Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

There is an alarming rise in the tension between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil (KRG). From an approaching conflict between the two in Kirkuk, Turkmen will suffer the most. The oil flow from Kirkuk and KRG will be disrupted too. The clash could weaken both sides and the PKK will avail itself of the possible power vacuum. All these can severely harm Turkey and cause a serious foreign policy crisis. What has sparked the crisis and what options does Turkey have to prevent a clash?

The apparent reason in the rise of the intensity in the conflict is KRG President Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. A close scrutiny of the ties between the two parties, however, reveals that there is a wide range of issues keeping them apart. The Baghdad government’s preoccupation with the war against Daesh has delayed the inevitable clash. With the battle of Mosul approaching its end, the political and military resistance of Sunni Arabs has been severely dealt with. There have been numerous recent calls from Baghdad to end the only defiant Shiite -dominated regime Iraq faces, that in the north from KRG. Should Turkey remain inactive and unable to defuse the tension, Iraq may soon witness its worst civil war and the Iraqi state could melt away. The consequences can be ruinous for all Iraqis and regional actors, especially for Turkey. Iran will avail itself of this new round of violence to assure its total dominance over Iraq and the building of a Shiite crescent will be completed.

Rising Tension

During the last decade, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been plagued with numerous contentious issues. This became apparent with the departure of US forces from Iraq in late 2010 when the former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki inaugurated a sectarian policy which alienated and marginalized both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to undue his predecessor’s policies and make the regime inclusive, al-Maliki’s followers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias have hindered his efforts. The Iraqi regime is now more exclusive than ever. Only two weeks ago Ibrahim al-Jafaari, the foreign minister, issued a decree which removed several Sunni individuals from Iraq’s foreign diplomatic corps.

Recently the US has failed to convince al-Abadi to allow several Sunni politicians, who have been forced into exile by al-Maliki, to attend a conference in Baghdad to build a credible Sunni leadership in Iraq. On July 20, 2017, the Shiite militias in Mosul clashed with the Nineveh Guards which is a further indication that Shiite militias are determined to re-establish their pre-2014 exclusive security rule in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict with KRG should be also viewed within this context. The KRG arguably feels that the partnership in government, which Kurds feel that the post-Saddam era will present to them, is all but an illusion. On 19 June 2017, in a response to al-Abadi’s statement which described the referendum as illegal, Barzani said “the Iraqi constitution, which was intended to create an inclusive government ruling by consensus of its major components, is dead in letter and spirit. Why is Article 140 of the constitution, which was supposed to be implemented in 2008, not implemented and neither is it on the agenda of the government in Baghdad?” Barzani pointed out that the Kurds have been gradually forced out from most important security, military and political positions, and al-Malik’s slogan to establish a government of the “political majority has been completely established in reality.”

Lately Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the referendum in northern Iraq is unacceptable. There is a heated exchange in the media and political statements made in Baghdad, Tehran, and Erbil. Although al-Abadi has been generally accommodating, recently his language became more threatening to the Kurds. Even Ammar al Hakeem, who has been in the past a close ally of Barzani, has recently threatened him with dire consequences should he proceed with the referendum. On 20 July 2017, the all-powerful bloc of State of Law in the Shiite Alliance issued a call in a statement to put Barzani on trial for charges of treason and collaborating with Israel and Turkey against Iraq. The Iranian regime too is threatening Barzani.

Having failed to dissuade the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from supporting the referendum, on 18 July 2017 Muhammed Baqri, the of Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, reminded the Kurds of Iran’s punitive and powerful weapon capacities.

 The Possible Clash in Kirkuk

Kurdish sources allege the Baghdad government has deliberately delayed the expulsion of around 2,000 Daesh militias from Haweja district, south west of Kirkuk, in order to use it as a pretext to attack Kirkuk. Peshmerga sources have recently detected the arrival of hundreds of Iranian revolutionary guards in areas adjacent to Kirkuk.

