The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) introduced geographical depth and diversification to its military operations against terror by initiating Operation Claw against elements of the PKK in the Hakurk area in northern Iraq on May 27, 2019. This operation carries critical importance in the creation of a wide and integrated zone for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory through proceeding in the direction of Mount Qandil, which is the headquarters of the PKK, and expanding towards the Iran border with the regions of Avashin-Basyan and Zap. As such, Operation Claw is the continuation of the cross border operation that started in northern Iraq on March 11, 2018, and is a precursor for subsequent ones.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terror in two ways: Firstly, it combines the structural, methodological and technological changes in the fight against terrorism. And secondly, it unifies the cross border operation started by Turkey in 2018 with operations to be conducted in the future. To understand the effects of Operation Claw, its scope must be analyzed. Thus, it is beneficial to briefly review the region, and the goals and concept of the operation along with the capacity of the threat. Following the review, the procedure of the operation, which is the main topic of discussion, and its place in Turkey’s fight against terrorism can be examined.

Operation Claw’s scope

The operation is being conducted in a mountainous region roughly 30 kilometers deep from the Turkish border and 25 kilometers wide parallel to the Turkish border, starting from the south of Derecik district of Hakkari province, including Iraq’s Kani Rash region and reaching to the rural surrounding area of Chubkan village of Soran district. The distance between the southernmost front of the operation and the PKK’s headquarters Mount Qandil is roughly 55 kilometers, and the distance to Asos Mountain, which is also used by the terror organization and lies further south, is 150 kilometers.

The operation geography makes it possible for elements of the terrorist organization to hide in the terrain, and constitutes a natural obstacle for the troops conducting the operation. Unlike Syrian territory, the region of Hakurk, with its many mountains, hills and deep valleys stretching from east to west, peaks ranging from 1.700 to 3.200 meters and low population density makes it hard and sometimes impossible to conduct armored and mechanized operations. Thus, the horizontal advance made by commando units in the mountainous region needs to be constantly supported by vertical engagement from the air. The low number of settlements in the region significantly reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties during the conduct of the operation.

The tactical aims of the operation are the destruction of the caves and shelters used by the terrorist organization in the Hakurk region along with the neutralization of the terrorists in the region, and the strategical aim is extending and deepening the region for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory. These actions are motivated to eliminate the PKK’s military capabilities and reduce the terrorist organization’s area of operations. The operation also prevents the PKK’s tactical elements from infiltrating into Turkey over the Hakurk region and makes the detection and engagement of terrorist elements easier by limiting them to a smaller region. The region of the operation is in a position that can be expanded towards the Iran border to the east and Avashin-Basyan and Zap regions to the west, which makes tactical and operative engagement of the PKK targets outside of the Hakurk region easier.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terrorism through combining methodological and technological changes in the fight against terror and through unifying with Turkey’s former cross border operations.

In order to carry out the fight against the PKK deep in the territory of a foreign country and over a large front, the TSK has determined a proper operation concept and chose the elements of the operation accordingly. The field conditions, tactical capabilities of the terrorists and the lessons learned from the operation that started in 2018 can be said to be the main factors in choosing the operation concept. The geographical conditions of the Hakurk region, along with the terrorists moving in small groups of four to five people, make the detection of terrorist elements harder. Due to this, the use of electronic intelligence devices for instantaneous target detection and the use of technical means for instantaneous engagement both increases success and reduces the casualty risk of maneuvering elements.

The operation is being conducted according to a concept that relies on the combined use of maneuvering elements composed of units from the Special Forces Command and commando units alongside tactical elements from the air force with UCAVs and UAVs from the land forces, combat helicopters of the army aviation units and land combat support vehicles providing constant combat support via high firepower and precise engagement. The maneuvering elements that have the capability to capture critical field locations via surprise attack landings are entirely composed of professional soldiers.

The air force elements that directly provide support for the operation can strike PKK targets outside of the operation region as well as meeting the instantaneous firepower needs of the maneuvering units, preventing terrorist elements from making consolidated defenses. Within this context, the importance of precision guiding kits that are developed by national resources, used by the air force and integrated with general-purpose munition must be emphasized. Mini smart munition used by unmanned aerial vehicles have also contributed greatly to the success and tempo of the operation both due to their capabilities allowing them to be used against precise targets and the close air support they provide for maneuvering units. It has also been observed that multiple-launch rocket systems used in the operation to prevent the terrorist organization from moving in large groups have been effectively integrated with the firepower support elements of the operation.

