W
hether it was a unilateral action by the Iranian deep state or had the assent of the Iranian government as well, it is hard to make sense of Iranian missiles that streaked more than 50 km deep into the territory of Pakistan on January 16, 2024, and, per Pakistan, killed two children and injured three others. When already faced with sanctions and in the midst of proxy wars on multiple fronts, why would Tehran decide to irk a neighboring Islamic country with which it shares a 900 km border and which has perhaps superior military strength?
A glance at the headline of the state-aligned paper Tehran Times on January 16, 2024, alludes to what the Iranian leadership could have been thinking. It read, “Iran Hits Back,” with the caption “Missiles rain down on the headquarters of Mossad and terrorists in Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria’s Idlib and Pakistan’s Balochistan.”
Interestingly, apart from the clubbing with Iraq and Syria in the caption, there was no mention of Pakistan in the news story itself. Manifestly, the strikes were aimed at creating the impression that Iran is a formidable regional power capable of retaliation and hitting back, among other threats, at the assets of its arch enemy Israel wherever those assets are – even if that stretched the narrative too far. Iranian sources suggested that the targeted Iran-based, anti-Iran sectarian group Jaish al-Adl had links with Israel and was planning attacks on Iran across the porous Iran-Pakistan border (which militants on either side cross frequently).
The temporary souring of relations with Pakistan was adjudged to be an acceptable collateral damage of the strikes that were meant to project Iran’s fury to the world. Tehran was ready to hit targets not just in Syria and Iraq, but even across clearly defined borders like Pakistan’s. The intended message was perhaps that if a nuclear power’s border could be violated so could others.
Pakistan took strong exception to the attack, which came as a complete surprise. After all, Pakistan’s interim prime minister had met Iran’s foreign minister merely hours before the attack on the sidelines of Davos. Worse, when Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -seen as the overreaching arm of the deep state- was striking Pakistan, unleashing kamikaze drones and missiles eastwards, the navies of the two countries were conducting joint naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.
Despite such close contact, no official communication channel, either between governments or militaries, was used to convey Iran’s concerns and/or intentions to Pakistan. This was completely in contrast with the relationship nurtured by the two countries over decades, where despite occasional disagreements and sometimes accusations, pertaining to Baloch insurgencies on either side of the border, security cooperation and coordinated border management had grown, especially in recent years since the 2013 security agreement.
On multiple occasions, Pakistan had targeted or arrested and handed over anti-Iran insurgents to Tehran, including key figures of Jaish al-Adl and its predecessor Jundullah. For Pakistan, the projectiles came out of the blue.
A midnight statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed the “violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty” as “completely unacceptable” and warned of “serious consequences,” as Islamabad waited for an official apology, as suggested by diplomatic circles. When it wasn’t issued within 48 hours, Pakistan struck Pakistani separatist insurgents belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) about 90 km inside Iran, using ballistic missiles, rockets, and jets. According to Iran, the incursions killed three women, two men, and four children who were not Iranian.
Iran’s miscalculation was surprising in the first place. Wind back to February 25, 2019, when Indian jets launched “surgical strikes” in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir province. At that time, Pakistani jets had intercepted the Indian jets and struck back at targets deep in the Indian-occupied Kashmir territory within two days, after having issued the warning “get ready now for our surprise” to India in advance.
When Indian jets tried to chase Pakistani jets, at least one Indian jet was outmaneuvered and coaxed into entering Pakistani territory, after which it was immediately hit and downed. The Indian pilot Abhinandhan’s comment, “The tea is fantastic,” upon being served a cup of tea in captivity, continues to fuel memes in Pakistani social media today.
With such a precedent existing in recent history, the calculations of the Iranian leadership remain shrouded in mystery. Perhaps, Iran thought that a missile-and-drone attack by a “friendly and brotherly” nation was below the retaliation threshold. For Pakistan, however, a counterstrike was imperative, not only to demonstrate its military prowess and respond to domestic pressures, but also in order to send a message to any aggressor, especially India.
Thankfully, things did not escalate any further. “Following the telephone conversation between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has been mutually agreed that ambassadors of both countries may return to their respective posts by 26 January 2024,” read a statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry.
However, Iran’s choice to target a neighboring Islamic country, a nation that stands unequivocally with the Palestinians and has been actively condemning the abominable devastation being wreaked in Gaza seems perplexing. The attack appeared merely to draw away the world from the ever clearer enemy lines being drawn globally between those who favor the mass-killing of civilians and those against it. How Israel will see a heated Iran-Pakistan border is anyone’s guess – but one wonders what the Iranian leadership was thinking.
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