As Turkey has entered into the atmosphere of early elections, there is one crucial question that begs to be answered: Why does the opposition in Turkey fail to win elections?

In order to win an election, political parties are supposed to create the most inclusive identity. This involves political parties to steer the majority of societal demands to themselves and articulate these demands within their constitutive discourses. For instance, a political party that pursues liberal-democratic politics is to argue that social problems such as underdevelopment or discrepancy between the rich and poor or ethnic and religious discrimination, or the absence of rule of law could only be solved if society embraces liberal democracy. From this perspective, if a political party cannot win an election or hold on to power, this means that the identity it offers was not the most inclusive or that society does not find it persuasive.

In Turkey the opposition, which is mainly formed by the secular-nationalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) and its constituents in society, suffers that shortcoming. The identity that the opposition offers, which is based on a secularist-nationalist discourse, is not that inclusive. This secularist-nationalist politics denies the demands of conservative and Kurdish sects of society, which constitute the majority of voters, at least 65-70 percent. Those demands are excluded on the ground that they menace Turkey’s long march to modernization and jeopardize the country’s unity and integrity.

Despite this, secular-nationalist politics fails to obtain sociological legitimacy. The equivalence between modernity and secular-nationalism played a central role for the Kemalist forces to sustain their political and international legitimacy in the pre-2002 period. In that period they held on to power by means of bureaucratic tutelage, yet suffered enormous democratic legitimacy. Due to these authoritarian policies, the Kemalists did not win a single election since 1950, when Turkey switched to a multi-party parliamentary system and held its first free elections in the Republican period.

The opposition kept clinching on to its secular-nationalist politics even after the AK Party rule started in 2002. The AK Party strived to lay the ground for democratic politics in the sense of emptying the place of power. This process of democratization gradually alienated the Kemalist forces from the state. Once this process of alienation was completed around 2010, the Kemalist CHP became the opposition party in real terms. Hence, it has left aside its secular-nationalist politics, which was functional in sustaining the identification between the Kemalists and the state, and adopted the discourse of democracy. However, this shift has not yielded the expected results. CHP lost all elections – the parliamentary elections in 2011, 7 June 2015 and 1 November 2015, the presidential elections in August 2014, the referendum of April 2017, and the local elections in 2014.

There are two reasons for these series of failures. First of all, in order to win an election by democratic discourse, there has to be a situation where there is a strong identification and integration between the ruling power and the state (there are democratic and non-democratic ways of doing this). As long as the ruling power observe the basic principle of democratic politics which keeps the place of power empty – that means allowing the transfer of power through free elections and respecting the presence of opposition parties within a multiparty setting and agreeing to share power with them if the conditions require so – the discourse of democracy does not help winning an election. Since the AK Party has in general abode by the basic norms and rules of democratic politics, this “negative” form of democratic politics has not delivered the expected results.

Secondly, as noted above, democracy also requires producing the most inclusive definition of demos by absorbing the majority of societal demands in order to win an election. This constitutes the “positive” side of democratic politics. Failing in this results in losing the elections and holding on to power. The opposition has so far failed to put forward the largest and most inclusive identity. This requires bringing together either the Kurdish nationalists or the secular-nationalist sections of society on the basis of secular politics or its secular-nationalist sociology with the conservative-religious sections of society on the basis of a form of right wing nationalism. The former backfires due to persistent nationalism of its constituents whereas the latter results in nothing due to their hard headed secularist tendencies.

Therefore, the options before the opposition comes to be either to transform the secular-nationalist identity of its constituent in order to bring them together with other identity groups or find a new identity basis that transcends secular-conservative and Turkish-Kurdish nationalist fault lines in society. Failing in both leaves CHP with the option of making the country ungovernable. Sadly, this disruptive politics is what the CHP has followed for a while. And it seems that it will continue to do so.

While the July 15 coup attempt and the immediate aftermath produced a unified synergy in favor of democracy, in the year since then this has not been the case. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in particular initially stated they were against all kinds of coups, yet lately they have made certain unjustifiable allegations that could cast a shadow on the process of uncovering the truth about the night of July 15, 2016.

