The outside danger of a regime assault has forced the armed Syrian opposition to cooperate with extremists, after they faced a huge setback following an Al-Qaeda-Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) linked major assault. While the Syrian opposition could have pushed back extremists, their inability to act as a united front made them an easy bite for extremists. As HTS expanded its control in Idlib, opposition fighters and groups in the area are now facing a dilemma. One the one hand, the Syrian opposition does not want to cooperate with extremists, but on the other, they want to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime, manning the front lines and providing HTS with the needed manpower, which the later cannot gather on its own. Long rivals of HTS, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham had to sign a deal with extremists, allowing its fighters to man the front lines in areas recently lost to HTS. Pinched between the danger of losing their hometowns to the Assad regime and their instability to act united against HTS, the armed Syrian opposition are preparing their own graveyards.

On January 1, 2019, HTS started its assault on areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement under the pretext of the killing of five of its elements by the later. As it became clear the next day that HTS aims to eradicate the entire presence of the Nureddin Zengi Movement, the general leadership of the National Front for liberation declared a general mobilization against extremists. The National Front for Liberation is a Turkish-backed umbrella of the armed opposition factions, which was gathered under one banner in order to counterbalance radical groups in Idlib. The National Front for Liberation included 11 Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army factions, including Faylaq al-Sham, Jaysh al-Nasr, the Free Idlib Army, the First and Second Coastal Divisions, the First and Twenty-Third Divisions, the Second Army, Jaysh al-Nukhba, Shuhada al-Islam Darayya, and Al-Hurriyat Brigade. Later, they have been joined by the Nureddin Zengi Movement, Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar, and Suqour al-Sham.

As HTS expanded its control in Idlib, opposition fighters and groups are facing a dilemma. One the one hand, the Syrian opposition does not want to cooperate with extremists, but on the other, they want to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime. 

Despite the call by the National Front for Liberation, factions in Idlib have shown little readiness to confront HTS and aid the Nureddin Zengi Movement. HTS was able to capture all areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement and force their leadership to flee to Afrin, as Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham accompanied by small subunits of Jaysh al-Nasr, the Free Idlib Army and Jaysh al-Nukhba in the Ghab Plains put up some fights against extremists. During the second round of its operations, HTS attacked the Ghab Plains and captured the entire area. On January 10, a ceasefire signed between sides ended the clashes in Idlib. The ceasefire also formalized HTS superiority within Idlib.

However, HTS faced a huge burden, which it couldn’t solve alone. As areas held by the Nureddin Zengi Movement and the Ghab Plains were located along the front lines with the Assad regime-held areas, these front lines had to be manned. First, HTS tried to persuade opposition fighters with salaries and promises to supply them, but these attempts failed. Knowing that its own manpower wasn’t enough, HTS needed the Syrian opposition to man the front lines in Idlib. Additionally, HTS had seen itself under pressure as opposition fighters living in the Ghab Plains wanted to leave the area towards Afrin. In the broader context, HTS strengthened its own position, but were on the verge to weaken the general balance of power in Idlib against the Assad regime.

Despite the call by the National Front for Liberation, factions in Idlib have shown little readiness to confront HTS and aid the Nureddin Zengi Movement.

Therefore, the extremists signed another deal with Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham, which allows for the return of these to the front lines in the Ghab Plains. The deal was signed by the two factions in order to protect their hometowns from the Assad regime. It does not put the factions under the control of HTS, but it does imply that the factions have to coordinate their work with HTS within an operation room. Also, many former subunits of the Nureddin Zengi Movement joined Faylaq al-Sham, meaning that the front lines in western Aleppo will be strengthened by opposition fighters.

The armed Syrian opposition in Idlib has become pinched between the danger of losing their hometowns of the Assad regime and their inability to confront HTS as a united bloc. As long as the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib do not confront HTS as a united whole, the groups alone will be an easy bite for HTS, as it is the biggest faction in Idlib. However, the number of the Syrian opposition in Idlib as a whole is higher than that of HTS. On the other side, the Syrian opposition will be forced to cooperate with HTS inside Idlib in order to protect their hometowns. A withdrawal to areas under Turkish protection in Afrin and northern Aleppo might be an option, but the personal links to hometowns is a preventative factor.

