In an earlier column, I wrote that the YPG will continue to harm Turkey-US relations, stating that the formation of allegedly new local military councils by the YPG might sabotage US-Turkey negotiations over the safe zone in northern Syria. Currently, despite the visible differences between Turkey and the US over its labeling and approach, the safe zone deal seems to be progressing, as both sides conducted their first joint patrol east of the Arab-populated Tal Abyad city. However, remarks by Turkish President Erdogan, and the visible differences between the United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) are strong indicators that the entire enterprise might fail. In this manner, the latest action by CENTCOM of conducting joint patrols with a YPG front group immediately after the joint Turkish-American patrol at the border region, indicates that CENTCOM knows how to sabotage the deal, and is willing to do so to reassert its position as the main policy-maker in Syria, preferring the interests of its local partner over the US, and to undermine the extensive role of EUCOM.

Regardless of how one may assess the deal over the safe zone between Ankara and Washington, the deal stands. But with the deal’s implementation, differences between Ankara and Washington and between CENTCOM and EUCOM have become more visible. While the Turkish Defense Ministry and the published deal between Ankara and Washington speak of a safe zone to be evolved into a peace-corridor, US officials constantly refer to it as a security mechanism instead. This framing by the US is a sign of the attempts to control the discourse around the US-Turkey safe zone deal in Syria, and to avoid making legally binding statements, but it also represents the different approach of both sides. Turkish President Erdogan made the differences clear as he said: “While Turkey is determined to remove the [PKK/YPG] terrorist group [from northern Syria], the US wants to straddle both us and them. It seems that the US is willing to establish a safe zone for the terrorist group”.

The entire safe zone deal becomes even more complicated due to the differences between EUCOM and CENTCOM. CENTCOM has long been the US’s only policy-making and implementing body in Syria and formed a close bond to the YPG terror group. The reluctance of the Obama administration to take strategic responsibility in Syria, and the ignorance of the Trump administration towards the details on the ground enabled CENTCOM to become the sole US actor in Syria. CENTCOM officials, the foremost being Brett McGurk, see the partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a milestone in the US approach to the Middle East. In the eyes of CENTCOM officials, the engagement with the YPG proved effective with low costs and no combat fatalities for the US. Over time, CENTCOM officials not only adopted the ideas and arguments of the YPG, but also made their alignment open to the public, even following YPG-affiliated official and non-official figures and sharing their tweets.

On the other side, EUCOM was more critical of the approach by CENTCOM and underlined the importance of Turkey to the NATO alliance. EUCOM officials have seen CENTCOM activities as steps weakening the NATO front and ignoring the threat perception of a critical NATO ally. The debacle in progress by CENTCOM had to be cleaned up by EUCOM. Therefore, it is no wonder that EUCOM played a critical role in the safe zone negotiations and enabled the deal despite CENTCOM’s resistance. US diplomats with knowledge of the safe zone deal state that CENTCOM was told that they do not have a say on this matter and must accept the deal. Actually, one of the main problems with the deal is the EUCOM-CENTCOM balance of power. Turkey falls within the scope of EUCOM’s concerns, but Syria is within the operational area of CENTCOM. The safe zone deal was brokered by EUCOM, but CENTCOM’s forces have to implement it on the ground. The difference became public when CENTCOM’s twitter account embedded a tweet by EUCOM only to say: “A combined-joint operation between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and Turkey for the security of northeast Syria” warning that the safe zone deal is not a tango between EUCOM and Turkey.