Unless the US and Turkey deliver a strong message to Iran, one can expect Qasem Suleimani, the head of Quds Corp, to soon appear in the ruins of Kirkuk to boast of victory over the so-called pro-Israeli and Saudi agents among the Kurds. The attack on Kirkuk can make tens of thousands of Turkmen homeless and asylum seekers at the frontiers of Turkey. The toothless Turkmen National Front and its followers can be caught in the middle of a devastating conflict. One of the possible consequences of an attack on Kirkuk is that it can also deepen the crisis between the Shiite and Sunni Turkmen groups. It is noteworthy that Iranians have already mobilized 12,000 Turkmen as part of the Shiite militias in Iraq for a possible attack on Kirkuk. There is also a potential for the Baghdad regime to use the old rivalries between Kurds and Turkmen and this might hurt Turkmen who have no military power to match that of the Kurds.

What can Turkey do to rescue Kirkuk?

Barzani and all other Kurdish parties have put too much stakes on the referendum and Kirkuk to retreat from their decision to hold the referendum. Forcing Barzani to give up the referendum will be a serious blow to his standing among the Kurds and will only help his foes, especially the PKK. Regardless of the stated objection of many Western countries to the referendum, Barzani appears to have received some assurances from many circles in the West to go ahead with the referendum. It suffices to say that on 28 June 2017, The Washington Post, which is close to the circles of decision making in the US, had Barzani write an op-ed to sell the idea of the referendum.

Turkey can still use its economic and political leverage with Barzani to delay the declaration of independence after the referendum. Donald Trump’s administration and several European Union countries prefer to enhance al-Abadi’s position in Baghdad in order to enable him to curtail the drastic Iranian influence over his country. This policy requires KRG not disrupt al-Abadi’s work. Barzani can be pressured by the US to be content with the de-facto annexation of the disputed territories and more independence using its current policy of selling its oil and gas abroad.

Being aware of this realty, Turkey can seek US support to defuse the situation before the current tension goes out of control and gives Iran access to Kirkuk. In addition, Turkey should give clear signals to both al-Abadi and Iran that Kirkuk is an issue that touches its national security and it will not stand by watching if things deteriorate. Besides, Turkey could use its leverage with Barzani to safeguard Turkmen rights if the referendum is held in Kirkuk. Hosting a meeting with both Barzani and Turkmen leaders in Turkey is long overdue. Shortly, Turkey needs to engage both Baghdad and Erbil in a more vigorous and foreword policy to spare Kirkuk from the destruction which has been inflicted on Mosul.

In 2014, Mosul had fallen to DAESH as the US-financed, trained and equipped Iraqi army left the city. Afterwards, DAESH had declared its caliphate in Mosul, and in the following months, expanded its territories, removing the border between Syria and Iraq and establishing a de facto state. However, the military campaign of the international coalition against DAESH caused the terrorist organization to suffer substantial losses. Between 2014 and 2016, DAESH lost half of its territories in Iraq, and more than one fifth in Syria.Along with territorial losses, numerous prominent military leaders of the terrorist organization were killed by US airstrikes or assassinations, while DAESH had to relinquish Dabiq, which was at the center of their messianic rhetoric, as Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels pushed for the city. More importantly, the anti-DAESH discourse become consolidated, both politically and religiously, and forced the terrorist organization onto the defensive, culling their aggressive military expansions and political power. Meanwhile, between the years 2014 and 2016, the steady flow of foreign fighters to DAESH was cut and the mobilization of their economic assets was largely limited.

All of the aforementioned factors led DAESH to employ a more limited defensive strategy, in order to protect their existing power in Mosul and Raqqa, which are their strongholds. For this reason, the Mosul offensive prompts an inquiry about DAESH’s existence and methods. Firstly, what kind of strategies and tactics await DAESH after they lose Mosul? Secondly, if the Mosul offensive is successful, is it then possible to talk about the beginning of the end for DAESH?