If the Syrian opposition in Idlib cannot get out of this pinch, it is doomed to fail. A growing presence of HTS will make a Russian-supported regime assault on Idlib more likely as Turkey will have a weaker position to prevent such an operation. The 12 Turkish observation points in Idlib are the main obstacles for the regime to start a wide-scale operation towards Idlib. Therefore, the negotiations between Turkey and Russia on the Syrian issue will decide over the fate of Idlib and the armed Syrian opposition.

As long as the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib do not confront HTS as a united whole, the groups alone will be an easy bite for HTS, as it is the biggest faction in Idlib.

However, HTS is now discussing providing the armed Syrian opposition with a new perspective in which the HTS-initiated civil ‘Salvation Government’ will form a Defense Ministry to which a new military council will belong, uniting all the armed groups inside Idlib. According to critics by Al-Qaeda figures who defected from the former Al-Nusra Front, the military council will be led by a commander of Faylaq al-Sham, who is a defected Syrian military officer. Additionally, rumors suggest that a former minister of the pre-2011 Syrian government will head the Salvation Government in order to boost the legitimization of the HTS-initiated body. The aim of HTS is to unite the entire armed factions in Idlib under its own government, and aims to prevent the legitimization of a military assault by Russia due to its own hegemony in Idlib and to strengthen its own military manpower.

Within HTS, this idea is a new attempt of the pragmatist wing. In the past, the pragmatist wing succeeded in accelerating the cut of ties to Al-Qaeda and the formation of HTS. With these developments, many hardliners of the former Al-Nusra Front deserted and others were assassinated by unknown gunmen in Idlib. Despite the strengthening of the pragmatist wing inside HTS, the dogmatic wing has still power to put an end to it, as the later controls the most efficient military units of HTS. The balance of power within HTS is thus shaping the future of Idlib.

In the long run, a solution has to be found on the issue of HTS in Idlib, which will be a military one. The armed Syrian opposition has the opportunity to protect their hometowns from extremism and the Assad regime.

While this idea is relatively new and is still being discussed inside HTS, it might be seen as a way out of the dilemma for the armed Syrian opposition in Idlib. However, this would mean that the armed opposition would be used in an attempt as a tool to legitimize the HTS project. It also seems unlikely that HTS would hand over its power. Instead, it might seek to use the military council under the Salvation Government as a front group. Furthermore, it has to be seen how this idea will evolve. Currently, neither HTS seem to be ready for such a move, nor is the international community ready to accept such a structure in Idlib.

From the Turkish perspective, the situation in Idlib is directly related to its own national security, as Turkey is already the country hosting the largest refugee population and wants to avoid a new refugee crisis. On the other hand, Russia wants to keep its good relations with Turkey and is aware of the difficulties and risks of a military operation towards Idlib. Therefore, both sides may agree on a roadmap, which will at least delay a military operation towards Idlib. In the long run, a solution has to be found on the issue of HTS in Idlib, which will be a military one. In this regard, the armed Syrian opposition has the opportunity to protect their hometowns from extremism and the Assad regime.

Under current circumstances, the Syrian opposition remains weak in their disunity and seem incapable of getting rid of HTS. In this case, the Assad regime would start an operation towards Idlib under the pretext of the presence of HTS supported by Russia, who will try to persuade Turkey to withdraw from Idlib. The Syrian opposition however seems reluctant to protecting their hometowns and are instead retreating, which could force them to cooperate with extremists in case of a regime assault. Such a scenario would surely end in the armed defeat of the Syrian opposition in their last stronghold.

Turkish President Erdogan met his counterpart Putin in Russia’s Sochi on Monday. In a joint news conference with Erdogan, Putin stated that “We agreed that by October 15 (we will) create along the contact line between the armed opposition and government troops a demilitarized zone of a depth of 15-20 km, with the withdrawal from there of radically-minded rebels, including al-Nusra.” Further, he also expressed that the Turkish and Russian mobile patrol units will monitor the demilitarized zone. The agreed points were released days after the meeting but the list just adds a few more details to the statement on Monday without changing the substance.

The buffer zone to separate the hostile forces with a demilitarized corridor surrounding Idlib sounds all good. This is exactly what Turkey wanted to achieve as the Idlib deal is going towards a sharp edge. Nevertheless, there is a significant caveat in this deal: the expiration date. There is a reason why Putin specifically referred to October 15. What happens if the projected demilitarized zone cannot be established by then? What happens if the groups in Idlib refuse to return their heavy arms to show no threat to Russia? What if an actor from inside or outside of Idlib spoils the process by an attack of provocation? These are all significant questions worth to think about.

