The long delayed Iraqi Kurdistan Parliamentary elections were finally held on Sunday, September 30th. According to the preliminary results, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) seems to increase its seats in the 111 seated (11 reserved for minorities) parliament from 38 to 45 compared to the 2013 elections. While the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also gained three more seats compared to the previous election, the New Generation Movement won seats in the regional parliament for the first time as it secured 8 spots. Interestingly, the total increase in the PUK and New Generation’s seats are equal to the number that the Gorran Movement lost.

The elections have not changed two simple facts regarding the political realities of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. According to the results, as usual, the KDP is the winner – this time with a greater margin. The party received over half a million votes and 43.6% of the votes in the entire region. Hence, the KDP votes more than doubled its closest follower, the PUK votes. Nevertheless, there is a caveat to these results. The KDP finished the race in first place but with fewer votes than it received in 2013. This is because the turnout was as low as 57.3%

Not only did the KDP come first once again, but the bipolar structure of the region has been protected once more as the KDP and PUK continue to dominate regional politics. This has further deepened after Gorran weakened due to the death of its founding leader Nawshirwan Mustafa in May 2017. It seems that the lastnames Barzani and Talebani will remain the strongest institutions in the region. Even the controversial independence referendum that took place last year in September, which resulted in a loss of territories, has not changed the bipolar structure in the region.

In sum, the KDP came out of the ballot box quite strong and seemed likely to win the Iraqi presidential elections, a position that was reserved for the PUK candidate for the past 13 years. For that reason, the KDP competed with the PUK for this spot for thinking that it no longer needed to leave this office to the PUK. And this is the part where Iran steps in. The PUK’s candidate Barham Salih was elected as the new president of Iraq on Tuesday, 2 October, in an easy win over the KDP’s candidate Fuad Hussein (219 votes vs only 22).

Many think this result became possible only after Iran cut a deal with the PUK. The terms of this deal, if there is one, is not known to political analysts yet. But if there is a deal, it will not surprise any analyst with some sort of interest on Iraqi politics. Iran seems to be committed to keep the Iraqi Kurdistan region in its current bipolar structure, and, further, it has no intention to give up its influence on Soleimani, the PUK’s traditional stronghold.

What about Turkey then? Where is Turkey in this equation? The simple answer is, Turkey is not in it. Turkey seems to avoid being directly involved in Kurdistan regional politics, let aside the politics of Baghdad. Ankara shows no enthusiasm to call the game whether it is regional parliamentary elections, national parliamentary elections, or presidential elections in Iraq. It seems that the government is pretty much focused on one single issue in Iraq: the PKK.

Turkey shows willingness to cooperate with any actor in Iraq, whether domestic players or influential outsiders, such as Iran. What drives Turkey’s attention in Iraq the most is not who will be elected the next president, as this is more or less a symbolic spot anyway. However, it is whether Turkey will be able to continue its counterterrorism campaign effectively within the borders of Iraq, where PKK camps are located. Once again, Turkey is playing its cards open and is not after any twisted plot to call the game of politics in Baghdad or Erbil.

The Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which was held upon the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani despite all the objections of local, regional and international actors, poses numerous risks that could drift the entire region into a state of chaos. The rising tension in Kirkuk after the Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim declared the referendum and the subsequent developments have shown how the decision to hold a referendum could drag Iraq and the region into further instability.

Tensions between the Erbil and Baghdad administrations, which have reached their peak due to the referendum decision, have also reverberated into relations between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army. Peshmerga forces were not included in the anti-Daesh operations launched in Hawija, a southern district of Kirkuk. In the midst of this strained atmosphere, only a week before the referendum, a conflict broke out between the Turkmens and Kurdish groups in Kirkuk, illustrating that the tension looming over the city might culminate into a major scale conflict at any moment. In addition, the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a significant actor in the city, announced that they would not recognize the referendum, revealed that the tension between Turkmens and Kurds would not simmer down after the referendum.

As Erbil increasingly insisted on the referendum, the Baghdad administration did not hesitate in responding with hostile measures. The Iraqi Parliament discharged the Kirkuk governor from duty and vested the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi with all kinds of authorities in order to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq by referring to his title of “Commander-in-Chief.” Vested with this authority, Abadi displayed that they would harshly respond to the KRG’s steps toward independence by stating a day before the referendum that the referendum is null and void. On the day of the referendum, the Iraqi Parliament assigned the Abadi government to send troops to Kirkuk. These developments highlighted that the decision-makers in Baghdad and the Abadi government have taken a determined stance concerning the referendum and the disputed territories in a coordinated and synchronized way. All these factors indicate that the disputed territories, which include Kirkuk, constitute the focal point of the referendum crisis.

