Some of the French say “Britain has a real democracy under the cover of monarchy, while France has a real monarchy under the cover of democracy.” Thus, it’s not the system of government which determines democracy; it can either exist or not exist in both situations. On the other hand, the French president is the most powerful one on the world, beside the periods of cohabitation. This power and influence becomes more prominent with the president’s individual character. For instance, François Mitterrand was regarded as a demigod. Similarly, former French president Valery Giscard D’Estaing expressed the extent of presidential authority during an interview on his experiences. “The office of the French President holds so much power that you become the most powerful man [completely disregarding the possibility of a women president] in France, which you can understand from the looks of women in the whole of France,” he said. Even though D’Estaing’s perception of presidential power can be regarded more in line with a sexual fantasy, it’s definite that the President of the Fifth Republic has prominent authority and power due to a system that was gifted by Charles de Gaulle. This gift is called the semi-presidential system, and it’s definitely more powerful in comparison with a president in a parliamentary system, however, the odd part is that the French president has more power even than the US president.

“The same person not being both the prime minister and the president is absolutely normal; however, it is also definite that the state can’t be dicephalus,” Charles de Gaulle said at the time, making a distinction between the roles of the president and the prime minister, while signifying that the principal rule was of the president. Regardless of the person occupying it, the office of the prime ministry is nothing but an ornament in France. While saying “a president who abides by the constitution is a man of the people and he is elected to shape the destiny of his people,” de Gaulle has expressed the very essence of the president’s authority. The French President appoints the ministers, has the right to abolish the parliament, determines the country’s foreign policy, and can gather all powers unto himself/herself during the times of crisis.

In France, many amendments regarding the authority of the president were implemented since 1958; however, most of these amendments produced an increase in the presidential authority. For instance, with an amendment in 2000 the president’s term was decreased from 7 years to 5 years and it was prohibited for the president to be elected more than twice; however, as the parliamentary elections were to be held right after the presidential elections, the risk of cohabitation was also removed. In this sense, the president became more engaged in the matters, because cohabitation periods were similar to the coalition between politically incompatible parties, causing the president to be isolated.

We can understand Turkey’s both old and current systems by evaluating the power of the French president. For years, the Ministry of National Education described the president as “ceremonial” in the schoolbooks they prepared and compared with the German president. When we became adults and saw the system functioning, we understood that it was more than just ceremonial. The system of government’s name was always the parliamentary system, since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Separation of powers wasn’t implemented at the time of Atatürk, the republic’s charismatic founder, and his successor İsmet Pasha had also followed this trend.

After the transition from a single-party system to a multiparty system in 1950 and following the military coup which resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Menderes, the 1961 constitution consolidated the power of the state institutions against the elected officials. Similarly, the 1982 constitution which was prepared by the junta which orchestrated the September 12 1980 coup, immensely increased the power of the president. It was believed that the tutelage existing since the foundation of the republic could be perpetuated by the president who was elected by the parliament and was under the influence of the military. For many years, they were successful in achieving their aims. As was made clear with the coup that resulted in the hanging of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, no ruling political party, besides the one they supported, would be able to fully control the government.

In the first years of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Minister of the National Education said “I was powerless in appointing bureaucrats and colleagues in my ministry.” As it required the approval of the president, it was impossible for ministers to appoint their own personnel. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was stonewalling all appointments. This resulted in either the deadlocking of the system or the appointment of a person favored by the president. With the right to veto, the president was the most engaged head of the executive. In other words, the president of the parliamentary system didn’t have less authority than the French president in a cohabitation period.

For many years, these “safety fuses” which were implemented with the 1961 constitution functioned. The Constitutional Court of Turkey made a decision to renew these safety fuses, a decision which would be deemed scandalous in the years to follow. Hayrünnisa Gül, the wife of the presidential candidate Abdullah Gül, wore hijab. This was unacceptable for both the military and the main opposition party. For them, a first lady wearing hijab couldn’t enter the Presidential Palace. Let alone the first lady, a woman wearing hijab wasn’t allowed into the presidential palace ever before, even as a guest! Meanwhile, the smaller parties in the parliament were pressured by the military to not support Gül, even though, according to the constitution, Gül had received enough votes to become the president. With the statements from the military, and the CHP’s, the main opposition party of the time (and still today), appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court decided that the vote Abdullah Gül received wasn’t adequate. The poll was canceled.

