Libya’s Maritime Deal Approval: A Major Win for Türkiye and a New Mediterranean Balance

November 18, 2026

The Eastern Libya House of Representatives’ approval of the Türkiye-Libya agreement has drawn criticism from other regional actors.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (R) meets with Libyan National Army Deputy Commander-in-Chief Lt. Gen. Saddam Haftar in Ankara, Turkiye, on July 24, 2026. Photo by Anadolu Images.

T

he unanimous approval on October 20 by the House of Representatives in Benghazi, eastern Libya, of the 2019 maritime jurisdiction agreement between Türkiye and Libya, which defines their maritime boundary in the Mediterranean, marked a major turning point in Mediterranean geopolitics.

The decision, which opens a new chapter in Türkiye-Libya relations, also repealed the House’s 2020 resolution rejecting the agreement and its decision to sever political relations with Ankara. While the move brings the agreement closer to full recognition under international law, its political significance may be even greater. The fact that Libya’s long-standing dual political structure has, for the first time, reached such clear agreement on the same decision can be seen as an important turning point for the country’s political future. It also demonstrates that Türkiye’s long-standing strategy of bringing Libya’s divided factions together on a common political platform is producing results.

The agreement was signed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, between Türkiye and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, which was internationally recognized at the time. It was subsequently approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. However, in January 2020, the eastern-based House of Representatives rejected the memorandum, decided to sever political relations with Ankara, and its Speaker, Aguila Saleh, took his objections to the United Nations.

Following these developments, Greece and Egypt, which pursued policies at odds with Türkiye in the region, also argued that the agreement violated international law. The two countries subsequently signed a similar agreement of their own.

New policies and deepening relations

In the period that followed, however, relations between Türkiye and Egypt underwent a significant transformation, becoming more positive. Coordination between Ankara and Cairo on Libya also increased, contributing to a shift in the geopolitical competition in the Mediterranean.

At this point, Türkiye’s decision to engage in dialogue with all Libyan parties and prioritize the goal of establishing a unified political structure in the country led to closer relations between Ankara and Tripoli and paved the way for a common foreign-policy approach.

As part of what Ankara describes as its “One Libya” policy, Saddam Haftar, the son of eastern Libya’s Khalifa Haftar, visited Ankara in 2025 and met with Turkish officials. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also traveled to Benghazi in August 2026, following his visit to Tripoli, where he held talks with the Haftar family and the speaker of the House of Representatives.

Another critical development came in early October, when the leadership of the House of Representatives changed. Aguila Saleh, who had held the position since 2014, was replaced by Saleh Abdelnabi al-Obeidi. The change was expected to usher in a stronger new phase in relations with Türkiye. The approval of the maritime jurisdiction agreement shortly after al-Obeidi took office appears to confirm this expectation.

Other significant developments in Libyan domestic politics have also taken place with Türkiye playing a central role. Abdel Salam al-Zoubi, defense minister in the cabinet of Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara to discuss the unification of Libya’s military forces.

Having established the trust of different sides, Türkiye is increasingly viewed as an indispensable actor in efforts to achieve domestic unity and improve foreign-policy coordination.

The House of Representatives’ approval of the agreement with Türkiye, one of the clearest indicators of this coordination, can be considered a major achievement for Libya’s political unity and stability. The emergence of common ground on a foreign-policy issue that the country’s two administrations have addressed separately and approached from deeply opposing positions for years is a historic development. It has also opened the way for the country’s political power centers to speak with one voice on a range of issues.

Second, Libya has entered a new phase in defending its rights in the Mediterranean. Under the agreement, Libya will now be able to defend its claims to waters south of Crete with the support of both administrations. Greece’s exploration activities in these waters, conducted with Chevron and Hellenic Energy, overlap with areas claimed by Libya, forcing Athens to engage in dialogue with Tripoli. The agreement’s approval has therefore strengthened Libya’s bargaining position over its rights in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mutual gains

Another important dimension of the agreement is directly related to energy. Since 2011, Libya has struggled with political instability and attaches great importance to the discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean as a means of overcoming its economic difficulties.

Given Tripoli’s limited capacity to explore offshore energy resources, the agreement is likely to accelerate cooperation with Türkiye in this area. An earlier memorandum between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) on conducting seismic surveys in the Mediterranean is also worth recalling. In light of this agreement, the two countries are expected to pursue joint oil and natural gas exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean in the coming period.

The Eastern Libya House of Representatives’ approval of the maritime jurisdiction agreement also provides the political and legal foundation for such activities.

The decision is equally significant for Türkiye. Recognition of the agreement will bring Ankara not only legal and diplomatic gains but also advantages in its broader regional policy. Its approval can be said to strengthen Türkiye’s position on the Eastern Mediterranean and its legal arguments concerning maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean in the future.

A similar assessment can be made regarding Türkiye’s position in Libyan politics. Ankara has maintained strong relations with Tripoli while successfully developing ties with the power center in eastern Libya, establishing a lasting channel of communication. In this respect, Türkiye has diversified its influence in Libya rather than making it dependent on a single faction.

From this point forward, Türkiye is expected to maintain relations with all sides in Libya and continue pursuing policies aimed at contributing to the country’s political stability, strengthening its institutions, and accelerating its development.

The House of Representatives’ approval of the Türkiye-Libya agreement has drawn criticism from other regional actors. Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, and Israel have reacted strongly, while Egypt has also announced its rejection of the agreement.

However, Cairo has also sent more constructive signals toward Ankara and expressed a willingness to maintain dialogue. The most conciliatory statement from Egypt came from Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, who visited Türkiye on October 23-24 and said that the delimitation of maritime boundaries required consultations with Türkiye.

Cairo’s desire to maintain the recent positive momentum in its relations with Ankara and extend it to the Mediterranean has prevented Egypt from adopting a more confrontational position.

Following the Egyptian government’s signals that it remained open to negotiations and dialogue with Türkiye, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler made a notable statement. He emphasized that if Egypt reached an agreement with Türkiye, it would gain approximately 15,000 square kilometers more maritime jurisdiction than it could secure through an agreement with Greece. In effect, Güler extended an invitation to Cairo to pursue a similar agreement with Ankara.

Ultimately, the decision by the House of Representatives in eastern Libya has strengthened Türkiye’s position both legally and politically. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to assume that the agreement will resolve the problems facing Libya or the wider Eastern Mediterranean.

Above all, it should be remembered that the continued validity of this approval will depend on whether Libya’s two administrations can maintain a shared vision and coordinated action.

Türkiye will continue working to encourage the different Libyan factions to act together. At the same time, it will seek to expand cooperation with Libya in the Mediterranean and strengthen its regional influence.

Ankara’s room for maneuver in the Eastern Mediterranean will largely depend on the relationship it develops with Egypt in this context and its ability to manage tensions with Greece.

Ultimately, a realistic and lasting solution to the competition for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean will only be possible if all relevant parties adopt a constructive approach, engage in a common framework for negotiations, and prioritize shared regional interests.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

Ismail Numan Telci is the Vice President of Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). He is also an Associate Professor at the Middle East Institute (ORMER) and at the Department of International Relations at Sakarya University. He is the author/editor of many books including 'Dictionary of the Egyptian Revolution', 'Eastern Mediterranean in International Politics' and 'Gulf Foreign Policy'. His comments appeared on international outlets including Al Jazeera, BBC, Le Monde, TRT World and Deutsche Welle.