The KRG administration insists on seizing control over the disputed territories by affording all the risks of conflict mainly due to the natural resources in those areas. According to the figures provided by the International Energy Agency, the overall oil reserves in the KRG region correspond to 4 billion barrels, while the inclusion of the disputed territories to the KRG will increase this amount to 45 billion barrels. Given that oil forms a large part of the KRG’s total revenues, Kirkuk’s importance for Erbil can be seen more clearly.

Another reason for the KRG’s expansionist policy in the disputed territories is the ambition to control the lowlands and the areas that are fit for cultivation aside from the highlands where Kurds are densely populated. The KRG regards the valleys that contain water resources and which are fit for cultivation, such as Tel Keppe and Zummar located in the north of Mosul, as strategic targets. Therefore, the KRG estimates that an independent Kurdish state would not be sustainable unless it includes the disputed territories.

Possible conflicts that could arise following the referendum

Following the referendum, conflicts could possibly break out in the disputed territories that strained the relations between the KRG and the Iraqi central administration. The Iraqi Parliament’s instructions to Abadi for intervention indicate that the disputed territories will bear witness to a sovereignty struggle in which the rivals may use force. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution rules holding referenda in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine which administration the territories will belong to. However, not all disputed territories are clearly specified in the Article. Due to this, the KRG were able to create an actual state and claim sovereignty, seizing control of a line that expands from Mosul in the west of Iraq to Mandali in the east. Before considering the requirements of organizing a referendum in these territories, it must be discussed whether the areas de facto seized by the KRG are within the disputed territories. A scenario in which these discussions cannot be finalized through negotiations might lead to a civil war. The process as of 2003 has clearly illustrated that if and when desired results cannot be obtained through negotiations, this ends in a civil war for Iraq.

A possible conflict between Baghdad and Erbil will undermine the fight against Daesh while creating a more convenient area of crisis for terror groups such as the PKK and its Syrian wing PYD. Conflict between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces may exacerbate the tension among different ethnic and religious groups in the disputed territories. Daesh and similar terror groups are likely to take advantage of such chaos and expand their domains. Besides, the PKK will want to consolidate its presence in Sinjar and make room for itself by benefiting from the crisis. The PYD stated that they would be ready to perform their duty at a possible conflict in Kirkuk, which clearly illustrates that the PKK and the PYD wish to make room for themselves by taking advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq.

The region’s countries are against the referendum

Iraq’s neighbors, including Turkey and Iran, have adopted a strict stance against the referendum as they foresee the heavy costs of managing the potential risks of a possible independence in northern Iraq. In a statement he issued on the day the referendum was held, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked that the border gate with Iraq is only open for Turkey-bound traffic, adding that some additional measures might be taken regarding the KRG’s oil transfer. In addition, it is clearly seen that Turkey has taken some critical steps in terms of economic and diplomatic sanctions considering the increasing coordination between Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara. In addition, the Turkish military launched drills near the Habur border gate, which is an important passage point between Turkey and northern Iraq, demonstrating that high level security measures have been taken with regard to the issue.

Similarly, Iran also believes that the KRG referendum threatens the stability of the entire region as well as Iraq. Therefore, the country closed its airspace to Erbil and conducted drills near the northern Iraq border ahead of the referendum. Besides, Iran displayed a determination to engage in joint action with Ankara and Baghdad concerning the developments in the KRG by pursuing heavy telephone traffic with these capitals. It was also reported that Iranian General Qasem Soleimani wanted to visit northern Iraq in order to stir negative views regarding Barzani within political circles. This indicates that Iran has also activated its influence in the field against the referendum by adopting diplomatic, economic and military measures.

Iran is also concerned about the possibility that an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with ethnicity-based motives, might threaten Tehran’s control over Iranian Kurds. The country presumes that with the effect of the KRG referendum, the Iranian Kurds might demand expansion of their rights even though they do not ask for independence. An ethnicity-based instability within Iran could threaten the domestic politics of Iran in general, since Iran is a country comprising multiple ethnic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Baloch people and various other minorities.

