Following the eruption of the Syrian uprising, the Assad regime has not hesitated to use any tactics to crack down on the uprising and reinstall its iron fist over Syrian territory. Using chemical weapons and barrel bombs are just among the many inhumane measures that the Assad regime has used.

However, despite all of its brutal methods, the Syrian regime was unable to maintain its control over Syrian territory. Since the first year of the crisis, the opposition forces have started to control different areas of Syria where it established its modus operandi of governing, and challenging the regime’s claims of sovereignty.

The Syrian control map has been changing dramatically. The expansion of the Syrian opposition territorial control reached its peak in mid-2013. However, the rise of Daesh at the expense of the opposition, and its loss of territorial control to the U.S.-backed PYD/SDF has marginalized the opposition, forced and limited its territorial control to non-connected separated pockets.

Yet, the Russian intervention at the end of September 2015, which radically changed the balance of power, and led to the Assad regime being able to re-stand on its feet. Backed by Russian Air Forces and associated by Iran’s paramilitary groups on the ground, the Assad regime started to choke the opposition’s controlled pockets, and apply its policy of forced migration. 

Encircle, starve and migrate

The Syrian regime has used forced displacement as a method to crack down on rebelled areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control since the first year of the uprising, as in the case of the Bab Amr district of Homs in February 2012. This method was accelerated and applied in several areas after the regime gained an upper hand with Russian intervention.

‘Encircle–starve–migrate’ was the tactic that Assad regime and its allies started to apply against the opposition-controlled pockets. Benefiting from Russian and Iranian support, and misusing the announced ceasefire and de-escalation agreements, the Syrian regime has accelerated its offensive campaigns.  

Dealing with each opposition pocket separately, the regime forces started to apply its tactics by encircling the pocket, starving its inhabitants, and displace the people who reject the regime’s rule – via what the regime and its allies preferred to call ‘reconciliation agreements.’ However, the ‘reconciliation agreements’ were nothing more than forced evacuation agreements, which came after long sieges and bombardment.   

‘Encircle-starve-migrate’ is the tactic being deployed by the Assad regime in order to crack down on rebel areas and to ensure the maintenance of its control. 

The evacuation agreements have enabled the Assad government to reclaim its sovereignty, but also to interfere in the demographic composition of the evacuated regions. The evacuation agreements of the towns of Madaya and al Zabadani in April, Darayya in August, Muaddamiye in September (in Western Ghouta), and East Aleppo in December 2016, evacuation agreement of Duma in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018, evacuation of northern Homs opposition pocket in May 2018, and Daraa pocket in July 2018, have all concluded with the forced evacuation of hundreds of thousands of Syrian people. Idlib was the final destination for the evacuated people, while Afrin and Euphrates Shield Operations have received a proportion of the displaced people, mainly in the latest waves.      

What is more important, is that the Assad regime seems to have taken measures to render permanent these coerced demographic changes instituted in various districts and even entire cities, and is set to accelerate these changes in the reconstruction phase of these areas. Among the most significant of these measures is the expropriation of former residents’ rights to their property, which would be transferred to Iran-backed pro-regime militants and their families.

Law No. 10 of 2018: Legalization of demographic engineering

The signing of law no. 10 of 2018 on April 2, 2018, represented a serious step by the Assad regime to ‘legalize’ the unlawful ‘de facto’ displacement. It is expected that this legislation will facilitate the legalization of demographic changes instigated by forced migration and deportation. The law, which has been voted on and signed into the Syrian legal code by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, authorizes the formation of new administrative units, in accordance to general administrative regulations. The measure in question will codify de facto demographic shifts by allowing for the reestablishment of administrative institutions in areas where residents had been compelled to abandon their homes due to armed clashes or forced migration, as it made it more difficult for former residents to retain their rights on their property, and enables those who have seized such property to register these properties under their own ownership. As such, this formerly unlawful action currently underway is now in the process of becoming legal.

As mentioned above, the latest legislation, which builds on the prior law no:66 of 2012, allows for the confiscation of property rights of lawful residents of areas having underwent forced expulsion and migration, by authorizing the establishment of new institutions in existing administrative units. The new law dictates that former residents must apply to these nascent institutions in order to acquire documents proving their ownership of their property within the first 30 days after the institutions’ establishment. While the law’s second clause of its second article, allows for the use of deputation of family members or other representatives by property owners in their application to the related institutions, it is foreseeable that evacuees will not easily be able to utilize this right. This is due to the fact that state institutions tend to be inactive in these areas of concern, as well as that it is usually entire families at a time that are expelled from their homes and towns, making options for potential representatives quite limited, if at all existent. In any case, it is not likely that those who have taken refuge abroad or in opposition-held territory to return to their former homes for fear of arrest, torture, and revenge, until these risks are eliminated.

Law No 10 of 2018, passed by the Parliament and al Assad respectively, attempts to legalize the unlawful de facto displacement of Syrian people.

