In many ways, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the drivers of the new cold war in the region.

In many ways, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the drivers of the new cold war in the region. They have confronted each other in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen, and now in Syria where they have been engaged in proxy battles for many years. To reduce Iran’s influence, the Saudis are trying to bring Syria back to the Arab world, while the Iranians don’t want to retreat and continue to support Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. In Yemen, Iran has been involved in supporting Houthi rebels, destabilizing Saudi’s southern border. Though Iran’s influence is less obvious, uprisings in Bahrain follow the same pattern.

Tensions between Tehran and Riyadh flared when, in September’s 2015 annual haj pilgrimage, hundreds of Iranians died in a stampede. The tension turned to an intense crisis and confrontation when in January 2016 the Saudis executed a Shia cleric and political activist Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, which was seen by many observers as a sign that the Saudis are going to reject any conciliatory policy towards Iran.

Iranian hardliners responded by attacking the kingdom’s embassy in Tehran, leading the Saudis to cut all diplomatic ties. Since then talks between the two countries have been complicated to the extent that both countries have failed to reach an agreement on arrangements for the Iranian pilgrims to attend this year’s Haj in Mecca.

The Saudis have done their best to further deepen Iran’s political isolation. Since the easing of sanctions on Iran early this year as a result of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), a key concern of the kingdom has been that Iran will use money from lifting sanctions to step up engagement in regional conflicts and funding terror groups. Known as “Plan B” to try to stop Iran’s economic rise in the region, Saudis are doing their bit to make sure the foreign investment will not arrive in Tehran. For instance, they banned Iran’s Mahan Airline from flying through Saudi airspace and shipping insurers have been advising clients that ships carrying Iranian crude will not be permitted to enter Saudi or Bahraini waters.

Most recently, conflict between the two countries entered a new stage of cyber war. The hacking of the website of the Statistical Center of Iran, rending it temporarily out of service, was attributed to Saudis. In a reciprocal action, two Saudi statistical websites were hacked, reportedly by an Iranian cyber army, just one day after Iran’s statistics center incident.

The leadership of both countries should know that they may never get to trust one another but they certainly can do business with each other.

In each country, elements of domestic politics work against the possibility of improving relations. In Tehran, it is the power of Sepāh e Pāsdārān, a parastatal organization with huge influence in Iran’s domestic political arena, also having organizational interests in pursuing aggressive policies in the region. In the Saudi Kingdom, the potential challenge comes from conservative elements hostile to Shia Iran. Hence, Riyadh’s decision to cut off diplomatic ties with Tehran shored up support for Saudi authorities from these Sunni conservatives. As one analyst noted, the perception by many in the Saudi Kingdom is that Iran is a bully, and that only a firm response can get it to back off.

What happens next is unclear, but the situation is extremely dangerous. The leadership of both countries should know that they may never get to trust one another but they certainly can do business with each other. They should also realize that this conflict has the potential to drag foreign military interventions into the region. Adding to these is the economic costs of the conflict. As was the case during the cold war, it will substantially increase the defense budgets of both countries, a factor that takes their national budget away from social welfare programs.

The administration of President Rouhani is seemingly pursuing a policy of constructive engagement with the world, including Saudi Arabia. Rouhani himself has always favored a rapprochement with Riyadh. The Saudi leaders might try to view him positively.

It is unclear where Khamenei and his office stand in a confrontation between Rouhani and hardliners on the issue of Iran’s Saudi policy, but the history of decision making in Iran shows that the Supreme Leader eventually sides with those who make rational policies.

Iran should leave the region militarily. In order to establish greater stability in war-torn Middle East, the Iranian leadership should understand that it would be beneficial to pursue pragmatic policies and concentrate on lessening political tensions -factors that would enable them to gain more than they would lose. In addition, Saudis should understand that they cannot exclude Iran from the region. In effect all both parties need to do is to change their paradigm and perception rather than playing the “blaming game”.

Turkey can attempt to create a system for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to facilitate dialogue over collective regional security interests.

Turkey can play a significant role in this context. A reasonable and appropriate construct is that Turkey can attempt to create a system for cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to facilitate dialogue over collective regional security interests. Although it is at odds over a number of issues, Turkey is an influential regional player and a trusty country for both parties due to its balanced relations with Tehran and Riyadh.  Therefore Turkey, because of the common interests with these two, can play a significant role in rapprochement between the rivals. Given its friendly ties with Iran and the Saudi Kingdom, Turkey can be a reliable mediator to reconcile these age old enemies.

Aware of the tense Saudi-Iran rivalry, Turkey has already been trying to maintain good relations with both countries. Within the new Turkish government’s framework, aimed at increasing the number of Turkey’s friends emphasized by the Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, Turkey is keen on following a balanced policy between the Gulf States and Tehran. Ankara has been developing a dual-track approach to the Middle East by simultaneously courting these two bitter rivals. A clear indication of Turkey’s willingness to do so is what former Turkish ambassador to Tehran, Ümit Yardım, said in an interview with Tasnim News Agency, “Turkey and Iran are two major players not only in the Middle East but also beyond this region that can put an end to the current situation.”

With Turkey’s involvement, it is not a remote prospect that Iran and Saudi Arabia will be inclined to cooperate to stabilize the Middle East. No doubt, it is a delicate balancing act that needs a lot of work to maintain given the current regional tensions, but it is doable.

The Egyptian Perspective on Normalization

Riyadh wishes to bring Turkey and Egypt back to the table in order to form a strong coalition.

