A New Game at the Southern Gate of the Red Sea: Somaliland

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lthough the announcement of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a diplomatic move, it reveals a process that undermines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa. This move is also a strategic step toward shifting the balance of power in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this move is no coincidence.

Recent regional developments include renewed momentum for southern secession in Yemen, discussions of a de facto division in Sudan’s Darfur region, successful direct elections in Somalia’s Benadir region (including the capital), the crash of an aircraft carrying the Libyan chief of staff and his delegation, and Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland. These events have transformed the situation into an issue of regional security architecture, especially given the more visible anti-Türkiye alliance in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is important to understand which negotiations and settlements recognition opens the door to, as well as the consequences it will have on the regional process. Recognition is more than an outcome; it creates a situation that gives rise to new demands, risks, and precedents. Furthermore, today’s events raise concerns about the principle of state integrity across the continent, including Somalia, as well as the fundamental pillars of the international order.

The strategic logic of recognition: Sea routes, platforms and corridor policy

The best way to understand the Somaliland issue is to look at a map of the region. In today’s global politics, geopolitical analyses and efforts to understand the transformation of the global system necessitate an update to traditional methods of interpretation. It is now imperative to understand the process within the context of security, the immediate environment, alliances, balancing, multilateralism, geo-economics, connectivity, and capacity.

Therefore, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are too dynamic to be viewed merely as bottlenecks of global trade or vital transit points of the global economy. At the same time, this region is a force field where military access, intelligence, pressure, and deterrence are produced. The Houthis’ ability to target maritime traffic in Yemen strengthens the pursuit of a “southern encirclement.” In this context, Somaliland’s geography offers external actors a lower-cost, higher-leverage option through its port infrastructure and access opportunities. Thus, recognition is a strategic instrument that goes far beyond a political gesture, paving the way for the construction of a platform on the ground.

The second axis of this process can be interpreted as corridor politics. The trade and energy links stretching from India to the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe should be discussed as the backbone of geopolitical competition, not just economic projects. Israel’s deepening relations with India, the UAE’s regional networks established through its ports and logistics, and the emerging alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) place a potential recognition of Somaliland within a broader strategic context.

If recognition is detailed through port, access, and base agreements at this point, the debate will move beyond legal status and actively enter the field. Therefore, this situation represents the most critical threshold. The nature of the issue will shift from Somaliland’s independence to whether Somalia’s sovereignty is effectively curtailed. Thus, recognition, beyond the debate of international law, will open the door to establishing a permanent settlement, which will bring numerous potential crises.

Regional chess and multi-front pressure on Türkiye

Although the recognition of Somaliland is presented as a single issue, it should actually be understood as part of a broader regional chess game. The rapprochement between Israel and the UAE, and its consequences in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, are particularly significant for Türkiye.

Prominent issues include the emergence of anti-Türkiye coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of spheres of influence through port and logistics power in the Gulf, overlapping moves in the Sudan and Syria files, and competition centered on oil, port, and space projects in the Horn of Africa. All of this makes it possible to interpret the Somaliland move as a means of applying pressure to regions where Türkiye’s capacity expansion is at stake, rather than as a form of recognition.

Five critical issues stand out here: Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. First, prior to the Ankara Declaration, Addis Ababa’s search for access to the sea clashed with Somalia’s sovereignty sensitivities, escalating tensions. Second, Israel’s move towards recognition could set a precedent for Ethiopia. It could encourage other countries to more readily consider recognizing Somaliland. This would put pressure on Somalia from two fronts simultaneously. The erosion of international legitimacy and the growing debate over coastal access and sovereignty are indeed among the pressures.

The second issue is the southern division shaped by Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The new balance of power over control areas and oil regions in southern Yemen is fueling another wave of division around the southern Red Sea. Read in conjunction with the recognition of Somaliland, this perception is reinforced, suggesting that a fragmented sovereignty pattern is being encouraged in the southern belt rather than a state-centered order. This perception pushes regional countries toward tougher security measures and deepens the security dilemma.

Warnings that the presence of the Darfur-based Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carries the risk of de facto division highlight the danger of the Somaliland example. If the option of “recognition” is offered as a lifeline to proxy structures trapped on the ground, the Sudan file could become the second link in a similar chain of fractures. In this case, the Red Sea basin would experience multiple separation crises simultaneously. This situation could lead to the further militarization of maritime security discourse and a prolonged period of instability.

Finally, Türkiye is under multi-pronged pressure, combined with issues in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. In every issue that could potentially harm Türkiye, Israel’s overt engagement and moves such as those in Somaliland appear to be linked to Türkiye’s regional projects and spheres of influence. This interpretation is reinforced by the simultaneous increase in rhetoric challenging Türkiye, accompanied by imagery and statements from the Eastern Mediterranean.

While maintaining steadfast support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is crucial to address the issue in terms of regional stability and the fundamental principles of the international system, rather than merely at the level of bilateral relations. This is because recognizing Somalia would set a precedent that concerns not only Somalia, but also all of Africa and the future of the principle of sovereignty.

What might happen in the coming period?

This process considers three main scenarios for the future. The first, and least likely, scenario is the emergence of a controlled tension process. In this scenario, while recognition remains a political message, it does not turn into a broad wave of recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland gains practical advantages. Its level of representation increases, and it makes more bilateral agreements. However, there is no significant progress regarding ports, bases, or access. Mogadishu increases its diplomatic mobilization, and the territorial integrity of Africa is more visibly defended. Tensions remain manageable. Nevertheless, the fragilities do not completely disappear.

A second scenario is emerging: a wave of gradual recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland could become a platform. One or more countries will take steps toward recognizing Somaliland. Through port access and surveillance systems, Somaliland effectively transforms into a security platform. This reduces Somalia’s sovereignty. It also increases pressure on Ethiopia to gain access to the sea. It also deepens the security dilemma in Djibouti and neighboring countries. The region settles into a state of constant yet manageable tension. A process of “normalized militarization” emerges in the region.

In the final scenario, a domino effect occurs, resulting in a fragmented order along the Yemen-Somalia-Sudan border. The separation of South Yemen accelerates in this scenario. Following Somaliland’s recognition, new fractures are created in the region and on the continent. There are attempts to politicize the de facto areas of control in Sudan. The Red Sea basin simultaneously experiences multiple “recognition/separation” crises. This could extend as far as Morocco, Mali, and other Sahel countries. The discourse on maritime trade security becomes more militarized. Proxy networks harden and the capacity for compromise diminishes. This scenario is considered the highest-risk scenario. Once a fragmented sovereignty order becomes entrenched, the cost of reversal becomes prohibitively high.

Ultimately, while it may appear to be a mere statement, the recognition of Somaliland could evolve into a framework on the ground in the future. The fundamental issue is the trade-offs on which these frameworks are built and the new precedents they will set. Stability in the Horn of Africa will not be determined by individual moves, but rather by the new architecture created by linking these moves together. If this architecture erodes sovereignty, both Somalia and the entire Red Sea region will become a long-term zone of tension.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)