The new law can also be interpreted to allow for incoming occupants of evacuees’ homes to claim ownership of these properties, based on the sixth clause of the second article, which permits the application for ownership based purely on a claimant’s word in the absence of documentation. The legislation is worded as such: ‘In the absence of documentation authenticating the claimant’s property ownership, the applicant must […] specify the location, perimeter, shareholders, and type of property for which they are applying.’ As can be seen here, the law’s phrasing is quite ambiguous and can be utilized by regime allies to claim ownership over property which is not claimed within the specified timeframe, or over property created by new administrative structures.

Following this new legislation, the Ministry of Local Government announced that it would be working on the necessary arrangements for the revision of administrative structures both in Homs and East of the capital. It has also been announced that these arrangements would apply to the Bab Amr district which had been evacuated in 2012 after its siege by regime allies, as well as the eastern entrance of Damascus and especially the Harasta District near Eastern Ghouta, which had been evacuated of most of its residents during the past weeks.

Another issue raising concern of evacuated real estate being distributed among regime allies is the statement that either official identification cards or passports must be presented during the process of claiming properties in newly formed administrative units, as is stipulated in clause 19 of the second article. The basis for this concern is the fact that the Damascus Directorate of Migration and Passports has recently distributed 200.000 Syrian passports to foreign militants transferred to the country by Iran. It is believed that these passports will be assigned to Iranian, Afghan, and even Iraqi Shiite militants and their families, thus giving them permanent residency in the country.

Long-term impact

The Syrian regime seems to continue its strategy of forced migration to win the battle on the ground and he would apply it in Idlib as well. Hence, while the Idlib region, which has remained as the latest pocket in the hand of the opposition, may represent a puzzle for international actors, it is not for the Syrian regime. Being the last destination for hundred thousands of displaced people, and the refuge of almost four millions Syrian would not prevent the Syrian regime from applying its strategy of scorched earth that generated new waves of displaced people. The ongoing offensive by the regime forces in southern Idlib has forced almost 150 thousand people to flee their hometowns towards the Turkish borders in its early days, generating the possibilities of new refugee waves.      

It is impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without the efforts of the young generations of well-educated and professional Syrian refugees.

The Syrian regime strategy of legalizing its unlawful measures will impact the future of Syria. Those forced to leave their homes in Syria either to the Idlib region, which would end as a temporary shelter, or to other countries, represent a remarkable proportion of the Syria Arab Sunni population. Taking into consideration that there will be limited proportion of returnees under current conditions, the exclusion of the displaced people from the Syrian population will recreate the Syrian social fabric, and thus have strategic impact.  

On the other hand, those who fled Syria to other countries represent the vast majority of the young generation, educated and professional class, as well as the main businessmen community of the Syrian society. Hence, it will be impossible for the Syrian state in the long-term to re-stand on its feet without their efforts.     

In June, 2015, I came across two Syrians in Şanlıurfa’s Akçakale district who were contemplating the Syrian border facing Tell Abyad with hopeless eyes. A black smoke remaining from the U.S. bombardment wreathed the town, which was covered with yellow dust as far as the eye could reach. Having received a substantial amount of military aid from the U.S., the terror group PKK and its Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) were advancing towards Daesh deployments in Tell Abyad thanks to the generous help of the American jets. However; that war, which was almost visible to the naked eye, was not similar to the wars on the other fronts of Syria. Daesh was leaving the areas it occupied without hardly any resistance and heading towards Raqqa, the city the terror group used as its Syrian headquarters at the time. Daesh militants looked as if they were willfully handing over Tell Abyad to the PYD.

The PYD’s attempt to carry out a demographic massacre in north Syria came to light with this war. In Tell Abyad, the PKK blatantly displaced the locals from the land they had been living on for centuries, which eventually started to be vocally expressed and recorded in various international reports. However, nothing was done to stop this crime against humanity. Of course, the PKK and the PYD’s displacement policy did not begin in Tell Abyad. The organization, which started organizing and collecting a base under the name of “Apocular” in eastern and southeastern Turkey during the 1970s, initially kicked off a sweeping process of destruction against religious functionaries along with the members of various Kurdish organizations such as the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (DDKO), Kawa and Rizgari. Becoming the only dominant organization in the region through this method, the PKK implemented the exact same method 40 years later in Syria.

The Baath regime, which got into trouble with its armed opponents in Syria in 2011, made an agreement with the PKK leadership in Mount Qandil and assigned the security to the PKK militants in many regions, including Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). In return for this generosity of the Assad regime, the PKK took over the role of silencing the opponents of the regime in these areas. On June 27, 2013, the PKK militants launched a fusillade attack on a group of Kurdish civilians who were protesting against the regime in Amuda district. Five civilians, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the incident. The terror group’s attacks on dissident Kurds continued. Several leaders including Mashaal Tammo, Abdullah Bedro and Sherzad Rashid were assassinated by the PYD militants. With these methods, the PYD built an empire of fear in north Syria and consolidated its power. No one was able to raise their voice against the organization. The terror group’s next step was displacing the Kurds who were not supporting the PKK. With compulsory military service, detentions, arrests, arbitrary fines and heavy taxes, the Kurds not adhering to the PYD and the PKK were displaced. Tens of thousands of Syrians were forced to leave Afrin, Qamishli, Amuda, Ayn al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The legitimacy guise tailored for the PYD

