In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.
Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.
While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.
In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.
Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.
A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.
This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.
In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.
A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.
Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.
Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.
Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.
In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.
Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
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