A Change of Strategy and A Retreat Phase

DAESH is employing what is called a gradual “mobile zone defense” strategy in Mosul. Establishing a mobile defense line on the outer rims of the city, DAESH prefers to employ hit-and-run tactics and bomb attacks. Moreover, in order to hamper the progress of the coalition forces and confuse them, the terrorist organization has resorted to one of its well-known tactics: infiltrating nearby cities and launching an assault from these cities. DAESH’s attacks in Kirkuk are an example of this tactic.

Nevertheless, DAESH either will retreat from Mosul, slowly or swiftly, or the terrorist organization will relocate a substantial number of its militants to the city center, which is on the western bank of Tigris, and will fight till the very end. While this defense strategy will be effective in the short-term, it will not be able to stop the inevitable. One of the first and most important consequences of losing Mosul might be a necessary change in the terrorist organization’s general strategy.

As the terrorist organization has a large swath of land, the most prominent advantage of DAESH is its freedom of maneuverability. Losing Mosul may unravel DAESH’s ability to maneuver, impacting the organization’s long-term aims. For this reason, DAESH’s guiding principle – to expand in order to protect its strongholds – will be modified to reflect its new defensive position: now it will attack to not become landless altogether, and will seek to expand the battle front. The first place to observe the effects of this change will be Iraq.

As a result of losing Mosul, DAESH may no longer be regarded as a quasi-state phenomenon in Iraq. While retaking the city will not completely eliminate the driving factors which allowed the existence of the terrorist organization in the first place, it might force DAESH to return to its roots, the clandestine cell structure which it embraced as the Iraqi Al-Qaeda before the Arab Spring and capturing Mosul, and form a new resistance movement in crucial cities to distract the Iraqi army. Such a change will force DAESH to restore itself to its pre-caliphate settings, especially in Iraq.

With losing Mosul, DAESH will have to decrease its military presence in Iraq and shift its militants to other regions. This means that the terrorist organization may employ asymmetric and guerrilla tactics more frequently, forcing the people living in Sunni regions into insurrection; or, they may start an unrelenting asymmetric urban warfare in the regions controlled by the Iraqi army or its allied militias. More importantly, DAESH will use every means they have to push Iraq into an ethno-sectarian disintegration process with the experience they have gained during the caliphate.

Organizational Weakness

One of the possible outcomes of losing Mosul is DAESH’s organizational structure becoming disintegrated, weakening the terrorist organization and forcing it to shrink. The international campaign against DAESH did not only cause the terrorist organization to lose territories, but also limited its economic mobility and incapacitated certain figures who were vital in its operations and decision making processes. The loss of Mosul will firstly mean the end of the two-year old administrative and organizational structure of the caliphate in Iraq.

DAESH, along with developing militarily, had also developed a political, judicial and social order based on absolute authority – even if it was forcibly /– in these two years, gathering its militants around the institution of caliphate. This situation transformed Mosul into a strategic center, allowing DAESH to control its elements in the center and the periphery. In the case of Mosul’s fall, the terrorist organization’s administration will also become a challenge. DAESH’s organizational weakness in Iraq may force the terrorist organization to go underground. As this shift will cause DAESH to lose its superiority in military operations, it will also entail a strategic weakness for the terrorist organization. For DAESH’s administrative structure – currently three levels of governance dealing with central organization, inner and outer peripheries – losing Mosul might sever the internal ties necessary for maintaining a hierarchical chain of command.

A Post-territorial Era?

DAESH is currently active in three basic types of geographical topology in regards to conflict, control and expansion: cities, suburbs and deserts. Even though it was formed within cities, it gained military and operational maneuverability by expanding to slums and vast deserts. While maintaining its existence within cities may allow DAESH to survive by employing elements such as the caliphate’s theological claims, economy, political order, security, mobilization and propaganda, staying as a force in slums and deserts will make it possible for DAESH to hold on to certain territories, even if the terrorist organization is weakened.

