On Saturday morning, the U.S., U.K. and France launched a retaliation strike on the Syrian military due to the use of chemical weapons on civilians. Regardless of the fact as to whether the strikes fulfill military and political necessities and is in accordance with international law, it’s interesting how the German government tried to position itself by evaluating and commenting on the recent events. Prior to the airstrikes led by the Western trio, which consists of three countries possessing legalnuclear weapons and being permanent members of the UN Security Council, Chancellor Merkel excluded Germany’s active participation in the possible military action in Syria while stressing that her government supports the need “to send a clear signal that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable.”

Following the airstrikes on Saturday morning, the Christian Democrat Chancellor said that the joint strike was “necessary and appropriate” while the country’s Social Democrat foreign minister supported the government’s stance as well. On the other hand, recent polls suggest that a majority of Germans (60 percent) don’t support the military strike.

Opposition parties also criticized the military campaign and even the government’s political support. Only the FDP rebuked Merkel’s early position by stating that it was not right to remove the possible military involvement of German military forces as an option at this point in time – maybe the allies could have asked for Germany’s military “help.”

Some left-wing German media outlets condemned the Assad regime’s chemical attacks but called for a non-military engagement against Syria in the form of strengthening sanctions against Syria’s patron, Russia. Conservative commentators on the other hand rightly stressed the fact that if there is no military retaliation against Assad, then, “the nuclear weapon of the little man” will be a common preferred weapon of mass destruction. Whether the recent strike was a serious retaliation step is a different question.

While the German public discusses these current developments it’s striking that some renowned think-tanks or foreign policy platforms also address Germany’s military potential and the alleged need for its “military revival.” Given the official views of German politicians in the last couple of years, and the increasing belief that Germany will to be a global actor, one could actually expect that Germany would have taken an active and joint role in striking the Assad regime. However, this did not happen.

Thus, why, on the one hand, do German politicians and renowned voices tend to discuss a militarily active Germany while not being involved in the case of actual opportunities such as joining the coalition against the Assad regime? The answer is based on domestic and external factors.

Due to its historical burden and post-WWII perception of a peaceful oriented foreign policy, German military engagement – in comparison to France or the U.K. – has generally been less on the country’s ambitious political agenda, despite rather external pressures. However, because of recent developments in transatlantic relations and other global developments, there is a steadily growing number of voices calling for a strengthening of European security – indeed, meaning the strengthening of the German military. In this sense, politicians underscore their country’s security interests by stressing the importance of the EU and its insufficiency in security matters. However, reality does not fit with the perceptions of German policy makers.

First of all, it’s very unlikely that a collective European idea of joint security will be established in the near future. The U.K. is leaving the EU and France, as a permanent member of the UNSC and a nuclear power, is also capable on its own. Secondly, despite the fact that the German army faces some scandals, the military’s capabilities are also extremely lacking despite all the rhetoric ambitions on strengthening the German military and the country’s alleged will to take its own fate into its hands. Thirdly, while on one hand the German public supports a more active role of Germany in global politics, there is not a majority who support any military engagement – despite louder calls from leading policymakers and international voices. As above mentioned, the public did not support a recent joint military strike against Syria.

Hence, it’s a bit strange that Germany has positioned itself within the circle of military powerful Western circles in the form of permanently commenting on global political and military related issues when it is not able to show any effective military capabilities. Furthermore, there are no serious signs that this will or can really change in the near future. The government neither tries to persuade the German public for a more militarily characteristic active role, nor does it plan to increase the country’s military spending – again, despite several calls from global voices. Thus, it would be more convincing if political elites take serious and realistic steps by leaving out ambivalent stances.

The suburb of Douma near Damascus witnessed a brutal chemical attack on April 7^th.  Seventy-eight people lost their lives due to the attack and the number of the wounded exceeds 100. The blood samples suggest that chlorine gas and an unnamed nerve agent were used in the attack. The signs also indicate the Assad regime for the perpetrated attack, as his regime has a long record of using chemical weapons indiscriminately against the rebels and civilians in rebel-held towns. Further, for actors other than Assad, using chemical weapons in the outskirts of Damascus is not an easy thing to do and using it against Assad’s enemies is not a smart thing to do.

Syria has long been a bloodbath in the midst of chemical attacks, heavy bombardments of civilians in Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Raqqa, and so on. As the death toll in the Syrian Civil War has passed half a million, the world seems to have gotten used to the pain and despair in Syria. Thousands of civilians dying under heavy shelling has become the new routine of Syria. Deaths under bombs do not even make headlines anymore, just like in its sidekick Yemen. Life in Syria, as in Yemen, in normal conditions is nasty, brutish, and short.

When you ask school kids to name some organic chemicals, you hear fructose or glucose, which tend to be the first world problems in the “normal” world. Yet, the answer to the same question might well be nerve agents or chlorine in Syria. While the world got used to seeing blood and tears in Syria, nerve agents that kill Syrians still make the world nervous. There is one thing that might still poke the world’s attention to the despair of Syrians and Assad seems to have been doing that one thing: using chemical weapons. U.S. President Trump does not have a good record of respecting civilian lives either as we saw in the U.S.-backed PYD offensives in Syria. But I guess what counts as crossing the red line is not how many civilians are killed but how. More, chemical weapons are the answer that the U.S. does not like to hear. Trump, in response to the Douma attack, tweeted full rage calling Assad an animal and promised to make him pay a big price.

