On Saturday 22 June, fear and anxiety griped Ethiopia – a nation already on uncertain political transition. A coup bid was underway in Bahir Dar, the capital of the northern Amhara regional state. Reports emerged that General Asamnew Tsige, chief of security of the Amhara region, busted into a board meeting of the regional government with coup plotters – mostly members of Amhara region’s paramilitary officers. In the incident, Dr. Ambachew Mekonnen, the regional president of Amhara and Atto Ezez Wase, a senior political advisor were murdered on the spot. The Attorney general of the regional state who was present was also wounded.

Meanwhile in Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital, the coup plotters were present and carried a string of assassinations targeting senior military officials: General Seare Mekonnen, the chief of Ethiopia’s defence forces and Major General (Rtd) Gezai Abera were murdered in their residents – by their body guards. The two incidents in Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa were coordinated and well-planned. Despite targeted killings of its top leadership with the aim to sabotage the chain of command, the Ethiopian army reacted swiftly: the coup leader was killed in Bahir Dar and many coup plotters were arrested. The African nation had survived a cataclysmic and potentially ruinous moment.

Reforms amid violence

However, Ethiopia is not out of the bushes yet. The Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, was himself targeted last year in a bomb blast in Addis Ababa. Since Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power Ethiopia witnessed both bright and dark gloomy days. He initiated political and social reforms that have won him praises both at home and globally. Ethiopia is on the right course. Nonetheless, the transition to democracy and liberty has unleashed out rancid ethno-nationalism and violence on a large scale – Ethiopia has the highest Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) globally, 2 Million citizens to be precise. And the recent coup d’ etat attempt has risen the political temperature of the nation.

Reforms in Ethipoia have to be ‘fast and furious’ – and so far they have been. 

So far Premier Abiy Ahmed has a good track-record. But the challenges his administration face are deep-rooted. Ethiopia has a brutal history: Centuries of imperialism; followed by the genocidal Marxist-Leninist Derg regime; and then came the equally genocidal and totalitarian Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF). Violence and brutalities have been rendered the social and political ethos of this nation that has more than 100 different ethnic groups and languages. Unfortunately, today Ethiopia is brimming with internal xenophobia, ethnic tensions and contempt, and a dangerous zero-sum political posturing among its different ethnic political classes.

The reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed since coming to power in April 2018 have been cathartic and promising. Political prisoners and journalists languishing in prisons were all released. Reconciliatory talks were initiated with secessionist rebel groups and factions – most prominently with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front (OLNF). Bones were also strengthened with arch-nemesis Eritrea. Freedom of speech and publication were celebrated by the government – a new trend in Ethiopia. Conversely, amid all these neck-breaking reformations Ethiopia was descending into an internal ethnic psychosis. The Somali and Oromo regional states were the epicentres, and most recently Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states.

Ethno-nationalism and the inevitability of decentralization

Centuries of a statist and centralised governance model are at the root of Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions and trepidations. Memories of state violence and brutalities coupled with perceived (and real) ethnic autocracies punctuate the tapestry that is Ethiopia’s national memory and consciousness. Interestingly, the ethnic based autonomy governance structure – that is now in place – instituted by the EPDRF since 1993 seems not to help at all. And when anti-government protests began in Oromo and Amhara regions in 2015, many regional analysts anticipated that it was a matter of time that Ethiopia takes the path of Yugoslavia and disintegrate along Ethnic lines.

Abiy Ahmed’s reign is characterised by his medemer philosophy: a loose meaning of unity, peace and coming-together in Amharic. But, so far, anything has happened but medemer. Ethnic violence has engulfed the Somali and Oromo states in 2018, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ State (SNNP) in the last three months. The Prime Minister himself was targeted. The president of the Somali State, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, a war criminal himself, was deposed by the Ethiopian Army from his post (and this was perceived as the beginning of a new ethnic hegemony by Abiy Ahmed’s Oromos). Bloody Saturday (June 22) and the subsequent coup d’ etat attempt will exacerbate the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed since April 2018; they are an unfortunate precedent in the new Ethiopia envisaged by medemer.