In the case of losing Mosul, DAESH will still maintain its status as a force in cities due to its existence in Syria. However, the terrorist organization might reorganize most of its force in slums and deserts, trying to remobilize militarily. They may especially try to occupy the desert between Tigris and Euphrates, due to the very low possibility of facing resistance from the Iraqi army. Still, as this situation will leave DAESH vulnerable to coalition airstrikes, it is not very probable.

As deserts and rural areas are insecure, DAESH will be forced to seek a new secure area in order to survive and regain its maneuverability. DAESH is employing defense and offense in three geographical regions: the innermost circle, consisting of Iraq and Syria, the inner circle, which encompasses the Middle East and Northern Africa, and the outer circle, comprised of the US, Europe and Asia. It can be understood that they have three strategic aims in the said three regions: defense in Iraq and Syria, expansion within the region and to recruit militants globally. In this sense, Iraq is at the center of DAESH’s strategic aims and future. The physical sustainability of the caliphate is only possible in Iraq due to unique opportunities present there. Losing these opportunities will be irrecoverable for DAESH, as they may not find a region or country as valuable as Iraq. Therefore, Mosul’s loss may first weaken the terrorist organization in its headquarters, Iraq, and go on to entail a loss of power in other regions.

Without the Iraqi territories, DAESH will try to consolidate its power in its new headquarters of Raqqa, reorganizing the lines of defense near the city. In this sense, DAESH may maintain its position to further its religious and political claims via the caliphate, as long as they continue to control the Syrian territories. Regardless of the territorial loss in Iraq, the Syrian territories of DAESH may allow them to retain the strategic initiative and, to a certain degree, maneuverability. However, the possibility of a military operation against Raqqa will prevent DAESH from feeling secure in the city.

The Fall of Messianic Codes

Even though losing Mosul will hurt DAESH’s political claim of statehood, it will not eliminate their messianic mindset and, on the contrary, will provide them a reason to continue their propaganda on the caliphate. DAESH desires a global caliphate. “The shade of the blessed flag will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jahiliyyah [ignorance], even if America and its coalition despise such,” it said in the fifth issue of Dabiq magazine.

DAESH’s ultimate aim is to spread chaos until it evolves into a global war and cause violent disorder which will perpetuate the caliphate’s claims. Even though the caliphate’s structure as a state cannot be secured without Iraq and Syria, theological claims of the caliphate will still be employed as a tool of propaganda and political ideology. The loss of Dabiq has not caused the annihilation of the messianic discourse, even though the loss definitely has weakened it. Likewise, the loss of Mosul can harm DAESH’s claim to statehood, but may not annihilate the messianic discourse.

As a conclusion, the belief that DAESH will face major transformations and will begin its downward spiral is very optimistic. In this sense, to talk about post-Mosul DAESH scenarios, one must wait for a complete loss of the group’s territories. Seemingly, it is highly improbable this situation will be happening in the short-term.

Compared to Russia and the US, Europe is effected more by the civil war in Syria in terms of a spill-over of terrorism, and major waves of refugees fleeing from Assad and DAESH brutality. The humanitarian crisis surrounding refugees created rifts between the member states and shook the foundations of the already reeling union. Agitation and fear-mongering through manipulation of the crisis gave rise to a far right, and created dynamics which might even cause the Schengen regime to collapse in the future. Despite the fact that the crisis has proved to be producing an existential threat to the EU, the union has not been able to show confidence and activity in the security affairs of the region, as other major players have. Then why has the EU – which is the strongest economy when its members’ resources are combined – been virtually absent from the debate? Why can’t Europe show strategic presence in the region when all other major players are busy trying to get a foothold in Mosul, or leave a more favourable administration there when the dust settles?The answer has less to do with the EU’s willingness than its ability to pool the military might of its members.