The most obvious indication of a unified anti-coup synergy was the spontaneous reaction by Turkish politicians on July 15 and July 16, and the Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım and the Chairman of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were never-ending advocators of democracy in all circumstances. CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also made similar strong statements against the coup attempt. The main catalyst for this active resistance against the coup attempt was in fact the message conveyed by President Erdoğan via Face Time that night, when he called for a unified national reaction.

The next day, all politicians formed a more unified nationalist stance against the coup attempt. Chief of the General Staff Hulusi Akar too attended parliament at the moment, and was an indispensable component of this anti-coup bloc. In the session, the Chief of the Parliament İsmail Kahraman said “our national anthem is our manifesto and we are all united nation.” Prime Minister Yıldırım said “all those who are involved in the coup attempt are traitors, regardless of their military ranks” after thanking all political politicians for their support. Kılıçdaroğlu said “this is definitely a coup attempt against our Republic and our traditions.” Bahçeli too said that “with the coup attempt, coup collaborators embedded into the Turkish army were identified and clarified.” HDP Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş was not able to attend the parliamentary talks as he was out of the Ankara; however, HDP spokesman İdris Baluken asserted that they were against all kinds of military coups.

The most critical aspects of a joint declaration passed then by the four political parties’ was: “the condemnation of the coup attack against the people and the parliament” and “the protection of the national will by four main political parties in spite of their political differences.” Namely, high political tension among political parties before the coup attempt transformed into a unified national stance against the coup, especially in the first days.

In this atmosphere, the Yenikapı bloc was formed not only by political parties but also by the people, who came from various ideological segments of the society. The most prominent aspect of the Yenikapı bloc was the sharp stance against all kinds of coups and a clarity about the identities and aims of the perpetrators. A national stance, one that included the cooperation of civil and military institutions, soon emerged against FETO, whose mafia-like organization and illegal actions were uncovered. Unfortunately, this unity started to crumble in a short period of time. After the national declaration at the parliament, politicians reiterated anti-coup messages for days; however, the CHP and HDP’s hesitant disposition in this matter distanced them from their initial political reflexes.

The Yenikapı Demonstration on August 7 was organized as the second platform to demonstrate national unity against the coup attempt, after the first one in parliament on July 16. Yet, the HDP was the first to stay out of this second unified platform. Demirtaş made unjustifiable accusations about the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) involvement in the coup, both while he was in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the HDP once again fell into the trap of illegal activities, just like it had with its treatment of Kurdish politics, with its disposition towards the coup attempt. Idris Baluken’s tweet: “AKP-CHP-MHP partnership isn’t new; it’s an alliance against Kurds since June 7 with the excuse of the survival of the state and fight against terrorism” was the confirmation and declaration of the HDP’s excluding itself from the anti-coup alliance. The HDP’s absence at the Yenikapı Demonstration was also a sign of their unsustainable image in the new path of Turkish politics.

On the other hand, the CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu declined to attend the Yenikapı Demonstration initially, saying “Erdoğan tried to increase his political influence on the people through criticizing the opposition party.” However, after Erdoğan and Yıldırım’s insistence, the CHP chairman changed his mind saying “we will attend the Yenikapı demonstration for the same reason we were at the parliament on the night of the coup attempt.” At the same time, he underlined that he would continue to be a legal part of the Turkish politics by accepting the invitation. The MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli announced that they were against the coup attempt, and beyond taking part in the demonstration, they also supported the government in these difficult days without wavering.  Bahçeli maintained his stable political stance behind the AK Party during the Yenikapı Demonstration and during the constitutional referendum campaign. The MHP saw itself as an important proponent of the political and institutional change the AK Party wanted to see in Turkey.

As a part of his “No” campaign in the lead up to the 16 April referendum, and a part of his general “anti-Erdoğan” campaign, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu tried again to discuss unproven speculative details of the coup attempt in the public sphere and thus he took unexpected risks both socially and politically. CHP politicians abused clear evidences of the coup attempt for their inter-party politics. By reiterating claims first made by Fetullah Gülen that “the coup was planned and controlled,” the CHP’s view converged with that of FETO.

