Prigozhin Died for Wagner to Live On

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n Wednesday, August 23, a private jet that took off from Moscow and was headed towards St. Petersburg, lost radio communication at around 17:30 Moscow time, once again putting Russia at the top of the news headlines. The world was quick to hear the news of the probable death of Yevgeni Prigozhin, the chief of the Wagner army, as videos of the moment of the crash and the wreckage site were posted on social media.

The fact that even the Russian news agency TASS was quick—by Russian standards—to announce that Prigozhin and the Wagner management team were on board the crashed plane signaled that the finale many had been waiting for had arrived.

After his death, commentary focused on Prigozhin’s personality and eccentric biography. However, for the purpose of providing a useful perspective on what the future holds for Russia, it is useful to focus less on who Prigozhin was and more on what he stood for. This approach is also more useful for answering questions about the future of the Wagner structure and Russia’s goals.

Post-USSR needs: Oligarchs and Wagner

Russia’s urgent search for a free-market economy organization to replace the Soviet system that collapsed in 1991 produced a class of elite capital labeled “oligarchs,” the likes of which are not found anywhere else in the world. This capitalist class, which at first, in cooperation with Western countries, siphoned off the resources of the Russian state, inevitably underwent a structural transformation after 1999, with Putin’s rise to power.

The oligarchs of the first era were replaced by the business circles that Putin cultivated while running the city of St. Petersburg, and both resources and wealth changed hands rapidly. When the first oligarchs of the post-Soviet era insisted on doing things their own way, they were purged, either by being forced to flee abroad or imprisoned. Prigozhin, thanks to his St. Petersburg roots, was able to carve out a niche for himself in the food industry as a chef within the oligarch structure of this second period.

What differentiated Prigozhin from his peers was that he recognized the Kremlin’s needs in time and invested in these areas at the right time and place. Caught unprepared for the rules of the free market economy in 1991, the Russian state found itself at the mercy of the oligarchs. From 1999 onwards, with NATO’s eastward expansion, it was discovered that a similar mistake had been made in foreign policy. In fact, the consequences of this mistake were the factor that brought Putin to power. What was the mistake?

By 1999, it was clear that the verbal assurances given to Gorbachev, then first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, by his Western counterparts and even NATO officials that NATO would not expand eastwards were in vain. However, by this time, Russia had abandoned its spheres of influence not only in Europe but also in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Asia-Pacific region. This vulnerability allowed the U.S. to intervene in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Serbia, and Venezuela without deterrence. The Kremlin urgently needed to find a solution to this imbalance created by the unipolar world.

Prigozhin: The man of opportunity

It was at this point that Prigozhin realized the advantages that the conflicts in Ukraine’s Donbas region and in Syria and Libya could bring Russia in terms of geopolitical competition. It was clear that a dynamic military force, in line with Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” would have a role to play in helping Russia reclaim its spheres of influence. This was the “opportunity” that set Prigozhin apart from other similar oligarchs and earned him worldwide recognition, even leading to his tragic end.

Russia needed a shadow army, whose powers were deliberately left ambiguous and whose legal position was not clearly defined, to protect its presence in overseas territories. Prigozhin provided this need with the Wagner Group. Representing the entrepreneurial personality, organizational skills, and patriotism he brought from his business life, the Wagner Group soon turned the tide of events in Russia’s favor on the Syrian, Libyan, Belarusian, and Ukrainian fronts. The geopolitical balance, which had turned against the Kremlin with the disintegration of the USSR, had reoriented itself and Moscow’s fate had begun to change.

Wagner’s operational success soon became a way out for African countries seeking to free themselves from the influence of France and the United States. Not only that, similar demands began to come from Latin American countries. The U.S. and France were now facing Wagner’s phantom in the countries they had plundered recklessly in the aftermath of the First Cold War.

Things were going well, even better than expected, for both the Kremlin and Prigozhin, until February 24, 2022. As much as the leadership in Moscow did not want to acknowledge it, when their plan to seize the capital Kyiv and fully occupy Ukraine, or at the very least change the government, failed, news of the cracks between Prigozhin and the ruling class around the Kremlin reached the media.

Russia-Ukraine war rocks the Wagner-Kremlin balance

The situation in which the Russian army found itself when facing the Ukrainian defenses forced it to adopt a defensive posture and led Prigozhin to make statements directly targeting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov before the international community. Moreover, ultranationalist figures such as Dmitry Utkin had rallied around Prigozhin.

Although the Wagner army appeared to remain loyal to Putin, it was now clear that they wanted to change the balance of power around the Kremlin. After Prigozhin’s death, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov stated, “Prigozhin was a nationally significant person. But he either did not see or did not want to see the whole picture of what has been happening in the country lately. I wanted him to give up his personal ambitions for bigger national issues, but that’s the kind of person Prigozhin was. He had a character of steel and a desire to achieve what he wanted immediately.”

The Battle of Bakhmut, which began in August 2022, marked the beginning of the final turning point in the future of the relations between Wagner and the Kremlin. Prigozhin’s criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov became increasingly harsh and reckless, arguing that both the capture and retention of Bakhmut were the work of Wagner. Prigozhin’s statements targeting Defense Minister Shoigu on May 5, 2023 were a sign that the tipping point had been reached.

Prigozhin was burning bridges with words like “Wagner is suffering tens of thousands of casualties so that you can sit like a fat cat in your luxurious office.” The Kremlin’s response to this was ordering an agreement to integrate Wagner into the Defense Ministry. Prigozhin refused to sign this and on June 23, repeating the words of the Roman general and statesman Julius Caesar, he said “Alea iacta est,” the die is cast, in other words. Prigozhin had now crossed all red lines,  but his future was not to be as bright as Caesar’s.

Prigozhin published a video message claiming that Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine was based on lies and that defense minister Shoigu had deceived both President Putin and the Russian people about the war. The next day, the Wagner army launched a mutiny unlike any other in modern history. Within 24 hours, Wagner reached within 95 kilometers of Moscow according to some sources and 310 kilometers according to others, shooting down Russian army attack helicopters and even an intelligence plane on its way at an unexpected speed.

However, the Wagner mutiny did not find the support it had hoped for from within the Russian army. In fact, Prigozhin’s mutiny hit the rocks when Ramzan Kadyrov, who shared Prigozhin’s criticisms against the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff but had redefined his side in this power struggle as of March, also turned against the mutiny.

The failure of General Sergey Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon” for his activities in Syria and the commander of the Russian forces that began the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to make a move in favor of Wagner was instrumental in ending the mutiny. According to Western sources, General Surovikin, who was the commander of the Russian Aerospace and Air Forces at the time of the mutiny, was intercepted by forces loyal to Putin, who had received advance notice of the attempt.

After his Telegram message on June 24 to stop the mutiny, Surovikin never appeared in public again and was relieved of all his duties the day before the plane crash that killed Prigozhin. It is now common knowledge that Surovikin is under house arrest and will never appear in public again, as happened to disgraced generals during the USSR. House arrest is, in fact, the best-case scenario for him.