The June 24 elections are over. As for the big picture, there is no surprise. Many analysts in Turkey predicted the results before the election day. The day before the elections, you also read in this column that Erdogan was likely to win the elections in the first round but with a divided parliament; the HDP votes, for the first time, would pass the MHP’s, and other projections as such. Nevertheless, the results are still full of depth to analyze, and here we go with a focus on ethnic voting patterns in Turkey.

Kurdish votes were expected to play a key role in the June 24 elections. As for the parliamentary elections, whether the HDP would exceed the 10% threshold would determine the AK Party’s chance to hold a majority in parliament. As for the presidential elections, the Kurdish votes mattered as well, which is natural because in an election that requires %50+1 votes to win, you cannot neglect any significant social segments. These novelties make it necessary to analyze the voting pattern in Turkey’s eastern cities where Kurds are thought to be significant demographically speaking.

The main results of the June 24th elections on these terms are:

• The AK Party and the HDP still dominate Turkey’s elections in the east.
• The HDP continued its loss in the region – as was the case in the latest general elections of November, 2015.
• Pre-electoral alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP.
• Turkey’s Kurdish votes do not act as a block but intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the region.

The AK Party and HDP still dominate Turkey’s elections in the east

In the eastern cities of Turkey, where the ethnic Kurdish population is in significant numbers, the competition took place between the AK Party and the HDP in this election. In the region, speaking of the parliamentary elections:

• The AK Party and the HDP shared the first spot in all the cities of the region. Whereas the AK Party won the first spot in 13 cities, the HDP came first in 11 (see map 1).

* these cities are chosen because they appear on the maps of the imaginary PKK state to be separated from Turkey. In other words, this is the area that the PKK calls Bakur (Northern) Kurdistan. In fact, the map is even conservative because some PKK maps also include cities such as Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Sivas where the HDP has no promising results at all.

• While the AK Party won 62 seats from these cities in total, the numbers for the HDP, CHP, and MHP seats are, respectively, 46, 11 and 7.
• The CHP and MHP have not topped the race in any of the cities in the region. Nevertheless, the CHP reserved second rank in Ardahan, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Hatay, Malatya and Tunceli. The MHP, on the other hand, came second in Elazig, Erzurum, Igdır and Kilis (see map 2).

• The AK Party came third and, hence, is not amongst the top two parties in Igdir and Tunceli. The HDP was not among the top three parties in Elazig, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis and Malatya (see map 3).

• In the cities of Erzincan and Kilis, AK Party won all the seats.
• As for the poorest performances, the HDP could receive only 2.3% of the votes in Kilis while AK Party stayed at 14.7 % in Tunceli.
• Hüda-Par can be seen to be successful compared to other minor ethnic Kurdish parties such as Hak-Par. Hak-Par candidates entered the elections with independent candidates yet its candidates could not exceed several hundred votes. When its independent candidates in Diyarbakir and Batman are also included, Hüda-Par received over 200,000 votes.

This column has addressed only one leg of the 24 June elections, parliamentary elections. If we had analyzed not the parties in the parliamentary elections but in the presidential elections, then the AK Party gets even brighter results. Given that Erdogan received more votes than his party whereas Demirtas below his party’s vote, the presidential elections in the region are much better off for the AK Party.

The other findings of the election results are as follows and will be analyzed in the upcoming column:

• The HDP has continued losing vote rates in the region as it was the case in the latest general elections of November, 2015.
• Pre-electoral alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP.

Eastern Turkey includes a multiplicity of ethnic groups. Other than ethnic identification, political salience of ethnicity also differs across cities in Eastern Turkey. Hence, Turkey’s Kurdish (and non-Kurdish) votes do not act as a block but intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the region.

During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.

Following the governing AK Party’s statements regarding the controversial referendum in northern Iraq, the two main opposition party leaders, Devlet Bahceli and Kemal Kilicdaroglu have also supported the government in its stance.

Leader of MHP, Bahceli, issued a written statement from the headquarters of the Nationalist Movement Party claiming that “it has become inevitable for Turkey to pursue an effective and comprehensive deterrence policy that includes the use of military force, and it has become inevitable for them to progressively determine coercive measures and gradually implement them.”

“This is a national security issue that cannot be underestimated by Turkey and I want to repeat that the Nationalist Movement party will stand with the government in its measures that it will take with determination in this regard.”

In the statement Bahceli said that the referendum brings a “message of a dark period” in the region, accusing Masoud Barzani of starting an “adventurous journey” that would end up with him “paying a heavy price and disappointment.”

The MHP leader added that “he [Barzani] will see how this childhood dream will turn into a nightmare.”

He called the poll a “piracy referendum” that had no legal and political legitimacy, adding that it is “void and condemned to stay on paper only.”

Earlier this week President Erdogan had only emphasized that the referendum was initiated by the KRG in order to secure the Barzani family’s political inclusion.

Moreover, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has urged for a common solution in regards to the aftermath of the referendum.

Talking to reporters in Ankara, the CHP leader called for Turkey, Iran and the central Iraqi government to find a common solution to the problem in northern Iraq following Monday’s controversial referendum.

“If a common solution can be produced, Turkey can make important progress on this issue.”

Kilicdaroglu also added that Turkey had demonstrated a “national stance” on the referendum and even its parliament was supporting this view.

Commercial, economic and political sanctions due

Prior to the referendum, President Erdogan had made it clear that if the Barzani administration do not listen to their calls, Turkey will not refrain from imposing political, economic and commercial sanctions on the KRG administration.

The first warning comes as the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council decides to remove 3 northern Iraq TV channels off air – K24, WAAR and Rudaw have been removed from Turkish satellite Turksat.

The decision was taken after the three channels called some parts of southeastern and eastern Turkey as “northern Kurdistan” in their television broadcast.

The channels did not have a license from RTUK, yet they were broadcasting the transmission using the license obtained from the KRG.

In addition to mere channel obstructions, the Turkish and Iraqi military have launched a joint military exercise on the Turkish-Iraqi border.

While Turkey had already started its military maneuvers in the southeastern Silopi region on September 18, a week ahead of the referendum, announcement of a joint exercise came after the vote took place.

A brief statement published on the Turkish General Staff’s official website announced that the third phase of the military exercise will start on Tuesday 3 October, jointly with the Iraqi military at the Habur border gate, also known as the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing, on the Turkish-Iraqi border in the Silopi district of Sirnak.

The area sits to the north of the Syrian and Iraqi borders and contains the Habur border crossing, which is the KRG’s main access point to the rest of the world.