Despite huge American support, PKK-affiliated YPG forces are trying hard to take Raqqa from DAESH. After the quick withdrawal of DAESH from the Raqqa countryside, their resistance against the US-backed YPG is strong. It seems like the YPG is scrambling to take over the city unlike the Manbij experience. Therefore, the US-led international coalition is massively bombing the city, but DAESH has heavily fortified itself inside.

Ineffectiveness of the YPG in Raqqa and DAESH Resistance

On June 6, the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the start of the Raqqa operation. Even if the list of participants was long, the main force in the operation are the PKK-affiliated YPG. Thuwwar al-Raqqa, which is the only brigade in the region which once governed Raqqa city and fought at Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) alongside the YPG against DAESH, has been excluded from the Raqqa operation, which has resulted in a lack of local support for the operation. Also, the Arab Quwwat al-Nukhba brigade (The Elite Forces) of Jarba was forced out of the Raqqa operation. Both brigades were forced out for the same reason: they weren’t obeying YPG orders. The number of Arabs within the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces was already low and with the exclusion of these two bigger brigades, it became even less than it was before.

The low number of Arabs in the ranks of the SDF and the exclusion of the only brigade in the region with governing-experience in Raqqa led to a lack of local support for the Raqqa campaign. Due to a lack of local support, it was certain that the operation will lack intelligence and insightful information which is important in urban fighting. Nevertheless, the huge US-support for the operation in terms of weapon supplies, military training, supervision and air support in the face of current DAESH-weakness led to estimates that DAESH will soon collapse in Raqqa. But it has been otherwise.

The YPG forces are apparently inefficient and have low fighting moral and discipline. DAESH on the other hand is still using their Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and other forms of suicide attacks which is completely inhumane, but it shows their fighting moral. In addition to suicide attacks, DAESH is heavily reliant on snipers. In DAESH propaganda videos, they show how their snipers kill YPG forces, smoking cigarettes on terraces. Despite long and systematic US-training for the YPG-led SDF, the fighters are lacking basic knowledge in urban warfare.

Airstrikes by the International Coalition in Raqqa to compensate for YPG ineffectiveness

Facing the ineffectiveness of the YPG, the US-led International Coalition is massively bombarding Raqqa. The bombardment is so intense that geolocation with DAESH propaganda videos became impossible. Not only DAESH propaganda videos, but also CENTCOM press releases show the huge destruction of Raqqa. Since the start of the operation, the US-led International Coalition has struck Raqqa 1,606 times in 68 days. That’s an average of 24 strikes per day. Compared to 5 strikes per day in Mosul in May 2017, the airstrikes are incredibly frequent. If one also compares the scales of Mosul and Raqqa, the intensity of airstrikes will become more visible. Or one can also compare the number of airstrikes to the number of Turkish airstrikes at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield Operation which was 211 in 66 days, or 3 strikes per day.

One point which shows the ineffectiveness of the YPG forces in Raqqa is the rising number of airstrikes conducted by the US-led International Coalition over time. While the International Coalition bombed Raqqa 21 times per day in June, it increased to 23 times per day in July and to 30 per day in the first 12 days of August.

The Future of Raqqa after the defeat of DAESH

The decision by the US-administration to start the Raqqa operation with the PKK-affiliated YPG-forces instead of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army seems to be a huge mistake, which will be clearer after the defeat of DAESH. This choice also increases the costs of the operation enormously, and makes it harder for President Trump to explain the undertaking to the U.S. public.

Compared to the operation to take Al-Bab, which was captured by Turkish-backed FSA forces and only partially destroyed in some western neighborhoods, Raqqa is being completely wiped out by airstrikes. Due to the lack of local support, which would be available if the Raqqa operation was conducted by the Syrian Arab rebels, and the ineffectiveness of the YPG in fighting in Arab areas, the US-led International Coalition is forced to wipe out Raqqa with airstrikes. Now, the rebuilding of Raqqa without the support of Turkey, which shares a long border with Raqqa province, will become very difficult.

Furthermore, the extremist-leftist ideology of the YPG and their ethnic Kurdish-identity are two main reasons why the Raqqa population sees them as a ‘foreign power’ which will occupy the city much like DAESH did for years. The YPG experience against factions like Thuwwar al-Raqqa which did not obey YPG orders is known. The leader of the brigade who fought in Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) is now under house-arrest by the YPG. In addition, Kurdish opposition parties like ENKS were systematically suppressed by the YPG. Therefore, the question of how Raqqa will be governed and rebuilt after it is destroyed remains unanswered. Claims of a US-Russian agreement of handing over the city to the Assad regime after the defeat of DAESH, seem for the time being unlikely, but not impossible either. If this happens, it will be the result of the unwise decision made by the US in Raqqa, when it preferred to work with the PKK-affiliated YPG forces instead of their NATO ally Turkey and the Free Syrian Army.