While the safe zone deal with Turkey was formed to address Turkey’s security concerns, the deal might end up provoking rivalry over power between EUCOM and CENTCOM, in which the US State Department and the US Special Envoy James Jeffrey might finally get control over Syrian affairs. The inter-military dispute over the balance between a key NATO ally and a local partner divides EUCOM and CENTCOM. EUCOM’s perspective may be more viable for international relations in a global sense and in the spirit of the NATO alliance, but it’s CENTCOM who is in charge in Syria. CENTCOM’s approach is limited, and prefers to engage with a non-state armed actor. As CENTCOM’s area of responsibility doesn’t cover any NATO state, it doesn’t value the NATO alliance as much as EUCOM. In this manner, the divergences between EUCOM and CENTCOM over how to respond to Turkey’s legitimate security concerns will continue, but CENTCOM has the capability and seemingly the will to sabotage the safe zone deal with Turkey. If CENTCOM wins this round of internal rivalry with EUCOM, the NATO alliance not only might face a huge setback as EUCOM weakens against CENTCOM, but CENTCOM may also grow into a hierarchy problem. People with knowledge about the entire safe zone discussion pointed out that the appointment of James Jeffrey after Brett McGurk’s resignation has been viewed with dissatisfaction by CENTCOM officials, and that Jeffrey and the US State Department have a tough time to enforcing their will on CENTCOM in Syria.

Therefore, the success of the safe zone deal is in the interests of the US State Department and James Jeffrey, and they must reassert control over CENTCOM and re-establish an order of command to ensure that CENTCOM is not a policy-making actor but a policy-implementing figure in Syria. James Jeffrey and the US State Department have long argued that it is wrong to ignore Turkey’s interests and doing so may ultimately end in a bigger escalation. It is only with the push from EUCOM, the threats by Turkey to launch a unilateral military operation and Trump’s unforeseen decision to withdraw from Syria that have enabled the safe zone deal with Turkey. Since the start of the counter-Daesh campaign, CENTCOM has been in charge but despite Daesh’s territorial defeat, CENTCOM isn’t willing to handover the power it shouldn’t have obtained in the first place. Now, Turkey is helping the US to re-establish order in its own house with its threats of unilateral action and with the safe zone deal, but CENTCOM knows how to sabotage agreements. CENTCOM succeeded in doing so during the Manbij roadmap, and this time tries to do so again by portraying the military councils formed by the YPG as local forces. This is despite knowing that such a move can trigger Turkey to end the safe zone deal or stall its implementation process. Such a move may end in a failure for EUCOM, blocking the US State Department and James Jeffrey from gaining control, and allowing CENTCOM to go on as the policy-making actor in Syria.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will be “coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now.” However, Trump previously promised the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he will immediately stop arm deliveries to the YPG in Syria, which didn’t happen. As the Pentagon’s 2019 Budget projection illustrates, the Pentagon predicts that U.S. troops will not leave Syria at least until the end of 2019. Within the State Department there is an internal dispute about U.S. policy on Syria. However, it’s not the Trump administration who seek to leave Syria soon, but the military and Pentagon deciding on U.S. affairs in Syria. Pentagon, CENTCOM and SOCOM are prioritizing their partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests.

From fighting Daesh to becoming strategic partners

The Obama administration decided to work with the Syrian branch of the PKK in order to fight Daesh. The US-YPG cooperation to fight Daesh rapidly advanced to a strategic partnership in Syria. Pentagon and CENTCOM’s partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces expanded to more than just fighting Daesh as U.S. soldiers joined a demonstration against Turkey in Manbij where Abdullah Ocalan posters and pro-PKK banners were seen everywhere.

Over time, the U.S. Army established at least 18 military bases in Syria, except two in south Syria. All of them are located in areas controlled by the YPG. Two of the military bases in northern Syria are used as military airports where U.S. Apache helicopters are stationed.

In addition to the military bases in northern Syria, which indicates the U.S. projection to stay long, the Justification for Fiscal Year 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) foresees the U.S.-YPG partnership in Syria at least until the end of 2019. The Pentagon’s budget projection for support to the YPG in 2019 doesn’t hint at big clashes and military operations against Daesh, but rather depicts a growing U.S.-YPG partnership.

300 million U.S.-dollars are planned as funds for the U.S.-YPG partnership in 2019. While half of the funds are reserved for weapons, ammunition and vehicles, 12% are planned to be invested in military bases costs and transportation costs. One third of the budget is expected to be spent in operational sustainability.

Weapons that are intended to be supplied to the YPG include AK-47 rifles, Machine Guns (PKM), Heavy Machine Guns (DShK), RPG-7 Launcher, Sniper Rifles, 60mm and 120mm Mortars.

