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olitical parties are shaped by the different divisions within society. Studies on the emergence of political parties generally take into account different variables such as socioeconomic divisions, religious and ethnic distinctions, urban and rural divisions, sentiments towards the current system of governance, foreign policy preferences, and whether economic policies are state-oriented or private entrepreneur-oriented. However, the shaping of politics over time, the presence of parties in the political arena, as well as their rise or fall in influence, are also explained through various other dynamics.
Although political tendencies in the world are categorized on the basis of two main labels, namely right and left, the breadth of the political spectrum cannot be explained solely on the basis of this distinction. The practice of political culture, the conjunctural positioning of election periods, and the constitutional and legal obligations of the political and electoral system often render a distinction solely based on a template of values ambiguous. In Turkey, despite the changes and transformations in politics and society, the main issues and axes that shape voter behavior still remain decisive.
For example, in the 2023 elections, as a manifestation of Turkish modernization, the idea of shaping society from the top down through elites influenced the political actors of the opposition bloc as they tried to bring together parties with different identities under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), assuming that the electorate would accept their engineered political vision. Through the discourse of the “historical and intellectual background of the Table of Six,” the opposition bloc tried to idealize the combination of right-left, conservative nationalist and secular liberal as a search for a kind of social contract, through ideas that even the actors sitting at the table themselves were ambiguous about.
Some of those who expressed this view, which was put forward as a “Century of accumulation,” did not hold back from declaring that after the elections the last thing they would want in their political lives was to be a CHP candidate. They misconstrued the transformation in politics and society in Turkey and presented de-politicization as a political tactic. This interpretation of politics was a manifestation of a failure to analyze fully the dynamics of Turkish politics and the basic worldviews and perspectives of Turkish society.
The divide that has existed between society and elites since Ottoman modernization has been the dominant determinant of Turkish politics in the last century. This dividing line, which stands out in political and sociological analyses as the center-periphery divide, has formed the founding basis for political parties in Turkey and the way they relate to society.
Since the Tanzimat period, certain elitist interest groups led and articulated by the military and civilian bureaucracy, mainly the forces representing the center, have supported political parties hat represent the interests and worldview of the latter. Meanwhile the more traditional, conservative, and religious segments of society, representing the periphery, have mostly clustered around the parties that are the main carriers of right-wing politics within the periphery bloc. Periodically and conjecturally exceptions exist and there are partial crossovers between these two main blocs, but for the most part identities are the main determinant of the behavior of the majority of voter clusters. In other words, the weight and determinacy of right-wing politics in Turkey persists.
Since its foundation, the CHP has represented the central forces, while the Democrat Party and its successors have been the representatives of the periphery. In the entire history of the republic, these two main blocs have also determined the course of ruling-opposition relations. Although the manifestations of social transformation were clearly visible in the 2000s, the CHP failed to achieve a meaningful increase in voter support, let alone win elections. Unable to come to power through democratic means, elitist interest groups and the tutelary structures with which they are allied have historically relied on the fragmentation of political space and the weakness of political structures to reduce the determinism of right-wing politics.
Since the 1960s, intellectuals and the press have played a central role in the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics. Most political scientists agree that the fundamental problem of fragmentation and volatility in Turkish politics is the result of intervention through different means and methods in the political sphere.
Political parties in Turkey were established at the beginning of the last century. A multiparty system was first introduced during the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Ikinci Meşrutiyet). In the early Republican period, the opposition attempted to form political parties, but they were soon shut down, as for example in the case of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In the single-party period, opposition parties were not permitted, and in 1936, the CHP, which was the only party, was integrated into the state.
Multiparty politics began in 1946, but democratic politics began on May 14, 1950 when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Since the DP’s first years in power, the state elites—civil and military bureaucracy, the majority of the educated class including the academia, and the economic class fed by the state—wanted democracy to be practiced in a restricted sphere and aspired to monopolize the normative sphere of politics.
By supporting military coups against civilian politics and demanding the permanence of the tutelage establishment, these groups created mechanisms of distrust towards political parties. They believed that only they, as opposed to democratically elected politicians and political parties, could determine the developments that would be in the long-term interests of society.
Thus, when political parties “went astray,” military coups could be “legitimized.” From this perspective, these self-interested tutelage groups supported the coups and coup attempts of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, blaming the parties elected by popular vote. In order to justify their undemocratic behavior, they took refuge behind the argument that the “political parties had deviated from Atatürk’s principles.”
In order to construe a “flawed democracy,” the elite blamed the people who voted for political parties they did not approve of. When the parties they opposed were elected, they devalued the people’s preferences by saying “democracy is not just about the ballot box” and that the majority of voters belonged to the “ignorant masses.” The idea that the main characteristic of Turkish modernization was its top-down, coercive nature, that democracy could be dictated from above, and that the people should vote for the indicated parties was defended even by political scientists who described themselves as democrats.
Parties voted into power by the people were punished, periodically removed from power, and had their institutional structures banned from the political arena. Their replacements were asked to engage in politics in a limited and narrowly defined field and, if they came to power, to deal only with roads, sidewalks, bridges, and infrastructure services. Foreign policy, security, higher education, even education and youth policies were required to be framed and implemented by the presidential office under the control of tutelage and the civil and military bureaucracy under its command.
