Turkish Influence Expands: Turkey-Somalia Maritime Agreement in the Horn of Africa

March 4, 2024

The Turkish navy in Somali waters could deter illegal fishing by countries like Iran and China, and address the resurgence of piracy along the Somali coast.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmud (left) as part of the 3rd Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF). Photo by Anadolu Images.

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he agreement signed between the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia on February 8, 2024, has had a significant impact on national, regional, and global politics. At the current stage, there is no official statement regarding the details of this agreement, and examining its possible repercussions is a more promising endeavor than attempting to make assertive statements about it.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud stated, “Our Turkish brothers will only protect our seas for ten years under this agreement. After ten years of cooperation, we will have a navy that will protect our seas.” The president’s statement reveals an important detail about the content of the agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, namely the signing of a 10-year cooperation agreement between the two countries regarding maritime security. It also discloses that Turkey’s presence in Somalia, which began in 2011, and its influence in the Horn of Africa are on even more solid ground following this latest development.

If the agreement with Somalia is evaluated alongside the defense agreement signed with Djibouti on February 19, it becomes clear that Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa has increased. The U.S., the United Kingdom, France, China, Italy, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti, while Germany and Spain have military assets in the region, but no military bases. In the medium term, Turkey’s growing presence in the Horn of Africa may also lead to the establishment of a naval base in Somalia or Djibouti.

In addition, given Turkey’s recent rapprochement with the West and its already good relations with Djibouti, Turkey can be expected to contribute to the risks and threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If Turkey were to become a security actor in the Gulf of Aden, this would likely put Iran in a position of concern. Thus, although the agreement was signed between Turkey and Somalia, it has regional implications as well.

Moreover, as Turkey continues its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, one of the critical issues is likely to be the Houthis. One way to eliminate the parameter of Houthi violence in terms of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is to stop the arms shipments. This, however, could create a situation that directly concerns Iran and Saudi Arabia; as a result, the moves in Somalia and Djibouti are seen as very critical in the context of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ asymmetric attacks, especially in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, have continued since October 19. The attacks are perpetuated primarily with weapons of Iranian origin; if arms smuggling in the region is prevented, the Houthis could be neutralized—a situation that could become a concern for Iran.

The agreement with Somalia paves the way for Turkey to make frequent naval deployments in Somali waters. The presence of the Turkish navy in Somali waters could create a situation that would help curb the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities of countries such as Iran and China, as well as the recent resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast. Both in the long and medium term, the Turkey-Somalia agreement is likely to strengthen Somalia’s navy and coast guard, with the potential to further deter illegal fishing and piracy. In this context, it is projected that Somalia is losing at least $500 million in revenue annually due to illegal fishing activities.

The economic problem, in fact, is as significant as the current terrorism problem in Somalia. After being elected president of Somalia for the second time, in his speech during his visit to SETA in Ankara July 2022, President Mahamud stated that he would focus very seriously on the fight against terrorism. At the same time, Somalia’s economic development will eliminate many of the security problems caused by al-Shabaab and other militants.

Regional implications of the agreement with Somalia

President Erdoğan visited Somalia in 2011 when the country had been left to its fate. That year was a new beginning for Somalia, and now, the new agreement between Turkey and Somalia, which heralds a renewed alliance between the two countries, can be regarded as a “second 2011.”

The agreement has the potential to allow steps to be taken towards the security of Somalia’s territorial waters, allowing investments in Somalia and tourism activities in the coastal area to increase. What is more, economic prosperity in Somalia can be expected to increase and security problems to decrease. At the same time, the improved security environment, supported in part by Turkey, will also provide an opportunity to increase investments in relevant regions.

An important aspect of the agreement is the compatibility of the development with Egypt’s foreign policy. Recently, immediately after the meeting between President Erdoğan and Egyptian President Sisi, the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister for African Affairs visited the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The possible cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in Africa was discussed during the meeting, establishing that Egypt has accepted the presence of Turkey in East Africa.

In addition, the Turkey-Somalia agreement has the potential to affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan equation in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of regional competition in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Of course, the agreement does not directly affect this issue; however, the expectation of increased cooperation with the Egypt-Turkey normalization can potentially affect the security perspective of Egypt’s attitude towards Ethiopia regarding the dam with Ethiopia. It should be noted, though, that Turkey should not be expected to intervene directly on the issue.

Egypt also supports the Federal Government of Somalia against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. At this point, Turkey and Egypt stated that they stand by international law against Ethiopia’s move into Somalia. Yet, it should be noted that the agreement that Turkey made with Somalia was not related to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, and that Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia. In fact, in addition to the economic ties between Ethiopia and Turkey, which is the second country with the most investments in Ethiopia after China, they seem to stay away from attitudes that would negatively affect mutual relations.

Global Actors’ Reactions to Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa

After the agreement signed by the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had previously been active in Somalia, took initiatives to hold meetings there with the Somalian government. Global and regional actors are likely to be concerned about Turkey’s increased influence and footprint in the Horn of Africa, and the U.S. can be seen to have expectations of cooperation with Turkey in the region.

Somalia has a federal structure, and the U.S. and the UK are working closely with the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. It is possible that the U.S. will cooperate with police forces and maritime security in Puntland, which borders Somaliland and has a coast on both the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In fact, Puntland’s maritime security forces are being trained by the U.S. At the same time, the UK is implementing a similar plan in Somaliland.

Following the agreement with Somalia, the U.S. expects cooperation with Turkey in new areas. Turkey and the U.S. are already cooperating against al-Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. However, the gains that Turkey and Somalia can achieve together in Somali waters, especially for Somalia’s blue economy, can potentially affect U.S. economic interests. On the whole, Turkey and the U.S. are not expected to directly confront each other regarding the conflict and challenge in Somalia, and have the potential to cooperate on specific files both in Somalia and throughout Africa. At the forefront of these issues is the fight against terrorism.

Overall, although Turkey and the U.S. are two allied countries within the NATO alliance system, they pursue very different policies in the context of Africa. Energy and economic policies play an essential role in U.S. policy in Somalia and Africa as a whole. On the other hand, Turkey’s success story in Somalia and across the African continent is rooted in a policy that is “people-oriented,” and based on the principles of “winning together” and “partnership.” In this light, Turkey and the U.S. have different approaches to Africa.

Assistant Professor of International Relations at Mersin University abd a researcher at Seta Vakfi. He researches the Horn of Africa.