The recent decision by the Manbij Military Council to hand over territories in western Manbij to the Assad regime to prevent attacks from Turkish-backed Syrian rebel brigades will have its long-term effects on the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. In the eyes of Kurdish opposition groups, Syrian Arab allies of the YPG and the Arab population in Syria the credibility of the YPG dominated SDF will be questioned.

Syrian rebel forces captured the strategically important city of al-Bab from DAESH with the essential support of Turkish Armed Forces. After capturing the city, the regime and allied militias captured the town of Tadif and some other villages to the east. By doing so, the regime blocked further attacks by Syrian rebel forces against DAESH. After Turkey and Russia reached a ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the Syrian rebels, the focus of the Euphrates Shield Operation shifted towards the YPG controlled city of Manbij. Facing this threat, the YPG has taken huge steps to avoid any offensive towards Manbij.

Firstly the YPG tried to gain US-protection against any military attack on Manbij. They threatened that they would retreat from front lines in Raqqa against DAESH to defend Manbij against Euphrates Shield forces. Knowing the strategic importance of the city for the new US administration, they thought this would convince Washington to protect their presence in Manbij despite the US’s promise of a withdrawal of YPG forces from that city. These threats may have some effects on the US’s trust in the YPG, but their partnership stays strong.

For a long time it seems that the US would protect the YPG from any attacks by Euphrates Shield forces on Manbij. The US sent new batches of armored vehicles to the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. It didn’t take long to see these new vehicles being used by YPG fighters. The military training of Manbij Military Council forces, which are also dominated by YPG fighters, also continued by the US. The CENTCOM Twitter account even cheered newly trained female fighters. YPG affiliated websites and sources started to publish visual confirmation of US troop’s presence in the area around Manbij. It seemed that the US would protect the YPG from any attack on Manbij despite its promise to Turkey, which designates the YPG as a terrorist organization because of its structural affinity with the internationally designated terrorist organization known as the PKK.

On 2 March 2017 the Military Council of Manbij published an official statement claiming they will hand areas west of Manbij over to the Assad regime and allied forces to prevent Turkish-backed rebel forces from taking the area, which means that the US’s ally on the ground is handing over territories to the Assad regime. This statement shows something important and will have many negative long-term effects for the YPG in Syria.

It firstly shows that the US didn’t agree to protect the YPG against Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces. Despite a media campaign, which assumed US-protection for the YPG in Manbij, the Turkish and Syrian resolve to conquer Manbij prevented such protection for the YPG. US officials want to avoid an open escalation with its NATO ally, especially before the planned Raqqa operation. Therefore, the US will most likely pressure the YPG to withdraw and focus on Raqqa when the Manbij operation starts fully, to avoid a decrease in the fighting capability of the YPG and to secure the Raqqa operation.

The first soft attack of the Syrian rebels near Arima ended with the capture of three villages from the YPG. The videos of the battle clearly shows YPG fighters at the frontlines, showing that the area is dominated by the YPG as local sources claimed. The effectiveness of a possible Assad regime protection as border guards against Euphrates Shield forces is also very doubtful.

In addition, this might cause many problems for the YPG, and internal discussions are taking place over how they can hand over territories captured with the blood of their own fighters. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) who are oppressed by the YPG started to question the goals of the YPG and how could they hand over areas to the Assad regime. The ENKS has traditionally strongly opposed the Assad regime, and they have good ties with mainstream Syrian rebels, the Turkish government and especially with the Barzani-government of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In the same day of this statement, the Syrian Rojava Peshmarga that operates in Iraqi exile started an operation in the Sinjar Mountain to push the PKK and allied forces out of the area in cooperation with the Barzani-government and Turkey. The PKK refused to withdraw from the area. Supporters of the ENKS are questioning the reasons behind the YPG handover of territories to the Assad regime and not to the legitimate government of Kurdistan in Iraq. The YPG’s credibility among the Kurdish population will suffer with this agreement with the Assad regime. Tensions between the pro-Barzani and pro-PKK Kurds are rising. These tensions could also cross over to the Kurdish areas in Syria.

Hemin Hawrami , a senior adviser and assistant to President Barzani, and member of the KDP Leadership Council has officially asked the question of why the PKK handed over territories to the Assad regime, but not left Sinjar.

