Relations between Turkey and the U.S. are underway fundamental challenges following the U.S. administration’s reaction to Pastor Andrew Brunson, who has been under house arrest since July 8. The tension reached peak due to the remarks made by Washington and Ankara regarding the freezing of two American officials’ assets – namely interior and justice ministers. However, given President Erdogan’s treatment of the issue, the continuation of diplomatic contact between the two countries at the highest level of crisis, and the preferences of President Trump, an expectation emerged that will help to overcome the Brunson crisis. It should be expected that the Brunson crisis will be overcome shortly. However, both sides have to intensify efforts in order to close down the deeply-rooted political rift in Turkey-U.S. relations.

One of the primary things that have to be accomplished shortly after the resolution of the tension is to redefine bilateral relations on a very realistic ground. For this reason, both sides need to communicate and understand the significant global, regional and domestic challenges that constrain relations. To do so, both sides should avoid conceptualizing bilateral ties within the framework of “strategic partnership,” “model partnership” and “alliance” – terms that have never entirely fulfilled the Turkish-American cooperation objectives. This, in turn, requires also the recalculation of the long-term strategic vision of Turkish foreign policy. It is important to note that Turkish-American relations are at the center of Turkish foreign policy if the existing foreign policy engagements of Turkey are taken into consideration, particularly in the Middle East region.

At this stage, both sides should analyze the real damages caused following the multidimensional conjectural crisis in Turkey-U.S. relations. Later on, it is also necessary to make a list of possible short-term problems that have been encountered in Turkey-U.S. relations and make clear what can be done and what cannot be to recover bilateral relations.

Managing the lack of trust in bilateral relations

The most important issue that both sides should bear in mind about damage assessment is the lack of trust in bilateral relations. The lack of trust between states is one of the oldest hidden rules of international relations. States usually do not trust each other. There is a simple explanation for that; a state can never be sure whether the intention of another state is good or not. It is possible to make a list of issues that fueled the lack of mutual trust between Turkey and the U.S. One of the most important reasons, and perhaps the most unlikely to be overcome soon is the role of the U.S. in the July 15 coup attempt. It is not possible to say that Turkish public opinion on this subject is very positive, given that Fetullah Gulen, the commander of the July 15 military coup, remains free in the U.S. and other members of FETO perceive the U.S. as a safe haven. The issue of lack of trust is not limited to this. With the support of the U.S., the PYD-YPG, the political and military branch of the PKK, enjoys its terrorist insurgency against Turkey. This further deepens the lack of trust between the two countries. Turkey strongly believes that providing more space to the PYD-YPG consolidates the PKK’s political and military power that ultimately undermine Turkey’s national security.

The crisis of the lack of trust in bilateral relations is not one-sided. The U.S. administration does not perceive Turkey as a “reliable ally.” From the U.S. strategic view, Turkey refuses to join the U.S. strategy towards Iran, continues to work with Russia, and undermines Trump’s Israel strategy. Therefore, the lack of trust is reciprocal.

The second issue emerges as a result of the lack of trust. Turkey has a serious difference as compared to the U.S. in addressing global issues. Turkey criticizes the U.S.-centric international order, believes that the international order should be reformed and underlines that the U.S. undermines the very nature of the international order, which is based on universal norms and institutions. Therefore, Turkey seeks to establish a more balanced international order. To do so, Turkey is working with the alternative power centers such as Russia and China to develop an alternative relationship and seeks to consolidate its relations with the rising powers to balance out the U.S.-centric international order.

Harmonization of foreign and security policies

Even if the conjectural crises experienced in bilateral relations are to be overcome shortly, the harmonization of foreign and security policies, which is the primary driving factor of the lack of trust, is crucial for the re-positioning of Turkey-U.S. relations. However, the issues that the two countries have to deal with in the near future are very complex in nature. One of the first issues that both sides should think about is Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. Turkey does not embrace any foreign policy option that could threaten U.S national security and territorial integrity, unlike the U.S. administration. If Washington D.C. maintains its current strategy regarding PKK presence in northern Syria and does not prevent the PKK from threatening Turkey’s national security, the U.S. may face a stricter face of Turkish military activism in the region. Immediately after the Brunson crisis is overcome, both sides have to develop a more comprehensive strategy on how the Manbij model will be implemented towards the other regions in northern Syria. This strategy should not be handled separately from the general solution to the Syrian crisis.

