NATO Summit in Vilnius: Ukraine, Sweden, and China Are on the Agenda

July 12, 2023

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the scope of support for Ukraine has been diverse and constantly expanding. Supporting Ukraine has now become a trend with weapons and platforms of strategic value being provided to the country. The support has been effective, especially in Ukraine’s newly launched operation. Yet, this effect is only visible in certain areas and the military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s withdrawal from all regions it occupied. The main reason for this is that such support could deepen the war or escalate the conflict by provoking unpredictable responses from Russia.

Military support in the absence of air superiority—as is currently the case of Ukraine against Russia—prevents Ukraine from achieving the capability to drive Russia completely out of the region and regain some of its territory. There may be different and more rapid developments once the F-16s are delivered and deployed to the battlefield after the training period. But for now, military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s defeat or to force Moscow to negotiate peace.

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this. Yes, at least 21 NATO members support Ukraine’s membership, but the continued occupation is one of the biggest obstacles to membership. NATO is unlikely to take such a risk.

Security guarantees could be considered in this context, but they are not very possible without agreement and foresight on how the future of the war will develop. Even now, security guarantees are unlikely within NATO. Even with the support of countries at the level of bilateral relations, it seems that member countries will not be able to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee that could end the conflict with Russia.

In the meantime, NATO’s strategy document, the new Strategic Concept, published last year, does not address the China issue in detail. However, this is the first time that China has been identified as a strategic challenge, given NATO’s post-Cold War history and transformation. At this stage, China poses more of a political and economic challenge than a military threat to NATO, the Alliance’s member countries, and the region they shape. It appears that NATO is not yet ready to portray China as a threat.

The U.S. perspective in the Sino-American rivalry is to transform NATO into a global organization, but not all NATO members share this view. For the time being, it does not seem possible for NATO as a whole to act against China. However, depending on how the dimensions of the Washington-Beijing rivalry evolve in the coming period, NATO may renew its position internally. That said, in the short term, it is not possible to define China as a threat.

The PKK’s demonstrations in Sweden, the Swedish government’s authorization of these demonstrations, and incidents such as the burning of the Quran show that, from Turkey’s point of view, Sweden’s NATO membership was hard to support. Turkey’s priorities in this context include NATO’s institutional support and the support of Alliance members for its counter-terrorism policy. This is why the post of special coordinator for counter-terrorism was established within the Alliance while Turkey and Sweden are establishing a new mechanism to further promote counter-terrorism in Sweden in return for Turkey’s declaration of support to Sweden’s membership.

Ukraine may also be one of Turkey’s priorities at the summit. Turkey’s policy of balance and, specifically, its balancing act in the Russia-Ukraine conflict remain important. In terms of ending the conflict in Ukraine or declaring a ceasefire and creating a basis for negotiations, Turkey’s view differs from that many of the Alliance members. In this respect, while Turkey supports the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Ukraine, it has reservations about NATO’s involvement in this process in any way. It is safe to say that Turkey will openly express these reservations at the Vilnius summit.

Dr. Yeşiltaş is a Professor of International Relations at Sakarya University. He is currently working on the following research projects: The Rise of Kurdish Geopolitical Space, Border Security in the Middle East and The New Regional Security Project in the Middle East (NRSP).