The Pentagon’s budget projection also foresees around 30 thousand militants to be trained and to the frontlines in addition to another 35 thousand militants of the YPG as so-called Internal Security Forces. According to the budget projection, the Pentagon plans to pay each fighter a monthly stipend payment range from $200 to $400. As written in the budget projection, the Pentagon is currently paying 10 thousand militants a monthly stipend payment.

In contrast to Trump’s declaration to withdraw from Syria, policy makers in the U.S., the military and Pentagon reportedly have other plans.

While for now the requested budget for the “train & equip” program in Syria for 2019 has to be accepted, the budget program for 2018 is already ongoing. It is unclear if the budget projection for 2019 will be blocked by the Trump administration, but until the end of 2018 the program will continue.

The increase of directly paid militants to 65 thousand until the end of 2018, the maintenance of military bases and the continuing support for the YPG even long after the forecasted end of Daesh in Syria suggests that the U.S. will remain in Syria for a long time, with their new strategic partner: Marxist-Leninist YPG militants.

Inter U.S. state conflict about Syrian policy

President Donald Trump told his advisers he wants an early exit of U.S. troops from Syria and he publically announced, “We’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon.”

A short period after Trump’s announcement, Brett McGurk, U.S. Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS said at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington: “We are in Syria to defeat ISIS. That is our mission and our mission isn’t over and we are going to complete that mission.”

Brett McGurk’s statement that Turkey failed to advance along the Marea line, but that the SDF (YPG) have been very successful, especially in Manbij, shows how short-sighted and single-minded the perspective of U.S. cadres in charge of U.S. policies around Syria are. Much wrong his statement is in military terms, as Operation Olive Branch illustrated, both politically and logically it is not a smart idea to compare a NATO army with a militant organization.

Shortly after Trump declared his intention to leave Syria, the U.S. Army were busy in establishing new military bases around Manbij in order to protect a designated terrorist organization from its NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian Opposition factions who were supported by the U.S. as well. The establishment of two additional bases in the Manbij region should not only be seen as a message to Turkey and the Syrian Opposition, but also a message towards internal conflicts within the U.S. as the bases became public after the announcement of the President.

The U.S. military deciding on the country’s foreign policies and its relations with other allied states is a story we’ve seen before in Syria. Shortly before the visit of former U.S. Foreign Minister Rex Tillerson, Maj. Gen. Jamie Jarrard, the Special Operations commander said: “We’re very proud of our positions here, and we want to make sure everybody knows it.” Lt. Gen. Paul Funk who accompanied Jamie Jarrard on his visit to Manbij went further and said: “You hit us, we will respond aggressively. We will defend ourselves.”

The U.S. Foreign Department under Rex Tillerson tried to find another policy for the Syrian crisis, especially regarding NATO ally Turkey. His dismissal is also a de-facto end to his efforts to de-escalate tension between Turkey and the U.S. over U.S. support for YPG militants. As Anadolu Agency reports, the U.S.-Turkey working group meeting has been delayed until the new U.S. Secretary of State takes office.

U.S. SOCOM commanders are growingly frustrated at policymakers in Washington for a lack of strategic guidance to further the counter-Daesh mission according to a report by NBCNews. The limited military view of SOCOM commanders backs their partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces more than U.S. strategic long-term interests.

Trump agreed in a National Security Council meeting this week to keep U.S. troops in Syria a little longer in order to defeat Daesh but wants them out relatively soon, a senior administration official said on Wednesday.

However, it seems that it is the Pentagon and CENTCOM who decide over when to finish Daesh entirely in Syria. As known for followers of the Syrian war, the International Coalition stopped fighting Daesh and months before the start of the Operation Olive Branch.

Later, Pentagon and CENTCOM blamed Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch for their pause in fighting Daesh, merely because YPG militants left the frontlines in order to fight against the Turkish military and Free Syrian Army. In reality, this development made clear that the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces are dominated by the YPG, disabling any military operation if the YPG militants refuse to fight.

While once the International Coalition conducted up to 1500 airstrikes per month in summer last year, the number of airstrikes against Daesh have been reduced to below 150 per month this year according to Press Releases by Centcom.

