Can the West weaken the Juntas in the Sahel with ECOWAS?

T

he coup against Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum, one of the most important allies of the West in the Sahel, paves the way for the consolidation of the influence of other global actors seen as alternatives by regional states, Russia in particular. The fact that people organized rallies in support of the junta intervention in Niger and unfurled the flags of other foreign actors, especially Russia, in the squares is a result of the growing reaction against the West and the search for trusted alternative partners.

The coups taking place in the Sahel since 2020 stem from the fact that the African society, nourished by pan-Africanist ideas, has consolidated its military forces to intervene against the governments in the face of antagonism towards the French.

Following the military intervention in Niger, the governments of the Sahel countries are divided into two factions: those which support the junta and those who support ousted president Bazoum. In the Sahel region, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are supported by Russia, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, which have pursued their democratization processes more steadily than others, have deepened their relations with Western actors, particularly France.

The polarization in the region and ECOWAS’ plan to intervene militarily against the junta government in Niger is one of the main items on the international community’s agenda. From this point of view, the planned military intervention in Niger by ECOWAS, which is supported by Western countries, in particular France, may prevent regional development and weaken West African states in general, rather than weakening the junta regimes.

Background of the events unfolding in Niger: The “coup ecosystem” born of Anti-Westernism

Niger, which gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960, has experienced four coups to date. On July 26, 2023, soldiers led by General Omar Tchiani, commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment, intervened against the Bazoum administration which had been elected in February 2021. The coup attempt was successful and currently, there is a junta government led by Tchiani, resulting in the polarization of the region with the support of global actors. The reasons for the military intervention can be explained in the context of both domestic and foreign policy.

Although Bazoum’s administration failed to solve the country’s security and economy problems in the context of the fight against terrorism, the main problem was Tchiani’s demand for power and his close relationship with Bazoum’s predecessor, Mahmoud Isafu. It is claimed that Bazoum wanted to remove Tchiani from office before the intervention, and that, therefore, the main reason for the military intervention in terms of domestic politics was the power dispute between the two actors.

Regional and global interactions are another factor underpinning the disagreements between the political and military leaders in domestic politics. During the last decade, the Sahel crisis, which involves the three border lines of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger of the Sahel geography, encompassing the arid topography extending from the Green Cape of Senegal to the Cape of Somalia, has witnessed the spread of al-Qaeda- and DAESH-linked terrorist organizations.

In this context, the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations carried out by Western actors in the region, France in particular, have not yielded any significant results, leading to a backlash among the local societies. Riding the wave created by this reaction, military leaders have created a “coup ecosystem” in the Sahel that interacts with the anti-French sentiments of the societies and has resulted since 2020 in coups in Mali, then in Guinea, and Burkina Faso. The intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is also part of this coup ecosystem.

Western actors’ influence in the Sahel and possible ECOWAS intervention in Niger

In the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, Western actors provide equipment and training support to countries in the field of security. As of 2022, however, France announced that it will withdraw its 5,100 troops, which have been in the region since 2013, first under the banner of Operation Serval and then Operation Barkhane. Instead though France shifted its personnel from Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger.

The United States, on the other hand, supports counterterrorism operations in Niger with 1,000 security personnel and an unmanned aerial vehicle base in the Agadez region. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established by a UN Security Council resolution in 2014, is supported by 53 countries with approximately 11,000 personnel.

Western actors might appear to be acting within the framework of common interests regarding the junta regime in Niger, but we know from international politics that actors may act under the same umbrella organization.

It should not be forgotten that the U.S. would have to impose sanctions on Niger if it used the word “coup” and chose instead to emphasize diplomatic efforts and differentiate itself from France’s rigid stance.

The diplomatic pressure exerted on the junta by ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, to hand over power to Bazoum, as well as the announcement by Burkina Faso and Mali that they would declare war against a possible Western-backed military intervention by ECOWAS against Niger, indicate that geopolitical ruptures in the Sahel may deepen. In this sense, Algeria has also stated that an ECOWAS intervention against Niger would escalate regional instability and that it will not use force against neighboring countries.

Algeria’s decision has a significant impact on the decision of ECOWAS countries to intervene militarily in Niger. Indeed, Algeria is a key country both for its strong economy among the countries in the region and for Nigeria’s Trans-Sahara gas pipeline project, which will join the existing natural gas pipeline connecting to Europe in Algeria via Niger. Therefore, it is clear that if ECOWAS intervenes militarily in Niger, it will not find full regional support.

On the other hand, an ECOWAS intervention scenario could accelerate the East-West confrontation in the Sahel, with proxy forces in the form of terrorist movements. This would have a significant negative impact on the demographic gains and the exploitation of natural resources by the regional countries.

Military intervention in Niger risks expanding the coup ecosystem

The military intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is a regional security concern due to the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel over the last decade and the success of coups since 2020. It is likely that the military intervention in Niger will bring Chad into the coup ecosystem after Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso. As a matter of fact, there is a growing and suppressed opposition to the current government in Chadian society,  as in the cases of Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The planned military intervention by ECOWAS against the junta in Niger led by Western actors will deepen regional instability rather than weaken the junta regimes. Indeed, in the event of such a scenario, proxy wars will emerge from an environment where terrorist movements spread and Eastern actors, especially Russia, fill the vacuum created by anti-Western sentiment.

Even if junta governments in the Sahel lose power, instability in the region will deepen and economic development will be negatively affected. A reasonable solution could be to accelerate diplomatic processes to ensure the transition of junta governments to democratic governance and development based on the equitable distribution of resources with the support of Western actors.