The geographical extent of the operation is not restricted and has the potential to expand in response to new conditions that may arise in the future. Within this context, the main factor that affects the success of the operation is the flexibility of its mission. The underlying reason for this is the compact and mobile capabilities of the units conducting the operation. Alongside the control of the operation area, in the regions outside, the TSK’s mobile air and land platforms can continuously maintain their effect on the PKK, blocking the terrorist organization’s action capabilities on a tactical and operative level.

Against this, the terrorist organization attempts to conduct low risk activities, meaning activities such as long-range mortar attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). And these activities fail to have a large effect due to not being supported by other action tactics. Moreover, the mortar detection radars used by the TSK make it possible to respond to the PKK’s long range attacks even in cases where the attackers are not visible to the eye, and this capability of the terrorist organization is instantaneously defused. Another action practice of the terrorist organization is the deployment of anti-air weapons and land to air portable missile systems against aircrafts. While the PKK attempts to use DSHK series anti-air weapons and SA series portable missile systems against the TSK’s engagement from the air, thanks to the continuous electronic surveillance capabilities of the TSK and the human-sourced information provided by the intelligence agency, the locations of these weapons can be easily determined, targeted and neutralized.

The importance of Operation Claw

The operations Turkey conducts against the PKK within its borders and the intelligence and military operations conducted against terror elements in northern Iraq and northern Syria continue simultaneously. The continuity and integrity of these operations have led the terrorist organization to lose power and become unable to conduct certain organized attacks within Turkey, while causing the erosion of its military capabilities and the loss of the areas under its control abroad. Operation Claw is also a result of Turkey’s integrated approach in the fight against terror, technological transformations in the military and structural reforms. The operation must be evaluated separately from previous cross border anti-PKK operations that had limited extent, and must be seen as part of Turkey’s political and military strategy in its fight against terror. The operation is being conducted in a manner in accordance with Turkey’s strategy of reducing the areas controlled by terrorist elements and addressing the problem at its source in its fight against PKK and with a tempo that lays the groundwork for subsequent operations.

With Operation Claw, Turkey both defends Iraq’s territorial integrity and strives to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

In 2017 and before, PKK had, by diversifying its action capabilities and expanding its fields of operation, forced Turkey to constantly develop strategies focusing on its internal security, and the terrorist organization maintained its presence across the border via this manner. The PKK diversified the locations of its activities within a region in Turkey bound by Tokat-Giresun-Gümüşhane to the north, Kars-Ağrı-Van-Hakkari to the east, Hakkari-Şırnak-Mardin-Şanlıurfa-Hatay to the south and Osmaniye-Adıyaman-Elazığ-Tunceli to the west, and kept the TSK and law enforcement forces occupied in different sectors within the country. But the concept of fighting terrorism that developed and started showing its effects after 2017 drastically changed the situation for the PKK.

The TSK has turned the PKK into an easier target by restricting their operations to a variety of sectors in small spaces in Syria and Iraq, and has ensured that the fight against the terrorist organization within Turkey changed from simply being limited to active PKK members to including all social circles of the organization such as its underground members, passive supporters and political extensions. While the fight against the PKK within Turkey has evolved towards fighting the ideology of the organization, the fight across the border is aiming to eliminate the last armed active members and the leaders of the organization.

As part of Operation Claw, 61 terrorists have been neutralized as of July 14, 2019, and a great deal of equipment, munition and materials belonging to the PKK, including advanced weapons such as the SA-14 portable anti-air missile system, have been captured. Alongside this, PKK’s action capabilities have heavily been suppressed and the region of Hakurk, 500 square kilometers in size and previously used for the purposes of logistics, training, smuggling and indoctrination by the terrorist organization, has been cleared of terrorist elements. Moreover, the operation is being conducted with national resources with a focus on intelligence and operation aspects. Neither is intelligence being received from allies nor are local forces supporting the operation.

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border. This phase is called Operation Claw 2.

