After two years of stormy relations with Turkey, Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, managed to establish workable relations with Turkey. Had he won the election, he would have continued to work with Turkey on several strategically important issues such as the establishment of a second pipeline for oil export from Iraq to Turkey, and joint efforts in order to eradicate the PKK presence in the Qandil mountains. Both countries were also planning to expand the size of commercial trade.

Adel Abdul Mahdi has been chosen as Iraq’s new prime minister-designate, and Barham Salih as the new president. Now, Turkey needs to be prepared for a post-Abadi era. This piece is about the intensified rivalry taking place between pro-Iranian and pro-American Iraqi political groups, which both seek to form a government, and reflect on how the probable result of this rivalry will affect Turkey-Iraq relations.

U.S. and Iran scramble for the cake

All these depend on the larger scene: What will be Trump’s forthcoming strategy to contain Iran’s expansionist policy in the Middle East? If Trump’s policy is to make Iraq the theater for the first attempt to restrain Iran, as some policy analysts have suggested, then confrontation will be more probable. It is clear that the U.S. and Russia have reached a tacit agreement, agreeing that Syria is in the interest of Russia, and thus leaving the job of containing Iran’s influence in the country to both Tel Aviv and Moscow.

During the last two months, both Brett McGurk, the U.S. Special Envoy on War against Daesh, and Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Quds revolutionary guard and the person in charge of Iraq’s file, made numerous visits to Baghdad and Erbil to rally support for the groups that they have influence on in order to form the “biggest election bloc” – the largest political alliance in parliament. The U.S. supports the bloc of al-Islah (Reform) headed by Abadi, and Iran favors the bloc of al-Bina (Reconstruction) founded by Nouri-al Maliki. The later has an edge and it has managed to elect Mohammed Halbusi, who is a pro-Iranian Sunni leader, as speaker of Parliament.

Why did Abadi lose his bid for power?

Towards the end of September, many of Abadi’s allies began to desert his camp, and this seriously weakened his chance to be re-elected. Abadi proved too tactless and has been alienated by many in his own camp. On the other hand, al-Maliki has exhibited considerable diplomatic skills and made compromises with both the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. According to unconfirmed reports, he conceded to the Kurds and the right of the Kurdish peshmerga to return to the disputed territories. Abadi has apparently refused to do what forced Masoud Barzani to side with al-Maliki.

In addition, al-Maliki has made deals with Sunni leaders to withdraw popular mobilization forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) from their cities. This irritated Abadi who considered these actions as illegal and being done without his prior knowledge – behind his back. Consequently, he sacked Falih Fayyad, his National Security Advisor, whom he accused of betrayal and inefficiency. The loss of Fayyad, a prominent Dawa leader and the son of a powerful Shiite tribal leader, accompanied by the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Basra, put Abadi’s statesmanship into serious question.

It was probably this state of affairs that convinced Muqtada Sadr, the powerful cleric and leader of the winning Sairoon bloc, to desert Abadi and reconcile with Hadi Ameri, the head of the powerful Badr militia. More, Abadi’s hasty and not so well-calculated statement to implement U.S. sanctions against Iran, has delivered a serious blow to his ability to present himself as a leader of Iraq. A statement in the pro-government daily Erem in Tehran on August 16, 2018, described Abadi as a “governor of Iraq who has been appointed by an Iranian general and who will face the same fate as Saddam.”

However, the final blow to Abad’s bid for a second term came with the statement of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential Shiite cleric in the country, banning those who have been in office before to take the post again.

Turkey’s stand in Iraqi politics

Turkey should take the existing tension between Iran and the U.S. into consideration as it will not diminish and may even end in direct confrontation in Abdul Mehdi’s era. Turkey should also be prepared for a possible inter-Shiite military confrontation in a proxy war. The burning of the Iranian consulate in Basra, and subsequent unknown missile launches on U.S. interests again in Basra and the Green zone in Baghdad, are clear indications that the U.S.-Iranian confrontation in Iraq has entered an alarming stage.

The Iraqi government accused ex-Baathist elements as being behind the events in Basra, and pro-Iranian groups in Iraq attributed the events to the U.S. and its Arab allies in the region. It can be argued that the events were in general spontaneous and triggered by Iran’s decision to cut off power to Basra due to the economic crisis in Iran. The people in Basra have repeatedly taken to the streets in recent weeks to protest against the lack of government services, and water contamination that left thousands in hospitals.

Besides, both Soleimani and Ameri have already threatened to attack U.S. interests in Iraq if they were excluded from forming a government. Qais Al-Khazali, the leader of the powerful Asaeb al-Haq militia, made similar threats.