While the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed have been cathartic and promising, his administration faces problems deeply rooted in Ethiopia’s governance.

2020 is an election year in Ethiopia: The first general election after Premier Abiy Ahmed’s political and human rights reforms. This election will be a litmus test of the EPDRF’s – the ruling party that is chaired by the Premier – resolve and commitment to democratic transition with free and fair elections, where different parties contest on a levelled political arena. Next year will be a defining year in Ethiopia’s future. Opposition parties are coalescing around political alliances and offer an alternative vision for the nation alongside the ruling EPDRF.

Reforms have to be ‘fast and furious’ – and so far they have been. Discourse and debates on the most effective and relevant administrative model is raging throughout the nation and among the intellectual and political elites. A statist and centralist model is detrimental for Ethiopia, and it is not feasible at this juncture – when different ethnic groups have tasted autonomy from Addis Ababa. A viable Ethiopian state will only flourish in a federated and autonomous Ethiopia. Centralization of power will only increase ethnic anxiety and tension that can loosen the nation’s social fabric. Centralization, which was argued for by the coup plotters, has dark connotations: Imperialism, assimilation policies, land grab and Amhara supremacy.

Diversity as a panacea

Ethiopia is a nation of different nationalities, peoples and ethnic groups all encapsulated in what was once the Christian Ethiopian empire. Today, the nation has a massive population of 105 Million and more than 100 languages. It is diverse and beautiful. Its 40% Muslim population – a whole population that is historically marginalized and suppressed – feel invigorated under the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed. Reforms in this transition period have to be painstaking and conscientious. Ethnic supremacists, chauvinistic nationalism and extremists will be a challenge in the transition period – and this was all-over the coup plotters.

After  decades of violence, brutalities and totalitarian regimes Ethiopia needs reconciliation on a national scale.

After  decades of violence, brutalities and totalitarian regimes Ethiopia needs reconciliation on a national scale. Premier Abiy Ahmed Ali has the backing and the goodwill of the majority of Ethiopians, and he has to deliver amid these challenges and quandaries that the nation faces. Reforming and strengthening the existing autonomous administrative structure is indispensible – the Tigray and Somali regional state parliaments are already ruminating secession in case a centralist way is ventured by the EPDRF. Rule of law, free and fair elections, respect for human rights and dignity and the Philosophy of Medemer will only salvage Ethiopia. Challenges, uncertainties and sabotages in this transition period will be inevitable. And Abiy Ahmed has the political and strategic acumen to deliver Ethiopians into the land of Canaan – of peace, stability, democracy and prosperity.

East Africa has witnessed an unprecedented geopolitical shake-up since Abiy Ahmed ascended to power as Ethiopia’s first ethnically Oromo premier earlier this year. His foreign policies were so swift and drastic that it caught his doubters and supporters alike off-guard. However, the region observers and political analysts struggled to decipher the substantiality of his foreign policies vis-à-vis the current ethnic-based internal decadence Ethiopia is going through.

Since Abiy Ahmed came to power, Ethiopia and Eritrea have normalized relations – the two countries were technically at war since 1998. Eritrea and Djibouti also smoothed ties between themselves after Ethiopia and other gulf states played a critical placatory role. Then for the first time in history, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia signed a tripartite security agreement of which the details and specifics are unknown to the public even now. Unforeseen seismic changes were altering the region’s geopolitical landscape. Yet all this was occurring as Ethiopia was undergoing neutrotic ethnic violence where more than 2 million people were displaced and rendered homeless.

A keen observer in the region’s geopolitical shifts and vicissitude would not reconcile Abiy’s foreign policy ambitions to Ethiopia’s internal ethnic psychosis. There is a lingering question: Where is Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy pace and hubris sprouting from while domestic issues glare at him?