On the other side, according to Associated Press during the National Security council meeting, Trump insisted for a rapid withdrawal from Syria. As has been reported, the President was presented with several consequences that would occur if the U.S. were to remain in Syria, and only one if they were to withdraw – which was that with full withdrawal, Russia and Iran would take advantage.

The Trump administration has not the political vision and capacity for a genuine Syria policy. The weakened administration has effectively empowered the military over deciding on issues relating to foreign policy and issues that will have long-term impacts on U.S. relations with regional actors. The Pentagon’s agenda for Syria lacks strategic guidance and it is short-sighted and single-minded as it prioritizes the U.S. partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. However, the internal U.S. wrangle over their policy will most likely continue.

Former US President Barack Obama had designated Turkey as a model partner in his first term. However, regional priorities of the Obama administration shifted drastically after 2012. The attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in September 2012, which resulted in the death of the US ambassador, is thought to be one of the main reasons behind this shift. After 2014, a new US foreign policy approach led to the containment of Turkey from all sides. The Obama Administration’s decision to form an alliance with the terrorist PYD/YPG against DAESH in Syria was a turning point for Turkey.

The US political and military support for PYD encouraged the PKK and other terrorist organizations to target Turkey. The PKK ended the reconciliation process in the summer of 2015 and commenced its terror attacks against the country. Simultaneously, DAESH started to increase the frequency of its attacks against Turkey. The US’s clear stance against Turkey might have been a factor behind the failed coup attempt by FETO (the Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization) in the Summer of 2016. The leaders of FETO had probably calculated that given the Erdoğan administration’s unpopularity in Washington policy circles, not many actors in the US would resist such a coup attempt. They were right in the sense that not so many people among the Obama administration clearly and vociferously condemned the putschists that tried to topple the democratically elected government of Turkey. However, FETO leaders miscalculated the Turkish people’s own resistance and strong reaction to the coup attempt.

Obama’s foreign policy approach was not just directed against Turkey. Although the second term of the Obama administration was a nightmare for traditional US allies including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Ukraine, Obama’s policies produced a favorable environment for the US’s rivals like Iran, Cuba, and Russia. The containment of Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” was truly ensured during the Obama administration. Nuclear talks with Iran, political developments in Iraq and the US’s military retreat from Iraq paved the way for Iran and its sectarian geopolitics. Iran was the primary beneficiary of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policy. “The strategy to balance old allies with old rivals” was costly for the US’s traditional allies. However, all actors started to seek new means to compensate for their losses. Turkey’s balancing strategy and recalibration efforts were the result of such a quest.

Turkey was in search of a new partner to overcome the internal and trans-border security challenges that the country was facing. Turkey’s attempts to improve relations with Russia and contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were a direct result of this search. Indeed, Operation Euphrates Shield that aimed to cleanse the Turkish-Syrian border from terrorist elements commenced only after mutual agreement with Russia. The search for new cooperation opportunities in Turkish foreign policy does not entail becoming a part of a new alliance system in the short term; however, it caused Turkey to distance itself from the alliance system that it is a member of. The new orientation of Turkish foreign policy may cause it to form issue or region-based strategic partnerships or limited alliances. The adoption of a dynamically balanced policy instead of relying on a particular alliance for increasing security in the short and midterm seems a more probable option.

In the short-term, Turkey will try to have a much more balanced relationship with the US, Russia and EU. To have a reasonable balanced policy, Turkey should do its best to avoid any situation that could bring these three actors in line against itself. At the regional level, on the other hand balancing Iranian expansionism, and sectarian rhetoric as well as the containment of the PKK/PYD and DAESH will be Turkey’s top priorities.

Being surrounded by the PKK/PYD, DAESH and Iranian-backed sectarian militias is the worst-case scenario for Turkey. However, Turkey is not the only actor unhappy with the activism of the aforementioned violent non-state actors and militia groups. Turkey may be in a position to take risks against these actors because unlike for the US, EU and Russia; PKK/PYD, DAESH and the sectarian militias constitute an existential threat against Turkey’s security. Turkey’s more assertive struggle against these actors in the field may encourage three major actors (US, EU and Russia) to cooperate or at least to stop resisting against Turkey. These diverse objectives may eventually contradict each other, which is the main challenge for Turkey.