After eliminating the potential problems, the PYD focused on its efforts to form a state in these areas. During the first weeks of 2014, the PKK declared three cantons in north Syria named Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Nine months later, Daesh took action to capture Kobani. A legitimacy guise was tailored for the PYD during the Daesh-PYD war with the contributions of the international press. Daesh’s attack on Kobani became the top topic on the international agenda whereas foreign correspondents paid visits to Kobani to market the terror group. So, the PYD militants were declared “heroes who defended their people against barbaric Daesh militants.” During this period, many countries offered considerable military support to the PYD. From then on, Washington became the PYD’s boss instead of Damascus. The U.S. authorities firstly helped the establishment of an operational group named Euphrates Volcano by uniting the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) with several minor armed groups. Soon after, the group was renamed as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After Kobani was “liberated”, many trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were sent to the SDF, in which the YPG operatives formed the backbone whilst the PKK commanded all the decision mechanisms. The aids were coordinated from a U.S. base established in Rimelan district. The YPG militants, who were endeavoring to secure a few checkpoints with ineffective weapons until that point, were being transformed into a regular army.

The next target after Kobani was Tell Abyad, which was occupied by Daesh at the time. Following a low-intensity conflict that lasted a few days, Daesh abandoned Tell Abyad. But the nightmare was not over for the locals. Having lived under the oppression of Daesh for more than two years, the locals of Tell Abyad were forced to leave their villages after the district was captured from Daesh.

On June 23, 2015, a source of mine whose family lives in Tell Abyad sent this text message to me:

“The PKK members gathered families in a school in Hammam Turkmen and threatened them saying ‘This place has become a military zone, so leave the village. If you don’t leave, we will make American jets bomb your houses by giving your coordinates as Daesh targets.’ Some families are now leaving the village out of fear.”

To research this incident, I made a few more contacts and after verifying it published the story in a national newspaper. The neighborhoods of the locals who refused to leave their homes were shelled the next day, upon which they had to be abandoned and most of the victims are currently living in refugee camps. Following this event many people brought this issue to the agenda. As someone bearing witness to this atrocity, I can safely say that the PKK/PYD and the U.S. connived on this crime against humanity in Tell Abyad. In Hammam Turkmen neighborhood, where the closest Daesh positions were 30 kilometers away at the time, 20.000 Syrian Turkmens were displaced in this manner.

The PYD has changed the demographics of Syria

Afterwards, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were forcibly displaced from the towns of Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, which were occupied by the PKK/PYD with the support of U.S. air forces. All of this happened before the eyes of the U.S. The terror group, seeking to consolidate its territorial power in Syria, used many methods to change the demographic structure of the country. Hundreds of Arabs were imprisoned and tortured after being accused of Daesh membership. Those who raised livestock had their cattle seized. Those who owned farmlands had their farms burned. People who did not want to leave had their children forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines. Most of the people who lived in these areas had to leave to escape such treatment.

The city of Tell Rifaat, belonging to the district of Azaz just south of the Turkish border, is one of the places where PYD/PKK’s strategy of forced displacement has been employed to its greatest extent. PYD/PKK surrounded Tell Rifaat, which lies along the Azaz-Aleppo road, in 2016 and subsequently started shelling civilian settlements in the region. The rebels in Tell Rifaat, seeing no other way out of this situation, had to hand over the region to the PYD to save the lives of the civilians living there. However, despite being spared death, they were not spared exile. The PYD forced 250.000 civilians to leave this region by employing the methods described. Tell Rifaat, once one of the largest settlements in the area, is now a ghost town.

The PKK turned the Daesh attack on Iraq/Sinjar, just like the one on Kobani, into propaganda, and used it to dominate the Yazidi population. The PYD began conscripting Yazidis once the attack was repelled even though during the Daesh attack on Sinjar it did not take a position that would change the course of the battle. The PKK, which had previously created a division called YPJ (Yekineyen Parastina Jin/Women’s Defense Units), created a division consisting solely of Yazidis called YPŞ (Yekineyen Parastina Şengal/Sinjar Resistance Units). Many young Yazidis were transported to Syria over the Rabia border crossing and given mandatory military training by the PKK in the organization’s military camp in Qamishli. Syrian Yazidis were also brought to this camp. After receiving a short military training, some Iraqi Yazidis were sent back to Sinjar while others were sent to Syrian front-lines.

Undoubtedly, the crimes and the demographic massacre of the PKK and the PYD are not limited by these actions. Some local councils founded by Syrian rebels are keeping records of some of the exiled Syrians. But these records are very limited. No credible number exists on how many people have been forcibly displaced from their homes so far. According to current records, the number of Syrians exiled from towns such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Qamishli, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Shaddadah, Rmelan, Al-Qahtaniyah, Al-Hasakah, Tell Brak and Tabqa exceeds two million. Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from these policies. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.