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t this historic crossroads, as the global power equation is rewritten and paradigms are shaken, the parameters of national sovereignty are undergoing a fundamental transformation. Full independence is now measured by control over not only land, sea, and airspace but also the digital (cyber) and space domains, which connect these elements via invisible networks. At the heart of this equation is one of the most critical technologies: national positioning systems. Turkey’s decision to develop its own national positioning system is a strategic response to 21st-century challenges and a concrete manifestation of the “Turkey Century” vision.
A country’s economic functioning and military operational capabilities depend on invisible signals, namely Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Turkey, a long-time user, is now taking decisive steps toward becoming a system builder. Developing a national navigation and global positioning system is not just a technological ambition, but a strategic necessity that has become one of the cornerstones of the country’s future sovereignty, security, and prosperity.
Alongside Turkey’s space program, the Regional Positioning and Timing System (RPS) will be established as a vital capability. Thus, Turkey’s positioning, navigation, and timing data needs will be met with high-precision, domestically produced systems that will replace those currently in use.
There is experience from various war environments regarding jamming and interference activities targeting Global Positioning System (GPS) systems. The precision guidance capabilities of today’s modern armies’ striking elements are priority jamming targets. In this context, reports have emerged of Russian GPS jamming (electronic warfare) applications against HIMARS and various smart munitions provided to Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine War. Even advanced systems equipped with receivers that obtain data from different positioning systems and anti-jamming subcomponents are not immune to jamming or deception under current conditions.
Although GPS is an important data source, sophisticated munitions do not rely solely on a single GNSS source or GNSS-based guidance technologies. Ballistic and cruise missiles can currently operate without being affected by jamming with inertial navigation systems; however, the increase in flight time causes deviation errors to grow proportionally over time. For this reason, hybrid structures that support data such as GPS are needed.
Counterterrorism operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as in areas of national interest such as Libya and Azerbaijan, have confirmed the Turkish defense industry’s game-changing role in technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. However, there is a bitter truth on the other side of the coin: the risk of strategic blindness. Our long-range ballistic and cruise missiles depend on foreign-sourced GPS signals, particularly those controlled by the U.S., for position and target data. Rival powers can compromise the effectiveness of our most advanced weapon systems by jamming or misleading these signals through intensive electronic warfare applications, even momentarily.
This situation represents an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that undermines Turkey’s ability to determine its own destiny. Rival forces’ ability to jam or mislead these signals through electronic warfare measures means the effectiveness of your most advanced weapon systems could be compromised at the most critical moment. This situation is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that conflicts with Turkey’s determination to chart its own course. A national system would eliminate this vulnerability by providing a military signal similar to a P/M code that is resistant to such interference, fully encrypted, and accessible only to the Turkish Armed Forces.
Today, many GNSS satellites are in operation. Each satellite has its own unique frequencies for transmitting navigation and timing information and typically operates in low and medium orbits. The global positioning (GPS) data they provide is intended for different users. GPS services include the C/A code, accessible to all users, and the encrypted P(Y) code, accessible only to authorized users. The system operates with three components: space (satellites), ground (ground control stations), and user (GNSS or GPS receivers). Receivers determine position using signal data from both space and ground components.
Regional positioning systems result from the need to provide positioning data for specific areas or purposes using indigenous resources. Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) enhances GNSS signal performance in Japan and neighboring East Asian regions by employing a mix of satellites in various orbits (GEO and MEO) to augment GPS. The QZSS program was announced with four operational satellites and currently operates with seven.
India launched the NavIC program to end its dependence on foreign GPS data amid tensions with Pakistan. Designed to cover mainland India and the surrounding region within a 1,500-kilometer radius, the NavIC system uses geostationary (GEO) satellites. Furthermore, satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS) have long been used in North America (“WAAS”) and Europe as a method of providing positioning services for critical applications, such as civil aviation.
Recognizing the importance of independence in strategic capabilities is the driving force behind Turkey’s national technology initiative. The leading institutions of the defense industry are transforming this vision into reality. TÜBİTAK UZAY’s satellite technology expertise, ASELSAN’s electronic warfare, signal processing, and cryptology expertise, ROKETSAN’s launch and fuel technology competence, and FERGANİ’s satellite target team form the pillars of this major project. Rather than a series of disjointed efforts, Turkey’s goal is a complementary, holistic strategy coordinated by the Turkish Space Agency.
This goal will not be achieved overnight, but rather through systematic accumulation over many years. In the first stage, rather than bearing the enormous cost and time burden of establishing a global system, the goal is to establish a regional positioning system (RPS) that covers Turkey and its sphere of influence, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This system will provide a more precise, secure, and uninterrupted service in a specific geographical area using fewer satellites than existing global systems. Successful implementation of the first phase will provide Turkey with invaluable technological expertise and lay a solid foundation for the TR-KKS, which aims for full global coverage in the long term.
The first and most realistic goal is to establish a regional satellite navigation system covering Turkey and its immediate surroundings, such as the Blue Homeland, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This system would be similar to India’s NavIC or Japan’s QZSS. Like other systems, this one will consist of three to seven satellites operating in different orbits (GEO and MEO) and will provide a much stronger and more accurate signal in the region than existing global systems. Implementation of this phase is expected to begin in the early 2030s with the launch of the first satellites.
The long-term objective is Global Coverage (TR-KKS). Upon building on the success of the regional system and the technological expertise gained, the long-term goal is to transition to a full global constellation of 24–30 satellites placed in low- and medium-Earth orbits (LEO and MEO). This would elevate Turkey to the same level as systems such as GPS (US), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU), and Beidou (China). This phase could be realized by the 2040s.
Rather than rejecting existing systems, Turkey’s strategy for this process is based on moving away from being a passive user and strengthening and managing them with its own system. The national receivers to be developed will operate on the principle of a “system of systems.” In peacetime, a UAV will collect data from all available GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, and TR-KKS satellites, achieving centimeter-level positional accuracy. The UAV will continue to use other systems to support its own without rejecting them.
The real game-changing difference will emerge during potential crises. The system will eliminate any foreign signals it detects as interference, and, when the threat escalates, it will disconnect from all foreign networks and connect only to national, encrypted military signals closed to external interference. This multi-layered security architecture eliminates the possibility of electronic blackmail or pressure against the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkey’s critical infrastructure.
Because establishing a global system of 24+ satellites requires billions of dollars and takes 15-20 years, Turkey is expected to pursue a more rational, phased strategy. In the first phase, the RPS will be established. The planned system is expected to be used extensively for civilian and military applications. Turkey’s investment in this critical technology should not be viewed solely through the lens of “protecting ourselves from embargoes”; rather, it should be seen as a proactive move to “create a regional sphere of influence, export technology, and set the rules of the game.” The project’s high cost should not deter Turkey, as it will generate economic value and trigger new sectors, creating effects that outweigh the cost. In short, it is an investment that will yield material and psychological gains, not an expense. The project is not limited to hardware and software. One of Turkey’s most important achievements will be elevating its human capital and serving as an instrument to reverse brain drain.
Turkey, which has depended on other systems for years, will become a center on which other countries depend for specific technologies. For instance, countries such as Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and Qatar will be able to use Turkey’s national navigation system for encrypted military signals for their most sensitive systems. By transitioning from user to provider, Turkey will ensure its strategic objectives are grounded in concrete technological foundations.
(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)
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