Sudan Lurches from Power Struggle to Humanitarian Catastrophe

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he popular uprising that started in late 2018 in Sudan, one of Africa’s most prominent countries culturally and geo- and socio-politically, has not only failed to bring the country out of its rut, but has dragged it to the brink of a major disaster.

Following the fall of the al-Bashir administration, the successive coup attempts have brought the Sudanese people face to face with a humanitarian crisis. In order to reveal the magnitude of the crisis, it is useful to briefly overview the process of coups.

The beginning of the chaos: The fall of Omar al-Bashir’s government

The desired recovery in Sudan’s economy was prevented by the division of the country in two in 2011 after years of civil wars, the fact that oil, the state’s most important source of income, remained in the southern region, the embargo imposed by the U.S., etc. Meanwhile, the embargo and the foreign trade deficit led to a major contraction in foreign exchange.

The economic distress in the country forced the Omar al-Bashir administration to raise the prices of basic consumer goods at astronomical rates. The hikes, coupled with widespread rumors of corruption, nepotism, etc., brought the anger of the Sudanese people to a peak. In April 2019, the people took to the streets and deposed al-Bashir.

However, the fall of al-Bashir’s regime did not lead to an economic recovery and plunged Sudan into one of the most critical instabilities in its history. Four years after the coup, the country has not recovered and the political and economic chaos has become unmanageable.

The main driver of the people who took to the streets in the capital Khartoum was the economic hardship and corruption that they had suffered for many years. There was no specific ideological ground driving the uprisings, and there was no foresight or plan for what would happen after the fall of al-Bashir.

Meanwhile, the army, which following independence has always been powerful position in the country after independence, did not want to let go of the reins. Realizing that it was no longer possible for the current government to remain, military officers took the lead and tried to seize power. The insistence of the protesters on civilian rule forced the military to back down, albeit to a limited extent, and a joint military-civilian transition administration was formed.

The Transitional Sovereignty Council, which was established to serve as a collective head of state, consisted of six military and five civilian members. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the army, was appointed as the chairman of the council, and Mahammed Hamdan Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, was appointed as his deputy.

Although the Sovereignty Council is dominated by the military wing, the government formed under the leadership of Abdalla Hamdok is predominantly civilian. In a sense, the military and civilian wings were forced into a union. The discord among the members of the Sovereignty Council, the differences of opinion between the council and the government, the disagreements with armed groups, and the discomfort caused by Sudan’s cosmopolitan nature were the precursors of the current crisis.

The civilian wing’s ideological stance

Although the military dominated the Sovereignty Council, the civilian wing, which formed the government and received strong international support, had the opportunity to move the country towards democratic rule. There was an expectation that the newly formed government would prevent corruption and put an end to the high cost of living in the country.

With these expectations, the Sudanese people gave the government almost unlimited credit and strong support in the first period of the transition. However, instead of fulfilling these expectations, the Hamdok government turned towards the ideological aims of a small minority.

The overwhelming majority of Sudanese people are religiously conservative. It was clear that any adverse developments in this area would be met with a public backlash. Yet, Hamdok’s government, instead of laying the groundwork and taking the country to elections, turned to making radical changes with no constitutional basis.

Hamdok tried to close down the country’s well-established religious institutions and Quran courses. The private properties of many businesspeople were confiscated on the basis of links to the al-Bashir administration. All diplomats and bureaucrats who were appointed in the preceding period were dismissed.

A large section of the society was excluded from the political and economic spheres on the grounds that they belonged to the Islamic Movement. The government’s ideological attitude caused great discontent among the religious population. Moreover, during this period, there was no improvement in the economic situation, which, in fact, became much worse compared to al-Bashir’s era.

Military-civilian conflict deepens crisis

The active position of the administration’s civilian wing had bothered the military from the very beginning, but it stayed silent out of fear of international reactions. In a way, the attitude of the Hamdok government served the military wing the opportunity it had been waiting for on a silver platter.

The military claimed that the government was unable to manage the state and worsened the economy, and put pressure on Prime Minister Hamdok to resign. Hamdok’s resignation was not contested by the public in light of his government’s policies and economic failure. Thus, the country’s sovereignty passed into the hands of the military.

However, this change further isolated the Sudanese government in the international arena: foreign aid to Sudan was significantly cut, the pressure on the Sudanese economy intensified, and, the country declared bankruptcy. By taking an ideological stance, the civilian administration under Hamdok squandered an important opportunity.

Power struggle in the military wing

The military wing, which had completely seized the reins with the purge of the civilian wing, this time faced an internal power struggle. Although General al-Burhan was the head of the Sovereignty Council, Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, which is said to have more than 100,000 mercenaries, was in charge of a huge, highly mobilizable, medium-weight armed military force that was loyal to him.

Dagalu’s maverick behavior, encouraged by his military and economic power, caused great disturbance within the military wing and led to a power struggle between him and the army commander al-Burhan. Al-Burhan had long wanted to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the army and eliminate this dual structure in the security forces.

Dagalu, recognizing that this integration would destroy his power, strongly opposed it. The covert power struggle between the two began to be conducted openly with the military buildup in Merawi. The situation evolved into a civil war with an armed clash between the two forces in the capital Khartoum on April 15, 2023, spreading to other regions shortly afterwards.