Firstly, Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia are an important factor. Riyadh was one of the staunchest supporters of the military coup in Egypt in 2013. Following the coup, the Saudi government provided significant financial assistance to the Sisi regime, enabling it to successfully manage the post-coup period. Despite the change in Saudi leadership in the beginning of 2015, Cairo-Riyadh relations have continued as usual. Saudi Arabia considers Egypt an irreplaceable ally in its struggle against Iran. In the same line, Riyadh also considers Turkey a crucial actor in balancing the expansion of Iran’s influence in the region. Because of that, Riyadh wishes to bring Turkey and Egypt back to the table in order to form a strong coalition.

A recent effort at reconciliation was made just before the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul in April 2016. King Salman made a 5-day visit to Egypt where observers suspect he may have advised the Sisi regime to normalize its relations with Turkey. Notably, the Egyptian Foreign Minister came to the opening ceremony of the Summit in Istanbul, in the highest level visit between two countries since 2013.

Egypt is aware that Turkey is an important partner in economic relations. Egypt is home to a number of investments by Turkish entrepreneurs, and trade between the two countries has increased significantly since 2011. It is in Egypt’s best interest for Turkish companies to continue their investments in the country and create new job opportunities for Egyptians. Additionally, it should be remembered that Turkey is ever seeking to diversify its energy imports, and considers Egypt as an alternative source. Ankara is a potential buyer of Egyptian natural gas which can be piped across the Mediterranean.

Importantly, the Egyptian public is not comfortable with the political stance of the Sisi government toward Turkey. This is mainly because of the positive perception of Turkey in the Egyptian public view. Particularly in recent years, thanks to Turkish TV series and cultural activities, Egyptians perceive Turkey as a friendly nation. Turkey opened the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centre in Cairo and Alexandria, attracting thousands of Egyptian youth for Turkish classes and cultural events. Tourist exchange between two countries had increased significantly, particularly between 2011 and 2013. Considering this background, it is obvious that the Sisi regime provokes more discontent from its public by continuing its alienation from Turkey.

Why Would Turkey Change its Position?

The main motivation behind the Turkish government’s position toward Egypt was the undemocratic nature of the military takeover.

Turkish government has been one of the staunchest opponents of the military coup in Egypt. It strongly opposed the toppling of President Mohammad Morsi, who won the overwhelming majority of votes in the 2012 elections. Ankara has openly criticized the Sisi regime and has allowed persecuted Muslim Brotherhood members to relocate from Egypt to Turkey. The main motivation behind the Turkish government’s position toward Egypt was the undemocratic nature of the military takeover. Since 2013, Turkey has made every effort to undermine the military regime in Egypt. However, the political support of the Western countries and the financial assistance of the Gulf States have allowed Sisi to keep his regime alive. Ankara has realized that it would be very difficult, under the present circumstances, to go back to democratic rule in Egypt. Given these stark realities, Turkey may have to reconsider its politics toward this country for several reasons.

The first reason is the Saudi Arabia factor. Riyadh is one of Turkey’s most important allies in some of Ankara’s foreign policy actions, particularly in Syria and Iraq, and more broadly in its competition with Iran. Riyadh also serves as an important economic partner with huge stocks of natural resources. Therefore, both countries would prefer Egypt not to be an obstacle in their bilateral relations. As Ankara and Riyadh seek to deepen their relations with each other, they are aware of the fact that any differences in their foreign policy priorities should be minimized. This does not mean that both countries will have unanimous foreign policies. However, it should be mentioned that despite their differences, an alliance between Ankara and Riyadh has serious potential to play an important role in Middle East politics. Therefore, it would benefit Turkey to normalize its relations with Egypt, as a means of advancing its cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and wielding greater influence in the region.

An alliance between Ankara and Riyadh has serious potential to play an important role in Middle East politics.

Secondly, in recent months Ankara has confronted a number of foreign policy crises, particularly with the most important actors in the region, namely the US and Russia. Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet in November 2015 led to a serious crisis between Ankara and Moscow. And Turkey’s criticism of US support to the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization, created tension between the two countries. In addition to these crises, Turkey has also been confronting Iran’s expansionist policies and hostilities by the UAE government.

Bearing these crises in mind, Turkey is considering new initiatives in its foreign policies. It has been continuing its normalization process with Israel and aims to calm things down with the UAE leadership. In this vein, the recent visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to Abu Dhabi can be interpreted as a timely move. It would be also an important step for Turkey to normalize its relations with Egypt. This would allow Ankara to ameliorate its relations with the governments of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the main supporters of the Sisi regime.

Such a rapprochement could help thousands of illegally imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members, if Turkey were to advocate for their release.

Maybe the most important factor in favor of Turkey’s normalization of relations with Egypt involves the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Normalization could have serious potential for the group’s survival by releasing the pressure imposed on it by the Sisi regime. Turkey could utilize its normalization initiative with Egypt to encourage the Sisi regime to loosen its pressure on the movement. In exchange for normalizing relations, Ankara could stipulate the release of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership from prison. Such a rapprochement could also help thousands of illegally imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members, if Turkey were to advocate for their release.

In order to overcome Egypt’s political crisis, the Sisi regime has been looking for a solution, particularly in its foreign policy. Normalizing relations with Turkey would be an important tool for Sisi to help ensure his regime’s survival. On the other hand, Turkey also may be better able to help Egypt in the long run by normalizing relations with the country. Normalizing relations would also give Turkey the chance to continue contributing to Egypt’s democratization efforts by serving as a successful model. It should be remembered that whatever steps Turkey may take in this regard would not be motivated by support for the military regime, but rather in the interest of giving Egyptians a light of hope for their future.