But no matter what, Turkey’s Idlib deal gave the rebels one more month to consider their options. It gave Turkey another month to make its preparations for the worst case scenario. It also presented another successful test for the Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria. Especially Iran seemed to be less proactive towards the final decision of Monday. With the diminishing pressure felt from the Assad and Iranian regimes, Turkey and Russia will find a lot more to agree on.

As for Iran, they must have no hard feelings. As Turkey did not spoil their plans to maintain security around Damascus and further down the south, Iran should and seems like did respect Turkey’s concerns just across its border in Idlib. Perhaps it was not Iran but Russia who came to this conclusion and kept Iran out in the most recent phase of the deal, but regardless of that, Turkey and Russia should be and for now are the actors to negotiate over the fate of Idlib. This intermediary solution over Idlib is still just a plan whose implementation will be challenging. Further, it is more like a temporary resolution until the involved actors decide and negotiate what to do next.

And finally, this deal is just about Idlib and does not cover the neighboring Tel Rifaat let alone the rest of Syria. But all these concerns do not make the Idlib deal a bad one. This plan was needed for its implementation and for a long-lasting resolution in Idlib. Simply, you cannot continue without a start even though there is still a long path to walk through from Idlib to Tel Rifaat and to the rest of Syria. But you have to start from somewhere and, at this stage, it is Idlib.

What Turkey needed in Idlib was a stable situation in the city that will not destabilize Turkish territory across the border and will not harm the Turkish-Russian deal. Turkey so far has been onto this goal but the question as to what will happen to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is still a question to decide about. In their recent statements, some pro-HTS accounts showed no sign of change in their hostile attitudes toward Turkey and Russia.

It almost seems like some rebel factions think that Idlib will not be like Northern Aleppo, Deraa, or Eastern Ghouta. It almost seems like they are confident that they will not lose a possible battle in Idlib. Yes, they can perhaps go underground and plan for a long-lasting insurgency in Idlib. But the simple fact about a possible Idlib offensive will guarantee a large-scale demolition of the city and loss of lives in great numbers. We will see whether we can see some sense of responsibility and rationality from the involved actors and we do not have much time to see the result as the expiration date of October 15 will come fast.

The Idlib uncertainty is temporarily over. However, following the Sochi Summit held on Monday, September 17, debates about the real winner in the Idlib case remains unclear. From a humanitarian standpoint, protecting more than 3 million civilians from a full-scale military assault carried out by the Syrian regime is a real achievement. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Idlib — as the last territorial stronghold of the opposition armed groups — turns into a chess-board between Russia and Turkey. At first sight, it seems that Turkey played a vital role in preventing a potential unilateral Russian-Syrian military offensive and found a new opportunity to maintain the existing border of the Idlib region; to consolidate its military presence through the extension of its military outposts, and to protect moderate opposition groups’ territorial control. However, the question of how Turkey will be able to deliver its gains on the ground is an open question and depends on how Russia thinks about the future of Idlib at the end of the expiration date of the deal signed between Moscow and Ankara in Sochi. But the strategic importance of the Russian-Turkish dialogue is valuable to maintain the deal. More importantly, Turkey’s Idlib projection might bring many new dynamics not only for Ankara’s own calculations regarding its position alongside its Syrian border but also for the future of the Syrian crisis.

From a very rationalist perspective, Turkey has many challenges as well as opportunities in the post-Sochi agreement period regarding its entire Syrian strategy. Turkey has to deal with challenging tasks in Syria. Among them, preventing the PYD-PKK’s consolidation of military and political leverage across Syria is the most crucial one, while the U.S. continues to reshuffle its original strategy about the Kurds in the eastern part of the Euphrates river. Maintaining the territorial control of the Afrin-Azaz-Jarablus triangle and protecting the Free Syrian Army’s status in this region are the secondary objectives that Turkey wishes to achieve. Consolidating the Free Syrian Army’s position militarily and empowering the Syrian political opposition within the wider geopolitical struggle regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis is another challenge that Turkey faces. Idlib is located at the center of these geopolitical concerns of Turkey. Fighting against the PKK means fighting against the U.S. at the same time, and struggling for a secure place for the Syrian opposition on the table means a deal has to be made with Russia.