This illegitimate crisis, which aimed to block a politician’s way to Çankaya (the location of the old presidential palace) just because his wife wore hijab, and triggered a new development. Previously, there was a president which the military tutelage employed to “shape the upper ranks of bureaucracy and limit politics” and had consolidated power pushing the limits of the parliamentary system. This time, something new happened: to resolve the crisis, the AK Party amended the constitution in 2007. The amendment was put to a referendum and was passed by a simple majority of the public’s votes. The president was now to be elected by popular vote. This amendment in 2007 added a new layer to the president’s power with the clause of “popular vote” by changing the Article 104 of the 1982 Constitution. It could be said that the long effective system backed by the military tutelage, which tried to keep the government’s reigns out of the hands of parties like AK Party, benefitted the AK Party government at the end, despite all the suffering it has caused.

The referendum in October 2007 transformed Turkey into a country that is governed through “a de facto semi-presidential system.” As the rest of the system wasn’t designed with a presidential system in mind, it created crises which the national will had to resolve every time they emerged. This caused the presidency to become “an executive with ambiguous limitations and authorities that could expand according to the characteristics of a person.” In this form, it’s pretty similar to the French system; however, this doesn’t mean that it has no quirks. Both the president and the prime minister are powerful in this system. Beside the ones that could emerge in a time of “cohabitation,” this system is prone to crises even if both of the executives are of the same party!

Even though the international community didn’t understand what was going on, the July 15 coup attempt, which was orchestrated by a parallel and parasitic structure within the state institutions, aimed to reestablish the status quo by deposing the government. Now the government started to fight against this organization which infiltrated the state, while continuing to fight against PKK and Daesh. A state of emergency was declared in Turkey. The AK Party government is now cooperating with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which came to the fore as a result of the political conjuncture, to pass a constitutional amendment.

This amendment is aiming to change the system of government, instead of a full new social contract. It foresees replacing the existing faux semi-presidential system with a complete presidential system. “It is easy to criticize; however, believe me, what he is doing is really hard. He is driving a car and someone intentionally crashes into his car. But he doesn’t stop. While driving, he is repairing his car and he is changing the tires of the car without stopping,” a Parliament member and friend of President Erdoğan said about the man.  Erdoğan, it should be remembered, was sentenced to prison as soon as he emerged as a prominent politician, and faced party closure trials and memorandums that tried to force his policies in a certain direction.

Despite all the illegitimate attempts aiming to depose him, Erdoğan received 51.79% of the votes in the first round of presidential elections and became the president. The highest percentage of votes to be received by any candidate at the first round in Turkey, and one of the highest in the world. The people will vote on the constitutional amendment this spring while Erdoğan keeps driving the car. If it is accepted, Turkey will be governed with a new system.

Turkish politics has flared up after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill. The reform bill seeks to move Turkey’s government system towards presidentialism. It introduces a severe system of checks and balances, or separation of powers by splitting the elections and operation of the executive and the legislative. The rationale behind this political move, as in many occasions allegedly voiced by the AK Party, is to avoid coalition governments and promote democratic politics as opposed to a bureaucracy. The AK Party asserts that coalition governments carry the danger of political instability and jeopardize democratic politics by opening up room for extra-political forces such as the bureaucracy.

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), takes the lead against the reform bill. The CHP focuses on the end results of the system change and criticizes the amendment by arguing that it will turn Turkish politics into an authoritarian regime. Its main thesis is that it is likely to abolish the parliament and put an end to the republican regime. Yet, a closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact. Nevertheless, it will lose its centrality after the center of gravity in the government system slides towards the executive. So this change does not pose a transgression on the republican order; on the contrary, it may reinforce the republican regime by boosting equality among citizens and giving a central role to the society in politics.

A closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact.

