When the Syrian civil war erupted, no one could easily predict the battlefield would evolve to a multi-dimensional and multi-territorial conflict where thousands of foreign proxies and fighters from different countries have been dragged into expeditiously. Based on the fact that the general overview of the battlefield has expanded and even most ominously crossed the borders of Syria and spilled over Iraq, it is unrealistic to talk about presence of just one battlefield but there are numerous battlefields where proxies have buckled down to debilitating each other.

DAESH is causing a radical sociological transformation in the region

Even though there are various actors actively playing on the ground, DAESH and its earlier incarnations are the main precipitating factors welcoming a radical sociological transformation in the region. DAESH has a bid of “becoming a state” leaning on a rather apocalyptic vision with a rhetoric of self-proclaimed caliphate. This rhetoric rips up the main notion of the Westphalian state system called ‘soil integration’ and destabilizes traditional state envisagement. When DAESH hit the road to implement a deconstruction model in the region, its golden shot was the seizure of Mosul in June 2014 which symbolized the tearing up of the Sykes-Picot Border of 1916, which demarcates Iraq from Syria. Only then did it grab the attention of international community and especially that of the US.

DAESH is slaughtering tens of thousands of people ferociously under its rule with a desire to expunge each force on its way, which puts in danger its autocratic rule. From the very beginning of the war; the reason of Russia and the US’s entry into the war respectively is primarily about saving Assad and destabilizing the region in the favor of PYD, Syrian branch of the PKK, where they are dominating a vast majority of Syria’s northern border; currently advancing towards Deir-Ez Zor Euphrates Axis and pushing towards DAESH de facto capital Raqqa with the full support of the US-led coalition.

Fighting against the threat posed by DAESH is one of Assad’s rationalization for staying in power and to be protected by Russia; however; it is crystal clear that neither Assad with a constant military, diplomatic and financial support from Russia and Iran nor the US is fighting DAESH to root out its cruel militias from the Middle East. One incident which is worth remembering: Syrian troops were driven out of Palmyra in December, 2016 following leaving of Russian soldiers and abandoning the historical city to fate of guardianship of the Syrian army in April. Syrian troops retook Palmyra from DAESH for the second time in March, 2017; nevertheless; it is blatant that there is a sham fight among Syrian troops and DAESH militants to leave and recapture the strategic territories in the Syrian civil war.

A success story in the Syria battlefield: Operation Euphrates Shield

Owing largely to the quest for a new pro-active foreign policy direction; Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24 to purge the region from terrorist groups such as the PYD, YPG and DEASH along with the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army force and Turkish officials confirmed that the 2,200-square-kilometer area has been completely cleared of the DAESH militants. While the operation has turned out an unequivocal success; a number of foreign policy commentators both in the national and international level are running a campaign to discredit significant gains by Turkey in the Al-Bab operation after the US deploys heavily armed marines to Syria to launch the Raqqa offensive with the YPG dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) amid Turkey’s objections to the US authorities.

However, as Turkey Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın stated yesterday; it is not yet certain which groups and policies will shape the future of Raqqa. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts; the speculation of Al-Bab operation is rather baseless; where Turkey’s gains on the ground are so obvious. In addition, one thing should be emphasized that Turkey is the only country in the world coordinating its fight against the PKK, its affiliate in Syria the PYD, and DEASH at the same time.

Manbij Operation: Outcome of military success in Al-Bab

Relying on its recent military success in Al-Bab, Turkey has launched an operation of encircling of the Western Manbij even though Russian General Staff declared that an agreement was reached between the Assad regime and the YPG for the peaceful transfer of Manbij’s control to Assad regime forces. Free Syrian Army continues its operations against Syrian Democratic Forces despite arrival of government fighters due to the fact that Manbij Military Council which is under the domination of the US allied Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) denied handing over areas to the Assad regime in a menacing manner.

In addition, as the US state department explained earlier this week; the US is insistent on not seeing the YPG as a terrorist group despite raising Turkish concerns which is a clear sign of the US authorities would carry on protecting YPG forces at all costs.  It seems that the US is going ahead with several measures with an intention to refute Turkey’s leading argument on the Syrian battleground, especially following Turkey’s announcement in the previous week that should the YPG forces does not withdraw from Manbij which was promised several times by the US authorities over the past few months, Turkey will storm the YPG forces.

The US recent moves are leveraging the crisis in the region

Apparently, the US’s recent moves are clear indicators of its willingness to escalate the crisis with Turkey. After Trump took office on January 20, 2017; it is still unclear what kind of a US is Turkey going to ally with? The latest moves of the US invite Turkey to reshape the basic parameters of Ankara’s relation with the US. Despite the fact that Turkey has been successful in blending its wider objectives with a clear intention to fight DAESH and YPG, the ambiguity that the US breeds in Syria is still eliciting many risks that Turkey should withstand. Based on a precarious sort of balance prevalent in the region, the final move of the US might be interpreted as way of blunting Turkey’s recent gains throughout the Al-Bab Operation.

Recent military maneuver of the US might raise up tensions between various actors in the battlefield

The US’s recent policy has produced a direct confrontation with Turkey such as once was experienced heavily with Russia. This would be the biggest foreign policy test for Ankara, on how much is it able to adjust to its new pro-active foreign policy instruments to the new phase of the US foreign policy. It seems that the US foreign policy priorities happen to line up with PYD which causes ramping up of divergence between the US and Turkey in terms of Syria policy and the Middle East as a whole. Nonetheless, recent military and political maneuvers of the US might lead to inter group and intra group struggles in the region taking into consideration sectarian and demographic vulnerabilities embedded in the region, especially while it is obvious that all the actors and borders have intertwined each other like never before. Having been confronted with multidimensional threats, Turkey appears determined not to leave off its advantageous position in Syria across swathes of strategic attacks coming from both national and international level.

The Syrian Civil War has developed in roughly three phases. The flow of events started as a protest that escalated into civil war, which then turned regional and even global as outside powers started a proxy war in the country while foreign fighters from Europe, Asia and Africa streamed into the country. There are multiple theories and assumptions in the air for the different aspects of the war.

The leading questions and the most common answers – thanks to the tools that political scientists have devised over decades – are as follows: Why did the anti-regime protests start in Syria in 2011? The quick answer is because of the spread of the revolutionary ideas of the Arab Spring (a.k.a. the diffusion argument). Why did the protests turn into a violent rebellion? The quick answer is because of the government’s handling of the protests (the repression-radicalization argument). Why did regional and global powers engage in the Syrian civil war? Well, this time the answer is not the oil.

Academia and lay analysts seem to think that the foreign intervention occurred in order to balance rivals (the balance of power argument). It seems like we have more or less an agreement on these answers. Nevertheless, one question lacks an agreed upon answer: Why did the foreign fighters flood into Syria? Well, while the balance of power explanations seem to work pretty well for the involvement of foreign states in the conflict, it does not say a word on the individual unit of analysis. The toolkits of political scientists do not have a quick answer to this question as the anecdotal evidence and journalistic opinions show a great deal of variety.

In order to answer the question of foreign fighters in Syria properly, we needed new (individual-level) data. An effort to profile the foreign fighters in Syria (and Iraq with the spread of the war) has found they – on average – seemed to be in their 20s, unemployed or students, and had an immigrant background. That was more relevant for DAESH though. Speaking of DAESH, a significant portion of the Western recruits of the organization have been criminals and gang members. The empirical evidence suggests that the DAESH recruits were not exclusively men (17% female) and not only Muslim-born people (6% to 23% converts). Once we get the profile, what remains is to figure out the primary motivation of those volunteers. Accordingly, foreign fighters spend a short process of radicalization, mostly as a group of friends and deciding to leave jointly for Syria and Iraq. As for the European recruits, the radicalization seems less explained by “economic or political conditions but rather by ideology” and the sense of alienation due to “the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries.” And of course, the allegedly Islamic character of the Islamic State (DAESH) was a pull factor on its own for those who needed an escape in a utopia.

Compared to DAESH’s recruitment of foreign fighters, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), could form a narrower pool of foreign fighters but enough to attract academic and journalistic attention. As the Syrian branch of the PKK – a terrorist organization based in Iraq that primarily targets Turkey – the YPG had already attracted a significant number of Turkish or Iraqi Kurds as foreign fighters. Nevertheless, the siege of Kobani in September 2014 gave the organization a reputation of fighting against DAESH with scarce resources and made it increasingly appealing in the West. In a parallel to DAESH recruiting, while some volunteers came for ideological reasons, with dreams of joining a utopia, others joined the YPG because they had nothing better to do back home. Some were criminals, some adventure seekers, some former soldiers who missed fighting, and some, simply confused minds. An American ex-fighter for the YPG claims that while he fought for the YPG alongside some former members of the American military and French Foreign Legion, “there was also a man […] who claimed to be Special Forces but was actually a child molester. There was a Canadian lingerie model, and a Muslim convert who liked to kiss dead DAESH on the lips.” In a nutshell, the YPG has quite a heterogeneous pool of foreign fighters from the West.

http://thenewturkey.org/ex-soviet-state-fighters-in-daesh/

DAESH’s barbarism deserves a great deal of anger, yet it takes more than anger to leave your home in Europe or North America and take a long journey to join the YPG. What it takes is also to be attracted to the YPG. Reddit, Twitter, and Facebook are full of YPG propaganda where you can also find publicly available information on how to join the YPG, the official email addresses to ask for recruitment, the contact information of the intermediary people between the volunteer and the YPG, etc.

Apart from such direct linkages to the YPG, one important factor that facilitates the group’s recruitment of foreign fighters is the depiction of it in the Western media.

While we read a lot about the foreign recruits of radical Islamist groups in Syria as losers or psychos – which might well be correct – the very same pages tend to cheer for those who join the YPG. One such recruit from Britain, Kimberley Taylor has made multiple appearances in the mainstream news outlets such as the BBC where she said that “everyone here sees the YPJ [the female force of the YPG] as leaders of the revolution, they’re women that we can’t compare with anything in the world.” While the Guardian also presented Kimberley Taylor as a revolutionary and glorified her as “the first British woman to travel to Syria to join the fight against Islamic State,” the same sources present the recruits of radical groups such as DAESH as radicalized girls who were promised utopia but found fear and death. Well, while, as expected, leaving your home to fight in Syria takes a process of radicalization and death is, to nobody’s surprise, associated with fear, dying for the YPG becomes a matter of bravery rather than fear.

The BBC quoted a Western YPG activist on the British recruit Ryan Lock’s suicide in a clash before being taken by DAESH as saying the act was one of “outstanding bravery”. Such depictions indeed shape how people see the YPG and find it worth fighting and dying for. This is how people become aware of the YPG. But also this is how they become aware of a country far away, where they can find an escape or seek adventure. Syria is shown as the address to those who want to pursue their revolutionary and anarchist anti-capitalist games – which they are not allowed to play in their home countries.

While the reasons to join the YPG vary, the reasons to flee vary as well. Some naïve recruits imagined the YPG to be too humane for a violent organization and joined it to fight for democracy, ecology, women’s rights, and anti-capitalism. Nevertheless, they probably change their opinion of the YPG after seeing the war crimes and ethnic cleansing in places under its control. While commenting on such accusations, a German YPG fighter stated that “I can’t confirm systematic displacement, some [civilians] are returning to their villages. But if you tell them [YPG] it’s an Arab village they’ll trash the place”. Some volunteers are fine with that because in that oversimplified depiction of the Syrian war, the YPG are the good guys who kill the bad guys – who speak Arabic and have long beards. But some think harder on the complexity of the causes of the war and the diversity of the motivations of the fighting parties, and find it hard to tolerate ethnic cleansing under the disguise of fighting against DAESH.

For some others who changed their mind about the YPG, it looked clear that fighting in Syria was not a summer vacation where you make a revolution and get back home for the Christmas. What they saw in Syria was blood and death; and blood looks bloodier when you see it in real life rather than on a computer screen. Some others deserted the YPG because Syria is not a place like the ones in GTA games they used to play back at home. According to Michael Enright, a former YPG fighter from the UK, some foreign recruits feel “a certain amount of frustration because they don’t see as much action as they would like.” An American volunteer who first joined the YPG but then crossed back to Iraq and joined the Peshmerga forces states that “a lot of people come over here thinking they’re going to be John Wayne and Rambo running and gunning. It’s not like that.” And some others, especially committed Christians, flee the YPG forces after seeing the group pursues a socialist ideology and is composed of a “bunch of damn Reds.”

In a nutshell, for the European and North American volunteers, both the reasons to join and desert the YPG vary. And it seems like both the governments and mainstream media address Syria as a place where such “confused” or “problematic” people can go and do things, which they are not allowed to do at home.

The Current Educational Conditions of Syrian Children in Turkey

Obviously, hosting refugees is not easy, either logistically or politically, and the bitter truth is that they will not return to Syria in the near future. This is why the success of sustainable migration policies is crucial in terms of the mutual adaptation of Syrians and the host community in Turkey. Also, the inconsistent policies of allied countries for the refugees during the refugee crisis, along with the existence of ethnic and religious terrorist groups such as the PYD/YPG and DAESH, constitute the external factors that encourage Turkey to be more determined to implement effective education policies. Similarly, in order to reach social agreement on Syrian refugees and to keep Syrian youths away from any activity that may disrupt public order, Turkey needs to prepare a road map for the education of refugee children. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a ghost generation that has no identity, no home and no future. Even though various regulations on education have been implemented since 2012, it is difficult to affirm the existence of stable policies on this issue.

Source: MEB

According to MEB’s February 2016 data, there are 834,833 Syrian school-age (5-18) children in Turkey. While 311,259 of these children are being educated at the GEMs[1] (Temporary Education Centers), the remaining 523,583 are yet to be enrolled in school. Furthermore, GİGM (General Directorate for Migration Management of Turkey) data says that there are 364,974 Syrian children currently aged between 0 and 4, who will start their education in the coming years. This picture illustrates the urgent need for sustainable migration policies for Turkey in terms of education and social adaptation.

What is to be done?

The SETA Foundation published a report to draw attention to this issue. As the authors of this report, based on our fieldwork conducted in the cities most populated with refugees, Şanlıurfa, Gazinatep, Kilis, İstanbul and Ankara, my colleague Müberra Emin and I argue that the education of Syrians is a challenge for Turkey, but this challenge could be transformed into an opportunity for both the refugees and Turkey. By conducting observations inside and outside the camps, holding interviews, along with holding in workshops and meetings to contribute to the process of preparing sustainable long-term policies, we developed a roadmap for the education of Syrian children in Turkey. First of all, Turkey needs more extensive and in-depth studies on Syrian children’s welfare and education conditions. The amendments needed to increase the number of schooled Syrian children necessitate a transformation of the whole national education system in Turkey, and such reforms must be encouraged. Educational reform could bridge more pluralist and enriched educational programs and environments. Also, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) has set a target to close the GEMs gradually over the next three years, and transiting Syrian students from GEMs with Arabic Syrian curriculum to public schools with Turkish curriculums.

Within the Syrian community, there are many serious concerns about this decision, because the Syrians are afraid of an assimilation that may cause generational clashes with their children. However, from the Ministry viewpoint, transition to public schools is critical to overcome the language barrier to ensure social adaptation. We should consider the concerns of the both sides, which show that Turkey needs a hybrid model for the education of Syrian children. Syrian children in public schools should undergo a 6-month/1-year language education and preparation program for school, after which they should be included in the education process according to their level. If the preparatory process is not enough, they should be provided with weekend or after-school Turkish language education. This could be a good start to increase the number of schooled Syrian children and to provide them with good education opportunities. Eventually, Turkey will promote a new strong generation rather than a Syrian ghost generation; most of them have disappeared in Europe. The report also addresses issues such as teacher training, recruitment and curriculum, and also includes policy recommendations with regard to Syrians children’s education in Turkey.

[1] GEMs are primary and secondary education institutions which provide temporary education to Syrian children and teenagers in Arabic and according to the Syrian curricula; they are active both inside and outside the camps.

There were moments, after 2000, when the identity-related diversity and multicultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire was celebrated. The AK Party government initiated an Alevi Opening, in 2007, and pioneered two important initiatives, one in 2009 and one in 2013, to resolve Turkey’s century-old Kurdish Question. These initiatives were important steps towards identity-related reconciliation in Turkey. Unfortunately, the crisis in Syria has stimulated the identity-related fault lines in Turkey, increasing the risk of social contention, whereby the escalating civil war in Syria has posed the threat of identity-oriented polarization in Turkey.

Unfortunately, the crisis in Syria has stimulated the identity-related fault lines in Turkey, increasing the risk of social contention.

Efforts to create a homogenous society during the early Republican era failed several times due to the resurgence of ideological and ethnic identities. Nonetheless, the top-down Turkish national-identity-building project of Mustafa Kemal is still regarded as a “successful” policy due to its immense defects. Ongoing developments in the region have drawn attention, once again, though unenthusiastically, to the harmonizing aspect of national identity. Ethnic and sectarian fragmentations in the Middle East, primarily ethnic terrorism and Salafist Jihadism, have become a serious threat to Turkey’s national security. The ongoing war in Syria has complicated the identity puzzle in Turkey, leading to the dangerous potential of triggering identity-related radicalizations.

The risk of ideological and political polarization in Turkey constitutes a serious challenge. In addition, the civil wars and uncertainties in Syria and Iraq could become a source of tension and polarization within Turkish society. The increasing material costs of the civil wars in Turkey’s neighboring countries, the presence of more than 3 million Syrian refugees living in Turkish territories and the mounting security risks are further fueling the concerns of the Turkish people. The Turkish government feels that the country’s Western allies are not taking these security worries seriously; in addition, the Western allies have proved unwilling to shoulder Turkey’s economic burden. Once ardent supporters of EU integration, the Turkish people are disappointed and feel abandoned by the country’s Western allies as Turkey faces the uncertainties of the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis.

Once ardent supporters of EU integration, the Turkish people are disappointed and feel abandoned by the country’s Western allies.

Most people in Turkey are fully aware of how the peace process ended, as the PKK attacked the Turkish Security Forces in the summer of 2015. This was partly related to the developments taking place in northern Syria, namely, the increasing power and international legitimacy of the PYD, the PKK’s Syria branch. The PYD managed to gain legitimacy and material support by positioning itself against ISIS within the Syrian context. So far, the Islamist, Alevi and Turkish nationalist dimensions of the identity polarization in Turkey have been either avoided or underestimated, owing to the absence of direct confrontations and violence. The terrorist attacks, bombings and the never-ending funeral ceremonies of the martyred Turkish soldiers are causing Turkish citizens further unease.

Secular nationalists feel further strained due to the hegemonic status of the conservative democratic AK Party in Turkish politics, which has gained ground over the last fifteen years. The rise of Salafist Jihadi radicalism in Turkey’s backyard is causing apprehension in all sectors of society in Turkey, including the conservative religious groups. For decades, conservative religious groups in Turkey managed to refrain from illegal activities and violence and pursued their goals through democratic channels, adding legitimacy to Turkish democracy. At one time, the military, judges and secular establishments had been considered the strongholds of, occasionally oppressive, secularism in Turkey; now, it seems that none have maintained their power. The loss of the relative influence of the institutions that oversee the secular foundation of the republic has caused some of the secular urban groups to feel uncomfortable.

Ethnic, sectarian and ideological tensions within the wider region have had definite spillover effects in Turkey.

Ethnic, sectarian and ideological tensions within the wider region have had definite spillover effects in Turkey. Turkey’s border with Syria is 911 kms long and all demographic groups, including Kurd, Arab, Turcoman and Assyrian, exist on both sides of the Turkey-Syria border. Indeed, the border between Turkey and Syria was drawn arbitrarily as a result of colonial bargaining in the early 20th century. Not surprisingly, given these close links between the two countries, ethnic, sectarian and political tensions on the Syrian side of the border have certainly affected and will continue to affect Turkey.

Different social groups in Turkey hold the expectation that the Turkish government will support groups in Syria to enable them to feel more connected. In 2014, a group of Kurds had expected the Turkish state to support the PYD against DAESH in the battle for Kobani. The Turkish government’s unwillingness to engage militarily was manipulated by the political wing of the PKK, which led to outrage among the Kurdish ethno-nationalists. Conservatives and Islamists wanted the AK Party government to support the moderate opposition in the Syrian civil war, whereas the secular left and the Alevis wanted the government to restore its relations with the Asad regime. Some influential names among the secular elite also wanted Turkey to stay away from the “Middle East Quagmire” and to turn instead to its traditional Western allies. Clearly, it is almost impossible for the AK Party government to meet the expectations of all social groups at the same time.

Different social groups in Turkey hold the expectation that the Turkish government will support groups in Syria to enable them to feel more connected.

Among the different social groups, there is increased excitement among the Kurdish ethno-nationalists. This group perceives the increased autonomy of the PYD in Northern Syria, under the conditions of the civil war, as a positive development, even an historic opportunity for independence or a strong autonomy. Many young PKK terrorists from Turkey either volunteered or were forced by the PKK to join the Syrian civil war in the ranks of the YPG. Some Alevis, on the other hand, fear that the anti-regime stance of the AK Party government in the Syrian civil war has sectarian underpinnings.

During the Arab Uprising, the Turkish government was in favor of political change in Syria and elsewhere, when Turkey chose to support the opposition politically and diplomatically. This support was interpreted differently and ideologically among some Alevis. The Alevis were concerned about the weakening of the secular foundations of the Turkish State, which previously had been neutral and distanced in its approach to the regimes in the Middle East. As a result, certain Alevis believe that the AK Party administration is pursuing sectarian goals within the Middle East.

Turkey’s increased security cooperation with Qatar and Saudi Arabia have further elevated such worries. From among the extreme-left Alewites (Arab Alewites differs from majority Alevis) of Hatay, few joined the Syrian civil war in the ranks of the Asad Regime as foreign fighters. Some people from Turkey joined the Syrian civil war in the ranks of groups such as the Free Syria Army, Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra and even DAESH. Those who are fighting on opposing sides of the Syrian civil war may bring hostilities and their fighting experience back to Turkey, which poses a serious risk to Turkey’s national security.

In addition, some young nationalists crossed the border to join the fight to defend Turcoman villages against the regime’s forces. For the time being, the AK Party government’s humanitarian aid to Turcomans, as well as active policies and diplomatic efforts to support Turcomans on the Syrian side of the border, has curbed Turkish nationalist sensitivities; however, fluctuations are always possible. For instance, there is increased nationalist sensitivity concerning the PKK-PYD attacks on Turkey and the demographic engineering against the Turcomans and Arabs on the southern side of the border.

People in Turkey who are anxious about the economic and security-related spillover effects of the Syrian crisis may experience some friction with the Syrian refugees.

Another important identity-related issue is raised by the situation of more than 3 million refugees from Syria and some from Iraq. At the beginning of the crisis, most people believed that the Syrians would return to their homes when the civil war came to an end. However, more than five years have passed since the beginning of the uprising in Syria and, as most of the country’s cities are devastated, most of the refugees have no safe place to return to, which means that the majority of Syrian refugees will become permanent residents of Turkey.

There is increasing sensitivity about the immigrants, especially within the cities neighboring the border of Syria, such as Kilis, Antep, Urfa and Hatay. The populations in those cities are concerned about the spillover effects of the Syrian civil war. Although the refugees from Syria are also the victims of the brutal civil war in their home country, people in Turkey who are anxious about the economic and security-related spillover effects of the Syrian crisis may experience some friction with the Syrian refugees. There is always room for potential escalation. The government has regulated to accommodate Syrians on a more regular and stable basis; however, the existing identity-related status quo in Turkey can hardly be maintained with within the fast-evolving conditions.

If not skillfully managed, serious social frictions may arouse.

The mounting civil wars in both Syria and Iraq have increased radicalization at Turkey’s southern borders. Turkish citizens who live in the bordering cities feel anxious. These fears trigger skepticism and may lead to polarization among different identity groups. So far, the psychological impacts of the Syrian crisis on identity groups in Turkey remains an underestimated issue. In particular, people living in the cities bordering Syria and Iraq are experiencing this tension more intensely. If not skillfully managed, serious social frictions may arouse. Becoming aware of such a potential threat is a crucial first step, but following steps need to be taken to ensure that communities in Turkey are more resilient to such tensions.