China to the rivalry between Athens and Sparta that led to the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), Graham Allison, in his new book “Destined for War,” has convincingly explained that fear of an emerging competitor may cause the dominant power to resort to war to preserve its supremacy.