The diplomatic relations between Turkey and the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have raised Turkey’s leverage in terms of intelligence and operations, increasing the country’s level of impact in the region. The diplomatic efforts of Turkey in its fight against the PKK in Iraqi territory both search for common ground in the fight against the terrorist organization and aim to prevent Iraqi territory from being occupied by another terrorist organization again. Thus, the country both defends the territorial integrity of Iraq and fights in the field to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

Operation Claw’s main goal

Operation Claw has the quality of being an operation that makes use of the success of Operation Determination, which started in 2018, and due to its goal of removing terrorist elements from a large region of Iraqi territory, it is a first in Turkey’s anti-PKK fight. The operation may lead to many potential outcomes that can contribute to ensuring Turkey’s internal and national security. It can be argued that the existing tempo and success of the operation will contribute to the stability of Turkey and the region within the framework of the following assessments:

• The operation that began in 2018 is stabilizing the safe area created along Şemdinli and Derecik and serves as a preventive measure for the PKK’s terror attacks. Alongside this, the offensive threat of the organization is being kept at a distance of 30 kilometers from the border.
• The operation has laid the groundwork for subsequent operations and has a unifying role in other operation areas in northern Iraq.
• It has reduced the chances of PKK’s staying intact by directly threatening the organization’s living spaces.
• It has caused the PKK’s loss of territorial control in Hakurk, which breaks the terrorist organization’s “media defense field” perception.
• It prevents a potential power vacuum that may arise in northern Iraq following a possible US-Iran conflict and averts the PKK’s possibility of taking advantage of the instability created by such a situation.
• It creates an opportunity to develop a common approach against the PKK with the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border that leads the operation’s right flank more active. The second phase of the operation is called Operation Claw 2 and it confirms the bridging role of Operation Claw for future operations. Though no conceptual or force combination change is reported, the number of soldiers in the operation increased in order to secure a larger area in the Khakurk region. Each and every phase of the operation is expected to target a new operational area in the form of a chain sequence until a vast safe area is established. An operation against the Qandil Mountain may be seen after a total establishment of a safe zone in northern Iraq.  

Turkey has been actively fighting PKK terrorism since 1984. As compared to the last 40 years of struggle, Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy, which was put in practice in 2015, has fundamentally changed the facts on the ground.

To begin with, it is important to note that the PKK’s number of losses has considerably increased recently. Since 2015, taking Operation Olive Branch in Afrin for example, domestic operations to contain the PKK’s urban and rural mobilization in Turkey, as well as Operation Decisiveness and Operation Claw in Iraq, Turkish security forces neutralized more than 15 thousand PKK terrorists in Turkey, Northern Iraq and Syria in total. More importantly, the number of high-ranking terrorist figures neutralized through drone strikes and special intelligence operations conducted by Turkey reaches up to 100, which marks the highest number in Turkey’s counter-terrorism operations history in a very short time period.

From a strategic counter-terrorism perspective, it is possible to argue that these numbers are relatively high to contain the entire mobilization of the PKK. However, from a realistic perspective, the PKK is still alive and has the capacity to sustain its rural insurgency in Iraq and particularly in Afrin, Syria. According to official intelligence estimations, the PKK has about 8 thousand militants in Iraq and Iran. The main driving factor behind the mobilization capacity of the PKK is the ongoing fight against DAESH in Syria and Iraq. More importantly, the PKK’s freedom of maneuver in the YPG-controlled areas in northeastern Syria, which is sustained by the political and military support of the U.S., strengthens this mobilization capacity.

The PKK is still alive and has the capacity to sustain its rural insurgency in Iraq and particularly in Afrin, Syria.

The second critical point is about the PKK’s demobilization and limited presence in Northern Iraq: Turkey has been actively operating in the region since Operation Decisiveness was carried out by the Turkish Armed Forces. The Turkish Armed Forces are actively monitoring the region that the PKK has used as a military camp. The military presence of Turkish security forces in Barmiza, Dilan, Kawet, Sidakan, Manava in the northeastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as the Turkish military bases around Kani, Mase, and Banfi along the Turkish-Iraqi border are preventing the PKK to mobilize its human resources and logistics. Furthermore, Turkey’s active intelligence surveillance operations in Northern Iraq are effectively containing the PKK’s active mobilization. In this regard, Turkey’s counter-terrorism technology grants a significant advantage to the Turkish Armed Forces.

