The foreign and defense ministers of 23 EU ministers signed a protocol in Brussels on Monday, which is considered as the first step towards establishing a European defense union. The signing of this document, which sets forth the increase of defense spending, forming joint armament projects, and setting up a joint military force to employ for intervention in crises when necessary, seems to have caused an excitement among various circles within the EU.

In fact, such a development was already expected considering German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement that Europeans must take care of themselves from now on after a number of unsuccessful meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump, and French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for reforming the EU in a way to encompass an increase in defense cooperation.

However, the primary question that needs to be answered here is whether the will of Germany and France will be enough to form a defense union in the EU. As similar attempts in the past have failed, it seems that establishing a defense alliance independent from NATO will be a challenging task for the EU.

As similar attempts in the past have failed, it seems that establishing a defense union independent from NATO will be a challenging task for the EU.

A year after the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) in 1951, which laid the foundation of the EU, the treaty establishing the European Defense Community, which was led by France with the motivation of controlling Germany and excluding the U.S., failed to obtain ratification in the French parliament and thus did not enter into force. Since the French government failed to convince its own parliament into a European defense force, Western countries, including France, spent the Cold War period under the umbrella of NATO, which has always been dominated by the U.S.

With the end of the Cold War, a group of EU countries, again led by France, attempted to form a defense unit under the umbrella of the European Union in order to liberate the EU from U.S. influence. However, they were impeded by the “pro-Atlantic” group led by the UK. They discerned their military shortcomings when they wanted to intervene in Serbia in order to end the refugee flow during the civil war in Yugoslavia, while the U.S. was reluctant to provide support for a long time. Even this realization did not bring success to Europe in terms of implementing its own policies to create a pan-European military force.

Due to pressures within the Union, during the St. Malo Summit in 1998, Britain showed a green light to the formation of a European army, which would not be considered as an alternative to NATO. The task of establishing a “European army” and “European police force” by 2003, which would perform the task of “intervening in crises” was determined in the Cologne and Helsinki summits in 1999. The transmission of the military institutions of Western Europe to the EU in the Laeken Summit held in 2001 was a considerable step in terms of creating a defense force in Europe. In the meantime, the efforts initiated for a “European Union Constitution” comprised the political leg of a possible military cooperation and signified a gradual approach to the federal unit ambition of the “Europeanists.”

The “European Defense Union” initiative is a manifestation of the campaign kicked off by Germany and France in order to create excitement within the Union and to take an effective step against the Eurosceptics.

Soon after these initiatives, Europe confronted a series of catastrophic incidents and crises for the integration of the continent. During the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, while some EU member states supported the U.S., others strongly opposed. Due to this, the idea of a “European Army” was suspended. Subsequently, the ideas of a common constitution and federalism suffered a major blow after people in the Netherlands and France voted against the EU Constitution in the referendums held in 2005.

The last couple of years have been marked as a period of crises for the EU due to the evolution of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, the refugee challenge, the rise of xenophobia and Euroscepticism, the crisis of separatism, Brexit, the crisis in Transatlantic relations, and the increase of terror attacks. The “European Defense Union” initiative is a manifestation of the campaign kicked off by Germany and France in order to create excitement within the Union and to take an effective step against the Eurosceptics. However, the failure of past attempts cast serious doubts on the prospects of this initiative since the EU is going through one of its weakest periods.

Last week during the WWI commemoration ceremonies, U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron had a quarrel over how to sustain European security. President Trump has been pressing very heavily on European leaders to increase their share in NATO, forcing them to follow the U.S. sanctions leveled against Iran and Russia, threatening to enforce additional tariffs on European products, mainly those pertain to the automobile industry. Germany and France, the two pillars of the emerging European super-state, have grown uneasy about unilateralism and the peremptory attitude of Trump’s foreign policy. However, they have showed no sign of aversion.

This has changed with Macron’s recent call for building up a European army to protect Europe in the face of growing Russian, Chinese and also the U.S. threat. This implied a new security framework for Europe outside of NATO. Macron’s call for an independent security framework was hastily backed by Germany. This snap has, of course, drawn Trump’s fury that he did not miss the opportunity to ridicule France by expressing that the U.S. saved France from Germany’s hand in WWI. Trump was obviously implying that if the U.S. gave up its role of European balancer, history would repeat itself. That is, Germany might invade the neighboring countries and establish its hegemony over the whole of Europe once again. Besides, he reiterated that the U.S. did not have an intention to renounce its role of European balancer or dissolve NATO but the U.S. needed the European countries to take more responsibility for maintaining security of the Western world.

U.S. President Trump didn’t miss the opportunity to ridicule France after Macron’s call for an independent security framework within the EU and said that the U.S. saved France from Germany’s hand in WWI.

Does this fray over European security between the U.S. and the European central powers demonstrate another challenge against the existing unipolar international order? And does it amount to a return of Europe to great power politics?

