The Search for Transformation: The Z212 Protests in Morocco

November 19, 2025

Rather than viewing the Gen Z212 protests as merely a youth movement, it is more meaningful to see them as a reflection of the accumulated social, political, and economic discontent within Moroccan society toward the decay of the monarchical regime.
Young people gather to stage a demonstration demanding reforms in education and healthcare and fighting corruption in Rabat, Morocco on October 3, 2025. Photo by Anadolu Images.

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orocco, considered a relatively stable country in North Africa, has been witnessing street protests. The protests that took place in 11 Moroccan cities on September 27, 2025, attracted attention as the largest anti-government demonstrations in recent years. The Gen Z212 Youth Movement initiated the protests, particularly through social media platforms such as Discord. This led crowds dissatisfied with current policies to take to the streets throughout Morocco, especially in Rabat.

Reasons for the protests

Several factors appear to have contributed to the rapid spread of protests across Morocco’s major cities. Among the developments that sparked the protests are the failure to heal the wounds of the 2023 earthquake, which claimed approximately 3,000 lives, and the deaths of eight women during childbirth at a state hospital in Agadir in early September of this year. Despite the serious problems with public services, the billions of dollars spent on the 2030 World Cup have clearly contributed to a wave of public anger.

Morocco, which is set to host the 2030 World Cup with Spain and Portugal, has constructed three stadiums and renovated six pitches thus far, spending $400 million on one of these renovation projects alone. During the protests, slogans such as “Stadiums are here, where are the hospitals?” and “Health first, we don’t want the World Cup” were prominent. The protests are driven by issues such as unemployment, limited educational opportunities, poor healthcare services, and the diversion of extensive public spending towards projects that prioritize spectacle over services and infrastructure.

The “Gen Z212” movement, which is at the center of the protests, exhibits an organizational structure without a predetermined leader and mobilizes through social media and digital platforms. This style of mobilization highlights young people’s distrust of traditional political channels. Rather than relying on political parties, unions, and civil society organizations, the movement presents itself as a new organizational model operating through digital environments.

The protests stem from inadequate healthcare services and ostentatious public spending. However, they also reflect general dissatisfaction with state institutions. Youth unemployment, regional inequalities, a lack of transparency in public spending, and a failure to prioritize public services while investing heavily in infrastructure are also motivations for the protesters. During the demonstrations, protesters gathered in front of the parliament building in Rabat, chanting slogans such as “Freedom, honor, social justice” and demanding improvements in economic and social conditions.

Slogans such as “the people want an end to corruption,” “enough corruption, you have disgraced the country,” and “we want health and education” revealed the public’s discontent with socioeconomic inequality. Demonstrators in Rabat targeted the government and former Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, calling for an end to corruption and demanding Prime Minister Aziz Ahnuş’s resignation.

The state’s response to the demonstrations

The state’s response to the demonstrations has been extensive. The protests began on September 27-28 and quickly spread to several cities. Thousands of young people took to the streets in cities such as Rabat, Casablanca, Agadir, and Marrakesh. While the protests were relatively peaceful in the beginning, they turned violent in subsequent days, resulting in clashes with security forces. For instance, two people were killed when police opened fire in the village of Leqliaa. The state used arrests, heavy deployment of security forces, mass detentions, and increased control over the media to control the events.

The Moroccan Interior Ministry stated that approximately 400 people had been arrested. The statement reported that 243 security personnel and 23 civilians were injured during the protests and that 142 security vehicles and 20 private vehicles were burned or severely damaged. Numerous official institutions, bank branches, and shops were reportedly looted and vandalized in Ait Amira, Inezgane Ait Mellul, Agadir-Ida-Outanane, Tiznit, and Vecde. The ministry claimed that protesters had used cutting tools, Molotov cocktails, and stones, and that the protests had escalated significantly.

The effects of governance

These protests in Morocco are the first mass demonstrations to occur across the country since the Arab Spring 14 years ago. Inspired by the protests that began in Tunisia, Egypt, and other Arab countries, Moroccan youth organized demonstrations demanding an end to the ongoing corruption and injustice of the parliamentary monarchy. Regional inequalities between rural and urban areas, income inequality, unemployment, and inadequate access to or delivery of basic services have brought about a deepening social crisis in Morocco over the years.

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy governed by King Mohammed VI. Regarded as the guarantor of the constitution, he is the most powerful person in the country as the head of state and government. He also has strong religious legitimacy as the “Commander of the Faithful” (head of the believers). Moroccan kings can exert powerful religious influence over the people because they claim their lineage goes back to Hassan and consequently to the Prophet Muhammad. The Moroccan king also holds authority over the army, security, foreign policy, and strategic economic decisions. He appoints the prime minister and approves or dismisses the government elected by parliament. The king ensures that decisions likely to provoke a public reaction are made by the government, ministers, and prime minister, thereby deflecting public anger toward them.

An example of this can be seen in the December 22, 2020 agreement to normalize relations between Morocco and Israel. The agreement was signed on Morocco’s behalf by then-Prime Minister Saadeddin Osmani. Although the Moroccan king made the decision to normalize relations, the agreement was signed by Osmani, who led the government on behalf of the Justice and Development Party, which is known for its “Islamist” leanings. This caused the public reaction to the decision to be directed at the government. Osmani was subsequently replaced by billionaire businessman Aziz Ahnuş.

The accumulated social, political, and economic discontent

Rather than viewing the Gen Z212 protests as merely a youth movement, it is more meaningful to see them as a reflection of the accumulated social, political, and economic discontent within Moroccan society toward the decay of the monarchical regime. The unequal distribution of growth across social segments in Morocco and the prioritization of ostentatious spending by the king and a small elite group around him also form the basis for the discontent expressed in these actions. The king’s — and consequently the government’s — focus on major infrastructure, tourism, and sports investments has reinforced the perception that the regime prioritizes its external image.

Conversely, the lack of improvement in areas directly affecting people’s daily lives, such as health, education, and employment, has contributed to growing disappointment, particularly among the country’s youth. The protests spread not only to major cities but also to less developed regions such as Beni Mellal, Ouarzazate, and Taza, revealing that dissatisfaction with politics and politicians has become widespread. Consequently, the Gen Z212 protests should be seen as a mass expression of the Moroccan people’s dissatisfaction with the monarchy and its loyal politicians.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

Hatice Rümeysa Dursun is an Associaste Professor in the International Relations Department at Sakarya University in Türkiye.