These statements by Kılıçdaroğlu became a signal of just how marginalized he had become from the national political scene. In order to counteract Erdoğan’s politics, Kılıçdaroğlu started to voice uncertain statements that downplayed the treacherous and violent aspects of the coup attempt. Abstaining from the anti-coup bloc thus was a calculated political mistake, and the balance of national unity was tipped against the HDP and CHP politicians who involved themselves in that alliance.

In the CHP’s report on the July 15 Coup Attempt, the expression “controlled coup” was reiterated. These implications and disinformation about the coup attempt have created a controversial discourse that is also harmful to the fight against these kinds of illegal bloody attacks. In any case, these allegations circulated by the CHP did not bear fruit, and were seen by the public as more attempts by the party to criticize the AK Party’s policies.

What is being done by the CHP and HDP is actually an attempt to downplay the government’s success in thwarting the coup attempt through inter-party political quarrels. Ultimately, the CHP’s allegation that the government – which was in fact the main target of the coup attempt – was responsible for July 15 was viewed by the people as simply a part of the party’s constricted politics.

The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu has made an allegation this week; actually, it would be more accurate to say that he has reiterated an allegation that he had made in January. “On July 15, a controlled coup attempt was realized,” said he.

We have a saying in Turkish which can be roughly translated as “it’s not enough to claim insanity; to be truly insane, you have to blab nonsense.” It seems that the main opposition leader has found his source of nonsense. In fact, the members of Fetullah Gülen’s cult loved this allegation and immediately showed their support. Even though this allegation doesn’t acquit them, they believe that it will eventually catch up with Erdoğan, causing him to lose support. They even could be the originators of the allegation, as it’s not something they haven’t done. They have already fabricated countless contradictory versions about what happened on July 15. Gülen himself and his men have made these claims at various times through different channels both in Turkey and abroad. The most famous is the following: “The junta was organized by Erdoğan. The junta consisted of Kemalist personnel, maybe some of our [Gülen’s] men were also in it; however, Erdoğan was aware of the coup attempt.” I’m not sure whether it’s his original idea or not, but the main opposition leader essentially implied the same: “President Erdoğan allowed the coup which was attempted by Gülen’s infiltrators within the army.”

Let’s suppose that the president was aware of the coup attempt beforehand and allowed Gülenists to attempt the coup in order to uncover and disarm all Gülenists within the state, while consolidating his own power. With this purpose, he has “let the organization which infiltrated the very heart of the republic just pass by.” Are such calculations and risk analyses possible? Who was Erdoğan going to trust? NATO or the EU? The international community would just publish a couple of statements which condemn the coup –that even didn’t happen after the coup in Egypt – and have no practical use. Or, when the junta controlled all garrisons, main roads and bridges, and the headquarters of National Intelligence Organization, Police Special Forces, along with the Parliament, was under attack, with what force could Erdoğan save the country? Did he have any kind of militia? Forget the country; how was he going to save his own life? Did Erdoğan have some sort of metaphysical or diabolic power, according to these allegations?

A true Junta is the successful one!

As far as it could be understood, the main opposition leader implied that a junta in Turkey has to be successful. If he had just made this statement before July 15, he could’ve had a point. As you know, the tradition in Turkey is to open your eyes in the morning to a junta. Whenever Turkey diverges from its assumed role, a junta appears. The junta deposes the government, hangs the prime minister along with some ministers, while jailing and torturing thousands. This was exactly what happened on May 27 1960. Citizens learned that the military seized control of the country at 04:36 on May 27 with a broadcast from Ankara on the radio. The leader of the coup General Cemal Gürsel announced the members of the National Unity Committee which was to handle legislation instead of the parliament. The next day the National Unity Government was formed. A couple of days later, Minister of the Interior Namık Gedik committed suicide, while Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan were executed.

The first military coup of Turkey which was carried out after the transition into the multiparty system was nothing short of a shameful event in the young republic’s history.

On March 12 1971, however, a different kind of military coup was realized. This time the military deposed the Süleyman Demirel government with a memorandum broadcasted on the state-run TRT, which was signed by three force commanders and the chief of general staff.