The EU wants to become a more robust, more influential strategic player, as is clearly stated in the European Security Strategy. It was also pointed out in High Representative Federica Mogherini’s statement on the aim of the EU Global Strategy, which included “making full use of our potential”. As Mogherini indicated, it has always been about putting a strong will in front of the huge potential of the EU. Yet, that is exactly where the problem begins. That sort of a pooling of resources for military optimization and strategic single-mindedness requires a full-fledged strategic body with actual authority to make decisions and implement them. The EU wants to go beyond the civilian role it has in every crisis, yet it is constrained by the typical structural limits imposed on any international institution: the diverse interests of member states. It has a weak decision-making mechanism and even weaker enforcement powers. The EU is not a state, it is only a framework organization where members push their interests and drag their feet when the matter is not their primary concern. In such a situation, power projection seems but a dream for the EU. It can only hold on to its normative-civilian power and make a presence in secondary issues.

The EU wants to go beyond the civilian role it has in every crisis, yet it is constrained by the typical structural limits.

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU, which was formulated after the Saint-Malo conference in 1998, gradually grew through a series of declarations and took its final shape with the Lisbon Treaty. CSDP was designed as a response to the new security outlook emerging after the Cold War and to a (perceived) loss of necessity and influence of NATO. From 1999 onwards there have been many summits attended by high-level officials from member countries, and many common security programs were formulated, along with their monitoring bodies, but the payoff has been too little. Notwithstanding the remarkable bureaucratic effort poured in, the result has been frustrating. So far, member states have not been willing to commit fully to the means for achieving a global role for the EU. Perpetual meetings, documents produced and agreements on paper serve to develop the EU’s strategic identity in declaratory terms, but its insufficient implementation reveals the immaturity and improbability of the project.

The EU’s method of trying to develop into a strategic actor has been to build certain consultation and cooperation mechanisms. Yet, these measures ensure neither developing a strategic vision, nor being able to implement it. It is true that the EU has the material capacity to become a strategic actor, but capacity alone does not guarantee strategic actorship. Without political will, strategy cannot be determined and pursued. Then again, ontological problems surrounding an international institution such as the EU would not allow it to harmonize the strategic behavior of its constituting member states, which have different levels of interest on any given issue.

The Libya crisis in 2011 was a typical example where interests and attention of member states did not overlap, and where they produced conflicting responses. As a European diplomat has put it “CFSP died in Libya- we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it”. Take Berlusconi’s statement that he did not call Gaddafi during the revolt for he did not want to disturb him. This was clearly at odds with the harsh diplomatic wording agreed upon by European institutions, but he as a national leader had to take Italian economic relations with Libya into consideration. German abstention from vote on Libya in the UNSC (probably because of the upcoming election) was another incident where the EU’s powerlessness was revealed. It was demonstrated that the concerns of the EU do not trump national concerns and national interests. A weak commitment to joint decision-making kept member nations from binding together, to put their differences aside, and act in concert.

In every major crisis the EU has aspired to intervene in, there have been multidimensional disagreements among the member states, which paralyzed the organization.

The EU has always been very vocal about DAESH activity in Syria and Iraq in terms of condemnation of terror. Moreover, member states, unilaterally or with NATO, conduct operations against the terror group. Yet, a serious evaluation of the strategic aspect of the issue, let alone an operation orchestrated under the umbrella of the EU, has always been unthinkable. In every major crisis the EU has aspired to intervene in, there have been multidimensional disagreements among the member states, which paralyzed the organization. Thus, using coercive diplomacy and demonstrations of military muscle have been more difficult for the EU than soft measures such as providing humanitarian aid or imposing travel bans. This indicates a fundamental trend in efforts to create a common foreign and security policy for Europe: being able to agree only on the lowest common denominator.

States still are the highest authority in international affairs. And their main concern is always security. This is one area where they would not lend their sovereignty to another body without putting up a fight. This is exactly why states would go to war in the past, and why they would do the same now.  They might choose to seek temporary alliances against common threats, yet they should be able to feel that they are still in control. Delegating their existential function willingly is not an option. This can only be done by an imperial expansion. The EU, as we know it, is not that sort of an imperial project. If it wants to become an empire, it should better be ready to get its hands dirty and conquer European capitals one by one. The question is: with which army?