Turkey’s Odyssey to the “Total” State

The Turkish state’s transformation from being a neutral state to a total state took place in a gradual manner. In the long nineteenth century (1808-1923), the monarchy was enervated by the bureaucracy and finally left its place to the republic in 1923. Although Turkey was established as a republic, at least in theory, it was an oligarchy in practice. So the state remained a neutral state for a long time. The bureaucratic oligarchy in Turkey might be divided into two periods. The one-party regime until 1950 and a multi-party parliamentary regime under the bureaucratic tutelage from the 1950s to the 2000s.

The general elections in 1950 were the first open and free elections of the republic. After the elections, the state opened up its doors to the society by allowing a multi-party parliament. The parliament, which used to be populated by merely the CHP, started to host the Democrat Party (DP). The DP attracted the support of the voters in the periphery and held the parliamentary majority with its successive electoral victories until the 1960 military coup.

http://thenewturkey.org/parties-politicians-and-dispositions-towards-the-july-15-coup-attempt/

The 1961 Constitution drafted after the coup redesigned the state-society relationship. It created a parliamentary system under the supervision of the bureaucratic elites. The parliamentary system under the tutelage of the bureaucracy limited the intrusions of society into the state. This was facilitated mainly by dividing the parliament into two chambers. The upper house was populated by the appointed members of the bureaucracy and served to control the lower house which hosted the representatives of the people. This was endorsed by installing more bureaucratic institutions to contain the political sphere.

The 1982 Constitution, on the other hand, redesigned the state-society relationship in a new format. It was drafted after the 1980 military coup, which came after the Kemalist state lost control of the society and that led to bloody clashes between the far-right and the far-left societal groups in the streets. The 1982 Constitution, therefore, gave emphasis to the executive branch in order to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the society. It divided executive power between the president and the cabinet of ministers. The president’s main role was to keep the cabinet and the parliament in line with the state.

After 2002, the AK Party started to dismantle the bureaucratic tutelage. The 2007 constitutional reforms introduced direct election of the president by the people. It thus transformed the presidential office from being the gate keeper of the bureaucracy to being the representative of the society. The president used to be elected by the parliament with the bureaucracy’s tacit permission. This was followed by the 2010 constitutional reforms that further curbed the bureaucratic tutelage by reforming the judiciary, especially limiting the powers of the military courts. The current reform bill seeks to continue this process of democratization by opening up the state to societal forces by moving the regime towards presidentialism.

The Crisis of the “New CHP”

The post-2002 period figures as the acceleration of Turkey’s evolution into a total state. This fundamental transformation in state-society relations has urged political parties to reconsider their political positions and discourses. The most radical change has taken place with the CHP.

Despite the fact that it has never won an open election to form a single-party government, the CHP’s secular-nationalist Kemalist ideology has always been in power. Hence, the CHP has always sided with the state in critical times against the society. It single-handedly ruled the state under a one-party regime during the period of 1923-1950. After 1950, it acted to protect the state from the intrusion of societal forces based in the periphery. Thus, it has strived to contain the parliament and placate democratic politics in order to maintain the “Kemalist” state.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010. In 2010, the CHP not only changed its secretary general, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced Deniz Baykal, but also it started to shape its politics around liberal-democratic ideology. With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state. More specifically, the CHP started to utilize liberal-democratic discourse in order to interrupt Turkey’s evolution to be a total state.

It has sought to form a political bloc with the anti-AK Party societal elements. The sole success of this liberal-democratic politics might be cited as the general elections held on 7 June 2015. For the first time the AK Party could not gain a parliamentary majority to form a single-party government. However, the other three political parties in the parliament also failed to carve out a coalition government. This led to a replaying of elections on 1 November 2015. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the AK Party. This was the starting point of the crisis of the New CHP.

With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state.