The recent military operation, Operation Claw, is a continuation of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy of maintaining active military presence and fight on the field. Turkey has three operational objectives when it comes to Operation Claw:

First, Turkey aims to contain PKK mobilization in the Hakurk region, which is used by the PKK as the second largest military camp after the Qandil Mountain. Hakurk has also  been used as a safe corridor by the PKK for many years to secure its presence and to infiltrate terrorists directly into Turkey. Although the Hakurk region has been targeted many times in previous years, the PKK has never given up on this region for its safety. With Operation Claw, however positions have changed and now Hakurk is no longer considered a safe haven by the PKK. In fact, Turkish military forces now control the region to directly contain the PKK’s mobilization between the Qandil Mountain and other regions. Thus the operation will be improved by increasing the base areas and consolidate the mobilization of Turkish Armed Forces.

Secondly, Turkey is trying to create a de facto safe zone in Northern Iraq. Following the shift in the operational depth of the Turkish Armed Forces, it is predicted that a geographical line that will facilitate the Turkish Armed Forces access to the Qandil Mountain will be established.

Turkey’s ultimate strategic objective is to strategically and operationally hold important points in Northern Iraq.

Thirdly, Turkey will eventually want to contain the PKK’s political mobilization across the region. In this regard, Ankara will recalibrate the Iraqi Peshmerga’s power against the PKK and eliminate the PKK’s influence over the Sinjar region, where the terrorist group has active control over the Yezidi forces. Following the power vacuum, which emerged since DAESH lost control, the PKK has been actively using Sinjar to freely move between Iraq and Syria and for recruitment purposes. According to intelligence estimations, the PKK has five camps in Sinjar. Maintaining control over the PKK camps before the Qandil Mountain is a strategically important objective for Ankara.

To conclude, it can be argued that Turkey’s ultimate strategic objective is to strategically and operationally hold important points in Northern Iraq to reduce terrorist infiltration into Turkish territory, minimize PKK mobility, and to catch the terrorists before they conduct terrorist attacks. Therefore, Operation Claw can be inferred as another move of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy, and new cross-border operations may be pursued in the future.

The recent change in Ankara’s strategy towards certain terrorist organizations has been a game changer. Since 2016, Turkey has been rapidly eliminating FETO and Daesh threats. However, the policy shift and the effectiveness of the fight given against the PKK threat has been incredible so far.

The numbers regarding the counter-terrorism performance shared by Turkey’s Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu last week demonstrated how Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has been functional in the fight against the PKK, particularly following the attempted military coup. Since the July 15 failed military coup attempt, Turkey has been revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy, especially in containing the PKK threat not only in Turkey but also in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara has made a drastic adjustment in its strategy towards the PKK. Before July 15, the PKK had found great opportunity to consolidate its military and political capacity to transform itself from a terrorist organization to an acceptable armed and political actor in Syria and Iraq. While the PKK has been enjoying the strategic advantages of the “reconciliation process” by reformulating its long-term strategy in Turkey, it has been repossessing its entire political and military organization and geopolitical agenda with the increasing international status notably gained following Daesh’s offense in Kobane (also known as Ayn al-Arab) in Syria and Iraq. The first attempt to achieve a territorial autonomy (known as democratic autonomy) in Turkey has failed due to Turkey’s active counter-terrorism strategy and has been territorially contained by Turkey’s military offensive in Syria and Iraq later on.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK. Besides these steps, one of the most important driving factors behind this success is the political decisiveness in sustaining a counter-terrorism campaign against the PKK. Undoubtedly, President Erdogan’s leadership role has been playing a vital role in consolidating the political determination of Turkey.

The success of Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy was shaped by three revolutionary steps; the paradigm shifts in counter-terrorism strategy, security sector reform following the failed military coup, and the changing military strategy in tactical and operational level on the ground against the PKK.

Firstly, Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and the technological components that reinforce the state as the ultimate legitimate authority over the population while reducing PKK influence over the Kurdish population, particularly. This was primarily the case following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. The counter-terrorism strategy was designed to simultaneously protect the population from PKK violence in city centers and strengthened the capacity of the state institutions to marginalize the PKK’s perception in the eyes of the local people. Especially the process of de-PKKization of the municipalities was one of the most important strategic decisions taken by the government to undermine the PKK’s mobilization activities, particularly in the economic, political and military domains.     

