Iraq has been witnessing popular protests that have taken the lives of more than 100 civilians. Political instability, economic hardships and increasingly difficult living conditions have caused the masses, especially young people, to protests against the government. A rapid escalation of violence during the protests caused death of at least 100 protesters in a few days. The course of events was very similar to last year’s wave of protests in the southern city of Basra, where scores of civilian protesters were also killed.

In both cases, unknown assailants were accused of attacking protesters with live weapons. Various social media accounts and eyewitnesses reported that a number of unknown assailants were seen as they shot protesters. It was speculated that some groups close to Iran could have been behind the attacks on the protesters as the demonstrators were strongly against Iranian influence on Iraq. While anti-Iran slogans are common, protesters carried banners criticizing Iranian influence in the country. Despite the claims, the role of any Iran-related groups in the spiral of violence is not clear.

However, Iran was associated with another key development that triggered the protests. The dismissal of Abdulwahab Al-Saadi from his position as the deputy head of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, came as a surprise for many, particularly for his followers. Al-Saadi was a key figure in Iraq’s fight against ISIS over the past years. Al-Saadi was seen as pro-American due to his record of working with US military as part of training for the Counter-Terrorism Unit, which was created by US forces. He was therefore considered as an obstacle for Iran-backed groups to have influence on the Counter-Terrorism Unit. Al-Saadi’s increasing charisma would have been also considered as a threat by circles that are close to Iran. So, it is widely believed by Al-Saadi supporters that he was removed from his position because he didn’t seem loyal enough to Iran as Tehran wished him to be. Therefore, Al-Saadi’s supporters, who thought he was dismissed because of his position toward Iran, voiced their discomfort with Tehran’s increasing influence over Iraq. While protesters shouted slogans like “Iran out” and “Free Iraq”, they also burned the Iranian flag. 

There is no doubt that Iran’s influence on Iraq has increased in recent years. This can be seen in political and social life. Pro-Iranian figures are granted high-ranking positions, and many Iraqis avoid making critical comments against Iran publicly. Iranian influence is also seen on Iraq’s security establishment. For instance, the Hashdi Shabi, which is composed of Shiite militias and backed by Iran, has become one of the most vital institutions in today’s Iraqi security sector. It is stated that Hashdi Shabii is the most organized military organization in contemporary Iraq. 

Apart from the Iranian aspect, another major cause of the wave of protests is the poor political and economic conditions in Iraq. Despite being one of the richest countries in world in terms of oil reserves, Iraqis have to confront with instability, poverty, unemployment, high inflation, power shortages and inadequate public services. Fed up with economic and political uncertainties, Iraqi youth no longer hesitate to raise their voices against the government.

Corruption is also seen as one of the main causes of the current problems in Iraq. According to international observers and local sources, at least $80 billion is said to disappear due to corruption annually. Experts state that a significant portion of this money may be going to Iran, which suffers economic problems due to international sanctions. If true, this flow of cash from Iraq could be helping the Iranian economy enormously.

Finally, the protesters also targeted Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who became the prime minister a year ago. Abdul- Mahdi is seen as incapable of leading the country, which has been witnessing a deteriorating political and economic environment and he was criticized for being too slow in making any progress to address the country’s urgent problems. Despite the criticism, Abdul-Mahdi made a public speech on TV and suggested that he would take steps to solve the problems that protesters raised. He also announced that he would implement some reforms in the coming period. These statements, however, were not enough to ease the anger of the demonstrators. The government declared a curfew in many cities, including the capital Baghdad, to prevent people gathering outside. The government also shut down internet access in order to prevent protesters from organizing through social media.

Even though the demonstrations in Iraq have slowed down after the intervention of the security forces and the government’s reform announcements, it should be underlined that the demands of the Iraqi youth remain and the reaction against the increasing influence of Iran in the country continues. Iraqi politics, which is already fragile, may be subject to greater complications if protests continue One of the most serious concerns discussed about the future of Iraq is the breakdown of the state and a possible division of the country. This has the potential to have lasting and serious consequences for both Iraq and the countries in the region. The concerns of the youth in Iraq should be taken into consideration and a lasting solution should be offered in order to protect the territorial integrity of the country.

After two years of stormy relations with Turkey, Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, managed to establish workable relations with Turkey. Had he won the election, he would have continued to work with Turkey on several strategically important issues such as the establishment of a second pipeline for oil export from Iraq to Turkey, and joint efforts in order to eradicate the PKK presence in the Qandil mountains. Both countries were also planning to expand the size of commercial trade.

Adel Abdul Mahdi has been chosen as Iraq’s new prime minister-designate, and Barham Salih as the new president. Now, Turkey needs to be prepared for a post-Abadi era. This piece is about the intensified rivalry taking place between pro-Iranian and pro-American Iraqi political groups, which both seek to form a government, and reflect on how the probable result of this rivalry will affect Turkey-Iraq relations.

U.S. and Iran scramble for the cake

All these depend on the larger scene: What will be Trump’s forthcoming strategy to contain Iran’s expansionist policy in the Middle East? If Trump’s policy is to make Iraq the theater for the first attempt to restrain Iran, as some policy analysts have suggested, then confrontation will be more probable. It is clear that the U.S. and Russia have reached a tacit agreement, agreeing that Syria is in the interest of Russia, and thus leaving the job of containing Iran’s influence in the country to both Tel Aviv and Moscow.