Indeed, Europe lost its central place in international politics with the rise of the U.S. as a regional hegemon in its region during the 19th century. Before the rise of the U.S., international politics was exclusively determined by equal relations among European states in the European continent and their colonial or rather hierarchical relations with the rest of the world. The rise of the U.S. at the end of the 19th century put an end to this dual order and shifted the gravity of international politics towards North America.

Does the fray over European security between the U.S. and the EU demonstrate a return of Europe to great power politics?

In the new format, international politics was determined by the U.S.’s perpetual attempts to prevent an emergence of another regional hegemon in other regions by following a strategy of offshore balancing. This strategy mainly comprises taking the side of the lesser power(s) in a region and thus to forestall integration of a region under a hegemon. This was clearly observed in WWI and WWII. In the former the U.S. attempted to prevent German hegemony in Europe whereas in the latter it sought to preclude German hegemony in Europe and Japanese hegemony in East Asia. The U.S. succeeded in both of those systemic wars.

However, the U.S.’s success backfired. It led to a power vacuum in Eurasia and gave way to the rise of another regional hegemon, the USSR. The Cold War witnessed an international system with two hegemons with their own spheres of influence. Europe was split between the U.S. and the USSR and became a dominated region. The end of the Cold War has not changed the status of Europe so much. But it has furthered European unification, which had started in the mid-1950s with the American support.

European leaders see Trump’s unilateral and domineering foreign policy as an opportunity to upgrade Europe’s status in international politics to a higher level.

Now we are at another stage in European integration and its return to international politics as a great power. No power in international politics desires to leave its national security to the hands of another state unless it has no other choice. Thus, French President Macron’s call for a European army and Germany’s backing cannot be thought as a bluff against the U.S. Nor can it be understood from a scapegoat approach, that states tend to start or escalate conflicts in outside their borders to sustain unity within the country. It seems that European leaders see Trump’s unilateral and domineering foreign policy as an opportunity to upgrade Europe’s status in international politics to a higher level. It is completely a different matter that whether they can achieve that goal or not, the intention is clear – Europe is on its way to smash another brick in existing unipolar international order, alongside Chinese and Russian challenges to the U.S.

Judaism has a holy day named Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), which is spent with ceremonies of redemption for the sins of the Israelites. During the early periods of Judaism, high priest Aaron would perform religious ceremonies for the atonement of the community and made people pray on this holy day. Then, he drew lots from a lottery box over two goats. One was selected to sacrifice for the sins of the people, while he leaned his hands on the second goat and confessed the sins of the entire people of Israel, thus making it the scapegoat. After that, the scapegoat was taken out of the sanctuary and cast into the desert. According to the Jewish faith, the sins were cleansed as the scapegoat lurked out of sight.

Today, the word scapegoat is used in almost every language, including Turkish, to define one that bears the blame for others. In that sense, the U.S. President Donald Trump has become a global scapegoat. Since his inauguration, his discharge is constantly on the agenda in U.S. domestic politics, while the international community is fed up with him. The most criticized thing about him is his “crude and obnoxious” tone. But as a matter of fact, he perfectly represents U.S. policies, especially U.S. foreign policy, with this very tone. That is why many international audience supported Trump against Hillary Clinton during the presidential race. It was obvious that Clinton would sugarcoat U.S. foreign policy’s atrocious practices and their consequences much better than Trump since Trump accentuates the vulgar side of U.S. policies.

To illustrate, let me remind the reader of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which led to a series of conflicts in the region. The U.S. Senator from Arizona, John McCain, who recently passed away and was eulogized by the U.S. press and even by his rivals, was noted as one of the leading hawkish names paving the way for the invasion of Iraq. Shortly before his death, McCain wrote in his memoir that the invasion “can’t be judged as anything other than a mistake, a very serious one, and I have to accept my share of the blame for it.” But no matter whether he regretted it, more than 600.000 Iraqi civilians were killed in Iraq over the past decade while the U.S. troops suffered 4.500 losses. Plus, millions of Iraqis were displaced and lost their homes.

A former deputy from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) likened the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) to a barnacle, saying that a barnacle cannot survive unless it feeds on a whale’s skin and how FETO flourished in Turkey. So, it can be said that Israel is a barnacle living on the U.S. ever since it was founded. The U.S. is also content with supporting the country’s tyranny. Innumerable examples portraying this relation can be given but let me remind you of the latest one. The law that recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital city passed in 1995 in the U.S. Congress. Although all U.S. presidents in office as of that date kept the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv by using their authority in foreign politics, this law has been in force since then. Trump only exercised it, making the U.S.’ Israel policy even more obvious, and urged moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.

