Even Daesh, which is known to be skillful in employing media and technology, is almost nothing when compared to the Gülenist Organization. While the Gülenist media conducted the usual media business on one side, they were working for the elimination of figures or organizations, which are critical of them or may disrupt their short-term, midterm or long-term targets. A short time after the news on the media, the Gülenists within the security forces and the judiciary were starting to operate and make comments on the issue which enforced the ideas been propagated by their own media outlets.

Thousands of Gülenists were able to fill posts in the judiciary, security forces and bureaucracy; sometimes they openly said they were Gülenists, sometimes they just assumed other identities, concealing their own identities: leftist, extreme leftist, right-wing, agnostic, deist, laic or Islamist, etc. This is also true for their members within the ranks of the media and the academia. To camouflage their identities like a chameleon until the time is right is the characteristic of this organization, which differentiates it from the other terrorist organizations.

It was recently revealed that they were also stealing the answers to various exams, including the military, civil service and university entrance exams. It should be expressed that these people, Gülenists, weren’t just waiting for the answers to the exams; they were also hard-working and diligent. In politics, they infiltrated not only the ruling party, but they have infiltrated almost all existing political, social and religious movements, including many NGOs.

Not all of the Gülenists have been found and put to trial yet, as it is an organization, which has been active for 40 years. The majority of the people of Turkey had at least an acquaintance, neighbor, colleague or even family member which was linked with this organization. This is another characteristic of the organization; none of the members of other secret organizations could have such day-to-day interaction with the people. Moreover, none of the other organizations’ members could look so ordinary to the surprise of the people.

The leadership of this terrorist organization, which resembles modern Western sects like the Moon or Scientology is also different from the leaders of all existing terrorist organizations. You can’t see any PKK or Daesh leaders speaking from different points of view on a singular subject, as if they have numerous different personalities. Gülen, on the other hand, can act as if he is a great humanitarian, the leader of a violent terrorist organization, a slanderer or just an ordinary person. He doesn’t even speak to his followers in a singular voice. It isn’t possible to cover each and every example; however, there was a speech of his to his followers that was uncovered recently:

“If I am to bring harm to Hizmet [“Service” – what the organization calls itself] and my annihilation is a way to protect my institutions, I’m ready to sacrifice my life. Even if it is a cardinal sin, I’m ready to face it. Considering this, you may think about what I’m further willing to do. (…) God willing, we’re ready to face every challenge for the Service. If such sacrifice is necessary, we will let the flames consume us. If we are talking about this issue extensively, all of our friends out there should also do so.”

In short, Gülen is saying commit suicide instead of endangering the organization, even if it means going to hell. Expressing this idea in longer sentences is not a coincidence; it is a method, of course. Looking at these speeches as a whole, it is easy to realize that he is trying to show that everything he says is consistent, while, in fact, it is contradictory.

It took a long time for Turkey to recognize and understand the threat of this organization,  which was thought to be comprised of friendly and charitable people. Even after the realization of the threat they pose, if the state could have made a propaganda film out of the events transpired on the night of July 15, get on to a time machine and show it on the night of July 14, one still would have had a hard time believing that the Gülenist Organization could be that brutal or bloodthirsty.

Moreover, if one had seen putschists firing on the elderly, who begged the putschists to give up their guns and stop this madness, in this hypothetical movie, one would have still said that the Gülenists were being demonized. However, all of this was not in a film; there never was a film. It was the cold harsh reality. The Parliament was bombed, the Chief of Staff was held hostage, and National Intelligence Organization was strafed by helicopter gunships. More than 2,000 people were wounded. All of the people in Turkey felt that this was more of an invasion than a coup. Even today, this harsh reality seems as unreal as a science-fiction film. As it was covered by foreign media outlets, not only do the supporters of the government believe that the coup was perpetrated by this organization; even the government’s fiercest critics are of the same mind with the government in this matter.

Who killed Karlov, the Russian Federation’s ambassador to Ankara? According to the initial findings, there are many signs, ranging from the schools the shooter went to, to his contacts, which suggest that he is a Gülenist. On the other hand, it isn’t a secret that Gülen had established his game with external parameters through his schools all around the world. His ambition and attempts to shape Turkish foreign policy aren’t also a secret anymore. Two years ago, the organization commenced an operation with its infiltrators within the security forces and the judiciary, accusing the government of being corrupt, which actually targeted Turkey’s relations with Iran and the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq. While the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials targeting the military allowed the organization to open space for their own members, it also eliminated military personnel, which argued that Turkey should prioritize the Russia-China axis. The “demonic Iran” propaganda, which was being propagated by the organization’s supporters, has also been deciphered, as the relations between the US and Iran entered a new phase. Now that the US is opening up to Iran, Gülenists aren’t even mentioning Iran anymore, even while talking about Syria.

Suspecting that the assassin was a Gülenist right from the beginning isn’t without reason. No one would be surprised if he were a Gülenist masquerading as an Al-Nusra militant. Turkey knows very well that Gülenists are like chameleons, always masquerading. This was experienced by everyone ranging from highest-ranking bureaucrats to the ordinary people, in every part of life, from ordinary events to foreign policy.

At this point, two important processes in Syria can be mentioned. The first is the mutual understanding on the evacuation of civilians from Aleppo between Turkey and Russia. Despite Iran’s and the regime’s interventions, Turkey and Russia are both putting forward a will to ensure that the understanding on evacuation continues. In fact, these evacuations are a point where the [Syrian] regime and Iran and Russia diverge politically. The guarantor of the mutual understanding being applied are Turkey and Russia, and the tension in relations between these two countries can bring an end to this understanding on evacuation. The second process is the talks that are to be held in Astana on Syria. Both the Turkey-Russia-Iran meeting and the new period that is being attempted to begin at Astana carry great importance in terms of the political solution of the Syrian crisis. This process also signifies a limitation of the American initiative on the Syria crisis. For this reason, this assassination, carried out at such a critical juncture, also has the aim of disrupting the meetings on Syria.