In case of a diplomatic rupture between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey’s national interest and security might be jeopardized. First of all, the PKK can avail itself from the chaos by extending its influence on the KRG. There is a boiling situation in the unsettled province of Kirkuk. The rapture may cause a clash there and the Turkmen may suffer in consequence. Besides, Turkey’s 11 billion worth of trade with Iraq can be seriously affected. Therefore, Turkey needs to develop and put in place contingent plans for such eventuality. Thus, Ankara cannot afford to be a bystander as things take a confrontational posture in the relations between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq.

Since the new prime minister is, to a large extent, a man of compromise between the U.S. and Iran, if he manages to form the government he will most probably try to pursue Abadi’s foreign policy objectives. Although he has stated that he wants a full mandate to form the government, he cannot afford to ignore Muqtada Sadr’s (his main patron) pressure with regard to further distancing Iraq from both Iran and the U.S.

Aware of his close ties with the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, he will probably try to open up to the KRG and come to close terms with them in regards to the sale of oil through the existing oil pipeline in the KRG. This means that he will try to please Barzani and most probably ignore or postpone the second pipeline that Abadi and the Turkish government agreed upon – an agreement to the displeasure of KRG leaders.

Being an economist and supporter of the market economy, Abdul Mehdi will try to expand commercial ties with Turkey and will try to avoid any political tension with Ankara. However, his foreign policy towards Turkey will not be free from Iranian and the U.S. influence. Abdul Mehdi’s anticipated foreign policy will in general be a continuation of the Abadi era, and Turkey-Iraq ties will continue on its current course of commercial growth and normalization.

Since the announcement of the inconclusive national election results, events in Iraq have been sliding towards a civil war. In addition to this, the U.S. and Iran race for influence and hegemony in the country has speeded up the deterioration of conditions in Iraq. This piece seeks to discuss the latest developments regarding this issue in the light of the decision of the Iraqi parliament, which was issued on June 6, and which called for the sorting and manual re-count of all votes and the abolition of thousands of ballot boxes. This matter puts Iraq into a path of uncertainty during a very critical period.

The political situation has become a bottleneck that may be difficult to get out of, and it is being followed with series of destabilizing events. Unless these issues are being checked upon, Iraq will witness a civil war in a manner very similar to what is going on in Syria and Yemen. An Iraqi political analyst, writing for the daily Baghdad Post (May 23, 2018), stated that: “Iran ignites fire of “civil war” in Iraq… Iran is trying through Qassem Soleimani’s efforts, which is in Iraq now, to ruin all efforts to form a government that would not be totally loyal to her…”

Nouri al-Maliki, ex-premier and the leader of the State of Law election bloc, has joined with Hadi al-Amir’s Naser bloc in a single sectarian bloc, and has declared their hostility to the Moqatada Sadr bloc, which won the most seats in the recent election. The Sadrist project, which has been viewed by many as an Iraqi project, stands against the pro-Iranian Maliki project. The former wants to disband and demobilize the Shiite militia, known as Hashed, improve relations with Iraq’s Arab neighbors, and wants to take a neutral stand in the ongoing U.S. and Iranian rivalry in the Middle East.

Iranians have been involved in many political games such as eliciting dozens of deputies in the coalition of Naser, led by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, in order to join pro-Iranian political blocs. According to some sources in Baghdad, the pro-Iranian circles have recently inaugurated a series of assassinations in Baghdad in order to fuel the fire of civil war. The explosion in Sadr City, which killed and wounded tens of people in Baghdad on the night of June 7, and the subsequent burning of the election ballot boxes housed in the Independent Electoral High Commission storage in Baghdad are designs of the people that want to push the Sadr group into retaliation and want to create a political rapture in Iraq. If history is any guide to us, Mr. Sadr will not be silent on all these events, even if this requires a full-fledged civil war.

It is noteworthy that al-Maliki made numerous statements in the week leading to the election in which he threatened with civil war if the election results were rigged. Many believe that this was an expression of prior knowledge on his part that he will lose the elections. Those threats “are not new to him, especially since his record is full of manipulating sectarian violence during the past years. It is not unlikely for him to re-start it again, if the course of the events were to his dislike,” wrote an expert on Iraq affairs. After the elections, al-Maliki repeated the same threat through the statement made by an MP from his bloc – Mohamed Sahiod – who told the press on May 17 that, “We demand the abolition of the election results and the extension of the work of parliament and to make the current government of Abadi a Caretaker Government due to the wide scale of fraud which took place in the electoral process.”

Iraq’s parliament passed a law on June 6 ordering a nationwide manual recount of votes in the May 12 parliamentary elections. This was a day after the prime minister had stated that there had been serious violations. This move could hinder the delicate process of forming a new government and raising the prospect of further uncertainty in Iraq. This law has also added further fuel to the fire of crisis and was received with mixed and opposing statements. It appears that Abadi’s bloc, which trailed in third place, has some information suggesting that a manual recount will increase their seats.