However, this was followed by the gradual increase of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil. The PKK, the FETO, and Daesh have targeted the country. The most important breaking point was the failed coup attempt perpetrated by the Gülen terror group on 15 June 2016. After 15 June, Turkish society united against terrorism, which was dubbed as “Yenikapı Ruhu,” or the Spirit of Yenikapi, referring to a historic rally against the coup. Yet, this climate of societal unity soon ended and political parties divided into two opposing blocs. The AK Party and the MHP joined forces on the basis of a conservative-nationalist ideology, or so-called “authentic and national” politics (“yerli ve milli” siyaset). The CHP and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), on the other hand, formed a tacit political bloc on the basis of a secular-leftist ideology. This has deepened the crisis of the New CHP.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive by moving the government system towards presidentialism. The former constitutes the “NO” bloc whereas the latter the “YES” bloc on the current constitutional reform. If the “NO” camp loses in the coming referendum (which will probably be held in early April) and the presidential system is institutionalized, Turkey’s gradual evolution to a two-party political system around the division between conservative-nationalist and secular-leftist ideologies, which is currently underway, will continue and consolidate.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive.

In this picture the CHP may stop swinging between liberal-democracy and secular-left ideologies by downgrading its emphasis on a liberal-democratic discourse, which mainly serves to limit the state and locks the CHP into being merely an opposition party. Thus, it may move secular-left ideology more into the center of its party politics. If that happens, then, it marks the end of the New CHP and perhaps causes a rift in the party’s leadership. Nevertheless, the CHP will have to take a more centrist and positive political discourse by moderating its emphasis on secular-left identity to become an alternative under Turkey’s new political conditions.

Turkish politics is currently polarized by the debate over a constitutional reform bill. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill to shift Turkey’s parliamentary system towards a presidential system. These two political parties defend the bill by arguing that it will boost Turkey’s democracy. Yet the opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), strongly oppose the bill by claiming that it will lead Turkey into an authoritarian one-man rule.

The opposition contends that the new constitution weakens the parliament to the extent that the presidency amasses all the powers in its hands. This will leave the government without a system of checks and balances and end the rule of law. So it sets forth a regime change, namely the end of Turkey’s republican order. The AK Party and the MHP, in response, propound that the new constitution provides better conditions for reflecting the popular will in the government. So it does not end Turkey’s republican order; on the contrary, it improves the republican order by empowering the society over extra-political forces such as the military and civil bureaucracy.

Indeed, this debate reveals the main fault line in Turkish politics. Turkish politics is primarily determined by the conflict of two historical blocs, the secular middle class and the masses in the periphery. The secular middle class, which constitutes the minority in society, figures that its interests will be best served as long as the parliament holds the central place in politics. The peripheral societal forces, which constitute the majority in society, seek to push the executive to the center in politics. The former believes that the minority will have more say in politics as long as the parliament holds a focal point. The latter thinks that the majority will get its due share in power as long as the executive occupies the central place in the political system.

So we have two competing views of democracy at hand. From a liberal perspective, democracy simply refers to the limitation of power. From a conservative perspective, democracy refers to the rule of the people, namely the concentration of power in people’s hands. While the opposition holds on to the former, namely the negative view of democracy; the AK Party and the MHP sticks to the latter, namely the positive view of democracy.

Parliamentary System under Bureaucratic Oligarchy

To put the matter in a historical perspective, the majority’s choice of positive view of democracy is tenable. The secular middle class organized around the bureaucracy ended the Ottoman monarchic regime in 1922 and established the republic in 1923. This regime change brought about another significant change, it ended the “neutral” state and replaced it with a “total” state. With this transformation of the state, the absolute separation of the state from society came to an end. The state and society, therefore, became enmeshed through political parties. The political parties became the most significant political actors.

Yet, the newly established republic was unable to deal with the disrupting effects of pluralism in society. The state found the solution in strictly separating itself from the society. It kept the parliament at the center of politics but the parliament was restricted to a political party, namely the CHP. The two attempts, one in 1925 and the other in 1930, to install multi-party systems failed.

Hence, the state under the control of the bureaucratic elite formed an oligarchic rule. It single-handedly decided on who should rule and be ruled. The nationalist-secular middle class values drove the line that divided the ruler and the ruled. The political actors with “secular” values were granted the right to rule, whereas the others with “conservative-religious” values were reduced to be ruled. Thus, the state evolved back to a neutral state. The state is off limits to society.

