The long-expected Tehran summit, which was aimed to bring a resolution to the heating Idlib problem on Syria took place on Friday, September 7. The tripartite summit of Turkey, Russia and the hosting country, Iran, also included bilateral talks between the leaders. As it appeared on the live speeches of Erdogan, Putin, and Rohani, the talks were hot and the positions were stiff, hence it was not an easy job for the leaders to meet around a common position. While the difficulties were obvious, the problem is heating for Idlib’s civilian population and the need for a resolution is imminent.

The joint statement of the summit included twelve points. According to the first point in the statement, the Astana process is regarded as successful for diminishing violence in Syria over the last one and half years. While this was the reason why Turkey backed the Astana process from the very beginning up until now, its effectiveness is questioned even by Turkey. The designated de-escalation zones (Idlib, parts of northern Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and Quneitra) worked for some time but the regime forces attacked them one by one with Iranian and Russian backing with one or another excuse. And now the last pocket of those, Idlib, has been sporadically targeted by air strikes for the last few days. In the summit, President Erdogan also stated his discontent with the destiny of the other three de-escalation zones and his concern about Idlib following the pattern.

The second point in the joint statement was more obviously agreeable with its emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria. This has been Turkey’s position since day one of the Syrian crisis. All the three actors genuinely share this position and this decisiveness can be interpreted as a handicap for the possible long-term goals of the U.S. in the east of the Euphrates River in Syria.

The rest of the points in the statement reaffirmed the three countries’ determination to continue their joint efforts for coordination. Turkey has proved to be a very collaborative actor for Iran and Russia but again, an fait accompli in Idlib will also shake Turkey’s trust in this trilateral cooperation and will put the future of this cooperation in danger.

From the perspective of Turkey, the joint statement is not the best possible text, but it is also not the worst. Of course Turkey would be happier if there was a clear warning to the PYD/PKK in the joint statement, but let us not forget that the summit was primarily about Idlib and hence, the absence of PYD-PKK linkages in the text is not a deal breaker for Turkey for now. This issue will be more and more important for Turkey when the attention will shift from Idlib to the northeast territories of Syria. Moreover, neither the PYD nor the Assad regime were represented in the Astana process or in the summits like the one in Tehran on Friday.

Another great thing about the summit would be if Russia and Iran fully agreed with Turkey’s concerns about the humanitarian crisis in Idlib in case it is attacked by the regime forces. Yes, the joint statement did not guarantee a fully peaceful solution over Idlib but this diplomatic traffic is still better than no diplomacy for Turkey, which is trying to eliminate the possibility of a bloodbath in Idlib. For Turkey, this diplomatic traffic is also a way to buy time as Ankara is enlarging the camps and increasing its capacity for relief around Idlib for a possible humanitarian crisis. After all, the odds for a larger scale attack in Idlib are very high but Turkey will try its best to postpone the battle until its relief mission is ready and also to minimize the battleground to narrower circles by keeping the heaviest populated areas of Idlib out. After all, Idlib’s future cannot be left to the radical groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham but it can also not be left to the regime, which is likely to carry out mass killings. Until a final resolution is adopted on the future of Syria, Turkey will play its fair role in Idlib to keep itself safe from possible threats to be originated from Idlib and to keep the city’s civilian population safe from Assad’s rockets and dungeons.

The Tehran summit on the future of the Idlib region is over, but the Idlib conundrum continues. The final meeting of the summit was interestingly broadcasted live so that the participating nations could raise their position publicly regarding the Idlib issue. It was a textbook example demonstrating competing discourses and strategies that frame the participating nations’ policy justification regarding the situation, not only in the Idlib region but also in Syria. President Erdogan encouraged Russia and Iran to accept a ceasefire in Idlib by saying that the people of the region hold many anxieties about the catastrophic consequences of the aerial bombing by Russia and Syria. He also mentioned that such an accord would be a victory of the summit.

However, Turkey’s cease-fire call was rejected by Russia and Iran. President Putin responded that “a cease-fire would be good.” Putin also mentioned that representatives of terrorist organizations have enough common sense to stop resistance and lay down their weapons. It was evident that President Erdogan underlined the importance of the cease-fire for the civilian people who might be targeted by Russian air bombardment.