Another long-term effect for the YPG will be its relationship with Arab forces in the Syrian Democratic Forces who mainly oppose the Assad regime. The Arab allies of the YPG in the SDF will surely question the future of the organization and it will damage the credibility of the SDF. This action will be seen as proof of its collaborating with the regime.

The weakening of the alliance between the YPG and the Arab forces inside SDF could lead them to some kind of negotiations with Turkey and rebel forces who work with Turkey. Or at least, rebel forces who attack areas controlled by the SDF could argue that it would just be turned over to the regime later. Therefore, the SDF/YPG might have prevented an attack this time, but it has done more damage over the long run. The population in areas controlled by the YPG-dominated SDF could fear that their villages will be handed over to the regime in the future, so they could work with the Syrian rebels. In reality, this already happened in some areas which supposedly should be handed over to the Assad regime.

This latest action of the YPG dominated and controlled Manbij Military Council of the SDF will probably not prevent an attack on Manbij. Turkish authorities and Syrian rebels signaled that they will go for the city and it is not for sure if the Assad regime and Russia will risk an escalation with Turkey or if they would give up the YPG-control over Manbij like the US. But it is certain that the YPG lost credibility among the Kurdish population and its opponents in the ENKS. They have also lost credibility with their Arab allies in Syria.

The move is not new to Turkey’s stance on the terror group. In fact, Turkey has always been a part of the political fight against Daesh. However, military participation can be considered a great contribution, making the anti-Daesh coalition more effective and multinational. Ankara has become part of this war by being at the frontline.Turkey and its citizens regularly have been falling victim to the country’s anti-Daesh policies. Since 2013, the terror group has targeted heavily Turkey’s major cities. In the last few months, Daesh terrorists have shelled Turkish territory and conducted large-scale terrorist attacks inside the country, including the bombing of Istanbul’s Ataturk International Airport, one of the world’s busiest airports, where 44 people were killed. In the most recent case, a suicide bombing carried out by the terror organization in the southern city of Gaziantep killed 54 people at a wedding party.

To some extent, Daesh retaliations have been predictable, due to the fact that Turkey’s firm security policies against the group have disrupted their activities, leading Daesh to regard Turkey as a threat. For example, Turkey has removed a 320-kilometer-long illegal oil pipeline controlled by the terror group and carried out many operations to disrupt Daesh finances, including the comprehensive monitoring by intelligence agencies of suspicious financial activities.

As pointed out by the Turkish authorities, the strategic objective of the Turkish operation in Syria is to secure a sizable safe zone. Euphrates Shield is a dual-edged strategy; first, the intention is to fight against Daesh, to ensure it is unable to penetrate Turkish borders again to carry out further terror attacks against citizens; second, the operation aims to prevent the expansion of PYD control (the Syrian affiliates of the PKK terror organization) along the Turkish borders. Turks are concerned that, if PYD terrorists are allowed to create a Kurdish state or expand their control, PKK pressure may intensify and pose a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity.

This is a serious concern of the Turkish elites, and other players involved in the Syrian war should understand Turkish sensitivities regarding national sovereignty. In addition, Turkey has witnessed an upsurge of violence by the PKK over the past few years. For over three decades, the PKK has waged a merciless guerrilla war in southeastern Turkey, killing more than 40,000 Turkish citizens. The most recent attack was carried out by the PKK at a time when Turkish security personnel were undergoing reorganization, and was intended to weaken security forces’ operational capabilities.

The PKK leaders do not hide their intention to wage terror on Turkey. The group recently pledged to start an all-out war if the Turkish government refused to negotiate with the organization. Just like many other states, Turkey does not negotiate with terrorists. In return, the organization has sent a “message” to the government by performing further and more violent acts of terror.

Evidence suggests that Turkey does have the military power in place to successfully carry out its mission in Syria to fulfil its strategic objectives. More than two and a half years after Daesh occupied Jarablus in Syria, the terror group militants were removed in a few hours and the city was recaptured within a day, a mission that other regional and global powers have not been able to accomplish.

Through Euphrates Shield, Turkey has quickly achieved its immediate objective of taking the city, securing a 90-kilometer corridor and marking a considerable achievement in its plan to expel terrorists and prevent the growth of the YPG.

In their latest movement, the forces of Turkey and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) moved towards al-Bab, 30 kilometers south of the border, controlled by Daesh since January 2014. The city has been one of the most important strongholds of Daesh, connecting the terror group’s control areas in the city of Aleppo in the north to Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa in the east.