Transition from Axis to Balance Policy

Turkey abstained from direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war and this was something unexpected by Washington, which, previously too, had not received logistical support from Turkey during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US administration seems to have been frustrated by Turkey’s military refraining from intervening in Syria in the framework of the alliance with the US, and started to question the necessity of an ally that didn’t act in the interest of Washington. On the other hand, relations with President Erdoğan and the AK Party government became tense.

The period following the downing of a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 had been painful for Turkey. The country’s relations with both the US and Russia became tense since early 2015. Meanwhile the EU was also indifferent towards Turkey’s sensitivities in its struggle against terrorism. All factors combined, each and every one of these actors tried to benefit from the fragility of the country and expected Turkey to go along with their interests. The Gülenist coup attempt of July 15, 2016, took place in such a fragile environment.

Today, Turkey’s top priority is to have more balanced relationships with the US, Russia, and EU. Improving the relations or being on friendly terms with at least two of these actors is a key to Turkey’s economic and political stability. Keeping a delicate balance between the US, Russia and EU is quite significant for maintaining Turkey’s relative autonomy in its foreign relations as much as in its domestic security. On the other hand, however, balancing interests in the economy and security is another challenge for Turkey. There is no magic formula to reach these objectives at the same time but the balancing policy should henceforth be the pivotal term for Turkish foreign policy. Having tense relationships with more than one global actor accompanied by other regional security challenges makes Turkey less immune to domestic and international shocks.

The turbulent era of Turkish foreign policy, especially during Barack Obama’s second term, is the reflection of the struggle to adapt to the new foreign policy approach. It is probable to have a more rational policy, based on the mutual interests of the two countries during the Donald Trump presidency. At some point, the Trump administration will have to make a strategic choice between Turkey and the PKK/PYD in Syria and it will shape the future of Turkish-American relations. The competition between US CENTCOM and the US EUCOM will also influence the end result. While US CENTCOM has chosen PKK/PYD as its strategic partner, EUCOM may choose to improve cooperation and collaboration with Turkey in critical security issues regarding Europe.

On the other hand, Turkey’s efforts to coordinate its Syria policy with Russia, despite certain difficulties, may have positive outcomes for Turkey’s security. If the Astana Process for the resolution of the Syrian conflict produces some productive outcomes, this might help the resolution of other issues as well. We have to keep in mind that Turkey and Russia are still far from reaching a strategic agreement in any significant security related issue including the future of Syria.

The EU is a more complicated counterpart for Turkey. Although there are more areas of potential cooperation and mutual interests between Turkey and the EU, especially in the fields of economy and security, the possibility of strengthening ties in the near future is quite grim due to internal political complications and challenges of both actors. The results of parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017 and French presidential elections will have a significant influence on the leadership of the EU. Until then, EU-Turkey relations may be unstable at best.

The legacy of openings to other regions such as Africa, Latin America and East Asia is positive but these regions do not have strategic value for Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. If the EU institutions decide to continue more hostile relations with Turkey and try to isolate Turkey, alternative options including the Shangai Cooperation Organization may be considered more seriously. Fluctuations and instabilities in US-Russian relations will have a direct impact on Turkey’s strategic decisions and choices. That is why the decision makers in Turkey will be following this relationship closely. Turkey is entering a new era where diplomacy has to be conducted meticulously to meet the new challenges.

Turkey is having difficulty communicating its current foreign policy objectives and practices, which are closely linked to the country’s recent domestic challenges. Both Turkey’s traditional NATO allies and Russia are unwilling to cooperate with it in its efforts to meet security challenges related to the spillover effects of the Syrian war and the problems related to the FETO (Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization). Indeed this reluctance is beyond the scope of a simple communication problem.

Turkish decision makers feel that the country’s traditional allies are now implicitly containing Turkey with their tacit encouragement of the terror organizations that are targeting Turkey. Both the US as well as EU members seem to have strong ties with terrorist elements such as the PKK and the FETO which constitute an existential threat to Turkish national security. The CENTCOM commanders do not hide their strategic cooperation and collaboration with the PYD and the PKK in Syria. Those terror organizations constantly target Turkey with the weapons provided by the US and other coalition partners.

