Despite huge American support, PKK-affiliated YPG forces are trying hard to take Raqqa from DAESH. After the quick withdrawal of DAESH from the Raqqa countryside, their resistance against the US-backed YPG is strong. It seems like the YPG is scrambling to take over the city unlike the Manbij experience. Therefore, the US-led international coalition is massively bombing the city, but DAESH has heavily fortified itself inside.

Ineffectiveness of the YPG in Raqqa and DAESH Resistance

On June 6, the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced the start of the Raqqa operation. Even if the list of participants was long, the main force in the operation are the PKK-affiliated YPG. Thuwwar al-Raqqa, which is the only brigade in the region which once governed Raqqa city and fought at Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) alongside the YPG against DAESH, has been excluded from the Raqqa operation, which has resulted in a lack of local support for the operation. Also, the Arab Quwwat al-Nukhba brigade (The Elite Forces) of Jarba was forced out of the Raqqa operation. Both brigades were forced out for the same reason: they weren’t obeying YPG orders. The number of Arabs within the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces was already low and with the exclusion of these two bigger brigades, it became even less than it was before.

The low number of Arabs in the ranks of the SDF and the exclusion of the only brigade in the region with governing-experience in Raqqa led to a lack of local support for the Raqqa campaign. Due to a lack of local support, it was certain that the operation will lack intelligence and insightful information which is important in urban fighting. Nevertheless, the huge US-support for the operation in terms of weapon supplies, military training, supervision and air support in the face of current DAESH-weakness led to estimates that DAESH will soon collapse in Raqqa. But it has been otherwise.

The YPG forces are apparently inefficient and have low fighting moral and discipline. DAESH on the other hand is still using their Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) and other forms of suicide attacks which is completely inhumane, but it shows their fighting moral. In addition to suicide attacks, DAESH is heavily reliant on snipers. In DAESH propaganda videos, they show how their snipers kill YPG forces, smoking cigarettes on terraces. Despite long and systematic US-training for the YPG-led SDF, the fighters are lacking basic knowledge in urban warfare.

Airstrikes by the International Coalition in Raqqa to compensate for YPG ineffectiveness

Facing the ineffectiveness of the YPG, the US-led International Coalition is massively bombarding Raqqa. The bombardment is so intense that geolocation with DAESH propaganda videos became impossible. Not only DAESH propaganda videos, but also CENTCOM press releases show the huge destruction of Raqqa. Since the start of the operation, the US-led International Coalition has struck Raqqa 1,606 times in 68 days. That’s an average of 24 strikes per day. Compared to 5 strikes per day in Mosul in May 2017, the airstrikes are incredibly frequent. If one also compares the scales of Mosul and Raqqa, the intensity of airstrikes will become more visible. Or one can also compare the number of airstrikes to the number of Turkish airstrikes at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield Operation which was 211 in 66 days, or 3 strikes per day.

One point which shows the ineffectiveness of the YPG forces in Raqqa is the rising number of airstrikes conducted by the US-led International Coalition over time. While the International Coalition bombed Raqqa 21 times per day in June, it increased to 23 times per day in July and to 30 per day in the first 12 days of August.

The Future of Raqqa after the defeat of DAESH

The decision by the US-administration to start the Raqqa operation with the PKK-affiliated YPG-forces instead of the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army seems to be a huge mistake, which will be clearer after the defeat of DAESH. This choice also increases the costs of the operation enormously, and makes it harder for President Trump to explain the undertaking to the U.S. public.

Compared to the operation to take Al-Bab, which was captured by Turkish-backed FSA forces and only partially destroyed in some western neighborhoods, Raqqa is being completely wiped out by airstrikes. Due to the lack of local support, which would be available if the Raqqa operation was conducted by the Syrian Arab rebels, and the ineffectiveness of the YPG in fighting in Arab areas, the US-led International Coalition is forced to wipe out Raqqa with airstrikes. Now, the rebuilding of Raqqa without the support of Turkey, which shares a long border with Raqqa province, will become very difficult.

Furthermore, the extremist-leftist ideology of the YPG and their ethnic Kurdish-identity are two main reasons why the Raqqa population sees them as a ‘foreign power’ which will occupy the city much like DAESH did for years. The YPG experience against factions like Thuwwar al-Raqqa which did not obey YPG orders is known. The leader of the brigade who fought in Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) is now under house-arrest by the YPG. In addition, Kurdish opposition parties like ENKS were systematically suppressed by the YPG. Therefore, the question of how Raqqa will be governed and rebuilt after it is destroyed remains unanswered. Claims of a US-Russian agreement of handing over the city to the Assad regime after the defeat of DAESH, seem for the time being unlikely, but not impossible either. If this happens, it will be the result of the unwise decision made by the US in Raqqa, when it preferred to work with the PKK-affiliated YPG forces instead of their NATO ally Turkey and the Free Syrian Army.

During the NATO meeting held in Brussels on May 25 2017, several assessments were made on the issues occupying the most significant place in the organization’s agenda so far which are expected to mark real progress. Two of these issues had great importance.

The first was to determine required steps to increase the effectiveness of the NATO in the fight against international terrorism, primarily DAESH, and to solve central problems like intelligence sharing among the member states.

The second issue was fairer burden-sharing on NATO’s defense spending throughout the alliance which has been on the agenda for a considerable period of time and frequently emphasized by the United States, particularly after Trump came to power. In order to stop cuts in defense spending, at the Wales Summit in 2014, all NATO allies agreed to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense within a decade. With its sharing of around 4% of its GDP on defense, the highest amount compared to the rest of the Alliance, the US has been imposing diplomatic pressure on its European allies in particular for the last four or five years to make them spend more on defense, and this topic also holds a great significance in Trump’s agenda and his discourse.