The Turkish attack has also shaped the war on Daesh to the advantage of other players involved in Syria, notably, the United States. It shows that Washington, which was becoming desperate in Syria, finally has a strong and professional military partner in the war on terrorism. To what extent that the partnership might yield a political result is not clear. Washington and Ankara diverge on many points, among them the PYD and PKK. From Ankara’s perspective, the PYD and its militia are extensions of the PKK terror organization, while Washington has a strong partnership with the YPG and considers the group to be a reliable and effective ally in Syria. This US-YPG partnership poses a longer-term threat to Turkish security. With Washington failing to address the Turkish security concerns, these dynamics point to considerable friction between the US and Turkey over the PYD and PKK in the long run.

Though with different motives, the Turkish involvement may launch a new era of Washington-Ankara cooperation in Syria and considerably reinforce the war on terrorism. Compared to other regional and global powers engaged in the Syrian war, Turkey has the ability to have greater impact in the fight against Daesh. Though the US may not be entirely happy with the Turkish move, having Ankara as a strong ally in the anti-terror campaign will give Washington greater leverage in its war on terror. However, Turkey needs to receive incentives in response. Washington should support Ankara in its quest to preserve national sovereignty.

Although Turkey’s entry into Syria can be a sign of increasing cooperation between all players in the Syrian battle – which gives more hope for positive results – it is impossible to predict how long this cooperation will last, especially at the level of the relationships between the US, Turkey, Russia and Iran. The result might be the risk of tension with Tehran and, to a lesser extent, with Moscow in the long run, highlighting the zero sum game that the three countries are playing in Syria.

While Moscow and Tehran share similar objectives to Ankara regarding Daesh, they disagree strongly over other objectives. Turkey is still determined to see the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, toppled regardless of Ankara’s recent conciliatory tone, while Iran is equally firm about seeing Assad’s government survive, and Russia seems in between.

For the Iranians, Turkey’s move is a powerful blow to their regional rivalry with the Turks, though they do not have the ability to respond. Unlike Iran, Russia’s interest in Syria is not strategic. Therefore, it may not consider the Turkish move to be a strong blow, as it has been regarded by the Iranians. In the broader world of Russia’s foreign policy, the Middle East in general and Syria in particular rank after the US, Europe, China and Asia. As a matter of fact, Moscow’s objective in the region is to use the Syrian card as leverage against the US in Ukraine. In other words, Syria gives Moscow the opportunity to achieve its strategic goals in Ukraine.

Whatever their objectives, Russia and Iran should demonstrate that they are serious about addressing Ankara’s key security concerns if they intend to build a strong strategic partnership with Turkey. Otherwise, their current stance could exacerbate Turkey’s security concerns and create new strains in relations with Ankara. Russia and Iran should understand that Turkey’s involvement is a significant chance to enhance stability in the region; they should not lose such an opportunity since it is also vital for their own security.

Here, the questions are how much of this area is strategically important to Turkey and what the strategic success of the operation would be. There are three major factors with regard to these questions. 1) Daesh threat against Turkey. Daesh attacks along the Turkish border from northern Syria have recently intensified and these are directly related to the military developments in northern Syria. 2) PYD/PKK threat to Turkish national security. The PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK, has consolidated its power in northern Syria, which has encouraged PKK terrorists to geographically spread its violence over the Turkish territory. 3) The growing refugee problem in Turkey. The country continues to shoulder the heavy burden of 3 million Syrian refugees and the concomitant social and economic problems. In fact, Turkey had little choice but to liberate the area controlled by terrorists and move some of the refugees into their homeland in Syria. Therefore, the open-ended Operation Euphrates Shield rests on two military contexts: it is an offensive operation to liberate the projected targets from Daesh and PYD/PKK, and it is a stability operation to provide a secure zone for those who seek refuge.Now, it is better to focus on the current stage of the Euphrates Shield. So far, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Turkish forces have liberated a significant amount of territory and the offensive operation is expected to continue until the whole territory within the area of operation is completely liberated from Daesh and PYD/PKK terrorists. The primary target of the operation is undoubtedly Daesh, but once Daesh is defeated, the PYD/PKK will have the chance to rush into the liberated lands and to colonize them. The aggressive territorial expansion of the PYD/PKK makes the current operation more vital for Turkish security as much as for the local Arab and Turkmen populations.

Having secured the strip from Jarabulus in the north all the way to the Sajur River, 15 km to the north of Manbij, the FSA has now focused on Daesh-occupied territories in the west. This means that the march into Manbij has been currently postponed. The offensive operation against Daesh is anticipated to reach the line between al-Rai and al-Bab. The fiercest battle to be fought in this campaign against Daesh is expected to occur in the vicinity of the al-Bab district and its outskirts. As the westward move of the FSA continues, more Turkish tanks and mechanized battalions accompany them. This operation is also backed by the coalition air force during the march against Daesh positions.