The Horn of Africa: the new Sino-American geopolitical playground

A geopolitical policy shift was evident in the U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy outline: In a speech he made earlier this year, Defense Secretary James Mattis posited that it will be “great power competition, and not terrorism the primary focus of national security.” This change in U.S. foreign and defense policy can be interpreted as the U.S. administration accepting that it needs to engage with other great powers geographically, and leverage its political alliances in Africa to its advantage. This includes engaging with China and Turkey in the context of Africa. Coincidentally, earlier this year, General Thomas Waldhauser, AFRICOM Commander, informed Congress of the geopolitical risk the U.S. faced in the Horn of Africa. Both Turkey and China have military installations in Somalia and Djibouti respectively. This was understood as a threat to U.S. global interests and in particular U.S. interests in the strategic Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The U.S. is wary of the growing Chinese and Turkish soft power influence in Africa. Chinese investments and Turkish humanitarian efforts in the region have surpassed the U.S. in the last decade. African states had on their disposal alternative foreign policy interlocutors and hence new forms of cooperation were possible and forged to their advantages. The U.S. fell out of favor in the age of Donald Trump’s America-first policy. The U.S. had to engage with African nations on a geopolitical level ground; the notions of security and anti-terrorism were hallowed and unsustainable in the face of a multi-polar world system.

It is in this approach that the fast-changing geopolitical landscape of East Africa can be understood and comprehended. Ethiopia has been central to the U.S. fight against terrorism in East Africa – the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia to dismantle the Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 with the backing of the U.S. Today they are part and parcel of AMISOM efforts to fight Al-Shabaab. Abiy Ahmed, a former member of the Ethiopian army and the founder of its Cyber-security intelligence department was elected by the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) to spear-head the country out of the three-year long protests and ethnic violence that engulfed the most populous nation in East Africa. To his credit, the new Prime Minister was cathartic to Ethiopia’s dire conditions, but his foreign policy forays captured global news head-lines.

Containing Turkish and Chinese influences in the Horn of Africa

Shortly after the unprecedented rapprochement with Eritrea, on 24 July this year, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed alongside Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea were in the United Arab Emirates for a tripartite summit. They were received majestically. On 20 September this year, Afwerki was again in the UAE for diplomatic talks. Saudi Arabia and Gulf nations, with the exception of Qatar, were already wary of Turkish and Chinese diplomatic forays into the Horn of Africa: Somalia, a regional ally of Turkey just closed the Emirati embassy in Mogadishu and Djibouti– where China established its first military base– terminated all contracts of the UAE state-owned DP world contracts over operational disputes in the Port of Doraleh. The summit was recognized as a Saudi and UAE (inevitably and ultimately the U.S.) efforts to salvage their geopolitical influence in the face of a growing Turkish and Chinese influence in the region. In their visit, the UAE Crown Prince conferred both leaders with the UAE’s highest award. Shortly after the summit was concluded, Eritrea information minister tweeted that the summit fostered “a broader and robust regional cooperation and coordination.”

Rashid Abdi, the International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Director emphasized the role of the U.S. in the tripartite summit and lifting of Eritrea’s sanctions. To counter Turkish and Chinese influence in the horn, a new ally in the name of Eritrea has to be saved first from the doldrums of international sanctions. It is in this consciousness that Abiy Ahmed prioritized normalization of relations with Eritrea. Eritrea was going the way of Iran, Syria, and Cuba and to save-guard U.S. regional interests and security, engaging the tiny nation was inevitable and necessary. Mehari Taddele Maru, a scholar of peace and security observed that the U.S. modus operandi in the Horn of Africa changed drastically: Eritrea has to be “fetched” from diplomatic isolation hence his notion of “Eritrea in, Djibouti out” of the U.S. strategic approach to the Horn of Africa. Somalia – a Turkish sphere of influence – and Djibouti – a Chinese sphere of influence – would be countered and checked with Ethiopia and diplomatically reinvigorated and exorcised Eritrea.