From the Turkish perspective, winning Idlib at this stage has many strategic values. First and foremost, preventing a possible humanitarian catastrophe provides Turkey a real advantage not only for its already-deepening refugee issue but also for its economy. Before the Turkish-Russian deal in Sochi, in case of a unilateral offensive, the UN announced that more than half a million people from the Idlib region would be displaced and move towards Turkey’s border. Under the current circumstances and changing public perception towards the refuges, this would bring real trouble into Turkish politics, particularly before the upcoming local election. More importantly, during the time of economic uncertainty of the country, the refugee flow would bring the extra cost for the Turkish economy.

The second one is significant regarding the protection of human life from a full-scale military operation. In the post-Astana process of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been consolidating the Syrian opposition under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. The FSA played a vital role during Operation Olive Branch and Turkey could maintain its military presence in the Afrin region with the assistance of the FSA and restructured the very nature of the local politics there throughout the mobilization period of the FSA. In the post-Astana process in Idlib, Turkey did the same thing without clashing with any radical armed groups and regrouped the moderate armed group under the umbrella of the National Liberation Army. The deal which has been agreed upon between Turkey and Russia means that Turkey can maintain the existing territorial management of the moderate armed group and that it also gets to keep its military posts in Idlib. If Turkey can manage to disband and dissolve the radical groups on the ground, such as the HTS, then it can keep maintaining its control over the Idlib region to consolidate its political leverage in the Syrian crisis for the foreseeable future.

The third strategic value for Turkey is to protect Turkish-Russian dialogue on the ground. Turkey and Russia have been closely working since the Astana initiative started. Even though the two countries do not fully agree over the Syrian crisis since they have been supporting different parties, both sides can compartmentalize their tactical and operational priorities on the ground. The Idlib deal represents that both countries agree on a full-scale military solution would prolong the war itself. More importantly, losing Turkey at this stage would bring a new wave of uncertainty for Russia in the Syrian crisis. Even though the roughly one-month time frame for Turkey to dissolve the radical group is not enough, the strategic dialogue between Russia and Turkey can provide an extension to do this objective.

When taking the dimensions above into consideration for the new Idlib deal, Turkey also gets to keep its role in the Syrian crisis. Controlling remarkable territories alongside its borders with its armed forces in the opposition armed groups’ presence, Turkey is still playing a vital role for the future of the Syrian crisis in the international arena. At this stage, the most important objective for Turkey is to solve the potential radicalization of the armed groups. If Turkey can deliver its objective, then it can keep its overall position in the Syrian civil war.

The Turkish-Russian agreement arrived in Sochi in a meeting between President Erdogan and President Putin comes just in time to avert a major humanitarian crisis. The agreement is to create a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposition and the Assad regime from where heavy weapons would be pulled out. The 10 to 12-mile corridor would be free of al-Qaeda related terror groups under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the zone would be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces. It is clear that the implementation will be key in determining the ultimate success of the deal but preventing hundreds of thousands from rushing to the north is already a huge relief for Turkey.

The agreement, which will come into effect by October 10, is a diplomatic win for Turkey as well. Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran to prevent the Assad regime from committing more war crimes and creating yet another humanitarian disaster. Through the Astana process, Turkey has worked to deescalate the conflict and to create safe zones. The Assad regime has been using the presence of terror groups like the HTS to justify a major military operation against Idlib, which houses around three million civilians. The Turkish-Russian agreement sends a signal to the regime that it cannot ignore Turkey’s interests and export insecurity to its northern neighbor.

Turkey has adopted a forward leaning military posture since the summer of 2016 to ensure that security threats emanating from Syria no longer threaten the Turkish border towns. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations accomplished this goal to a large extent by pushing the YPG, Daesh, and regime control away from the border. A large-scale military operation by the regime against Idlib would upset the hard-achieved stability in the areas controlled by Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups. It would not only weaken Turkey’s ability to manage the humanitarian challenges on the ground but also threaten Turkish border security.

The most difficult part for Turkey will probably be ensuring that the HTS are removed from the buffer zone areas. The continued HTS presence has given the Assad regime an excuse to make a case for attacking Idlib. While it is extremely difficult and unrealistic for Turkey to eliminate HTS completely, the agreement gives Turkey time to force the group’s hardcore elements, which are in fact in the minority, to separate from the more local Syrian fighters and leave the area. This will be critical in removing the Assad regime’s excuse to attack Idlib.