Turkey’s priorities regarding Syria are still shaped by the same parameters as the final declaration of the summit shows. Territorial integrity has always been a central component of Ankara’s concerns regarding the Syrian crisis. President Erdogan underlined the terrorist threat by referring to the growing relationship between the U.S. and the PYD, which is the PKK’s Syrian branch. As it can also be understood through the Russian and Iranian leaders’ statements during the meeting, the U.S presence in the northern part of Syria is not welcomed as it undermines Syrian territorial integrity and Turkey’s national security. This concern was directly mentioned in the final statement of the meeting.

However, as compared to the previous Astana summits, in the final communique of the Tehran summit, Turkey, Russia, and Iran framed Syria concerning its official name: the Syrian Arab Republic (three times). This is an important signal to see Turkey’s “new” position regarding the Syrian regime, as Turkey always tends to prefer the Assad regime instead of using SAR.

In addition to the strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria Turkey, Russia and Iran also revealed the “sovereignty” of the Syrian state in the final declaration of the meeting. From a personal point of view, it is unclear to me how Turkey locates the sovereignty of the Syrian state over the entire country which has been divided into many parts, in which Turkey also holds some part of it. More importantly, how Turkey understands the domestic dimension of the SAR’s sovereignty is not clear. This shows also how the PKK threat shapes Turkey’s understanding of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, the Tehran summit is interesting to understand whether Turkey’s perception of the solution of the Syrian crisis has shifted.

As the final statement of the meeting underlines, the UN is the most important component of Turkey’s perspective regarding the Syrian crisis. In the joint statement, Turkey, Russia, and Iran reiterated the importance of the UN and underlined that the Syria crisis could only reach a final resolution through a negotiated political process, not military means.

How the Idlib issue will be solved is still unclear as there was no mentioning of any mechanism to prevent the Russian and Syrian regime’s full-scale military assault on Idlib, but it seems that Turkey’s proposal was partly accepted by Russia and Iran. Before the summit, there were three scenarios: limited intervention against the radical groups such as HTS in particular places, full-scale military intervention and, finally, allowing Turkey to dissolve and disband the radical groups. At this stage, it is claimed that Turkey has given HTS a week deadline to respond to Turkey’s proposal of dissolving and disbanding the group. From news on the ground, the group will only accept the proposal if Russia and Syria give an end to their attacks.

The Tehran summit underlined the importance of the Astana summit and Turkey’s role in the resolution process of the Syrian crisis, but it also showed the difficulties for Turkey, particularly during the emergency time on the ground. 

May 2017 has been a historic month for Turkish diplomacy. President Erdoğan had one-on-one meetings with leaders of prominent countries including the US, Russia, China and India. The importance of the month for Turkish foreign policy is due to the number, diversity and timing of meetings, rather than their content. These meetings may have the potential to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy, which has been stuck in a defensive mode since 2014 due to the Syrian Civil War and domestic political issues, and now is expected to take a new direction. Turkey’s active involvement in the Qatar crisis is also an important sign of returning to pro-active diplomacy and mediation efforts.

These proactive steps taken to shape Turkey’s foreign policy vision and its framework were not indicative of a clear strategic disposition, but were tactical attempts to widen Turkey’s shrinking economic and strategic field. For these steps to acquire a strategic quality, Turkey has to make an agreement with at least Russia, the US or the EU, which Turkey has fluctuating relations with.

Turkey’s relations with the US are expected to stay fragile due to Washington’s insistence on supporting the PKK in Syria. With the EU, Germany will be the determining factor but stagnant relations seem likely to continue until Germany’s federal parliamentary elections. Among these three actors, Russia seems to be the most viable option for a positive structural change in the short run.

Whether to cooperate with Russia in strategic terms is a vital question for Turkey. This cooperation has the potential to directly affect Turkey’s relations with the EU and the US. However, contrary to economic relations, Russia seems to be refraining from negotiations with Turkey at an equal level, along with binding diplomatic actions. Ankara’s negotiation with Moscow to buy the S-400 air missile defense system is an important move that has strategic value, but any strategic effort with Russia has the potential to be overshadowed by friction between the two countries when it comes to Syria.

Limitations of Strategic Cooperation

The most prominent diplomatic meetings in May were the ones with the leaders of the US and Russia. The main focus of both the meetings was to manage the effects of the Syrian Civil War on Turkey and limit the support being given to the PYD/YPG. The crisis which emerged with the downing of the Russian SU-24 aircraft by the Turkish Armed Forces in November 2015 ended with Erdoğan and Putin’s meeting in Sochi in May 2016. While the normalization process between the two countries is often described as being complete, there are still disparities in bilateral relations.

