Turkey is currently under a severe financial attack. It is quite apparent that Turkey’s macroeconomic indicators are quite healthy, and it is not possible to explain the current situation “economically”.

Attracting foreign investors relies on two main factors: the country’s economic vitality and debt ratio. Naturally, investors want to invest in countries in which they can profit handsomely. At this point, economic vitality comes into play. A country with a high growth rate has a significant potential in terms of investments as it offers high profits for firms. On the other hand, investors expect the country they are lending money to have the capacity to pay off her debts. In this respect, if a country’s debt ratio rises, its capacity to pay off her debts will decline, causing investors to withdraw their investments.

We see that Turkey has a good performance in both of these aspects. First, Turkish long-term annual economic growth rate averages out 4.8%. Moreover, despite the July 15 coup attempt in 2016, the Turkish economy grew 7.4% in the following year, showing an impressive performance and clearly demonstrating her resilience. Hence, Turkish economy is quite vital and naturally attracts investors.

Second, Turkish public debt-to-GDP ratio is around 28.5%, which places Turkey among countries with the least debt load and this ratio is much higher for most of the countries in the world. For example, France’s ratio is 97% while the U.S. and Japan hover around 105% and 253% respectively. On the other hand, Turkey’s budget deficit-to-GDP ratio is approximately 1.5%, despite being in an election year. This ratio is significantly lower than the Maastricht criterion, which is 3%. The same ratio is 2.8% for France and 2.9% for the U.K.

Lastly, Turkish external debt-to-GDP ratio is 53%. When compared to other countries such as Germany (141%), Spain (167%) and France (213%), it becomes apparent that Turkey has a very low level of external debt-to-GDP ratio.

On the other hand, like all economies, the Turkish economy has its own problems. The biggest problem for Turkey for the last two decades is her relatively high current account deficits. However, Turkey has learnt to live with this problem as she has tried to overcome it. Moreover, Turkey’s current account deficit is considerably lower right now than previous years.

When all of these factors taken into consideration, it is clear that the steep rise in the TL/Dollar exchange rate does not have an economic explanation. Not to mention that the abrupt increase in the exchange rate would require an “equally abrupt” economic cause. We know that there is none. So we are left with politics. The only viable and “abrupt” explanation left is the “surprise” snap elections, which will be held on June 24.

So, how should Turkey respond to this severe financial attack? First, it is wrong to see policy interest rate as almost the sole monetary policy tool, as assumed widely now.  The Argentinian experience is illuminating in this respect. After Argentine Peso lost 15% of her value last month while inflation was around 25%, the Central Bank of Argentina altered the interest rate three times within a week, increasing it from 27.25% to 40%. So, what happened in the end? Argentine Peso lost another 15% of its value.

The Turkish Central Bank (TCMB) increased the de facto interest rate by 300 base points, from 13.5% to 16.5%, on May 23 in order to address the financial attack, resulting in a further tightening in monetary policy and making Turkey an outlier among emerging countries in terms of real interest rate. After the steep rate hike, TL/Dollar exchange rate decreased from 4.80s to 4.40s gradually, only to increase 4.60s again swiftly with no apparent “economic” reason.

To address this “mindless” financial attack, respective ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy, along with the TCMB should establish communication channels with citizens and try to relieve their concerns. On the other hand, both the government and TCMB ought to establish good relations with financial circles that are only economically-motivated. Achieving these, Turkey will be able to weather these financial attacks. At this point, Turkey has an important leverage: the current level of the TL/Dollar exchange rate renders Turkey a tremendously attractive country for investment.

Lastly, it should be noted that TL/Dollar exchange rate will sooner or later return to normal levels, particularly after the snap elections. The Turkish state and the TCMB’s strong communications with both Turkish citizens and financial circles that are “economically motivated” would ease up this process.

The Turkish economy grew by 7.4 percent in 2017, ahead of China and India, ranking first among the G-20 countries. However, there are some concerns within and outside of Turkey regarding whether the Turkish economy has been overheating or, quite the reverse, whether an economic recession is imminent. These concerns are mostly unsubstantiated.

First, a 7.4 percent of economic growth rate is not too high to justify the overheating thesis, particularly when compared to the long-term average economic growth rate of Turkey (4.7 percent). Moreover, one can argue that the one-quarter slowdown of the Turkish economy in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup attempt has been compensated by the above-average economic performance in the following year.

Second, given the current economic outlook of Turkey, the suggestion of an economic recession could be much more of wishful thinking or scare mongering rather than an informed prediction about the economy. That said, the Turkish economy has its own weaknesses (as well as strengths) as do other economies. Talking about existing economic weaknesses – such as the relatively high current account deficit – as a possible cause of an imminent economic recession, therefore, is not satisfactory at all and lacks a coherent internal logic: Why now? Given that Turkey has had a relatively high current account deficit for the last two decades, she has experienced no economic crisis, apart from the global financial crisis, which emanated from outside and which Turkey recovered more than completely and did so very fast.

There is no perfect economy in the world and no country needs a seamlessly-working economy to avoid a recession or a crisis. What is needed is a relatively healthy economy and the current economic outlook of Turkey does not show any significant sign of unhealthiness. Actually, quite the opposite: The Turkish economy showed its resilience time and again after 2001 and the economic performance of Turkey in that period is quite good, particularly given the global economic situation in the last decade and the continuing hangover of the 2008-09 global financial crisis for a quite number of countries. Actually, given what Turkey has gone through since 2013 in the political sphere, one can easily conclude that the Turkish economy has performed above standards. Therefore, one needs a very good explanation as to why Turkey should fall into a recession in order to be credible.

Another factor concerning some regarding the Turkish economy is the devaluation of the Turkish Lira against the U.S. Dollar and Euro. Between November 2016 and November 2017, the Turkish economy suffered three distinct financial attacks, which resulted in an elevated volatility in the financial markets and rise in the inflation rate to an extent, besides devaluation. While these factors certainly made a dent in the Turkish economy, their scope was quite limited by nature. Volatility and inflation rates can increase just once after a financial attack and these variables return to their normal levels after a while. The marginal efficacy of financial attacks decreases to a great extent with each additional attack.

Some argue that the devalued Turkish Lira could be a real headache for the Turkish economy in the near future. While there are certainly some downsides of a devalued currency both in the short and long run, there are also important upsides. In addition, given that Turkish banks and firms are in a good shape in terms of their foreign exchange position, thanks to a solid financial infrastructure in Turkey, the downsides of the devaluation of the Turkish Lira is quite limited.

Moreover, a developing country such as Turkey needs not an over-valued currency but certainly an undervalued currency. It should be noted that the Turkish Lira had been tremendously overvalued against the Dollar and Euro in the 2000s up until a couple of years ago thanks to the abundant global liquidity and tight monetary policy in Turkey. Only with the dwindling of global liquidity to a certain extent and with – paradoxically – the aforementioned financial attacks, the Turkish Lira has returned a much more balanced level against the Dollar and Euro. Therefore, there is no reason to be afraid of “normalcy.” Actually, it is the overvalued currency a developing country should be avoiding.

All in all, taking Turkey’s economic history and performance as a guide, with all her weaknesses, the prospects of the Turkish economy are relatively high.