2. What can be said about the perpetrator?

The murderer is Mevlut Mert Altintas, employed in the Ankara Riot Police as a police officer. Altintas snuck into the building pretending to be among the ambassador’s personal guard and took place directly behind the ambassador while the latter was giving his speech. After shooting the ambassador, the murderer shouted slogans in Arabic and Turkish and made references to Aleppo. It is observed that the Arabic slogans were memorized in order to give the attack the appearance of being carried out by al-Qaeda or DAESH. It is not possible for these groups to have infiltrated and burrowed into the police department, let alone the fact that neither group would accept a position such as being a police officer per their own doctrines. It is also not possible for such an organized and well-planned attack to be done by a lone wolf.

There are strong traces of FETO in the murderer’s past. One of these is his employment in the Police, which was among the central institutes within the FETO structure. Even after the dismissals from duty and layoffs after July 15th, it was assumed that there remained FETO members within law enforcement. Holding on to the key, important positions in the Police for many years, FETO placed its members through certain promotions within the ranks of the agency. One of these is also the school from which the murderer graduated, the Izmir Rüştü Ünsal Police School. There are also allegations that the murderer was laid off due to the case about the school examination’s questions being stolen, that he took time off during July 15th, and that he lives in the house of one of FETO’s key people. Ultimately, there is no other organization within the police establishment who can conduct an operation of international scope with the structure and the belief to carry out what might well be called a suicide mission other than FETO. Among the Russian public, the allegations about the attacker’s FETO past were debated and the FETO-US connection was established.

3. How should reactions to the assassination be regarded?

It is understood that one of the most important targets of the attack on Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov was to end the period of rapprochement that had been going on for the past few months between Turkey and Russia. As is known, relations between Russia and Turkey experienced several serious crises following the shooting down of a Russian plane that had violated Turkish airspace by the Turkish air force on November 24, 2015, but following intense diplomatic efforts on both sides, the diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Moscow was finished.

Compared to the plane incident, the crisis management that was enacted in the aftermath of the assassination of the Russian Ambassador was done much better. The initial reactions coming from both capitals and leaders prevented the assassination from turning into a crisis. First, Erdogan immediately calling Russian president Putin and directly informing him rendered speculations that would have abounded after the assassination ineffective. At the same time, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s travel to Moscow in order to participate in the trilateral summit on Syria and his informing of Russian authorities there also played an easing role in the management of the crisis.

Secondly, both Erdogan and Putin have qualified the attack as a provocation and expressed that the attack’s main aim had been Turkish-Russian relations. This unity in discourse has also made the management of the crisis easier. Moreover, Turkey’s announcement that Russian security officials would be allowed to participate in the investigation of the assassination also made the process easier.

Among the underlying reasons for carrying out this crisis management in such a careful and delicate manner can be shown the experiences from the previous crisis lived shortly before and the continued diplomatic efforts to overcome the past crisis. Also, the fact that the diplomatic process among Russia, Turkey and Iran continues on a very delicate base can be shown as among the justifications for the joint reaction of the two sides.

4. What might the consequences of the assassination be?

The purpose of the assassination was to sabotage the rapprochement efforts between Turkey and Russia. In fact, the West created a discourse likening this assassination to that carried out by Gavrilo Princip against Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand which set off the First World War, and stated that this could be the beginning of the Third World War. Moreover, many analyses were written stating that this could deepen the crisis between the two countries. However, both countries’ carrying out mutual high-level meetings which kept the issue from ballooning invalidated expectations of a crisis. Therefore, contrary to assumptions, Turkish-Russian relations will not enter a period of conflict.

In the forthcoming period, the assassination’s consequences could appear on a few different levels. First, there could be a period where bilateral relations become stronger. Both countries’ tensions in their relations with the West brings them closer together. Despite the presence of many political problems on which Moscow-Ankara cannot come to an agreement, the sides are putting into play a certain model of strategic rationality. Accordingly, while areas of disagreement are handled through diplomatic channels, relations in the economic realm are protected from the fall-out in the area of political irreconcilability.

Secondly, a new solution-making period can result where Tehran is also involved in the political solution that Moscow-Ankara work out on Syria. The US compartmentalizing the Syria crisis by focusing solely on fighting DAESH and leaving that up to the PYD-YPG might mean that it will be left out of the aforementioned solution process. When considered as a whole, it is possible to say that this assassination will develop Turkish-Russian relations.

5. How might the assassination reflect on the Syria crisis?

The two sides will not want to lose the momentum they have gained in the resolution of the Syria crisis. In fact, the trilateral summit that was nevertheless carried out and the decision to act in a joint manner point to this. In the forthcoming period, Turkey will expend efforts for involving the opposition in the process and for the establishment of a ceasefire by maintaining open channels of communication with Russia. For their part, Russia and Iran will be engaged in overtaking Aleppo and will work to turn political negotiations to the advantage of the regime following the assassination. In this period, the three actors finding the least common denominator will increase the potential for a political solution. There are not just differences between Turkey and Iran-Russia about the future of Syria, but between Russia and Iran as well. It can be expected for these differences to become more apparent as negotiations continue. For this reason, the negotiations aim to bring together the regime and opposition with the international actors who support the regime and the opposition on some common ground.