The changing understanding regarding the reformulation of the military operation modality is another revolutionary step in containing the PKK threat. Until recently, Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy had been based on one-dimensional strategic calculation aimed to prevent the terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK against the military and security units, especially in the South-eastern part of Turkey where the PKK’s main terrorist campaign takes place. This one-dimensional counter-terrorism strategy is based on the action-reaction operational model in which security forces usually carry a reactionary military operation following the terrorist attack against any target in a specific geographical zone.

The new counter-terrorism strategy, however, is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where the PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. More importantly, the preemptive operational model that aims to neutralize the PKK threat in its base has become the central operational mentality for Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy.

Turkey’s new counter-terrorism strategy is based on non-stop anti-terrorist security and military operations not only in city centers where PKK-affiliated persons might live but also in rural areas. 

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists. The percentage of the operations carried by Turkish security forces is also remarkable compared to previous years. Turkish security forces have increased counter-terrorism operations in rural areas by 173 percent over the last two years.

Turkey’s superiority in terms of surveillance technology and advanced intelligence capacity also facilitated the effectiveness of its counter-terrorism strategy and helped to prevent potential PKK attacks. Thanks to the strong intelligence network among the state security institutions and efficiency of the intelligence information shared in the operational domain, 100 senior terrorists were neutralized in 2018, including those who were listed under the red, blue, and grey categories of the most wanted terrorist list. In 2017, for instance, the PKK planned 965 armed attacks. However, this figure dropped to 677 in 2018 demonstrating the impact of Turkey’s effectiveness in military intelligence. More importantly, while the PKK conducted 250 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in 2017, the number of IED attacks in rural areas decreased to 148 in 2018.

According to figures shared by Minister Soylu, Turkish Security Forces carried out 87,838 operations against the PKK in 2018. As a result of the anti-terrorism operations in 2018, Turkish security forces have neutralized 1,289 terrorists.

Recruitment is also vital to the PKK’s survival to sustain its terrorist campaign and propaganda. However, the numbers show that the PKK has not been effective in recruiting new fighters because of the counter-narrative program of Turkey. This is the new face of the Turkish counter-terrorism strategy in containing PKK influence over the Kurdish population. Turkey’s effective control of public space and improved population-centric counter-terrorism understanding, the PKK lost its efficiency in delivering its propaganda. The number of terrorists recruited to compensate for others killed during the counter-terrorism operations is in decline. Participation in PKK events has reached its lowest level in the last 30 years. In 2016, while the total number of terrorist recruitment was 3,881, only 95 joined to the ranks of PKK in 2018.

The security sector reform process adopted following the July 15 failed military coup attempt is another driving factor that positively shaped Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. While the relocation of the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of the Interior was an act strengthening the effectiveness of the internal counter-terrorism operations, the Turkish Armed Forces found a great opportunity to focus on extra-territorial counter-terrorism operations against the PKK, particularly in Iraq, which operationally prevented the terrorist organization to find extra space for maneuver to infiltrate into Turkey.

More importantly, the institutional reformulation of the Village Guards (VG) in counter-terrorism operations facilitated the effectiveness of internal operations in rural areas. The numbers show the increasing effectiveness of the Village Guards in fighting against the PKK. While the number of Village Guards reached 52,395 (plus 19912 volunteers) in 2018, the average age among the village guards decreased to 32. This is not limited to the increasing number of the VG; their technological capacity and training programs were also reformulated and improved following the new requirements of the PKK’s threat.

The harmonization of the technological capacities of different state/security institutions is also a critical infrastructure investment that Turkey has been doing since 2015. The reformulation of intelligence sharing, improvement of joint operation room and joint operational information mechanism facilitated the joint counter-terrorism operations. The number of professionals in Gendarmerie is 65 %, which is incredibly high as compared to previous years. To detect and end terrorist mobilization, especially in special counter-terrorism operations, drone technology provided Turkey another great opportunity in containing the PKK threat. Except for the TAF’s drone capacity, the drone capacity of the Ministry of Interior has increased 50 percent over the last two years. This is especially vital in creating a joint security umbrella to sustain active intelligence and rapid reaction against the PKK.

Turkey is revolutionizing its counter-terrorism strategy not only against the PKK in Turkey but also against other terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq. The new face of terrorism and changing dynamics in the Middle East are likely to push Turkey to revolutionize its military engagements in the near future.