Nevertheless, as days passed after the Douma attack, mixed signals came from the US. Would the US hit Assad? Analysts found it highly likely. When would the attack take place? According to the signals coming from the DC, Paris and London, it would be sooner than later. Would it be enough to topple down the Assad from power? That was the big question. And now we know the answer is no. The strikes did not aim to end the Assad’s brutal regime but just to deter another instance of chemical attack.

In an earlier occasion of the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, the U.S. had launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Mediterranean Sea and hit the Shayrat Airbase around this time last year. Yet, hitting regime-held military bases in such a limited way has proven to be ineffective. It cost Assad some soldiers and some weaponry and equipment, but Assad did not have shortage of replacements with the ongoing Iranian and Russian support. Hence, the earlier strikes last year this time did not prevent Assad from committing brutality again and the most recent one on Friday night will not. As a response to the U.S.-led alliance strikes, we might see one change in the way Assad commits brutal acts. April 2018 strikes were stronger than the U.S. strikes in April 2017. The message for Assad is that the volume will increase even more if he uses chemical attacks once again. However, the very same message tells Assad that he is quite secure if he is satisfied with killing his own citizens with weapons other than chemical weapons.

Last week, the rebel-held Douma city in Syria experienced apparent chemical weapon attacks. There is no doubt that the use of chemical weapons is consistent with the past behaviors of the Syrian regime. This development was not the first in Syria’s history. Since 2013, there have been dozens of chemical attacks carried out by the Syrian government itself. The regime has repeatedly employed chemical weapons towards the areas under opposition control, as documented by international bodies such as the United Nations and other nonpartisan international organizations. Chemical attacks fit within the broader policies of the Syrian regime and were used against civilians in the past. Particularly during the Syrian uprising, chemical attacks were used as part of a broader strategy of the regime in rebel-held areas. Leaving Assad’s chemical brutality against civilian targets aside, what made the attacks possible, among other things, is more important than the chemical attacks themselves. First and foremost, it was the lack of sufficient legal, diplomatic and military deterrence displayed by the international society.

For instance, following the Syrian regime chemical attack against the civilians in Khan Sheikhoun in August 2017, the U.S. launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were limited to a Syrian base in Homs. Trump’s tactic of military engagement into the Syrian crisis after the chemical attack was part of the U.S.’ global “face-saving” strategy. Actually, the use of chemical weapons was not against Syrian civilians per se, but it was an attempt that undermined the normative nature of the universal values of humanity, which are perceived as an integral part of the western-centric liberal international order. Therefore, with a very limited and single target selection strike, Trump’s first intervention caused no concentrate loss for the Syrian regime. Trump’s first intervention against the Syrian regime also lacked a follow-up strategy to ensure lasting damage.

This time, the reaction of western powers was the same. The use of chemical weapons against civilians was not treated because many civilians were killed by the Syrian regime; rather it was framed as an integral part of the Assad’s “animalism” as expressed in a tweet shared by Trump. The Syrian regime’s use of barrel bombs since the beginning of the Syrian crisis has never been associated with this kind of concept, even though using barrel bombs is also against international humanitarian law. Now the U.S. and the countries which support a strong and joint reaction against the Syrian regime worry about the overall “Syrian strategy.” However, the situation appears very different in Syria in the eyes of the Trump administration, and this time, the president seems to change his policy in general. This is interesting since the president announced the U.S. military withdrawal from Syria last week.

There are two broader objectives of the U.S. in Syria when it comes to expected military interventions. Firstly, the Trump administration wants to effectively deter the use of all chemical weapons in Syria held by the regime. Secondly, without any doubt, the U.S. security establishment seeks to push back on the Russian/Iranian influence in Syria. This objective became a priority following the Russian involvement in the Skripal spy game in the U.K., and the increasing criticism against Putin in the U.S., as well. Trump himself is now against Putin as following the chemical attack he tweeted: “Get ready, Russia, because they (missiles) will be coming.”

To achieve these two broader objectives, the nature of military strikes in eliminating the Syrian regime’s chemical weapon capacity and the Russian/Iranian influence in the country should be evaluated critically. Even though Trump has no coherent strategy in Syria, the type of military intervention may change something on the ground. If Trump chooses the “purely punitive strikes” method to make the international community feel better about the retaliation against the brutality of the Syrian regime, then this will be the recurrence of the last missile strike that caused no considerable strategic costs for Assad. If Trump chooses the “minimum strike” option by targeting more than one place including aircraft bases, ammunition stores and command centers of the regime, then the price will be quite high for Assad, and probably for Russia, as well. However, this option also reserves some risks and opportunities for the U.S.

It is risky because a direct military confrontation with Russia is of high probability. It is an opportunity for the U.S. because the Syrian regime would feel more insecure and lose a good percentage of military capacity. If the president chooses the “extended strike” method this will serve the broader purpose of undermining the regime’s military capabilities. This type of military intervention needs to take the duration variable into consideration, which means that the strikes would continue for more than one day. This option may provide more opportunities for the rebel groups in Syria while generating costs for the Syrian regime. However, the collapse of the Syrian government may also bring more chaos to the entire country at this stage. The second risk of a direct military confrontation with Russia is also valid for this option.

If the objectives of the proposed action cannot be linked to a coherent strategy, Trump’s new Syrian game will not be effective in deterring the Syrian regime’s brutality and in undermining its military capacity. Therefore, it is possible to argue that military action far from the “reality” of the geopolitics of the Syrian crisis would not otherwise matter.