The pro-Iranian camp wanted the parliament to go further than by just declaring the election results null and void in order to deny Sadr any opportunity to form the government. The National Coalition of Iyad Allawi, which did not perform well either, has also supported the idea of re-holding the election. Allawi stated that, “the declared results of the elections, as it stands now and without taking into consideration numerous appeals against abuse and large-scale fraud, especially after the United Nations confirmed the existence of fraud and manipulation of votes, will lead to producing a parliament challenged by its legitimacy and an illegitimate government.

Hassan Jihad, a leader in the Coalition of Justice and Democracy in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan), led by Barham Sali, said on June 7 that the decisions of the parliament on the elections restored confidence in the elections and institutions: “The re-counting and manual counting and the application of recent measures will change the number of seats and the results of opposition parties.” He added that, “the ruling parties in the KRG should accept the fact that recounting electoral votes will change the number of seats and it should respect the domestic experience.”

The new election has suspended the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and authorized a Commission made of nine judges to carry out the re-count of votes throughout Iraq. Should this law be applied, it may lead to a series of new crises and complicate the political situation in Iraq in order to reach a state of suffocation. On June 21, the Supreme Court passed a decree, which approved the June 6 law passed by the Iraqi Parliament regarding the manual recount of votes in Iraq as constitutional. This will halt all attempts to form the government and will open hell’s door and further complicate the situation.

It appears that the “biggest beneficiaries of this process are parliamentarian Salim al-Jubouri and the government of Haider al-Abadi.” Al-Jubouri, who failed to regain his seat, believes that he has been done a great deal of injustice in this election. Hassan Turan, a Turkmen MP, was quoted stating, “The high attendance rate during the parliamentary session confirmed beyond doubt that all political blocs, including the winner, wants to distance themselves from the forgers.”

While it may seem that both Iran and the U.S. are distancing themselves from all these rapid transformations that are taking place in Iraq, behind the scenes both governments are moving all the threads of the game. It is noteworthy that both governments have welcomed the results of the election declared by electronic counting. However, it seems that the frantic frenzy behind the scene of both the U.S. and Iran is to influence the process of government formation.

It could be stated that the election results are only a symptom of a larger crisis. The 2003 Iraq invasion not only destroyed the existing state machinery but failed to replace it with a sound and effective one. As the Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi told The National during his visit to Dubai on April 9: “Elections will not solve the crises Iraq faces unless it maintains an inclusive political process, overcomes sectarian divisions and rids itself of foreign interference.

The African proverb goes to say that when two elephants wrestle, it is only the grass on which the wrestle taking place will be harmed. Iraq looks like it has become the grass affected by the two fighting elephants: Iran and the U.S. Turkey should support Abadi or Sadr in order to form a coalition government as only a moderate Shiite group could help prevent a civil war. As with the Syrian Civil War, a civil war in Iraq will have adverse effects on Turkey.

On Oct. 31, 2015 the Iraqi National Alliance, a front of Shiite political groups, announced that they are in the process of drafting an important document called the “Historical Settlement.” On February 6, 2017, Ammar al–Hakeem, the leader of the Alliance, stated that the project is the result of intensive and constructive talks with all Iraqi groups and has the backing of regional stakeholder governments. Moreover, the United States and the UN will have a role in it too, and it will be announced after the end of the war against DAESH. Thus, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) will draft the final version of the Historical Settlement after the document is approved by both the parliament and the Cabinet and Iraqi parties agree to abide by it. UNAMI will try to convince regional institutions, namely the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to support the project. The document is to addresses key issues, including power and wealth distribution between the Federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the grievances of Sunni Arab provinces. The implementation of the Historical Settlement has many opportunities as well as insurmountable challenges, and to succeed Iraq needs to avail itself from the experience of other countries who have dealt with the same kind of divisions.

Road to Historical Settlement

Iraq, like other countries which have witnessed dictatorship and civil war, is in need of a national reconciliation. Though Iraqi governments in the past have officially committed themselves to the achievement of national reconciliation, very few tangible steps have been taken so far. In 2003, the government of Ayah al-Alawi, the leader of Iraqiyah Bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, who would serve as Prime Minister, officially committed their governments to the process, but no concrete steps were taken. As Prime Minister, Al-Maliki pursued sectarian and authoritarian policies which resulted in alienating Sunni Arabs and Kurds, and led DAESH to try championing the Sunni cause.

