Why the Left Fell and the Right Rose in Greece

A

s a result of the general elections held in Greece on June 25, eight parties entered the parliament. The New Democracy (ND) party, which won 158 parliamentary seats with 40.55% of the vote, won the majority in the 300-seat parliament. The Radical Left Alliance (SYRIZA), which won 48 parliamentary seats with 17.84% of the vote, is back in the main opposition, while its center-left rival PASOK won 32 seats with 11.85% of the vote. Among the other parties that passed the 3% electoral threshold, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) won the right to be represented in the parliament with 20 MPs, Spartans with 12 MPs, Greek Solution (EL) with 12 MPs, Democratic Patriotic Movement – Victory with 10 MPs, and Course of Freedom (PE) with 8 MPs.

The result shows that in the coming period there will be a divided opposition in the parliament against a strong government. Due to the rivalry and differences of opinion among the opposition parties, it will be much more difficult for them to define a common position against the policies of the government than in the past. This situation will allow the second Mitsotakis government to act more decisively and boldly. The weakening of the left and the rise of the far right in Greek politics are also expected to affect the political dynamics of the new period.

The Decline of Left Politics

The June 25 elections resulted in a right-dominated parliamentary arithmetic in Greece. It was the first time since the 1974 elections following the military regime that right-wing parties won so many seats and left-wing parties so few. Considering that the radical left came to power only eight years ago, Greek politics has undergone a rapid and sharp transformation.

Greece’s debt crisis in 2009 led to the imposition of strict austerity measures under EU supervision. SYRIZA, which promised to solve people’s economic problems with radical steps, was seen as a savior in this period and a leftist party outside the mainstream came to power for the first time in the 2015 elections. SYRIZA’s success was also attributed to the fact that its leader Alexis Tsipras was young, dynamic, and politically untainted.

However, Tsipras’s adoption of a soft transition during his term in office, his agreement with the European troika, and the continuation of austerity measures disappointed SYRIZA voters and caused many members with radical views to break away from the party. SYRIZA, thus, became a mainstream center-left party.

SYRIZA, which has been in the main opposition since 2019, stood against the economic and social policies implemented under the ND government and promised to implement the principles of the welfare state to the fullest if it came back to power. In the run-up to the 2023 elections, Tsipras emphasized his party’s “progressive” credentials and included elements such as improving wages, reducing indirect taxes, and greater state responsibility in areas such as education, health, and housing in his election program.

Despite all this, he failed to evoke the same excitement in the electorate as in 2015. While the disappointment of Tsipras’s tenure has a partial share in this, the main problem stems from SYRIZA’s inability to develop a holistic and realistic alternative to ND’s pro-Western neoliberal policies that combine geopolitical and economic goals. No matter how valuable SYRIZA’s program based on social justice, humanitarian values, and multilateral foreign policy may be in principle, it cannot offer a package that can provide a short-term solution to the economic problems and geopolitical risks facing Greece. This is more a matter of conjunctural realities—in other words, the spirit of the times—than SYRIZA itself.

There is fierce competition among left-wing parties to fill the vacuum left by SYRIZA’s decline. The Course of Freedom (PE) party, led by Zoe Konstantopoulou, a former SYRIZA member, managed to enter the parliament with a program close to the radical views that SYRIZA advocated before it came to power. The idealistic goals of the European Realistic Disobedience Front or MeRa25, the party of Yanis Varoufakis, another former SYRIZA member, to restructure the whole of Europe are not seen as realistic by the Greek public under the current circumstances. On the other hand, the KKE, representing the revolutionary left, is far away from all other parties in terms of its principles and goals.

While these relatively small parties are not expected to have a serious impact on politics, PASOK has become a strong alternative for the leadership of the left. PASOK has adopted a balanced line between ND and SYRIZA in economic policies, while in foreign policy it has adopted almost the same stance as ND in terms of relations with the West and its approach to the problems with Turkey. PASOK, which has shifted from the left to the center, aims to be a mass party alternative to ND as it used to be.

However, ND, which has expanded its base under the leadership of Kyriakos Mitsotakis and has recruited some former PASOK members, has gained a very strong position in central politics. If SYRIZA fails to renew itself, PASOK could once again take the leadership of the center-left and become the second-largest party in the country.

Of the three small right-wing parties that entered parliament in the last elections, the Spartans party is the most notable in that it includes former Golden Dawn members and received more votes than the others. As a result of the ban on the National Party-Hellenes, led by former Golden Dawn MP Ilias Kasidiaris, its candidates participated in the June 25 elections from the lists of an unnamed nationalist party called “Spartans.” In this way, the far right of the Golden Dawn line re-entered parliament after a four-year absence. Kasidiaris, who is still in prison, has signaled that he will lead a fierce opposition in parliament after the elections. However, given the recent sensitivity of the judiciary to far-right activities, the party may face judicial investigations if it pushes the boundaries of legitimate politics.

The other two right-wing parties in parliament, Greek Solution (EL) and Victory, have so far not shown any aggressive behavior, but have very strong nationalist conservative views. Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, EL’s leader Kyriakos Velopoulos has previously called for the death penalty for serious crimes and the laying of mines on the border to counter threats from Turkey and the influx of migrants. The Victory party, founded in 2019 under the leadership of religious studies teacher Dimitris Natsios, entered the parliament for the first time with a surprise vote thanks to the support it received especially from the church and monastic circles. Defining his party in terms of Greek Orthodoxy, chairman Natsios states that they aim to achieve unity in the country through the reconstruction of religious consciousness.

The right-wing parties advocate common themes such as anti-immigration, anti-vaccination, protection of national identity, and family structure. Paying special attention to disputes with neighboring countries, these parties oppose the Prespa Agreement resolving the Macedonian name dispute and demand rights for the Greek minority in southern Albania. Regarding the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus, they argue that Greece should not back down from national stances and work for international sanctions against Turkey. They also agree that Turkish identity in Western Thrace should never be tolerated, and they argue that relations with the Western world should be determined according to national interests and that Greece should cooperate with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic alliance when necessary.

Although it is inevitable that right-wing parties will spark various debates over these and similar views in the coming period, their influence on political decisions and practices is expected to remain limited as they are not strong enough to set the agenda. Especially in the current economic and geopolitical conditions, it is unlikely that the ND government will deviate from the Euro-Atlantic line.

Moreover, given the EU’s increased emphasis on enlargement in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war, it is unlikely that Greece will take any action that would hinder the membership perspectives of North Macedonia and Albania.

Nevertheless, the fact that left-wing parties are weaker than in the past and are competing among themselves can be considered a handicap in terms of balancing far-right tendencies. Demands from the far right on issues directly related to national identity and interests, such as anti-immigration, minority rights, and relations with Turkey, could put pressure on the government.