Due to their diverging positions with the US and EU, Turkey was forced to take the path of least resistance during this process. Even though Turkey tried to use the relations with Russia as a counterbalance for the strained relations with the West, it could be said that it was not a complete success. Despite the warm messages from the Moscow, Russia has utilized Turkey’s isolation from the West for its own interests.

http://thenewturkey.org/rebalancing-turkey%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/

Breaking away from this strategic congestion difficult because without a significant detachment from the West, Turkey has little chance to develop a strategic relation with Russia. This kind of disengagement would leave Turkey more vulnerable and in a disadvantaged position as Turkey and Russia’s strategic vision on the Middle East, the Balkans and the Black Sea are mostly contradictory.

Russia would see Turkey’s disconnection from the West as a sign of weakness and a chance to impose its own will. It is also possible for Turkey to have worse tension with Russia than it does today with the EU and the US. Turkey seemingly will have a hard time in overcoming this paradox in the short term. Conducting meticulous diplomacy that does not antagonize any of these actors should be Turkey’s priority.

Despite the disparities on Syria’s future, Turkey and Russia establishing a joint political platform during the Astana Summit is a positive development. Even though Russia takes Turkey’s concerns about the PYD into consideration, it has also kept the possibility for cooperation with the Syrian Kurds on the table. Russia is simultaneously attempting to keep relations with Turkey at a certain level and not letting the US have all the influence over the PYD. For Russia, a partial agreement with Turkey on Syria means counterbalancing Iran’s influence in Syria. Restraining Iran would also prove useful for the regime.

Meanwhile, Turkey having various operations in Syria, such as the Operation Euphrates Shield, which aimed to establish a presence on the field, serves as a potential risk to the relations with Russia. A closer look at this complex web of relations reveals that all actors are trying to counterbalance each other, especially in the context of Syria. Turkey, due to its strained relations with the US and EU, is at a disadvantaged in this game.

Search for Balance in Trade

In terms of trade, limitations on Turkish agricultural exports to Russia were largely removed and a partial agreement reached between Turkey and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia continues to enforce limitations on tomatoes, which are an important agricultural export item for Turkey. After the meeting between the Turkish and Russian leaders, Turkish tourism business leaders were relieved and entered the new tourism season with more hope. The issues in fields where mutual interest is at hand were resolved quickly and the two sides cooperate in many cases; however, it is not possible to talk about similar progress or agreement in strategic issues.

The most important field of cooperation between Turkey and Russia that has a strategic aspect is energy. While multinational platforms like the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization diversify Turkey’s economic and diplomatic relations in terms of both quantity and quality, these platforms offer little strategic value for Turkey. None of Turkey’s strategic priorities can be addressed with a deeper level of cooperation with these organizations.

Turkey’s economy is dependent on the EU, whose member countries account for Turkey’s largest foreign trade volume. While Indian, Chinese and especially the Gulf markets have gained prominence for Turkey, the volume of Turkey’s exports to these countries is still below a level that could compete with trade with the EU. Chinese and Indian markets do not offer a rich potential that could lead to the creation of substantial employment in Turkey in the short and midterm. In terms of exports, Turkey has yet to find alternative markets that can compensate if there are any hiccups with the EU market. Turkey’s fragility in its European relations lies in trade, rather than security and diplomacy. Turkey’s alternatives to the European markets are much more limited than Europe’s. Creating market options besides the European one has become a strategic aspect for Turkey.

A game-changing strategic agreement in terms of economy, security and foreign policy seems impossible for Turkey in the short term. Turkey and Russia’s joint initiative on the de-confliction zones in Syria is an important venue for strategic cooperation. Most pressing issue for the Kremlin is, however, the choice between tactical ally in Syria, the PYD, and a possible strategic partnership with Turkey. Turkey’s most essential dilemma, on the other hand, is to try to achieve a strategic alliance either with the US or with Russia, while keeping which one would be the right choice in mind, to overcome the impasse in foreign policy and security aspects that were caused by the Syrian Civil War. The disagreement of the said two powers causes the elongation of the Syrian war. On the other hand, an agreement between them could leave Turkey out of the loop.