Britain Allowed the EU into Cyprus, Now It Must Use NATO to Kick It Out
Now that Britain has left the EU, its vital military bases in Cyprus are at the mercy of a Greek Cypriot regime drunk on the political leverage handed to it by Brussels.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (C) is received by Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar (L) to attend opening ceremony of the New Ercan Airport in Nicosia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on July 20, 2023. Photo by Anadolu Images.
H
istorically, Cyprus has always been a complicated place. For more than 3,000 years, the island has been caught up in disputes between opposing powers. When Britain took control of Cyprus in 1878, the island was once again thrown into turmoil after more than three centuries of stability under Ottoman Turkish rule. Apart from a few hiccups, the island’s Turks and Greeks had largely lived peacefully side by side, with the Greeks enjoying a degree of socio-economic autonomy within the millet system. But the day the British flag was raised over Nicosia, everything changed.
Britain became the new power broker in the region, but it wasn’t necessarily peace and stability that the British had in mind. Their priority was to secure their trade routes and supply lines to India, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire, at the expense of Russia, which had its own designs on the region in its search for warm waters. The problem for Britain, however, was that when it took control of Cyprus, it wasn’t quite sure what to do with it once the Russian threat had subsided. While London was still considering what to do with its newly acquired asset, many factors on the ground were changing.
The Ottoman Empire collapsed, leaving a void that invited various rival factions, each with their own dreams of glory, vying to become the next regional superpower. All the while, Britain acted as a mediator, ensuring that the region didn’t descend into complete chaos, but also making sure that no nation rose to such prominence that it could survive without Britain’s blessing. Britain could not leave the region to any single power that was strong enough to tell it to step aside, nor could it leave a vacuum that might allow the Russians to creep in.
So, a delicate balance of power had to be struck in places like Cyprus. Even when Russia decided to abandon its Mediterranean campaign in 1917, Britain had no choice but to remain on the island, if only to prevent Turkey, Greece, or any other claimant from taking it. But this was never going to be a long-term solution, as sooner or later Britain would have to reduce its overseas presence across its vast empire. By the end of World War II, as Britain began to bring most of its forces home, the spread of Soviet-inspired communism meant that the Russian threat was back.
Only this time, the Russians were not just a foreign invader from a distant land. They had managed to hack into the minds of locals who had become disaffected with British rule. In the case of Cyprus, communism affected both the Turkish and Greek populations of the island. Communism was fast becoming the ideology of peaceful coexistence that would unite the two communities in a future without Britain, and one that, had it succeeded, would probably have turned Cyprus into a Soviet vassal.
On the other hand, there were two opposing nationalist movements on the island, one calling for the annexation of Cyprus to Greece (enosis), the other for a divided Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriot community having closer ties with Turkey. Another problem was that, despite being at loggerheads over Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were both members of NATO, a military bloc formed in 1949 to keep the Soviets at bay. Direct conflict between these two allies had to be avoided at all costs, as this would lead to the collapse of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, opening the door for the Russians to enter the region from the Caucasus and the Balkans. So, despite the underlying tensions, it was absolutely vital for Britain that the right balance be struck in Cyprus before it lowered its flag there, and that balance had to be protected by some kind of guarantee.
It could be argued that inviting Cyprus to join NATO would have been the most logical step forward. However, Russian sympathies in Cyprus ran too deep for this to become a reality, especially as the then Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, was best known for his closeness to the Soviets. Instead, Britain, Turkey, and Greece jointly signed the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which gave them all the power to intervene if the newly formed Republic of Cyprus was ever disrupted. The treaty offered the island the protection of three NATO members without it having to become a member itself; on paper, it was the ideal solution to the Cyprus problem, but it wasn’t to last.
Just fourteen years later, the Greek military junta joined forces with pro-Greek EOKA-B paramilitary fighters in Cyprus and took control of the island with the aim of annexing it to Greece. This prompted Turkey to send its troops there to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriots, who would otherwise have faced almost certain genocide. Seeing no direct threat to its military bases at Dhekelia and Akrotiri, Britain decided not to intervene. The result was the division of the island into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, with little incentive for either side to resolve the frozen conflict until thirty years later, when both communities were offered the prospect of EU membership.
In a UN-backed reunification referendum organized on both sides of the island, there was an overwhelming “yes” vote on the Turkish Cypriot side; however, the Turkish Cypriot optimism was met with a resounding “no” on the Greek Cypriot side. In these circumstances, either the island’s two communities should have been left alone to spend more time ironing out their differences, or a game-changing two-state solution should have been put on the table. What shouldn’t have happened was for the Greek Cypriot side to be accepted into the EU as representing the whole of Cyprus, while increasing the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people.