The anti-DAESH coalition provided limited support to Turkey in its fight against the terror group, however the coalition partners also set some limits for Turkey in its fight against the terror group in the course of Operation Euphrates Shield. EU institutions and European politicians are pursuing biased policies to tarnish Turkey’s international image rather than cooperating in the areas where both sides have common interests. These are the main reasons why Turkey has to make a structural transformation in its foreign policy approach as well as in its priorities in its relations with the US, EU, and Russia.

This transformation is directly linked to Turkey’s rising security concerns in which change in the policies of Ankara’s historical allies is the main reason behind it. The new yet complex security environment and challenges made Turkey more introverted within the last two years. Turkish foreign policy did not choose an isolationist path, however unlike the more idealist era Turkey’s imminent security concerns necessitated a more balanced approach. Defensive and coercive foreign policy tools started to assume a more significant place in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Turkey seemed less prepared in coercive foreign policy, besides the use of military might, and faced more international resistance despite the fact that it was used against DAESH.

The priority of the AK Party era Turkish foreign policy was to diversify its relations in terms of regions/countries and to expand the autonomy of Turkey’s foreign policy. This diversification also tried to strike a balance between economic, political, and security related interests. Turkey tried to resolve its problems with neighboring countries and institutionalize strong political, economic and cultural ties during the AK Party administration until 2013. This diversification effort was not shaped at the expense of any specific third party. This approach also aimed to decrease Turkey’s dependency on its traditional allies in terms of defense and security.

The inclusion of the EU integration process into Turkey’s policy agenda played constructive roles within the political and economic fields. However, with the EU decision to block Turkey’s membership process under the pretext of the Cyprus issue, Turkey turned to improve its ties with other regions, and thus the policy was labeled as an “opening period.”  Turkish foreign policy tried to improve ties with the Middle East, Russia, and African and Latin American countries during this time. Rather than shifting its axis towards other forces, Turkey prioritized the country’s national interests. This policy was frequently criticized by Turkey’s traditional allies as well as by the local affiliates of these allies. Turkey’s allies put pressure on Turkey through rhetoric like “shift of axis,” “Neo-Ottomanism,” “Middle-Easternization,” “Eurasianism,” and “Islamization of Turkey’s foreign policy.”

On the other hand, Turkey adopted an idealist foreign policy vision between 2004 and 2013 with the claim to be an actor that can help to facilitate more collaborative relations around its neighboring region. This policy emphasized an “order instituting” actor role for Turkey. In accordance with this idealist vision, Turkey decided to become a proactive mediator or facilitator for the resolution of numerous regional crises. Regional cooperation and trade opportunities were improved with comprehensive international platforms. These policies were quite effective until the early stages of the Arab Spring. The regional atmosphere was conducive to the implementation of such a constructive agenda. Turkey also paid attention to coordinate its efforts with its Western allies.

The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and the destabilization of Iraq due to the rise of terror organizations and ethnic and sectarian militia groups radically changed the security environment of Turkey. The country felt the risk of destabilization due to immediate challenges. Terrorist organizations found a suitable environment to spread along Turkey’s southern border. NATO mostly stood still against these changing security trends; only precautions against DAESH were taken. NATO involvement was quite weak and insufficient to provide safeguards for Turkey. Threats posed to Turkey’s security by terror organizations such as the PKK, DHKP-C and FETO, were mostly disregarded.

The lukewarm stance of Turkey’s NATO allies with regard to Turkey’s security challenges resulted in the isolation of Turkey in terms of security and foreign policy. Turkey was left alone in its fight against terror and this strategic choice of Turkey’s “Western allies” was at the same time a strategy to constrain and balance Turkey’s pro-active role in regional politics. Turkey was expected to renounce its proactive role and return back to a traditional defensive role that was designated for it during the Cold War era. Turkey resisted in adapting its regional foreign policy to the traditional defensive model.