Tactically, Turkish ground forces are formed in armored Battalion Task Forces (TF) as part of a brigade. Combat units consist of tanks, mechanized infantry, anti-tank, artillery, and air defense capabilities. Battalion TFs are the most important maneuver units for dominating ground battles by promptly responding to emerging threats and shaping the security environment. FSA soldiers are equipped with small arms and mounted on light sport utility vehicles to carry out the mission of seizing the intended targets.

Daesh and the PYD/PKK carried out numerous offensive activities against each other before the FSA and Turkish offensive operation began. Now they are both stable, and are digging in their positions to prepare a defensive stance. Al-Bab is fortified by Daesh and Manbij by PYD/PKK. The defensive actions of the terrorists being used in preparation to take advantage of the terrain in ground battles. The first element of exploiting the terrain is to secure the positions of fields of observation and fire. Both al-Bab and Manbij are covered by fixed weapon positions that have a range of 5,500 meters of direct fire. The direct fire weapons are the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) of MILAN for the PYD/PKK and the 9M133 and 9K129 Kornet missiles for Daesh. So far, 5 Turkish tanks have been hit by these weapons, leaving 4 Turkish soldier dead and 10 others wounded. While the total number of ATGM that the PYD/PKK owns is estimated at 300, the number owned by Daesh is unknown. The mortar shells of both terror organizations could be effective against the FSA moving with light SUVs, but the positions of these weapons can be easily detected and engaged by Turkish or coalition air force elements, or the Turkish long-range Fırtına guns.

The second element of the defensive activities in al-Bab and Manbij is cover and concealment from FSA/Turkish observation and fire. Both terror organizations are expected to position themselves in urban areas inhibited by civilian populations. Al-Bab is populated by thousands of civilians and the population cover will presumably be the major factor of Daesh’s defense. On the other hand, the PYD/PKK has moved some civilians from the eastern bank of the Euphrates into Manbij to cause civilian casualties during an FSA/Turkish offensive. Moreover, some US Army Special Forces ODAs have also moved to Manbij to provide ally cover for the PYD/PKK, a human shield made up of US soldiers.

The third element is the obstacle to stop, canalize, or divert the FSA/Turkish offensive. Since the terrain around al-Bab and Manbij is bare, very few natural obstacles are set in the paths of FSA/Turkish advance. This means that both Daesh and the PYD/PKK have begun to set a series of mine fields. Since both terror organizations have very limited anti-tank landmines, they are expected to employ huge numbers of IEDs along most possible avenues of FSA advance. In fact, both terror organizations are highly experienced in using IEDs.

The fourth factor are the key terrains. Urban areas, roads, high ground, and bridges around al-Bab and Manbij are vitally important for both terrorist groups if they still intend to withhold the cities that the FSA/Turkish offensive aims to liberate. The road between al-Rai and al-Bab is of particular strategic importance for the FSA/Turkish advancement and provide supplies to the vicinity of al-Bab. The towns of Hazwan, Sozan, and Qabasin around al-Bab and the interconnecting roads are also critical for the FSA/Turkish offensive to break the resistance of Daesh. On the other hand, the roads between al-Bab and Manbij and the town of Arima are in key positions for the offensive in that they form the southern line of future stability operations.

The FSA/Turkish forces expect to seize Manbij in a peaceful way with the help of US-Turkish relations; however, a political and armed resistance is expected from the PYD/PKK, which also aims to jeopardize the strategic relations between Turkey and the US. Karakozak Bridge is the main supply connection between Manbij and the eastern bank of the Euphrates, and it is expected to be the number one key terrain to seize in the case of the PYD/PKK resistance to withdraw from Manbij.

As is understood from the elements of the terrain assessment, the first four elements will shape the FSA/Turkish advance into al-Bab and Manbij. The momentum of the Euphrates Shield is related to this. Other than Daesh and PYD/PKK direct actions against the FSA/Turkish advance, there are two possible threats: first, friendly fire casualties from the reluctant coalition air force; and second, the US Army Special Forces manipulations around Manbij.

Undoubtedly, the FSA/Turkish forces are capable of liberating the lands from the terrorist groups, if no international political strings are attached. However, the biggest challenge is endurance and, after the projected area is liberated from Daesh and the PYD/PKK, the presence of the FSA/Turkish forces for a period of time will be needed to guarantee stability. The success of the current offensive can be considered a threshold to the strategic success, but the real achievement will be the future of the stability operation that will shape the political environment as well as its capacity to respond to possible crises.