After the Greek Cypriots joined the EU in 2004, the dynamics changed. There was no longer any incentive for the Greek Cypriots to recognize the Turkish Cypriots as their long-lost compatriots and equals at the negotiating table. With the EU’s support, the Greek Cypriots began to see the peace process less as a solution-oriented discussion and more as a conversion on the terms of Turkish Cypriot surrender. Even the UN, which is as guilty as the EU of legitimizing the Greek Cypriot regime despite the obvious collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, is now struggling to get a word in, with UN-backed models of reunification being spat on after having been agreed, and UN representatives who criticize the Greek Cypriots for doing so being all but banned from the island.
So, with very little to persuade the Greek Cypriots to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots, where does this leave the Treaty of Guarantee? As far as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, the treaty still stands. Britain, as always, continues to send mixed messages about it. Meanwhile, Greece and the Greek Cypriots argue that the treaty has expired because it is not appropriate for an EU state to be bound by such an agreement. But the situation in Cyprus remains delicate, and Russia is as much a threat to regional stability today as it was during the Cold War. The EU has no unified army to defend Cyprus if it were ever attacked, and without the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus has no NATO members to protect it in a worst-case scenario. Ultimately, what the EU has done is to destabilize Cyprus further and cast a shadow over its only real international security agreement.
As a member of the EU at the time, Britain should have recognized the threat that Greek Cypriot accession would pose to its interests in the region, and London should have used its veto to block it. Even then British foreign secretary Jack Straw, now an advocate of a two-state solution in Cyprus, admitted in a recent article in Politico that the EU “could and should have put Cyprus’ accession on hold at this stage and made clear to both sides that only a united island would be allowed to join the EU.”
Now that Britain has left the EU, its vital military bases in Cyprus are at the mercy of a Greek Cypriot regime drunk on the political leverage handed to it by Brussels. There is even talk of France, arguably the EU’s most powerful nation, now seeking to establish its own military presence in Cyprus. President Emmanuel Macron, who has long called for a unified European army that would make Europe less dependent on NATO for its defense, is undoubtedly using the EU as a mechanism to project French soft power onto Cyprus. France may even be seeking to replace Britain in Cyprus, trying to make London subservient to Paris when it comes to securing British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
But Britain can reverse this. It could call for international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, thereby securing an alternative ally in Cyprus that can protect its bases if the Greek Cypriots fail to do so. Alternatively, Britain could work with Turkey to sideline the EU in the peace process. By ratifying the 1960 treaty, Britain would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot regime, which openly violated Article I of the treaty when it joined the EU in 2004. If Britain cannot ratify the treaty, it should work with Turkey to establish a new arrangement that will secure a future reunification agreement in Cyprus.
One possible way forward is the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force on the island made up of soldiers from Turkey, Britain, and Greece. This could take the form of a new force set up by the three nations or under the auspices of NATO, of which they are all members. This force would replace the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus and work to ensure stability on the island, in the same way that NATO forces have worked to stabilize Kosovo since 1999.
Another option, which could actually go hand in hand with the first, is to put Cyprus on the road to NATO membership. This is a process that would take many years, if not decades, but if there is genuine will and cooperation, it can be accelerated. Turkey has shown good will towards other countries’ bids for NATO membership when they have taken the necessary steps of rapprochement, as in the case of Sweden and Finland. There’s no reason why Ankara shouldn’t do the same for Cyprus if it feels that Turkish Cypriot rights on the island are guaranteed. Perhaps if Cyprus were to join NATO, there would be no need for a treaty between Britain, Turkey, and Greece, as the existing policies of the military bloc would provide that protection instead.
For there ever to be a chance of reunification in Cyprus, a path to NATO membership must be charted, and it must be Britain that takes the first step to make this happen, if only for its own interests. Britain must stop parroting EU and Greek Cypriot rhetoric on the Cyprus problem and make its own voice heard. British spokespeople, diplomats, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers all need to be briefed to this effect. An open invitation to begin discussions on a new approach to the Cyprus problem should be extended to all relevant parties. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would no doubt welcome such a proposal. Greece, if convinced of its strategic merits, would probably also welcome it. The EU would thus become irrelevant to the peace process, and the playing field would be levelled for a resumption of talks based on a newfound mutual respect.
Of course, all this depends on how willing the Greek Cypriots are to go down this road. For them, it would mean giving up the leverage offered by the EU. It would also mean diluting their ties with Russia. If they are serious about ending the island’s division, these are sacrifices they should be prepared to make. If they prefer to continue on their current path, with no foreseeable end to the island’s current status quo, then they should be prepared to accept a two-state solution. London needs a reliable partner in Cyprus, and if the Greek Cypriots do not fulfil this requirement, Britain must seek to protect its interests there by other means. With Turkey acting on its own, the Turkish Cypriots may only ever get limited recognition from friendly nations such as Azerbaijan, but if Britain gives the green light, many more countries are likely to jump on the bandwagon.