Even if the PKK problem in Syria is overcome, it is unlikely that the two countries will share the same strategy on Israel after the Brunson crisis. A new political structure has emerged in Washington and the Middle East following the Trump administration’s Al-Quds decision. The Washington administration has an agenda that gives Israel a “blank check” on its policy towards Palestine. In the region, there is also a turning point in the policy of Arab states towards Palestine. Turkey is the only country in the region that has many objections against the policy of “abandoning Palestine.” Turkey’s Israel policy will be directly affected by its relations with the U.S.

After the Brunson crisis, the more difficult issue that the two countries are unlikely to overcome is Turkey’s desire to obtain an air defense system from Russia. Provided that the Turkish administration ultimately receives the S-400 systems at the end of 2019, the U.S. administration might impose a series of additional sanctions against Turkey. One of the first results of this purchase will be seen in Turkey-U.S. military relations. The U.S. considers removing Turkey from the F-35 program. Another short-term problem that can potentially disrupt bilateral relations is the Trump administration’s strategy towards Iran. Turkey believes that the new U.S. strategy on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region and undermine Turkey’s trade relations with Iran. Turkey’s early reaction against the U.S. administration’s decision about imposing new sanctions against Tehran highlights that Turkey will not follow the U.S. strategy. Therefore, the U.S.-Iran conflict would bring more instability to the U.S.-Turkey relations.

As long as there is no structural change on the regional or global level, it is not true that Turkey-U.S. relations will collapse. In this transition period, it is necessary to contain the costs of damage for both sides. Therefore, in the post-Brunson Turkey-U.S. relations, both sides should carefully follow a damage control policy. One of the most fundamental things that the Turkish administration should be aware of is the fact that under the Trump administration no single strategic logic can run bilateral relations and other regional issues. For this reason, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to remind itself that the tensions in Turkey-U.S. relations are shaped by mutual foreign policy choices rather than a single actor-centered determination.

When a glance is taken at the history of Turkey-U.S. relations, it becomes evident that the relations follow a rough course. Even though the tradition of initiating this relation dates back to the Cold War era (1945), one could tell that the contact that was attempted in the 19th century at the last Ottoman period was full of issues. Along with the 1947 Truman Doctrine, Turkey had attracted American attention on a strategic level. As a result of the 1952 NATO membership, Turkey became part of a relation that was going through an institutionalization process on military and political levels.

Unfortunately, since then, cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. has not been exempt from issues. Putting the idea of being exempt aside, it is possible to argue that the course of Turkish-American relations has had direct impacts on Turkish politics. The cause of these issues has been the fact that the U.S. administration portrays Turkey as a passive operator of its own strategies. In other words, the U.S. has considered Turkey as a country to facilitate American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East without hesitation. This consideration has prepared the ground for an interfering character over time. The American interference in Turkish politics, including the facilitation of military-coups and enforcement of a series of unjustified political methods, have resulted in the deterioration of relations between the two countries. Consequently, this situation has given birth to a deep trust problem in bilateral relations. Since 1945, due to a lack of structural change in international systems, the conjunctural crises in Turkey-U.S. relations have been left behind and repaired in one way or another. However, along with the 2003 Iraq invasion, the fluctuations experienced in relations have taken deeper structural forms as opposed to short-term interest discrepancies.

Even though the international system continues to be U.S.-centric, Turkey’s perception of this system, the partial transformation experienced within the system (proliferation of power centers), the change of Ankara’s priorities in terms of its foreign policy, as well as the tensions and fractions experienced in the geopolitical environment involving Turkey make it even more difficult to overcome the crises in Turkey-U.S. relations.

Therefore, it is not possible to take the newly emerged Pastor Brunson crisis out of this context. It is also not quite possible to overlook the new evangelist, conservative and extreme right religio-political identity of U.S. foreign policy that has accelerated under the Trump administration when examining the Pastor Brunson case. More importantly, it is worth noting that the Brunson case is likely to be used for leverage in the upcoming elections by the Trump-Pence duo. The difference between Trump and Pence is also notable here. Trump is very likely to make use of any tools at his disposal to continue his presidency, and this fact is not only limited to Turkey. Trump’s interactions with countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia also prove this point. However for the vice president, Pence, this situation contains more ontological reasons. Pence’s expressions, relationships, and foreign policy engagements lie in the heart of evangelist political existence. The cases of Pastor Brunson and Jerusalem both represent a ‘clash of civilizations’ and even a ‘religious-conflict.’ This should be noted as the most significant exposal of the messianic wave in U.S. foreign policy.

The reparation of Turkey-U.S. relations is now more challenging

Today, the crucial pillars of the Turkey-U.S. relations have been weakened, and this makes it even more challenging to overcome the bilateral crises.

