Why Did Israeli Intelligence Fail to Forestall the Hamas Attack?

The attack on Israel launched by Hamas on October 7 marked an unprecedented escalation in both scale and ferocity. The incursion, dubbed as “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” by Hamas, resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives and the capture of more than 200 individuals.

The prevailing state of tension in the Middle East erupted into open conflict when Israel launched Operation Iron Swords in response to Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood. Despite its seemingly abrupt launch without advanced intelligence or warning, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood can be traced back to decades of simmering hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians.

Why did Israeli intelligence fail to anticipate this attack, having Mossad, often hailed as one of the world’s most formidable intelligence agencies, among its ranks? Before answering this question, it is imperative to review the basic structure of Israeli intelligence which comprises three primary agencies: Shin Bet, responsible for domestic intelligence; Mossad, entrusted with foreign intelligence; and Aman, an integral part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

All three intelligence agencies failed to detect and thwart Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. This reality has led some to speculate about various conspiracy theories. While some of the speculation may seem plausible, none of it has been substantiated by concrete evidence.

Failure of Israeli intelligence

In the context of the failure of Israeli intelligence, it is crucial to examine the multiple factors that contributed to this outcome.

Intelligence agencies, despite their importance, are not infallible entities, and are prone to error and miscalculation. Intelligence failures and shortcomings are more common than one might think. Israeli intelligence is no exception to this reality, exhibiting a degree of overconfidence that can lead to operational setbacks. In addition, Israeli intelligence has cultivated an aura of invincibility, propagated in part by portrayals in Hollywood films, documentaries, digital series, and selected academic literature.

This cultivated image serves as a deliberate psychological tool of deterrence used against potential adversaries. While Israeli intelligence is undoubtedly a powerful and effective entity, it is not an all-encompassing, all-controlling apparatus. It has had notable successes, but, as has been pointed out, it is not immune to failure. For example, Mossad’s 1997 operation against Hamas politburo leader Khaled Meshaal ended in failure, culminating in Mossad’s operatives falling into the Jordanian intelligence’s custody. The botched mission escalated into a major diplomatic crisis.

Has Hamas been learning?

Operation Al-Aqsa Flood clearly shows that, like a boxer who has learnt to take blows, Hamas has now acquired the ability to strike back effectively. Hamas has demonstrated an ability to learn from its past mistakes and has shown extensive preparation for this operation. Visual records of the ensuing conflict show Hamas members in high spirits and displaying a remarkably professional demeanor.

Hamas managed to conceal the planning of Al-Aqsa Flood mainly due to the limited number of individuals who were privy to the full scope of the operation.

Israeli intelligence may have a significant number of agents within Hamas, however, it appears that these agents are not within the core leadership structure that was privy to the primary plan. These agents have clearly not been able to infiltrate the upper echelons of the Hamas leadership cadre.

At the same time, aware of the presence within its ranks of individuals working as agents for Israel, Hamas has taken steps to identify and recruit double agents from among these individuals. It deliberately manipulates Israeli intelligence with misleading information, thereby fostering the perception that Israel underestimates Hamas’s capabilities. In this context, Netanel Flamer has insightfully explored Hamas’s methods of undermining Israeli intelligence in a 2022 article.

Thus, Hamas has become adept at implementing effective counter-espionage strategies, developing safeguards against technical intelligence, and even deliberately spreading false information through communication channels to manipulate Israel.

Divided Israel

The turbulent and tense political atmosphere surrounding the judicial reforms in Israel have led to factions and infighting within the intelligence apparatus. Israeli intelligence has become politicized, distracted from its core mission, and struggling to focus on its basic duties and responsibilities.

Meanwhile, given the advances in current technological developments and increased accessibility, preparing for such a full-scale attack may not have taken Hamas as long as originally thought.

Reports have circulated on social media claiming that Egypt gave Israel ten days’ notice of the impending attack. In the world of intelligence, information received from a foreign intelligence service is known as “outsourcing.” Outsourced information must always be corroborated or refuted using national resources to prevent any manipulation.

Even if this report is accurate, Israeli intelligence still failed to use its corroboration and refutation mechanisms effectively. Other social media accounts have claimed that Israeli intelligence had foreknowledge of Hamas’s attack, but misinterpreted it as a large-scale exercise due to faulty intelligence analysis. This situation clearly underlines the failure.

In conclusion, Operation Al-Aqsa Flood was a success for Hamas and a colossal failure for Israel—this much is obvious. The Hamas operation cannot be attributed to any conspiracy theory. The IDF can regain lost territory, but the image of invincibility that Israeli intelligence has cultivated for decades in the eyes of the world has been shattered. Restoring that image will be a formidable challenge.