Another example can be given from Turkey. FETO of course did not appear during Trump’s term in office, as the terror group has been revealed to have almost 40 years of past. When FETO attempted to stage a military coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, Barack Obama was in the White House. Both Obama and his successor Trump issued statements siding with Turkey on the subject, but this cannot change what happened. FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, who moved to Pennsylvania in 1999, with the help of former CIA vice-chair Graham Fuller, is still living there without facing any restriction since then.

European leaders, especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, criticize Trump for being compliant with authoritarian regimes and having problems with Washington’s allies. But endless examples can be listed showing that France, Germany, and the U.S. have not only complied with authoritarian regimes and even dictatorships, but have also laid the groundworks for these regimes in most cases. The second new situation for Germany and France is Washington’s relations with its allies since Trump’s inauguration. But Trump does not represent the entire U.S. on this matter. As the German Foreign Minister put it, the U.S. is bigger than the White House and Trump cannot change that no matter how much he tweets.

Nevertheless, the rest of the world can hardly contend that Trump is not suitable for the U.S. Presidency.

It seems that the dispute over a detained U.S. pastor between Turkey and the U.S. has triggered new dynamics in Turkey’s relations with leading EU states, above all with Germany. As Burhanettin Duran recently addressed, “The Trump administration’s policy of economic selfishness … encourages the world’s leading economies to work more closely together. The U.S. decision to weaponize the dollar and customs compels them to form a common line of defense in international trade. … At the end of the day, the Russian, Chinese, German or French support for Turkey in the face of U.S. sanctions wasn’t just about the potential problems that they would face if the Turkish economy suffers a crisis.”

By looking at the last week, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that reactions from German officials were in compliance with these statements. For instance, members of Germany’s coalition government made some positive comments regarding Turkey-Germany relations in order to stress the country’s stance with regard to Trump’s irrational sanctioning steps against Turkey. In addition, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel had a telephone call in which both leaders discussed the current developments as well as regional issues, such as the situation in Syria. While the Turkish and German leaders pledged their determination to strengthen relations between the two states, some details regarding President Erdogan’s planned visit to Berlin in September were also addressed.

Even before the phone call, Chancellor Merkel clearly stated that “Nobody has an interest in an economic destabilization in Turkey” while adding that “Germany would like to see an economically prosperous Turkey. This is in our interest.” It has also to be mentioned that Germany’s Economy Minister Peter Altmaier (CDU), who is one of the closest politicians to Chancellor Merkel, was one of the first European officials opposing Trump’s tariff policy on Turkey. Altmaier explained, “This trade war slows down and destroys economic growth and produces new uncertainties.” While Altmaier also emphasized that Germany is willing to keep good economic relations with Turkey he stated, “Turkey stands for security and reliability in Europe. We are working together well with Ankara in terms of migration.”

A similar positive step came from the junior coalition partner, the Social Democrats. Besides Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD), the party’s chairperson Andrea Nahles stated in an interview on Sunday that Germany could help Turkey should it become necessary. According to Nahles, despite the possibility whether her predictions became true or not, “A situation could arise in which Germany must help Turkey, regardless of the political discrepancies with President Erdogan.” While she also stressed that it is in everyone’s interest that Turkey remains economically stable and that currency turbulence is curtailed, it is also crucial for her to keep up dialogue on all levels with Turkey, which is a member of NATO and part of Europe.

In addition, some publicly funded German media outlets, which are generally and unfortunately known for their biased broadcasting in the case of Turkey, published some news, in which a rather neutral –or even pro-Turkey– media language and stance has been observed — this was surprising but was also an understandable step due to the current political conjuncture. However, many German media outlets, commentators and columnists, on the other hand, still preferred nearly similar arguments, stating that the Turkish economy is in a very bad situation and accusing the country’s President. In most of these articles, a known language regarding Turkey has been preferred. Without going into detail, one might just mention, that those pieces generally include one-side criticisms while disregarding the U.S.’ role and the contextual impacts.

Nevertheless, it seems obvious that despite certain opposition politicians and known media representatives’ biased perspectives, the German government’s recent steps can be elaborated as rational ones in order to achieve some –in particular economic– objectives. This, with no doubt, aims an improvement of relations between Turkey and Germany – on both sides. Thus, under these circumstances it is also no surprise that, for instance, the German government’s Commissioner for Tourism and Parliamentary State Secretary, recently promoted travel to Turkey by stating that “there is no reason not to go on holiday” to Turkey.

It’s obvious that Germany’s federal government does not have any interest in supporting the U.S. President’s sanctions against Turkey. Even though Germany’s recent positive position regarding Turkey is based rather on economic interests and short-term goals, which are also based on President Trump’s personal and similar negative attitudes against Germany, relations between Turkey and German might mutually benefit from this current situation. Above all, in regard to the Turkish President’s planned visit on 28/29 September to Germany, some additional steps in order to intensify the mutual confidence might be advantageous for both countries – also in fields other than economics.