Another possibility that concerns Iran is the division of Iraq into three parts in case Iraqi Sunnis also found an independent state following the declaration of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In such a case, the Sunni state can join the anti-Iran league since they have had problems with the Shia ever since the occupation, and this would threaten the corridor Tehran has recently formed that extends through Iraq to as far as Syria and Lebanon.

Iran also estimates that it might lose its current allies if an independent Kurdish state is formed since the country has profound ideological differences with allies of the KRG. When the Iranian administration hosted a delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tehran in June, the PUK did not take up any stance against the referendum although the Iranian administration expressed its reservations over it. In addition, Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim, who is a PUK member, announced that Kirkuk would also take part in the independence vote. This development showed that Iran, which harshly stands against the referendum, could not alter the opinion of the PUK although the country is known for its close links to the political party.

All in all, given that the PUK has a secular and ethno-nationalist ideology and the public opinion acts as a determinant over the political actors in the KRG, the foundation of a Kurdish state under the leadership of Barzani would undermine Iran’s influence in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani’s amicable relations with the U.S. and Israel escalate Iran’s security concerns. Iran fears that an independent Kurdish state might act as a base for the operations to change the regime in Iran and the KRG might turn into a factor threatening the country.

Due to the clear stance of the Ankara-Tehran-Baghdad triple against the referendum and the fact that other international actors are not supporting Erbil in the current state, it seems that the Erbil administration has taken steps backward in the short term. The fact that KRG officials also emphasize negotiations and positively welcome Ayatollah Sistani’s call for “lowering the tensions and invitation for negotiations” could be interpreted as the willingness to communicate with Baghdad. Considering issues such as sovereignty in disputed areas, the extraction and sale of oil, the status of the Peshmerga within the Iraqi security forces – which are deeply rooted problems – these negotiations can turn into a means of time-gaining between Baghdad and Erbil. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that almost all actors in northern Iraq agree on independence and see it as their “right,” so therefore it would be wrong to expect the Erbil administration to completely eliminate the independence process. For this reason, even if negotiations begin between the two parties, it can be concluded that in the long-term the quest for independence in northern Iraq will continue to remain as an element of tension in the region.

There is an alarming rise in the tension between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil (KRG). From an approaching conflict between the two in Kirkuk, Turkmen will suffer the most. The oil flow from Kirkuk and KRG will be disrupted too. The clash could weaken both sides and the PKK will avail itself of the possible power vacuum. All these can severely harm Turkey and cause a serious foreign policy crisis. What has sparked the crisis and what options does Turkey have to prevent a clash?

The apparent reason in the rise of the intensity in the conflict is KRG President Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. A close scrutiny of the ties between the two parties, however, reveals that there is a wide range of issues keeping them apart. The Baghdad government’s preoccupation with the war against Daesh has delayed the inevitable clash. With the battle of Mosul approaching its end, the political and military resistance of Sunni Arabs has been severely dealt with. There have been numerous recent calls from Baghdad to end the only defiant Shiite -dominated regime Iraq faces, that in the north from KRG. Should Turkey remain inactive and unable to defuse the tension, Iraq may soon witness its worst civil war and the Iraqi state could melt away. The consequences can be ruinous for all Iraqis and regional actors, especially for Turkey. Iran will avail itself of this new round of violence to assure its total dominance over Iraq and the building of a Shiite crescent will be completed.

Rising Tension

During the last decade, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been plagued with numerous contentious issues. This became apparent with the departure of US forces from Iraq in late 2010 when the former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki inaugurated a sectarian policy which alienated and marginalized both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to undue his predecessor’s policies and make the regime inclusive, al-Maliki’s followers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias have hindered his efforts. The Iraqi regime is now more exclusive than ever. Only two weeks ago Ibrahim al-Jafaari, the foreign minister, issued a decree which removed several Sunni individuals from Iraq’s foreign diplomatic corps.