Since the transition to democracy and until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, no party has been in power for a long period of time, with the exception of the DP’s 10-year uninterrupted government that ended with a coup d’état. In every election held from the late 1980s until 2002, a different party came out on top.
In Turkey, political parties have always lacked institutionalization and existed as leader-centered entities. The parties of leaders who could not manage political elite change and management well were constantly divided and lost ground. Again, as a result of the lack of institutionalization, external interventions in political parties’ elites often facilitated divisions. With the exception of the AK Party and the DP, none of the parties that were founded as offshoots of major parties have been able to become an alternative to power; these efforts have only contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere, serving populism and the devaluation of politics.
As Turkey enters a new century, it has experienced an AK Party government that has been in power for 21 years with the same leader. Within this period, Turkey was able to make a major transformation in politics. The factors that made this possible include an expansion of the middle class; the acceleration of elite transformation and the widening and pluralization of the inputs that shape public opinion; a change in the political system; the experience of alliance politics; the public agenda being open to all kinds of discussions, both positive and negative, thanks to technological developments; a weakening of the influence of the elite on parties and voters; the economic classes and capital breaking out of the control of a narrow circle; the transformation of the media and bureaucracy; and the increase in urbanization.
Although the experience of the long-term rule of the AK Party is often analyzed on an emotional basis overshadowed by current debates, it undoubtedly constitutes a legacy for the new century of the Turkish Republic. While the AK Party has been able to adapt its politics according to social transformation, it has also forced other political parties to seek change. For example, the CHP’s political pursuit accelerated after the 2000s and the quest for change in politics has been revisited at shorter intervals. The CHP has continued its discussions on change mostly through trial and error, and by aligning itself according to the AK Party.
The necessity of winning the elections with 50+1 percent that came with the change in the political system has made alliance politics almost mandatory, and, as a result, alliance politics has significantly affected the political sphere and parties. Politicians who cannot achieve tangible results from the micro power struggle in their parties, establish new parties and pursue alliance politics through bargaining with other parties in the hope of gaining political traction. This has accelerated fragmentation in the political field and devalued politics by forcing the larger parties to be shaped according to politically insignificant parties.
Since parties within the People’s Alliance, of which the AK Party and the MHP are the main backbone, were led by strong leaders, they were able to minimize the negative consequences of alliance politics and issues that could arise from disagreements such as identity stances and political elite management. On the contrary, the People’s Alliance was able to manage the opportunities created by alliance politics to win elections. For instance, the voters who had distanced themselves from their own parties directed their votes towards other parties within the alliance. The fact that the People’s Alliance was in power also prevented disputes within the alliance or individual parties.
In the case of the opposition, alliance politics has prevented parties from producing original policies, depoliticized them, obscured their identities, negatively affected their institutional structures, increased intra-elite factionalization, and weakened voter loyalties. Contradictory rhetoric, unrealizable political stances, and makeshift approaches have led to a lack of credibility. For example, the rhetoric of ‘‘helalleşmek’’ (making amendments) initiated towards different segments of society before the elections could not even be sustained until the elections. The circles supporting the opposition could not hide their enmity towards the voters who supported the ruling bloc. After the elections, this anger was directed towards the parties and leaders they supported.
As we enter the new century of the Republic, there are two important variables that will shape the future of politics and political parties in Turkey. The first is whether the presidential system of government will continue with the same electoral system. If it continues in its current form, it will become increasingly difficult to manage and maintain alliances, especially for the opposition bloc. Parties that win elections can manage alliances more easily because of their capacity to exercise power. However, if the alliance parties do not have strong leaders, alliances, regardless of whether they are in power or in opposition, can fragment and even corrupt the political system.
The second issue is the institutionalization of political parties. Today, the AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) are parties with strong leaders who have been at the helm of their parties and the country for a long time. In the case of long-term leaderships, ensuring the integrity of the party and maintaining voter party loyalty focuses on “voter-leader identification.” After the leader has gone, though, the party’s integrity and voter loyalty can only be guaranteed by institutionalization. In leader-centered parties, the dynamics of alliance politics can be sustained at the level of the leaders, without leading to protracted negotiations.
For example, unlike the opposition, the People’s Alliance, has not been involved in bargaining or power sharing, and compromise on critical issues on the national agenda has been maintained without any crisis through regular meetings between the two leaders. Compromise and power sharing are achieved due to institutionalization after leaders are gone as the decision-making process becomes less independent on individuals and more independent on institutions.
Overall, the institutionalization of parties and the party system is important for the political stability of a country. Institutionalization directly affects the development and establishment of democracy through sustainable stability. One of the most important obstacles to the long-lasting consolidation of Turkish democracy has been the lack of institutionalization and longevity of political parties.
Institutionalization is also directly related to the establishment of party organizations, organizational processes, and political relations, which ensure predictability in a democratic system. Institutionalization makes future steps and expectations transparent. In this context, the AK Party, in particular, needs to complete its institutionalization and enter the next century of Turkish politics.
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