In July 2014, Haider al-Abadi came to power as prime minister with a promise to curb corruption and broker national reconciliation. However, his efforts were hindered by the pro-al-Maliki group and the rising power of al-Hashd Shaabi, Shiite militias which have Iranian backing. Those Shiite militias have taken very uncompromising steps. Besides, pro-Iranian political circles used their best to prevent the formation of a National Guard in Sunni Arab majority provinces, and they made the long awaited Amnesty Law, which was passed in the parliament on August 2016, toothless and too late. For these reasons, even if DAESH were to be expelled from the cities, the grievances of Sunni Arabs will continue.

Opportunities

Through Iraq’s distant and modern history, it is evident that its diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural communities have succeeded in peaceful coexistence and intermixing. Unlike many other countries, where Shiites and Sunnis live apart, before the effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shiite and Sunni Iraqis lived in integrated communities in many mixed regions, especially in Baghdad. There are several powerful tribal confederations which have a mixed Shiite and Sunni membership. These are potential resources, which need to be tapped in for reconciliation. For example, in 2007 a group of facilitators from the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in the district of Mahmoudiyah, an area south of Baghdad which was known as the “Triangle of Death,” helped to broker a reconciliation pact through tribal chieftains from Sunnis and Shiites that still endures. This experience needs to be generalized to other regions in Iraq. Besides, the implementation of the stated policies of US president Donald Trump with regard to the curbing of Iran’s undue influence in Iraq and al-Abadi’s imminent victory against DAESH will have a combined impact of weakening the al-Maliki camp and pro-Iranian Shiite militias. These will give national reconciliation internally a great momentum.

Challenges

The most serious challenges to national reconciliation are the lack of trust among various Iraqi groups, the exclusiveness in the nature of some influential elements on both sides, structural flaws in the post-2003 government, Iranian interference in Iraq, and the lack of a determined will to have reconciliation. After the US invasion, Iraqis agreed to form governments of communities, instead of government of citizens, as a power-sharing formula. Since 2014, al-Maliki’s group, supported by Iran, has been calling for the formation of a government of a “political majority.” In reality, al-Maliki is trying to use democracy to establish the government of a Shiite majority to the exclusion of Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds). In addition, al-Abadi’s inability to live up to his government program with regard to the Kurds has forced the Kurds to distrust Shiite politicians in Baghdad. During the first week of February, al-Hakeem visited the KRG to sound them out on his project. He received a cold response from their leaders, who have mostly opted for separation from Iraq and waiting to see what Trump’s future policy on Iraq will be.

These and other challenges have been spelled out in a well-written piece by Nazli Tarzi in the Middle East Eye. Tarzi rightly points that there is a lot of vagueness in the project and it has been drafted in the dark unilaterally by Shiite groups. It is not so inclusive either. But all these challenges could be overcome, if al-Hakeem’s proposed document was to be discussed openly with prominent Sunni groups and the international community lends its support to it.

Turkey and Iran have many stakes in its success and they should and could play an important role in this regard. Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group in a 2007 report, and more recently the al-Bayan Center for Study and Planning, an Iraqi think tank based in Baghdad, have prepared projects for national reconciliation which reiterate the same points: the complex nature of the conflict in Iraq has reached a point where an international and regional intervention is necessary. Iraq needs to upgrade the role of Jan Kubis, the head of UNAMI, from that of good will ambassador to that of an arbiter. The US also needs to use its influence and leverage among all communities in Iraq for this purpose. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan must put pressure on Sunnis (Arabs and Kurds) to show a readiness for a historical compromise to achieve a durable and lasting peace. Iran has to be pressured to exercise a positive influence on Iraq’s Shiites. Except for a few extremist groups, the war-weary majority of Iraqi groups are now ready to accept this.

And the Iraqis need to benefit from other countries which had experienced civil wars. The formation of a body in Iraq similar to the Committee of Truth and Reconciliation, which was established in 1990 in South Africa, for example, is noteworthy. This Committee addressed the needs of the victims of the Apartheid regime by recognition and remedies instead of revenge and punishment. It convinced the perpetuators of the crimes to admit and apologize for their deeds. The new constitution of 1996 guaranteed the rights of black majorities and safeguarded that of white Afrikaners.

Traditional and tribal institutions were utilized to bring harmony to the conflict-torn country. The hastily drawn Iraqi constitution of 2005 needs to be amended to address the needs of Sunni Arabs. The controversial practice of de-Baathification should be reversed and de-politicized and be left to the judicial authorities. The controversial current Iraqi laws and regulations on terrorism have to be either eliminated or amended to exclude its future abuse. The high-ranking Iraqi religious authorities among Sunnis and Shiites need to act as peace-makers similar to the role South-African Archbishop Desmond Tutu played. Furthermore, the issue of disputed territories and control over oil and gas revenues with the KRG needs to be addressed by resorting to a third-party for mediation, as well as the Supreme Court of Iraq.

Iraq has a chance to achieve a much needed national reconciliation, if political groups exhibit a true will to do so and receive the needed external support.