Recently the US has failed to convince al-Abadi to allow several Sunni politicians, who have been forced into exile by al-Maliki, to attend a conference in Baghdad to build a credible Sunni leadership in Iraq. On July 20, 2017, the Shiite militias in Mosul clashed with the Nineveh Guards which is a further indication that Shiite militias are determined to re-establish their pre-2014 exclusive security rule in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict with KRG should be also viewed within this context. The KRG arguably feels that the partnership in government, which Kurds feel that the post-Saddam era will present to them, is all but an illusion. On 19 June 2017, in a response to al-Abadi’s statement which described the referendum as illegal, Barzani said “the Iraqi constitution, which was intended to create an inclusive government ruling by consensus of its major components, is dead in letter and spirit. Why is Article 140 of the constitution, which was supposed to be implemented in 2008, not implemented and neither is it on the agenda of the government in Baghdad?” Barzani pointed out that the Kurds have been gradually forced out from most important security, military and political positions, and al-Malik’s slogan to establish a government of the “political majority has been completely established in reality.”

Lately Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the referendum in northern Iraq is unacceptable. There is a heated exchange in the media and political statements made in Baghdad, Tehran, and Erbil. Although al-Abadi has been generally accommodating, recently his language became more threatening to the Kurds. Even Ammar al Hakeem, who has been in the past a close ally of Barzani, has recently threatened him with dire consequences should he proceed with the referendum. On 20 July 2017, the all-powerful bloc of State of Law in the Shiite Alliance issued a call in a statement to put Barzani on trial for charges of treason and collaborating with Israel and Turkey against Iraq. The Iranian regime too is threatening Barzani.

Having failed to dissuade the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from supporting the referendum, on 18 July 2017 Muhammed Baqri, the of Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, reminded the Kurds of Iran’s punitive and powerful weapon capacities.

 The Possible Clash in Kirkuk

Kurdish sources allege the Baghdad government has deliberately delayed the expulsion of around 2,000 Daesh militias from Haweja district, south west of Kirkuk, in order to use it as a pretext to attack Kirkuk. Peshmerga sources have recently detected the arrival of hundreds of Iranian revolutionary guards in areas adjacent to Kirkuk.

Unless the US and Turkey deliver a strong message to Iran, one can expect Qasem Suleimani, the head of Quds Corp, to soon appear in the ruins of Kirkuk to boast of victory over the so-called pro-Israeli and Saudi agents among the Kurds. The attack on Kirkuk can make tens of thousands of Turkmen homeless and asylum seekers at the frontiers of Turkey. The toothless Turkmen National Front and its followers can be caught in the middle of a devastating conflict. One of the possible consequences of an attack on Kirkuk is that it can also deepen the crisis between the Shiite and Sunni Turkmen groups. It is noteworthy that Iranians have already mobilized 12,000 Turkmen as part of the Shiite militias in Iraq for a possible attack on Kirkuk. There is also a potential for the Baghdad regime to use the old rivalries between Kurds and Turkmen and this might hurt Turkmen who have no military power to match that of the Kurds.

What can Turkey do to rescue Kirkuk?

Barzani and all other Kurdish parties have put too much stakes on the referendum and Kirkuk to retreat from their decision to hold the referendum. Forcing Barzani to give up the referendum will be a serious blow to his standing among the Kurds and will only help his foes, especially the PKK. Regardless of the stated objection of many Western countries to the referendum, Barzani appears to have received some assurances from many circles in the West to go ahead with the referendum. It suffices to say that on 28 June 2017, The Washington Post, which is close to the circles of decision making in the US, had Barzani write an op-ed to sell the idea of the referendum.

Turkey can still use its economic and political leverage with Barzani to delay the declaration of independence after the referendum. Donald Trump’s administration and several European Union countries prefer to enhance al-Abadi’s position in Baghdad in order to enable him to curtail the drastic Iranian influence over his country. This policy requires KRG not disrupt al-Abadi’s work. Barzani can be pressured by the US to be content with the de-facto annexation of the disputed territories and more independence using its current policy of selling its oil and gas abroad.

Being aware of this realty, Turkey can seek US support to defuse the situation before the current tension goes out of control and gives Iran access to Kirkuk. In addition, Turkey should give clear signals to both al-Abadi and Iran that Kirkuk is an issue that touches its national security and it will not stand by watching if things deteriorate. Besides, Turkey could use its leverage with Barzani to safeguard Turkmen rights if the referendum is held in Kirkuk. Hosting a meeting with both Barzani and Turkmen leaders in Turkey is long overdue. Shortly, Turkey needs to engage both Baghdad and Erbil in a more vigorous and foreword policy to spare Kirkuk from the destruction which has been inflicted on Mosul.