Old Routes, New Influence: China's Emerging Strategy in Somalia

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or centuries, Somalia and China have been connected through the Indian Ocean. Long before the establishment of the modern Somali state, commercial and cultural exchanges linked the Somali coast with China through maritime networks. The modern diplomatic relations were established in 1960 and have survived some of Somalia’s most turbulent political periods.

Yet the significance of the relationship today is not simply that it has survived for decades. It is that the architecture of Chinese engagement with Somalia appears to be changing. China is increasingly visible not only in government offices and diplomatic exchanges, but also in Somali classrooms, universities, investment forums, youth networks and spaces of knowledge production. In September 2024, the two countries elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.

This development should not be interpreted simply as another example of China expanding its footprint in Africa. What is more interesting is the changing instruments through which Chinese influence is being constructed in Somalia. For years, external engagement with Somalia has largely been understood through security assistance, humanitarian intervention, development programs and political diplomacy.

Türkiye has developed a particularly visible role across security, education, infrastructure and diplomacy, while Western and Gulf actors maintain their own political, economic and security relationships. China is now becoming more prominent within this increasingly competitive external environment, but its approach appears to rely on a somewhat different combination of instruments including economic statecraft, education, people-to-people exchanges, diplomatic networks and knowledge production.

150 Somali students win Chinese scholarships

Considering education, in August 2026, more than 150 Somali students received full Chinese government scholarships, one of the largest recent cohorts, with students entering fields including medicine and engineering. The Chinese Embassy’s scholarship reception was not presented merely as an educational event. Ambassador Wang Yu encouraged the students to develop a new perception of China, build new friendships and contribute to China-Africa and China-Somalia exchange. This scholarship initiative coincides with a parallel trend of self-funded Somali students choosing to study in China recently.

The wording is revealing. Scholarships are usually understood as development assistance or educational opportunity. But international relations shows us that education can also become an instrument of soft power and long-term socialization. A student who spends several years in another country does not return with a degree alone. They return with language skills, professional networks, personal experiences, perceptions of the host country and, sometimes, an entirely different understanding of how a state and society function. China has already begun building upon this accumulated human capital. Its embassy has previously brought together Somali alumni of Chinese universities, explicitly linking their educational experiences with future China-Somalia cooperation.

This does not mean that scholarship recipients automatically become instruments of Chinese influence. Such an interpretation would underestimate their agency. The more important point is that education creates social relationships that can survive individual projects and political administrations. A road connects two places, but an educational network can connect two societies for decades.

China and the youth in Somalia

The same logic is increasingly visible in China’s engagement with Somali youth. In August, a nine-member Somali youth (TikTokers) delegation travelled to China through a cultural-exchange program facilitated by the Chinese Embassy. Participants visited Chinese cities and institutions and subsequently documented their experiences for Somali audiences.

This is particularly significant because Somalia’s public sphere has changed. Foreign policy narratives are no longer communicated exclusively through embassies, official statements or traditional media. They increasingly travel through TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and other digital platforms. When Somali young TikTokers visit China and communicate their experiences to Somali audiences in their own language and cultural context, the relationship is no longer being narrated solely by Chinese diplomats. t is being re-mediated by Somali actors for Somali audiences.

That is an important distinction in understanding contemporary soft power. Influence does not necessarily become stronger because the source speaks louder. It can become stronger when local actors become the intermediaries through which an external country’s image and experience are interpreted. At the same time, Chinese institutions have increasingly used African and Somali youth engagement as part of the broader 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. Somalia’s Ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has herself emphasized the role of young people and language learning in sustaining China-Africa relations.

But China’s emerging strategy goes beyond people-to-people diplomacy. It is also becoming increasingly economic. In August, the Somalia-China Business Networking Forum brought together government officials, Somali and Chinese businesses, investors and chambers of commerce in Mogadishu. The discussions covered infrastructure, manufacturing, fisheries, agriculture, energy, transport and logistics, while the Somali government presented investment opportunities linked to its National Transformation Plan.

Zero-tariff policy

Beijing is simultaneously presenting its expanded zero-tariff policy toward African countries as an opportunity for greater African exports and has explicitly discussed the policy with Somali officials. Somalia’s ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has also publicly highlighted the importance of using these opportunities to deepen economic cooperation.

This matters because Somalia has historically been approached primarily as a recipient of humanitarian assistance, security support and development aid. A relationship increasingly organized around investment, exports and productive sectors could create a different form of engagement in which Somalia participates more actively in the economic relationship. China’s broader zero-tariff policy toward African countries also creates opportunities for Somali exports, an issue that Somalia’s ambassador to China has publicly emphasized.

But perhaps the most overlooked dimension is knowledge. In April, Yangzhou University discussed supporting the development of a Center for Somali Studies following engagement with Somali National University. The initiative points toward a growing Chinese academic interest in Somali language, society and affairs.

This may appear less consequential than investment or infrastructure, but it represents another form of power which is the epistemic power. Who studies Somalia matters. Who produces knowledge about Somali society matters. Who teaches Somali language matters. And who trains future specialists capable of interpreting Somalia matters.

For decades, much of the internationally influential knowledge about Somalia has been produced through Western universities, think tanks and international institutions. The emergence of Somali-focused academic engagement in China suggests that Beijing is gradually developing its own knowledge infrastructure through which it can understand Somali society and cultivate people capable of sustaining the relationship. China is therefore not simply increasing its presence in Somalia. It appears increasingly interested in developing the human, social and intellectual networks through which its presence can endure.