The Cold War led Turkey to position itself in the Western bloc under American supervision. However, Turkey no longer positions itself as such. Furthermore, the current international system is no longer unipolar, which enables regional actors to obtain wider impact zones. It is possible to examine the Middle East, where most actors have acquired independent policies apart from American interests to comprehend this phenomenon.

Nowadays, being part of the Western bloc represents nothing but a means of strategic, economic and political engagement for Turkey. Thus, U.S. supervision is no longer seen as necessary when it comes to Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, the Turkey-U.S. relations are now being redefined with factors including anti-Americanism and American-suspicion. From now on, the U.S. is positioned as ‘the other’ of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish state identity. Turkey is no longer an advocate or critic of an American-centric liberal international system, and that is not because Turkey disapproves a liberal world order, but because it is one of those state actors that advocate a fair restructuring.

It is now evident that Turkey and the U.S. have lost intersections when it comes to their foreign policy objectives. The U.S. is reluctant to respond to Turkey’s security concerns, and as compared to the beginning of the 2000s, there is less cooperation between the two states. In fact, due to the cases of S-400s, Jerusalem, Syria, Iraq and Iran, they are far apart regarding opinion. Turkey’s regional foreign policy priorities do not approve American regional foreign policy approaches and generate ‘troubles.’ Iran sets a good example in this regard. Even though Turkey is upset about Iran’s regional policies, and disapproves the Iranian Nuclear program just as much as the U.S., it does not support the harsh American policy towards Iran.

Even though it is possible to argue that the military pillar of the Turkey-U.S. relations, NATO, stands still, it cannot compromise the issues experienced as a whole. Within this framework, it is clear that even more challenging periods are awaiting, and it can be argued that relations between the two can worsen.  If Turkey can level up in the international system and increase its share of power through the new system change, it could also fix the asymmetric issues in its relations with the U.S. More importantly, if Turkey has taken the initiative to step out of the Western bloc, it should create a new identity complying with real power capacity and means. The first thing that comes to mind in such a context is the ‘alternative world’ definition. The issue that requires attention is that actors such as Russia cannot replace the U.S., as superpowers. Instead of leaning towards power dilemmas, Turkey should establish its own independent identity. Despite the issues experienced by the U.S., Turkey’s foreign policy practices still carry a transatlantic nature. This character cannot be changed all of a sudden. Therefore, Ankara should be careful regarding reducing costs. It is necessary for Turkey to stand firm against the insistent and menacing behaviors, the country should respond to every single step taken by the U.S. determined to proceed with its independent foreign policy.

On August 1, 2018, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Department of the Treasury  announced that two high-level government officials of Turkey, namely Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister of Interior Suleyman Soylu were sanctioned. The main motivation of taking the measure was the detention of Pastor Brunson.

The OFAC relied on an Executive Order which was signed by President Trump to mainly target individuals from different countries, such as Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Serbia and so on. The President finds his authority to issue this Executive Order in widely different laws. For instance, the first one was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which was the one of the charges brought against Hakan Atilla. The second law was the National Emergencies Act (NEA) that was enacted in 1976 and gives the President the authority to declare “national emergency” under certain circumstances. The third law mentioned in the Executive Order was the notorious Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act) which was enacted in 2012 to target certain Russian officials who were responsible for the loss of Sergei Magnitsky’s life in a prison under serious human rights violations. While the target was initially Russian individuals, Congress invented this legal tool, giving it to the executive power to target other foreign individuals as well. The final legal text was the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which is related to the immigration and citizenship law in the domestic law of the U.S.

The recent action taken by OFAC raises a question as to how the Executive Authority chooses this legal basis. Although OFAC mentioned the Magnitsky Act specifically in its announcement, it is not precise whether the Magnitsky Act was the only legal basis of this decision. In other words, OFAC explained that the action taken “pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption,” which builds upon Treasury’s Global Magnitsky Act authorities, albeit it did not specify whether the Magnitsky Act was the only basis. Therefore, it was unclear whether the other abovementioned laws, such as IEEPA or NEA, were at issue when deciding to impose sanctions. These laws require the President to determine whether the situation in Turkey constitutes a national emergency or unusual or extraordinary threat for the U.S.

Since OFAC frequently mentions “serious human rights abuses” in their claim, it is implied the only legal basis relied on was the Magnitsky Act. The OFAC’s allegations against two ministers raise several doubts whether OFAC interpreted the text of the Magnitsky Act properly. Section 1263 of the Magnitsky Act requires two different things for the president to determine. First, the president needs to determine the violation of human rights occurred, and second, the targeted individual is responsible for this violation. According to this one page explanation, these determinations hardly appear. The responsibility was understood by OFAC as a mere political responsibility which does not necessitate any concrete evidence to show why these people officials bear responsibility.