The period of 1950-2002 witnessed a process of controlled opening of the state to society. The bureaucratic oligarchy allowed a multi-party system. The political parties such as the Democrat Party in the 1950s and the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s dominated the parliament and challenged the hegemony of the bureaucratic elite. The former broke down after the military coup in 1960, whereas the latter collapsed within itself and lost its parliamentary majority after the leadership change.

Besides, from the mid-1960s to the 1980 military coup, the state lost control of the society. The parliament fell short of absorbing pluralism, and this unrestricted ideological polarization unleashed bloody clashes on the street, especially from the mid-1970s till the coup. In the 1990s, with the decline of ANAP, the number of parties in the parliament rose. The parliament absorbed pluralism to an extent, yet it failed to provide a working coalition government to sustain political stability. This weakness of parliament eventually pushed the state to a deep legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s.

Democratization of Parliamentary System

However, after the AK Party came to power in 2002, power has gradually shifted from the secular middle class to the masses in the periphery. This power shift led to two important constitutional reform bills in 2007 and 2010. They were designed to curb the power of the bureaucracy. The constitutional reform in 2007 brought the popular election of the president. The presidential office, which was granted broad powers by the 1982 constitution, used to be elected by the parliament and served as a gate keeper for the bureaucratic oligarchy. The 2010 constitutional reform, on the other hand, reformed the judiciary system by limiting the powers of military courts.

These institutional changes were accompanied by the process of sociological equalization within the society. This change in the distribution of power in society and the loss of power urged the opposition to launch a new political discourse which targeted the AK Party with a negative view of democracy. It constantly criticized the government for establishing an authoritarian rule. In the meantime, the power vacuum in the bureaucracy was filled up by the Gülenists. Starting from 2012, the opposition and the Gülenists began to team up against the AK Party. The Gülenists attempted a coup twice. One through the Judiciary on 17 and 25 December in 2014. The other was through the military on 15 July 2016.

Upon these onslaughts against the government, the AK Party and the MHP agreed to embark on a new constitutional reform on 1 December 2016. The 2016 reform aspires to empower the political infrastructure of the country by shifting the government system towards presidentialism. It mainly seeks to shift the center of gravity towards the executive branch within the political system and strengthen democratic politics versus extra-political forces, namely the bureaucracy.

Presidentialism and the Republic

With presidentialism, the government seeks to strike a delicate balance between two opposing forces in society, pluralism and stability. Thus, on the one hand, it seeks to sustain pluralism in society by keeping the state open to the whole society. On the other hand, it struggles to maintain political stability by steering political parties to the center.

Indeed, this has been the basic motivation of the 1982 Constitution. It installed a multi-party parliament while introducing a 10 percent election threshold. More, it split the executive between the president and the council of ministers. The president, who was planned to be elected from the cadres of bureaucracy, was granted more powers and was supposed to keep the government in line with the bureaucracy.

The current constitutional reform shares the same motivation, emphasizing stability at the face of centrifugal societal forces, but with a caveat. First of all, it unites the executive by abolishing the office of prime minister. Second, it separates the presidential election from the parliamentary elections. Third, it deprives the parliament of its power of a vote of confidence. The parliament keeps its other powers that enable it to check and balance the executive, such as calling for new elections, debating and approving the budget, etc.

Thus, the constitutional reform that seeks to shift the government system towards presidentialism abides by the basic democratic norms. Moreover, it may serve to further the democratization of the country and create a better republic. Indeed, a republican order requires two conditions. First of all, it underlines the fact that rule is supposed to be a political rule, namely there should be no categorical difference between the ruler and the ruled. It is the rule by the people for the people. Secondly, the rule is supposed to be based not on power but rational discussion. Having equality and cultural and economic homogeneity among the members of the political community is a sine qua non of a republican order. These measures constitute its genuine and actual basis.