During the last two months, both Brett McGurk, the U.S. Special Envoy on War against Daesh, and Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Quds revolutionary guard and the person in charge of Iraq’s file, made numerous visits to Baghdad and Erbil to rally support for the groups that they have influence on in order to form the “biggest election bloc” – the largest political alliance in parliament. The U.S. supports the bloc of al-Islah (Reform) headed by Abadi, and Iran favors the bloc of al-Bina (Reconstruction) founded by Nouri-al Maliki. The later has an edge and it has managed to elect Mohammed Halbusi, who is a pro-Iranian Sunni leader, as speaker of Parliament.

Why did Abadi lose his bid for power?

Towards the end of September, many of Abadi’s allies began to desert his camp, and this seriously weakened his chance to be re-elected. Abadi proved too tactless and has been alienated by many in his own camp. On the other hand, al-Maliki has exhibited considerable diplomatic skills and made compromises with both the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. According to unconfirmed reports, he conceded to the Kurds and the right of the Kurdish peshmerga to return to the disputed territories. Abadi has apparently refused to do what forced Masoud Barzani to side with al-Maliki.

In addition, al-Maliki has made deals with Sunni leaders to withdraw popular mobilization forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) from their cities. This irritated Abadi who considered these actions as illegal and being done without his prior knowledge – behind his back. Consequently, he sacked Falih Fayyad, his National Security Advisor, whom he accused of betrayal and inefficiency. The loss of Fayyad, a prominent Dawa leader and the son of a powerful Shiite tribal leader, accompanied by the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Basra, put Abadi’s statesmanship into serious question.

It was probably this state of affairs that convinced Muqtada Sadr, the powerful cleric and leader of the winning Sairoon bloc, to desert Abadi and reconcile with Hadi Ameri, the head of the powerful Badr militia. More, Abadi’s hasty and not so well-calculated statement to implement U.S. sanctions against Iran, has delivered a serious blow to his ability to present himself as a leader of Iraq. A statement in the pro-government daily Erem in Tehran on August 16, 2018, described Abadi as a “governor of Iraq who has been appointed by an Iranian general and who will face the same fate as Saddam.”

However, the final blow to Abad’s bid for a second term came with the statement of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential Shiite cleric in the country, banning those who have been in office before to take the post again.

Turkey’s stand in Iraqi politics

Turkey should take the existing tension between Iran and the U.S. into consideration as it will not diminish and may even end in direct confrontation in Abdul Mehdi’s era. Turkey should also be prepared for a possible inter-Shiite military confrontation in a proxy war. The burning of the Iranian consulate in Basra, and subsequent unknown missile launches on U.S. interests again in Basra and the Green zone in Baghdad, are clear indications that the U.S.-Iranian confrontation in Iraq has entered an alarming stage.

The Iraqi government accused ex-Baathist elements as being behind the events in Basra, and pro-Iranian groups in Iraq attributed the events to the U.S. and its Arab allies in the region. It can be argued that the events were in general spontaneous and triggered by Iran’s decision to cut off power to Basra due to the economic crisis in Iran. The people in Basra have repeatedly taken to the streets in recent weeks to protest against the lack of government services, and water contamination that left thousands in hospitals.

Besides, both Soleimani and Ameri have already threatened to attack U.S. interests in Iraq if they were excluded from forming a government. Qais Al-Khazali, the leader of the powerful Asaeb al-Haq militia, made similar threats.

In case of a diplomatic rupture between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey’s national interest and security might be jeopardized. First of all, the PKK can avail itself from the chaos by extending its influence on the KRG. There is a boiling situation in the unsettled province of Kirkuk. The rapture may cause a clash there and the Turkmen may suffer in consequence. Besides, Turkey’s 11 billion worth of trade with Iraq can be seriously affected. Therefore, Turkey needs to develop and put in place contingent plans for such eventuality. Thus, Ankara cannot afford to be a bystander as things take a confrontational posture in the relations between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq.

Since the new prime minister is, to a large extent, a man of compromise between the U.S. and Iran, if he manages to form the government he will most probably try to pursue Abadi’s foreign policy objectives. Although he has stated that he wants a full mandate to form the government, he cannot afford to ignore Muqtada Sadr’s (his main patron) pressure with regard to further distancing Iraq from both Iran and the U.S.

Aware of his close ties with the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, he will probably try to open up to the KRG and come to close terms with them in regards to the sale of oil through the existing oil pipeline in the KRG. This means that he will try to please Barzani and most probably ignore or postpone the second pipeline that Abadi and the Turkish government agreed upon – an agreement to the displeasure of KRG leaders.

Being an economist and supporter of the market economy, Abdul Mehdi will try to expand commercial ties with Turkey and will try to avoid any political tension with Ankara. However, his foreign policy towards Turkey will not be free from Iranian and the U.S. influence. Abdul Mehdi’s anticipated foreign policy will in general be a continuation of the Abadi era, and Turkey-Iraq ties will continue on its current course of commercial growth and normalization.