The other problematic aspect of the interpretation of the Magnitsky Act is related to the level of seriousness of the abuse of human rights. The text of the law specifies this level as “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” It also gave examples of internationally recognized human rights as torture and extrajudicial killings. However, OFAC left no detailed analysis of what level of human rights abuses in Turkey attained to qualify the situation in Turkey as “serious human rights abuses.” It is difficult to declare Turkey as a country of “serious human rights abuses” based on the alleged violation of rights of one individual. Nevertheless, in the case of Brunson it is not plausible to claim that the principles of due process and fair trial are seriously violated by the Turkish authorities.

The future of the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey is difficult to predict because of the unexpected and unclear scope of the sanctions. At first glance, claiming the responsibility of these two individuals implies that OFAC put the responsibility on the two government officials exclusively. However, then it is reported that the scope of sanctions against Turkish officials may broaden, including many more individuals and entities. It is fair to conclude that these legal tools were used to gain a leverage in U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

Turkey’s official Anadolu News Agency reported that Brunson, 50, an evangelical Christian pastor originally from North Carolina, was let out of jail to serve home detention because of “health problems” which were not further specified.

Brunson was charged with spying for the PKK, a designated terrorist group in the U.S. and Turkey, and the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) which orchestrated the defeated coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

The cleric denies the charges.

The Izmir 2nd High Criminal Court said Brunson would be electronically monitored and barred from leaving his house. The cleric left prison with a police escort after completing certain procedures.

Brunson, who has lived in Turkey for 23 years serving as the pastor of Izmir Resurrection Church, is also prohibited from leaving Turkey.

The court decided to allow Brunson to live at his home address in Izmir, and as his trial continues his “abandonment of residence” is prohibited and he is also banned from leaving the country.

If convicted, he will face up to 15 years in prison for “committing crimes on behalf of terror groups without being a member” and another 20 years if he is found guilty of espionage.

The pastor’s detention has strained ties between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO Allies are already at loggerheads for some time.

Citing Brunson’s case and Turkey’s plan to buy the S-400 missile system from Russia, U.S. senators are pushing to delay Turkey’s acquisition of American-made F-35 fighter jets.

President Trump and Vice President Pence’s Twitter bluster

On Twitter, U.S. President Trump threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey if Ankara continues to refuse to free Brunson.

“The United States will impose large sanctions on Turkey for their long time detainment of Pastor Andrew Brunson,” Trump tweeted. “He is suffering greatly. This innocent man of faith should be released immediately!”

Trump called Brunson “a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being.”

Previous to this tweet, again on Twitter, Trump tweeted that the detention is a “total disgrace.” “He has done nothing wrong, and his family needs him!” Trump tweeted.

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaking in Washington D.C., at a conference on religious freedom hosted by the U.S. State Department, made a similar threat of “significant sanctions” against Ankara over the imprisoned pastor.

Pence, threatened President Erdogan and the Turkish government via Twitter to “be prepared to face consequences if Pastor Andrew Brunson is not released immediately.

Evangelical support for Pastor Brunson

The reason why Brunson’s detention has received so much attention is due to the evangelical Christian lobby in the U.S. – as they are among the president’s most reliable supporters. The White House has been pressured by these groups to take steps in order to ensure Brunson’s release.

On Wednesday Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also expressed his opinion about the decision of the Turkish court to place Brunson under house arrest.

“We welcome long overdue news that Pastor [Andrew Craig] Brunson has been moved from prison to house arrest in Turkey,” Pompeo said in a tweet.

Pompeo, described the court’s decision as “not enough” while he added that there is “no credible evidence” against Brunson.

Turkey’s response

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also responded to the statements of the White House on Twitter, saying, “We will never tolerate threats from anybody.”

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry insisted that the Brunson Case is under Turkey’s jurisdiction as a sovereign state, and told the Anadolu Agency that the White House’s rhetoric was “unacceptable.”

“With regard to the Brunson case, necessary information has been provided to our U.S. counterparts on various occasions and it has been clearly expressed that this issue is totally within the competence of the independent Turkish judiciary,” the ministry added.

After the threats of Trump and Pence via Twitter, Ankara’s Ambassador to Washington, Serdar Kilic, said that the United States should not resort to threats against Turkey.

“My message was crystal clear; No one should expect Turkey to give in to threats and that as an Ally US should not resort to threats against us,” the Ambassador said in a post on his Twitter account, adding his disappointment that U.S. authorities had failed to take his explicit advice at all levels into consideration.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan