After last Friday’s tripartite summit of Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Tehran, there was another meeting this Friday, bringing Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany together in Istanbul. The meeting enabled France and Germany to be more involved in the resolution of the crisis. France and Germany’s positions on Idlib are very similar to that of Turkey for different reasons. Hence, we can talk about a European perspective on Idlib and it also includes Turkey’s. Going back to Friday’s meeting, all parties agreed on the necessity of a political solution for Idlib according to the statement of Turkey’s Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin. As these diplomatic exchanges continue, Turkey feels to have more time to facilitate a peaceful solution on Idlib.

Turkey is trying real hard to prevent a devastating battle from occurring in Idlib. The diplomatic talks that occurred in Tehran and this Friday in Istanbul are just one side of these efforts. The other side is pure realpolitik. Turkey increased its tone against a fait accompli regime offensive in Idlib and it further made its deterrence discourse more credible with new deployments on the ground. While the open sources did not give the specifics, what we know is that Turkey’s reinforcement included new troops and armored vehicles around its observation posts in Idlib and along its border with Idlib.

The reinforcement, on the one hand, serves the purpose of deterring a possible regime offensive, but on the other hand, it is also vital for Turkey if its deterrence strategy fails to deter the regime from starting the offensive. In such a scenario, these reinforcements will play a significant role for Turkey to defend its already-settled troops in Idlib. These troops had been deployed to serve in Turkey’s observation posts that were established in the Astana process of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. They were not designed for defensive purposes but merely for the reconnaissance mission. Now Turkey is making these posts defendable with new reinforcements and, hence, also deterring the regime and other hostile forces from attacking them.

What is crucial at this moment for Turkey is meeting on a middle ground with Russia. As long as Turkey and Russia can keep a common position based on mutual respect for their security perceptions, the situation in Idlib and elsewhere in Syria should be solved peacefully and satisfactorily for both countries.

Excluding the American sphere of control in Syria, Turkey’s primary concern is the PYD’s role in Tel Rıfaat and Russia’s primary concern is the armed groups in Idlib. Turkey has already designated the the Hey’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a terror organization and it seems like Turkey will increase its pressure on the HTS to dissolve itself or leave Idlib. As long as Russia plays a supportive role in Idlib, the city can be cleaned from groups like the HTS without burning down the entire city and causing another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey’s primary strategy in this game is to deter the Syrian regime from a brutal offensive while trying to find a middle ground with Russia and bringing the similar minded European powers closer to the game. This strategy seems to not be a maximalist one but quite a reasonable and applicable strategy that can convince both Russia and European powers. What Turkey and the rest of the reasonable actors need now is to prevent spoilers from undermining this well-crafted strategy.

The Tehran summit that was held last week did not produce any clear-cut solution to overcome the ongoing uncertainty in the Idlib region. The uncertainty remains as to whether Russia and the regime forces will carry out a full-scale military offensive against the opposition via Iran-backed Shia forces. While Turkey’s position and solution package regarding the issue is welcomed by the international community, especially by the United Nations, the other stakeholders of the Astana process, Russia and Iran, reject the Turkish proposal. Two basic factors trigger the uncertainty and disagreement over Idlib between Russia and Turkey. The first is the security concerns of Russia regarding the terrorist threat emanating from HTS, which targeted Russian military bases in Syria with drones at the beginning of this year. On the other hand, the occasional confrontation between the opposition armed groups and Syrian regime forces constitute a rationale for a military offensive in Idlib. Therefore, the security concerns of Russia and the regime form the main reason for Russia to disagree with Turkey’s proposal.

The second reason is more complicated, and it might deepen the uncertainties in the region. This is the question of how the HTS is going to disarm itself and disband its organizational structure in preventing Russia to agree on Turkey’s proposal. The primary dynamic that drives these uncertainties is the ambiguity of the overall Russian strategy towards the position of the opposition groups located in the Idlib region. It is clear that Russia’s ultimate desire is to undermine the presence of all opposition groups in Idlib and to declare its military victory. The Syrian regime also shares this objective. This therefore makes the Turkish solution package more fragile and difficult to achieve – unless the Turkish government receive stronger international support. To put the matter bluntly, three questions should be asked at this stage: Does Russia think that the Turkish proposal is credible and achievable? Is the Turkish offer achievable on the ground? Does Turkey have the deterrence capacity to transform the HTS and other minor armed groups with military force? These questions cannot be answered at this stage.

It is not yet possible to state that there is full consensus between Putin and President Erdogan on the management of the Idlib crisis. However, at this stage, it is possible to say that the proposal Ankara has offered provoked Russia to re-think its position. The first pillar of the Turkish solution package consists of a “security warrant” that will be provided by Turkey to Russia in the south and to the Syrian regime forces in the northeast. According to this option, Turkey will consolidate its military presence along with the presence of the member of National Liberation Army, established by Turkey in the post-Astana process under the framework of creating a moderate opposition group and dissolving the radical elements in Idlib. Turkey will apply the same procedure towards the de facto border between the regime forces and the opposition armed groups.

After the first phase Turkey will start to implement a mechanism to enable the HTS to lay down its weapons and dissolve its military structure. This act, for sure, will take time for Turkey. With the support of Russia and Western countries, this objective is achievable. If the HTS does not accept this option, then Turkey is proposing a military solution to disband the group. Only then will the Turkish-backed moderate armed groups carry military operations against the HTS and other minor armed groups. It is possible to say that Turkey and the moderate armed groups can achieve this objective at the end of the day. According to signals coming from the ground, the HTS seems to accept the first option and tends to desire to disband its military structure. This option also depends on Russia’s intention of air bombardment. If Russia continues to carry out air strikes against the HTS, then it is difficult to say that the HTS will come close to Turkey’s offer.

The third part of the solution package is establishing a joint struggle with the terrorism issue in the Idlib region as expressed by President Erdogan, following the Tehran summit. This proposal involves creating an international dialogue mechanism to overcome extremism-related matters in the Idlib region, including foreign fighters, stabilizing refugee mobilization, and forming a stable non-conflictual region. This does not necessarily mean that an international military coalition is necessary to overcome the issue. Instead, political support for Turkey’s decisiveness and good intentions is much more important than providing military means on the ground.

This is the right time for the international society to take real responsibility in order to overcome the already deepening Syrian crisis. The violent fall of Idlib will not bring an end to the Syrian Civil War, but Idlib can provide a tremendous opportunity for Russia and the international community to find a common ground for the future of Syria. Therefore, Turkey’s struggle to find a peaceful solution to the Idlib issue should be supported.

On September 7, the leaders of Turkey, Russia, and Iran met in Tehran to discuss the Syrian issue with Idlib being the most important topic on the agenda. The organizers broadcasted the whole summit, which allowed us to witness a kind of a televised argument in which Erdogan ceased the moment to ask Putin and Rouhani for a ceasefire in Idlib. Basically, what the Turkish side was trying to achieve is to spare lives of more than 3.5 million civilians in the province from the Assad regime’s aggression, and buy some time to solve the problem.

During the summit, Turkey’s President highlighted his country’s grave concerns and sensitivities towards the issue. If a major assault is to be launched against the Syrian province, the humanitarian catastrophe will be big and Turkey, with its maximum capacity being utilized to support refugees, will not have more room to deal with it. Stressing the importance of Idlib, the Turkish side clearly said that it is a matter of national security and will not leave the city.

President Erdogan may not have fully succeeded in convincing both leaders to halt the military operation; however, the political showdown uncovered in the summit shed light on the different agendas, interests, and priorities of Turkey, Russia and Iran. If we add the U.S. to the mix, then it would be safe to assume that the way the Idlib dilemma is going to be handled will have a profound impact on the power game evolving in Syria and on its future.

Despite the unlimited support the Syrian regime is getting from Moscow and Tehran, Assad is still less than a decision maker in his country’s affairs. By defeating the opposition and taking over their last stronghold Idlib, Assad’s allies want to guarantee his regime a better position in the political process, boost the efforts to extend its control over Syria, and expedite the ongoing proceeding to re-legitimatize it as a de-facto ruler for the whole country.

Although in a very unfavorable position vis-à-vis the Russia-Iran-Assad axis from one side, the U.S.- SDF/ PYD /YPG axis from another, Turkey –as clearly reflected by the Tehran summit– is the only country which is still actively defying Assad in public and behind closed doors. In this sense, Ankara is seen as an obstacle that needs to be neutralized if not completely removed from Idlib.

Unlike other times where Russia conceded for Turkey, things seem to be a little bit different now. Aware of Ankara’s critical position, Putin insisted on his stance, refused to include “ceasefire” in the text and showed support for the assault against the province with the pretext of the presence of terrorist organizations. After the summit, Assad and Russia intensified their aerial bombardment giving a clear sign that a land assault is near.

The situation will harshly test Ankara–Moscow relations in Syria and how both of them will cope with the coming developments and challenges there. A major assault on Idlib is expected to create a humanitarian catastrophe and trigger flows of refugees towards the Turkish borders. This will increase the political, economic, and security pressure on Ankara, but most importantly will hinder its credibility as a guarantor in the eyes of the Syrian opposition. The direct result will likely be the end of the Astana process and the breakdown of the trilateral mechanism with further implications to come.

Thus, by ignoring Turkey’s critical points and concerns, Moscow not only risks undermining its understandings with Ankara, but also endangers the fate of the political process in a way that will likely make a sustainable solution in Syria impossible. Taking into consideration that, without Turkey, there can be no serious progress on the coming non-military challenges (constitutional law, preparing for elections, construction….etc), Russia would be shooting itself in the foot if it insists on a full scale military assault on Idlib.

Moscow needs to understand very well the risks arising from such a scenario and that without taking Ankara’s concerns into account, it might win the war but it will never win peace. If decision makers in Russia are fully aware of this point, then there will be still a slim chance to halt the military operation or at least downsize it to a limited operation.

To be sure, everyone except Turkey, seems to be agreeing on the military operation in a way or another including the U.S. While Russia and Iran are in a rush to achieve the above-stated goals and consolidate Assad’s power, Washington made it clear that its only concern is the use of chemical weapons. Last week, U.S. ambassador to the UN said at a UN press conference, “If they – Assad and his allies- want to continue to go the route of taking over Syria, they can do that, but they cannot do it with chemical weapons.”

Just five months ago, U.S. President Trump stressed that he wanted to withdraw from Syria and bring his troops back home. Now Trump has agreed to a new strategy that indefinitely extends the military effort to ensure the departure of Iran and its proxy forces, the “enduring defeat” of Daesh (IS), the establishment of a stable, nonthreatening government acceptable to all Syrians and the international community.

Yet, allowing Assad to kill civilians, take over Idlib, and extend his control over more territories with the help of Iran and Russia will run against the freshly stated goals of Washington’s new policy in Syria. It will be hard to imagine that the U.S. will be able stay in Syria indefinitely, prevent the emergence of terrorists, and drive Iran out of the country if Assad is going to consolidate his powers. In this context, the U.S. has an interest in stopping the imminent military assault on Idlib and can work with Turkey on this issue for their mutual benefit.

Americans have always complained lately about the Turkish-Russian cooperation. It should be kept in mind that Ankara is working with Moscow in Syria after it was on the verge of war with it at the end of 2015 because the U.S. decided to downsize itself and make alliance with a franchise branch of the PKK in Syria, thus constantly working against Turkey’s national security.

Currently, disagreements with Russia and Iran on Idlib are visible. Turkey, a NATO ally, is saying it will stand its ground amid the imminent military assault of Assad and his allies on the city. However, since the balance of power is not in Turkey’s favor versus Assad, Iran and Russia, the U.S. can step in to defend Ankara, not only politically but militarily if needed. When they have the will, Americans proved that they can act. They defended the PYD against Assad, they defended themselves against Russian mercenaries without the pretext that such a lethal engagement will lead to a total war.

Another option on U.S.-Turkey cooperation in this matter can be explored too. U.S. officials can offer valuable intelligence information that might help Ankara convince Moscow that there is a more effective way to work on counterterrorism operation in Idlib rather than letting Assad and his allies take over the city with the pretext of fighting terrorism. This will not only raise Turkey’s chance to halt the operation but will serve Washington’s interest too.

If it were considered as a country, Idlib would have been the second country in hosting refugees. The Tehran summit proved that Ankara’s position to defend the civilians in Idlib against the Assad regime is not another PR strategy rather than an ethical position, which is constantly undermined by the imbalance of power. Defending civilians against the brutality of the Assad regime and his allies should not only be Turkey’s responsibility. The international community, including the U.S., has great responsibilities to carry in this particular matter as well.

The Tehran summit on the future of the Idlib region is over, but the Idlib conundrum continues. The final meeting of the summit was interestingly broadcasted live so that the participating nations could raise their position publicly regarding the Idlib issue. It was a textbook example demonstrating competing discourses and strategies that frame the participating nations’ policy justification regarding the situation, not only in the Idlib region but also in Syria. President Erdogan encouraged Russia and Iran to accept a ceasefire in Idlib by saying that the people of the region hold many anxieties about the catastrophic consequences of the aerial bombing by Russia and Syria. He also mentioned that such an accord would be a victory of the summit.

However, Turkey’s cease-fire call was rejected by Russia and Iran. President Putin responded that “a cease-fire would be good.” Putin also mentioned that representatives of terrorist organizations have enough common sense to stop resistance and lay down their weapons. It was evident that President Erdogan underlined the importance of the cease-fire for the civilian people who might be targeted by Russian air bombardment.

Turkey’s priorities regarding Syria are still shaped by the same parameters as the final declaration of the summit shows. Territorial integrity has always been a central component of Ankara’s concerns regarding the Syrian crisis. President Erdogan underlined the terrorist threat by referring to the growing relationship between the U.S. and the PYD, which is the PKK’s Syrian branch. As it can also be understood through the Russian and Iranian leaders’ statements during the meeting, the U.S presence in the northern part of Syria is not welcomed as it undermines Syrian territorial integrity and Turkey’s national security. This concern was directly mentioned in the final statement of the meeting.

However, as compared to the previous Astana summits, in the final communique of the Tehran summit, Turkey, Russia, and Iran framed Syria concerning its official name: the Syrian Arab Republic (three times). This is an important signal to see Turkey’s “new” position regarding the Syrian regime, as Turkey always tends to prefer the Assad regime instead of using SAR.

In addition to the strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of Syria Turkey, Russia and Iran also revealed the “sovereignty” of the Syrian state in the final declaration of the meeting. From a personal point of view, it is unclear to me how Turkey locates the sovereignty of the Syrian state over the entire country which has been divided into many parts, in which Turkey also holds some part of it. More importantly, how Turkey understands the domestic dimension of the SAR’s sovereignty is not clear. This shows also how the PKK threat shapes Turkey’s understanding of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, the Tehran summit is interesting to understand whether Turkey’s perception of the solution of the Syrian crisis has shifted.

As the final statement of the meeting underlines, the UN is the most important component of Turkey’s perspective regarding the Syrian crisis. In the joint statement, Turkey, Russia, and Iran reiterated the importance of the UN and underlined that the Syria crisis could only reach a final resolution through a negotiated political process, not military means.

How the Idlib issue will be solved is still unclear as there was no mentioning of any mechanism to prevent the Russian and Syrian regime’s full-scale military assault on Idlib, but it seems that Turkey’s proposal was partly accepted by Russia and Iran. Before the summit, there were three scenarios: limited intervention against the radical groups such as HTS in particular places, full-scale military intervention and, finally, allowing Turkey to dissolve and disband the radical groups. At this stage, it is claimed that Turkey has given HTS a week deadline to respond to Turkey’s proposal of dissolving and disbanding the group. From news on the ground, the group will only accept the proposal if Russia and Syria give an end to their attacks.

The Tehran summit underlined the importance of the Astana summit and Turkey’s role in the resolution process of the Syrian crisis, but it also showed the difficulties for Turkey, particularly during the emergency time on the ground.