Turkey, being surrounded by a mix of violent non-state actors/ terror groups, felt it necessity to deploy its military on the field with Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey’s active presence intensified its relations with the US, Russia and Iran since mid-2014. However, the attempts to recalibrate the Turkish foreign policy to this new security oriented paradigm started in mid-2016. Turkish foreign policy is switching into a more pragmatic approach. Border security and the struggle against terrorism will be prioritized, yet non-coercive approaches such as humanitarian and development aid, conflict resolution and mediation approaches, trade diplomacy and soft power will continue to be on the agenda.

Reducing dependence on defense industry and expanding and strengthening its network of non-state partners in the regional context are other medium term goals. Having been disappointed by the hostile policies of its traditional allies, Turkey will now emphasize an issue-based balancing strategy. Turkey is experiencing a seesaw pattern and disappointments in its foreign policy are the byproduct of this recalibration effort. Turkey does not refrain from using its hard power against terror elements on both sides of its borders, despite criticism by the US, Russia and other regional actors.

The adoption of pre-emptive security operations on both sides of Turkey’s border was a major shift for Turkey’s security doctrine. Turkey shifted its foreign policy approach along its southern and eastern borders. This shift can be portrayed as a change from pro-active constructive diplomacy to pre-emptive security. This change also has effects on domestic politics and bureaucratic configuration. More nationalist discourses started to dominate multilateralist voices and security diplomacy started to become more central actors to Turkey’s foreign policy making since both the Turkish public and Turkish decision makers are getting increasingly disappointed by the US and EU’s indifference to its security concerns.

De Oppresso Liber!

The motto of ‘de oppresso liber’ in the United States Army Special Forces is traditionally believed to mean ‘to liberate the oppressed’. The US Army Special Forces is the key actor in planning, organizing, executing and supervising nation creation operations on the ground. In nation creation efforts, the US avoids the deployment of large units of US soldiers on the ground, but entrusts the war effort to local, indigenous, armed opposition, as it did in Afghanistan against Soviet invasion during the 1980s.

In nation creation efforts, the US avoids the deployment of large units of US soldiers on the ground, but entrusts the war effort to local, indigenous, armed opposition.

The main body of the US Army Special Forces is composed of five active and two National Guard Special Forces Groups (SFG); each are usually composed of four active battalions with four combat companies. SFGs have the responsibility of special operations in different parts of the world. 1st Group is responsible for the Pacific countries (USPACOM area), 3rd Group is active in western Africa (USARAF area), 5th Group in the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia (CENTCOM area), 7th Group in the Latin American countries (USSOUTHCOM) and 10th Group in Europe (USEUCOM area). 19th and 20th SFGs are the national guards – not active – and they are deployed to support the other groups when called to duty.

A Special Forces Company is composed of six Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA) and ODAs are the core element of the US Army Special Forces. A team of ODA is composed of twelve men of six specialties; two of the twelve men are officers, who command the team, together with the Team Sergeant. The Commander is the team leader and is responsible for organizing missions and briefing the team on mission objectives. The Assistant Detachment Commander is the officer and second in the chain of command, and is responsible for civil affairs. The remaining ten men are the Sergeants (NCOs), who serve in the same ODA for a long period of time. The Operations Sergeant (18Z) has the responsibility of Team Sergeant, and is the senior person and the most experienced soldier. The Intelligence Sergeant (18F) gathers and analyses mission-critical intelligence. Two Weapons Sergeants (18B) are responsible for the training of the local paramilitary elements in weaponry and ammunitions, ranging from small arms to anti-aircraft MANPADs (man-portable air-defense systems) such as Stingers, SA-7s and SA-18s.

Explosives experts teach the local armed elements how to improvise explosives with commercially available materials such as ammonium nitrate.

Man-portable anti-tank weapons such as the AT-4, FGM-148 Javelin and Kornet 9M113 are also taught by the weapons specialists. Two Engineering Sergeants (18C) train the local forces in mining and explosives. In nation creation operations, the US is reluctant to supply locals with mass destruction explosives in order to avoid international criminal courts; therefore, explosives experts teach the local armed elements how to improvise explosives with commercially available materials such as ammonium nitrate. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) – handmade – are the deadliest weapons that paramilitary organizations use against designated targets. Two Medical Sergeants (18D) are the combat medics, who teach and operate in medical emergencies. These experts are also the sympathetic faces of the ODAs, and, as such, they carry out psychological operations to convince the local people to support the American presence on the ground. Wounded local fighters are also treated by these paramedics. Two Communications Sergeants (18C) teach indigenous armed elements how to use tactical radios.