At 03:00 on September 12 1980, the military once again seized the power. Consisting of the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren and force commanders, the National Security Committee announced the coup declaration via the only TV channel of the time, TRT. The reason was the same as the 1971 coup: “Turkish Armed Forces came together under the chain of command and seized the control of the whole country to fulfill the duty of protecting the Republic of Turkey in the stead of its people, as it is stated in the Internal Service Code.” With the following declarations, commanders were assigned to regions under martial law. At 05:30, notifications signed by the chief of general staff were sent to Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit and Necmettin Erbakan.

It was written “Turkish Armed Forces have seized the control of the state. Your government has been abolished and your parliamentary membership has been dismissed. Please listen to the instructions of the officer who brought you this notification” on the said notifications. None objected. The first ones to be executed right after the coup were the leftist Necdet Adalı and right-winger Mustafa Pehlivanoğlu. Junta Leader Kenan Evren expressed that they were being impartial by saying “we have executed one from the left and one from the right.” Executions of 7000 people were requested, while more than 500 were executed. Moreover, almost a thousand people died of executions, torture, under suspicious conditions in prison or by committing suicide.

Considering all these experiences, Gülen, who still lives in the US, was right to believe that the Turkish government could be deposed with a military coup. This organization which named themselves as the Hizmet Hareketi (Service Movement) and infiltrated the military since the 1980s clearly calculated the following: When a threat to the status quo appeared, there always was a way, even if the other methods were exhausted; to depose the government with a junta. No political party leader had ever resisted the coup; they weren’t able to do so, as the people had never taken to the streets during coups. The tradition was that the people would react against the junta in the first elections after the coup by electing an anti-status quo party. Nevertheless, many components of the democratic system would be damaged more by each coup.

Indeed, Osman Özsoy, one of Gülen’s well-known followers, had answered questions on a foreign TV channel owned by Gülen a month before the coup. The true meaning of the broadcast was understood after the July 15 coup attempt.

“We don’t have to tell everything on the TV screen. I will just say that beautiful days await us. Hectic days await our friends within the Service Movement. Don’t be fooled by the fact that 50% of the people support Erdoğan. I’m a professor of political science, heed what I will say: if the people are told that there is a curfew, none will go out on the streets. Even imams will be afraid to go to attend their mosques. All coups in Turkey were carried out on Fridays.  The people of Turkey don’t have such sensitivity to protect democracy. They are only a crowd. Maybe a couple of leftists will go out on the streets for rights and freedoms; however, none of the intellectuals of the right will go out on the streets. I guess the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has 5-6 million members and you can seize all their properties …”

What was he implying? “We will depose them and seize the power. Because there will be no opposition as none will stand against a coup, including the 50% of Turkey’s population who support Erdoğan.”

None could truly imagine that all kinds of people who love their country, regardless of their view of Erdoğan, would go out on the streets and stand against tanks in most imaginative ways. Erdoğan had a close call; while his plane was lifting off from Marmaris, there was an armed conflict at the hotel he was staying. His bodyguard was killed. There were also bizarre events. A think-tank named Stratfor published the coordinates of Erdoğan’s plane over the internet while he was flying towards Istanbul. There were countless speculations about Erdoğan fleeing Turkey; Gülen’s followers also spread these lies. TRT was captured, Türksat headquarters was bombed. President Erdoğan addressed the public through CNN Türk Ankara Bureau Chief Hande Fırat’s mobile phone using Face Time: “This attempt against the unity of our country will face defeat with the people’s will. They will pay for what they have done and we will not let them reign free. I beseech the people to gather at town squares and airports. I have known no power over the power of the people.” After this 2-3 minute-long address, people from all cities took the streets. You know the rest.

After three coups, a leader stood against the putschists for the first time and called the people to take the streets, which they did. Despite hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded, an epic of democracy was realized.

The mother of a young male who was killed by the putschists on the night of the coup said the following to a journalist: “Those putschists had calculated everything. Everything! But they were unable to calculate my son Recep.” The junta failed because of people like her son Recep.

By the way, a little note: a controlled coup isn’t a completely unsuitable concept for this attempt, as there are very concrete suspicions about the international dimension of Gülen’s cult and that they are being employed as a subcontractor for certain forces. At least those who have attempted the coup know who are aiding them. The people have their own opinion as well.