The U.S. is totally in support of the new axis of political alliance that has emerged at the ruins of the Qatari blockade: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan. This comes at the expense of Turkish and Qatari interest in the larger Muslim world and strategic Horn of Africa. A shift is already apparent in U.S. geopolitical strategy: strengthening regional allies geopolitically; propping-up new allies (in this case Eritrea) and other partners in the face of a growing global multi-polar new order. The geopolitical and foreign policy changes in the Horn of Africa ought to be seen in the underlying dynamics of U.S. foreign policy and its perceived threats from other spheres of influences. Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy reforms and the peace breeze sweeping the Horn of Africa is commendable and long-waited but the deafening geopolitical changes’ raison d’etre definitely lie elsewhere: the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the last couple of months, the Horn of Africa has been witnessing landmark developments. As the most important actor in the region, Ethiopia has been making successful attempts to end the long-term regional conflicts. The leadership change in Ethiopia is the major dynamic that transformed Addis Ababa’s foreign policy behavior. The new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, who took office last April, has been following a more active policy – both domestically and externally. Following his inauguration, Ahmed lifted the state of emergency, ordered the release of political prisoners, and called for exiled opposition figures to return to the country.

Ahmed has also pursued an active foreign policy agenda. Since April 2018, he has visited a number of countries, including Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. This showed his interest in becoming a more influential country in regional and global politics. Abiy Ahmed’s priority in regional politics is to end the political conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Firstly, Ethiopia has resolved its decade long conflict with Eritrea. Ahmed’s efforts then focused on reconciliation between Djibouti and Eritrea, which have been hostile neighbors due to the border dispute.

Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody war between 1998 and 2000. The war led to the death of at least 100,000 people and thousands of displaced citizens of both countries. The peace agreement signed at the end of the war was never fully enacted and the crisis continued until this year. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s historic visit to Eritrea in July 2018 led to the end of the crisis. In the following period, relations between the two countries were normalized, and the two leaders signed a peace agreement in Saudi Arabia on September 16.

Ethiopia’s initiatives have also provided a solution for another long-standing crisis in the region. The conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti began in 2008 due to the border dispute, which caused the deaths of dozens of Djibouti soldiers. Throughout the years, the conflict between the two neighbors continued to deepen. The recent mediation efforts by Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia yielded results, and the leaders of Djibouti and Eritrea met in Jeddah on September 17, in a reconciliation meeting for the solution of the crisis.

A similar rapprochement in the region also took place between Somalia and Eritrea. The two countries had experienced hostility towards each other due to Eritrea’s support for militant groups in Somalia. These claims, however, gradually decreased. Following the efforts of Ethiopia, and support of the international community, Somalian President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed visited the Eritrean capital Asmara on July 30, 2018, and paved the way for reconciliation between the two countries. Both leaders agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations. In early September, the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia came together in Asmara and took important steps in deepening cooperation between countries in the region.

The main actor of the current developments in the Horn of Africa is obviously Ethiopia. Addis Ababa aims to become a new power base in regional politics. The country has been in competition for leadership with regional actors, particularly with Egypt. A recent example of this on-going competition is the tensions that arose over Ethiopia’s dam project, which is being built on the river Nile. With its proactive foreign policy, Ethiopia also aims to gain the support of other important regional actors such as Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti.

It is thus clear that the Horn of Africa has been witnessing rapid political transformation in the recent period. It can be stated that the driving actors of this transformation are regional governments, particularly Ethiopia. However, global actors such as the U.S., China, and Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are very interested in the transformation process in the region. On the other hand, while having great interest in the Horn of Africa region, Turkey and Qatar have followed a relatively calm attitude vis-à-vis the current developments in the region. Both countries have been focusing on their domestic issues and paying less attention to developments in the Horn of Africa. Having said that, with its strategic position for international trade and African politics, the Horn of Africa will continue to remain on the radar of these regional and global actors.