In the current situation, 22% of NATO’s budget is funded by the US, 15% is funded by Germany and 10% is funded by the United Kingdom. The effectiveness of the decision made at the Wales Summit can be seen both by evaluating the data of 2015, which reflects that the cuts on defense spending came to a stop, and having a look at the 3.8% increase in total in 2016 on defense spending across Europe and Canada.

It is a well-known fact that the NATO has been facing challenges with effective intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism. The Alliance’s current policy of counter-terrorism has been shaped in NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism declared in May 2012 and it was based on three main principles: 1) awareness (to promote a common understanding on counter-terrorism), 2) capabilities (meaning the ability that NATO could impose its own methods of countering terrorism on the international level, and 3) engagement, (strengthening the NATO allies’ capacity for countering terrorism at the local level by training local forces in operation areas instead of NATO to send troops to the conflict area).

Prior to the Brussels Summit, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, made several statements on NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism to express the steps and implementations taken with reference to this concept. Mr. Stoltenberg’s emphasis on the ongoing potential of NATO becoming a part of a 68-member anti-DAESH Global Coalition drew particular attention. In fact, even if 28 members of NATO have been individually participating the Coalition, the NATO has not involved itself directly and institutionally with the Coalition.

On the contrary, the NATO has participated in the Coalition with an observer status. Therefore, the Alliance’s wish to take an active role in the fight against terrorism was discussed at the Brussels meeting. Among these declarations, some other details about the NATO’s contribution to the Coalition with regard to technical and military aspects such as the effective use of AWACS surveillance aircraft were also mentioned. These details were to transform into an action plan in which the Alliance’s activities to counter international terrorism were discussed. The action plan will establish an ‘Intelligence Fusion Cell’ that will enable the NATO to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism within the Alliance and in addition, a senior NATO official would be designated as coordinator.

Above all, there are questions about the sincerity and seriousness of NATO allies. The US in the first place as a leading ally gave the impression that they will follow their own political-military strategies and the NATO its own. In an environment where self-interests and policies distinctively differ, making common policies and implementation of these have become much harder. Hence, the raison d’être of the Alliance comes into question.

Even a president who relied on discourses and statements against the NATO, prefers to shelter his country in the Alliance when it comes to Middle East policies within the context of countering terrorism. This indicates seeing the NATO more as a temporary political and psychological tool than an urgent need. As a matter of fact, the expectation of the Alliance’s institutional involvement in the US-led Global Coalition against DAESH proves its commitment to this situation. Moreover, it could be indicated that the Alliance’s contribution to the fight against DAESH holds political significance rather than being militarily operational, since the member militaries will not all directly enter combat.

The Alliance’s involvement will hold a much more supportive quality which prioritizes providing intelligence and training in the frame of its Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism. On the other hand, the NATO’s focus just on DAESH has been questioning by the allies in terms of sincerity and confidence. That is, the YPG can be counted as an ally in the fight against the DAESH even though Turkey, one of the most significant members of the NATO, has been struggling with its organically linked fraction, the PKK.

Furthermore, even though Turkey’s objections, warnings and all diplomatic efforts, the US has been supplying this terrorist organization with weapons; therefore, this also challenges for NATO’s struggle for a common strategy in the fight against international terrorism. For this reason, the Alliance’s assertions and efforts to create a common understanding of terror reflect a vain perspective. As a result, a NATO with policies and functions intended to be determined in accordance with several members’ interest and varied threat and threat perceptions bodes ill for the future of the alliance.

Another policy that needs clarification is that in NATO’s efforts to display a great idealism, the Alliance will be confronting many challenges due to intelligence sharing which held a considerable importance in the Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism meeting as well as the Brussels Summit 2017. Yet, prior to the NATO Summit, the leaking of some details and photographs of a terrorist attack in one of the key members of the Alliance, the UK’s city Manchester, provoked a crisis between the security agencies of the UK and the US. UK Prime Minister Theresa May brought up this issue and clearly reminded attendees of the importance of safeguarding shared intelligence between security agencies. These explanations pointed out that the UK considers the US intelligence and security officials as responsible for the leak and also shows a lack of confidence between them.

President Trump, assessing this leak as a ‘serious problem’ through a written statement, is accused of lacking an understanding of intelligence gathering because he has shared top-secret classified information, including the threat of terror attacks on airlines forwarded by the Israeli intelligence agency, with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov during a meeting in the Oval Office on May 10. Therefore, this situation causes a lack of confidence in intelligence sharing between two allies with different understandings of how secrets should be disclosed. Following this event, during his visit to the US, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that the intelligence coordination between these countries is “terrific.”

Despite its good intentions and development as an institution, the NATO will likely continue struggling with its traditional problems. At the root of these problems are the alliance’s dominant members, who seek to lead the organization according to their own understanding and policies. Therefore, in an environment comprised of different threat perceptions by the member states, the problem of a NATO led and shaped by dominant members and their political preferences emerges.

Since the end of the Cold War, the expectations from the NATO’s missions have changed. That is, in the context of regional conflicts and the fight against international terrorism, the NATO has been challenged to undertake new responsibilities and this leads to serious problems among the Allies due to different interests and political understandings. Challenges on intelligence sharing constitute just one of the main examples of challenges in the context of cooperation.