In strategic terms, Idlib is the last bastion of the moderate opposition supported by Turkey. The agreement would require the opposition to pull its heavy weapons out of the buffer zone, which would remove the chance of an imminent clash with the regime forces supported by Russia and Iran. It is not yet clear whether Iran would abide by this agreement but it was already clear that Iranians did not necessarily alienate Turkey at this point. It would be extremely difficult for the regime to launch an offensive on its own without Iran’s help. If the opposition can feel somewhat secure as a result of this agreement, given that Turkish troops will be patrolling the buffer zone, they may be able to focus on other priorities such as providing security and confronting al-Qaeda related groups.

Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.

The Tehran summit that was held last week did not produce any clear-cut solution to overcome the ongoing uncertainty in the Idlib region. The uncertainty remains as to whether Russia and the regime forces will carry out a full-scale military offensive against the opposition via Iran-backed Shia forces. While Turkey’s position and solution package regarding the issue is welcomed by the international community, especially by the United Nations, the other stakeholders of the Astana process, Russia and Iran, reject the Turkish proposal. Two basic factors trigger the uncertainty and disagreement over Idlib between Russia and Turkey. The first is the security concerns of Russia regarding the terrorist threat emanating from HTS, which targeted Russian military bases in Syria with drones at the beginning of this year. On the other hand, the occasional confrontation between the opposition armed groups and Syrian regime forces constitute a rationale for a military offensive in Idlib. Therefore, the security concerns of Russia and the regime form the main reason for Russia to disagree with Turkey’s proposal.

The second reason is more complicated, and it might deepen the uncertainties in the region. This is the question of how the HTS is going to disarm itself and disband its organizational structure in preventing Russia to agree on Turkey’s proposal. The primary dynamic that drives these uncertainties is the ambiguity of the overall Russian strategy towards the position of the opposition groups located in the Idlib region. It is clear that Russia’s ultimate desire is to undermine the presence of all opposition groups in Idlib and to declare its military victory. The Syrian regime also shares this objective. This therefore makes the Turkish solution package more fragile and difficult to achieve – unless the Turkish government receive stronger international support. To put the matter bluntly, three questions should be asked at this stage: Does Russia think that the Turkish proposal is credible and achievable? Is the Turkish offer achievable on the ground? Does Turkey have the deterrence capacity to transform the HTS and other minor armed groups with military force? These questions cannot be answered at this stage.

It is not yet possible to state that there is full consensus between Putin and President Erdogan on the management of the Idlib crisis. However, at this stage, it is possible to say that the proposal Ankara has offered provoked Russia to re-think its position. The first pillar of the Turkish solution package consists of a “security warrant” that will be provided by Turkey to Russia in the south and to the Syrian regime forces in the northeast. According to this option, Turkey will consolidate its military presence along with the presence of the member of National Liberation Army, established by Turkey in the post-Astana process under the framework of creating a moderate opposition group and dissolving the radical elements in Idlib. Turkey will apply the same procedure towards the de facto border between the regime forces and the opposition armed groups.

After the first phase Turkey will start to implement a mechanism to enable the HTS to lay down its weapons and dissolve its military structure. This act, for sure, will take time for Turkey. With the support of Russia and Western countries, this objective is achievable. If the HTS does not accept this option, then Turkey is proposing a military solution to disband the group. Only then will the Turkish-backed moderate armed groups carry military operations against the HTS and other minor armed groups. It is possible to say that Turkey and the moderate armed groups can achieve this objective at the end of the day. According to signals coming from the ground, the HTS seems to accept the first option and tends to desire to disband its military structure. This option also depends on Russia’s intention of air bombardment. If Russia continues to carry out air strikes against the HTS, then it is difficult to say that the HTS will come close to Turkey’s offer.

The third part of the solution package is establishing a joint struggle with the terrorism issue in the Idlib region as expressed by President Erdogan, following the Tehran summit. This proposal involves creating an international dialogue mechanism to overcome extremism-related matters in the Idlib region, including foreign fighters, stabilizing refugee mobilization, and forming a stable non-conflictual region. This does not necessarily mean that an international military coalition is necessary to overcome the issue. Instead, political support for Turkey’s decisiveness and good intentions is much more important than providing military means on the ground.

This is the right time for the international society to take real responsibility in order to overcome the already deepening Syrian crisis. The violent fall of Idlib will not bring an end to the Syrian Civil War, but Idlib can provide a tremendous opportunity for Russia and the international community to find a common ground for the future of Syria. Therefore, Turkey’s struggle to find a peaceful solution to the Idlib issue should be supported.