Furthermore, the current constitutional reform may endorse the process of sociological equalization and promotes cultural and economic homogeneity among the citizens without forsaking societal differences and pluralism. This is because it puts a premium on democratic politics in the face of extra-political forces and pushes political parties to address the whole society in order to get elected. In other words, it rules out coalition governments and shifts the center of gravity in the state towards democratic politics. In short, it gives priority to society’s will.

The draft currently being debated in parliament focuses on the essence of the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches and the primary features of a presidential government system. Called the Presidential System indigenous to Turkey, the draft aims to discuss the design of checks and balances between state branches. In this context, there are two points vital for ensuring majority support in the parliament for the president: the timing of constituency and presidential elections, and the formula for presidential elections. After that, other checks and balances instruments, the decree power of the president, the power to repeat elections for both parliament and president, and the procedure for budget preparation can be discussed.

Concurrent Constituency and Presidential Elections

There are two attitudes towards how the timing of elections effect the majority support of the president in parliament. The first one argues that concurrent constituency and presidential elections could create a problem in terms of checks and balances, and such an election could mean both a majority of parliament and the president could be elected from the same political party.

The other argument is that the possibility of differentiation between the president and parliament would increase if elections were held at different periods. Especially, this possibility could become evident with runoff elections. The consequence of this difference would be a parliament that reflects the political mood at one point, but not at the point when the president is elected, leaving the two bodies out of step with public will.

A considerable part of criticism against the current amendments argues that they leave the legislator with little power against the executive. The supporters of this argument state that concurrent elections for the legislator and executive would lead to a political majority in both branches from the same political side. However, while empirical research based on comparative examples supports this argument, some research also shows that there are experiences which prove this argument wrong.

Even more, as the system is presented in the current amendment, runoff elections in the presidential system could reduce the occurrence of a political or ideological divide in state organs, thanks to coalitions based on popular political figures, especially in the second round of elections. So, the argument that such a system would lead to a single party dominating both the executive and legislative branches, should not be accepted as an absolute given.

Moreover, there is a reasonable argument for justifying the amendment: getting rid of instability created by the current parliamentary system. There are some executives working with a political majority in the legislatures that are from an opposing party. This situation is called a divided government, and leads to a deadlock in the system, especially for tasks that require cooperation between the legislature and the executive. So, concurrent elections should be evaluated in terms of solving this problem.

Mutual Power to Call for New Elections

Another issue of synchronism between the legislature and executive is having the same expiration date for these state organs. If this was the case, it would be possible to prevent the occurrence of an asymmetric balance of power between them, a situation which draws attention to another issue in the proposed amendment: a mutual power to call new elections for the presidency and the legislature.

One of the weaknesses of the presidential system is the possibility of a deadlock because of a strict separation of powers and related with that, a situation where both organs cannot cease the existence of each other. Apparently the amendment aims for the avoidance of the threat of deadlock in the system by granting the power to call new elections to both the president and the parliament.

Clearly, the proposed solution is not a common mechanism in current global examples, where presidents generally have the right to unilaterally call for a new parliament, called a rescission of parliament. Presidential systems in which presidents have the right to unilateral rescission, especially in Latin America states, experience regime crisis frequently, and when presidents are elected from non-political figures, meaning presidents who are not popular, the risk of a crisis increases. In practice, different political ideologies in the branches of power could ease dissolution, and in such systems, there are no constitutional mechanisms to safeguard against this problem. There are not many examples of this power for the president or legislator in presidential systems. Today, the constitutions of some countries in Latin America, such as Peru (article 134), Ecuador (article 148) and Venezuela (article 236) give this power to presidents.

For example, article 12 of the proposed amendment envisions a mutual renewal of elections. According to the draft, the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) can decide on new elections with a 3/5 ratio of total members, and in this case, the election of both branches is done together, and this concurrency is also valid if the decision to hold new elections is made by the president.

On the other hand, if parliament decides to repeat elections in the second term of office, the president can become a candidate one more time. The parliament and the president which will be reelected will be in power until elections occur. Also both the parliament members and the president will be elected for 5 years.