The US Army Special Forces troops are trained through several phases in Fayetteville, North Carolina. After completing the training of small unit tactics and specialties mentioned above, they are isolated from the outside world and sent to a fictitious Unconventional Warfare Environment based on the scenarios in which Special Forces troops affiliate with non-state actors. Robin Sage is the name of the final phase where the troops play their roles in nation creation. The US Army Special Forces ODAs infiltrate the country, then organize the scattered resistance groups and, finally, turn the armed elements into an effective army in the projected nation.

The People’s Republic of Pineland is the name of the fictitious country invaded by a neighboring country and local militias ask for US military help to equip, train and organize against the enemy.

The People’s Republic of Pineland is the name of the fictitious country invaded by a neighboring country and local militias ask for US military help to equip, train and organize against the enemy. Fundamentally, the US Special Forces is accredited as the liberator of the Pineland. During the close relations with local armed partners, the US forces exchange their patches, coins and other symbols with the indigenous comrades as a show of respect and US support to the national cause of Pineland. US soldiers even wear the uniforms or insignias of local fighters. Like the Pineland scenario, Special Forces troops play their roles in other fictitious countries such as Attica, Aragon, Krasnovia and Atropia, coping with different situations in the world with divergent actors.

To Free the Oppressed or to Oppress the Already Free?

Terrorist organizations such as the YPG are never seen paving the way for the US Army Special Forces to infiltrate the countries of Pineland, Attica, Aragon, Krasnovia or Atropia. In 2015, the US Special Forces affiliated with the YPG – the Syrian branch of the PKK – in Syria and prompted a major terror threat against Turkey. The US denies the direct connections between the PKK and the YPG and describes the YPG as its local partner in Syria against ISIS. US officials visit the YPG fronts and encourage the PKK terrorists to fight against ISIS. Meanwhile, the US Army Special Forces units continue to arm, equip, train and supervise identical twins of the YPG and the PKK yet to be recognized as terrorists.

The PKK has adapted new tactics using IEDs and has killed hundreds of Turkish security personnel and civilians within Turkish territory since the US Special Forces were deployed in Syria.

The PKK has adapted new tactics using IEDs and has killed hundreds of Turkish security personnel and civilians within Turkish territory since the US Special Forces were deployed in Syria. Moreover, the PKK has also seized the weapons and ammunitions distributed to YPG elements by the US Army Special Forces and has used them against the Turkish security forces in Turkish territory. The US Army Special Forces units are able to provide and train the YPG (meaning the PKK) with MANPADs such as the SA-18 and anti-tank rockets such as the AT-4, FGM-148 Javelin and Kornet 9M113. PKK terrorists shot down a Turkish AH-1W Super Cobra with a Russian-made surface-to-air SA-18 on 13 May 2016. SA-18s can be easily obtained in Syria and transferred to the PKK; once the PKK missile operator is analyzed in video footage, it can be seen that he was newly trained. On the other hand, Turkish security forces captured an AT-4 anti-tank missile, which was distributed to YPG elements by the US forces, in the Nusaybin District of Mardin.

Currently, the US Army Special Forces ODAs affiliating with PKK-rooted YPG terrorists are coming under heavy criticism for wearing YPG badges on their uniforms. Special Forces operatives seem to imagining themselves in the fictitious Pineland where there is no real criticism. Romanticizing the YPG/PKK terrorists with the idolized Pineland Guerilla Force is another US setback that upsets its ally. Sadly, the Special Forces operatives of 10th SFG are deployed from Incirlik Air Base in Adana.

As in the Jundullah case in Pakistan, American pledges to fight against terrorism involve no aspect of Turkish security. The US pledges to fight against terrorists while working alongside another terrorist organization, which causes serious security problems for its allies such as Turkey and Pakistan. This raises the question, could Turkey benefit more from a possible regional security alliance than US-orientated NATO policies?