With this proposed amendment, the parliament and president would have the right to call for fresh elections. Thus, presidents do not solely have the power of dissolution of government, but either the legislator or the executive could decide for new elections, and as the amendment proposes, such elections would be for both branches, preventing this decision being made in an arbitrary manner. In effect, whoever decides to call for fresh elections must themselves be confident they will win power again.

Runoff Elections for the President

Part of the amendment, which is not so different from the current system, suggests runoff elections for president. In the first polling, if any candidate cannot win an absolute majority, there will be a second poll in which the two candidates who have the highest votes in the first poll would compete. In this poll, the candidate who has the plurality of votes will be elected as president. This ensures that there will be reconciliation (no matter the vote ratio in the first poll) on the winning candidate. So this situation would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the president.

Presidential Enactments

According to a survey of current global systems, presidents as the head of the executive have the power to publish regulatory administrative acts to carry out or develop policies. In the United States, for example, the constitution does not give power to decree law directly to the president, but they use this power based on Article 2 of the constitution. These enactments, called “executive orders,” are administrative acts and also very important instruments for building various institutions, organizing or changing bureaucratic processes and executing laws which have already been approved by the legislature.

In the Turkish amendment being currently considered, there is a proposal to give the president power to enact such orders. According to Article 9 of the amendment, which aims to change article 104 of the current constitution, the “president can publish an enactment on executive issues.” In the same article, there are restrictions and rules on this power that preclude any such enactments from effecting:

• Fundamental rights, individual rights and duties stated in the first and second parts and political rights and duties in the fourth part in the second section of constitution.
• Issues which should be regulated exclusively by laws according to constitution.
• Issues which are regulated by laws clearly.
• If the enactments conflict with laws, the provisions of the law are valid.
• If parliament passed a law about an issue which is regulated by enactments, laws replace the enactments.

These restrictions and rules circumscribe the limits of executive orders, and will not violate legislative power, a major criticism of enactments being they could act as a de facto legislative power. Certainly, the same criticisms can be made of the power to publish statutory decrees by the government in the present system, and governments could publish these statutory decrees under empowering laws which are passed by parliament. So, according to the amendment, the president could have this power without empowering law.

However, it should be considered that current presidential systems are based on a strict separation of powers. Even more, the requirement of taking permission from parliament by the presidency as an executive position cannot be compatible with the spirit of a presidential system. At this point, it could be said that the limits of presidential enactments are not clear in the amendment. For instance, in article number 9 in the draft, there is a regulation with the issue. These regulations aim to prevent any damage to fundamental rights and freedoms that could be done by enactments. In the amendment, fundamental and individual rights and duties, as already enumerated in other parts of the constitution, are preserved clearly. On the other hand, presidential enactments could be published dealing with social and economic rights as enumerated in the second part of the third section of the constitution.

Enactments are under the monitor of the Constitutional Court, and that institution is also significant for the checks and balances mechanism. For example, in the possible situation of a conflict between enactments and laws, the Constitutional Court will be the authority for a solution.

Budget Preparation

Finally, the state budget is a way of interaction between the legislative and executive branches in many governmental systems. In presidential systems, this interaction becomes more powerful and important because the strict separation of powers creates a relationship based on mutual checks and balances through the budget.

The proposed Turkish amendment gives the authority to prepare budgets to the president, and this prepared budget needs the approval of parliament, as is the case in many presidential systems in the world today. Thanks to that, the legislator has the right to reject a budget prepared by the president when it deems it necessary. In this situation, the president could prepare a new and temporary budget according to the revaluation rate.

There are major mechanisms for ensuring checks and balances in the new system which are: 1) Concurrent constituency and presidential elections, 2) Concurrent renewal of elections, 3) A time limit for terms of office, 4) Runoff elections for presidents, 5) The power to publish enactments by the president on limited issues and under the supervision of the Constitutional Court to develop and execute policies, 6) And budget preparation as a power of the president but at the same time needing the approval of parliament.

In short, the Turkish Presidential System, which is the center of the proposed amendment, creates differentiations from the current system, not only institutionally but also in terms of the construction of checks and balances. This feature puts limits on the powers of the president and parliament, especially in terms of their relation with each other, and also aims to preserve their spheres of power from intervention by the other.