The Council of the European Union had decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023. On June 25, 2024, the EU held the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova. In many ways, this accession negotiation process was different from others. A brief look at the EU’s previous enlargements is needed to understand this difference.

A Brief History of EU Enlargement

Enlargement policy is the EU’s most important foreign policy instrument. The reason for this is the transformative power of the EU, the power to transform the countries that will become members of the EU by means of conditionality. By spreading its values through enlargement, the EU is able to ensure its stability, security and prosperity. Moreover, by enlarging with new member states, the EU becomes a much stronger Union economically, politically and geopolitically, and increases its effectiveness in the international system.

Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU has gone through several rounds of enlargement, bringing the number of member states up to 28. Following Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal from the Union, the EU now has 27 Member States. Each enlargement has been assessed in the context of the needs of the time and has taken place when the conditions have been met. For example, the UK, Ireland and Denmark applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, but were rejected twice, first in 1963 and again in 1967, because of French President Charles De Gaulle’s concerns over Britain’s close ties with the United States that would be detrimental to the Union. The first wave of enlargement, which included the UK, did not take place until after De Gaulle’s resignation.

The second wave of enlargement was also dealt with assessing in the context of the needs of the time. The EEC had suspended the Association Agreement with Greece after the Greek junta seized power in 1967 and installed the regime of the colonels. After the military junta had handed over power to civilians and a democratic government had been restored, Greece applied for membership again. After six years of negotiations, the Member States, instead of excluding Greece, arguing that its democratization could be achieved more effectively within the EEC, acted with the idea that we would admit Greece as a member in 1981 and democratize it.

Under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain’s application to join the EEC in 1962 was rejected. Following political reforms and democratic elections, Spain submitted its formal application in 1977, which led to the EEC’s decision to open accession negotiations in 1978. Similarly, after the resignation of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 and the replacement of the regime established by the military coup of 1974 with a democratic regime following the 1975 elections, Portugal formally applied to the EEC in 1977 and began negotiations in 1978. The 1981 enlargement to include Greece and the 1986 southern enlargement to include Spain and Portugal changed the EU from a “club of democracies” into a “school of democracy”.

In addition to political issues, obstacles to Iberian enlargement included the fact that these two countries produced similar agricultural products to France. In addition, the fact that Spain and Portugal, which had been ruled by dictatorships for many years, were economically lagging the other members caused concern among other EEC member states because of the possible influx of workers from these two countries.

Although Bulgaria and Romania failed to meet the EU’s criteria on corruption and an impartial judiciary, they were granted membership in 2007, albeit belatedly. Rather than leaving Bulgaria and Romania outside the EU, as was the case with Greece, they were helped to continue their transformation and development within the EU.

The most recent enlargement of the EU was the accession of Croatia. Croatia, which gained independence after the break-up of Yugoslavia, was able to join the EU after resolving its border issue with Slovenia. The growing strategic importance of the Balkans for the EU paved the way for Croatia’s accession process and the prospect of future Balkan enlargement.

For Turkey, which started accession negotiations to the EU at the same year with Croatia in 2005, the EU negotiation process was de facto frozen. When Balkan enlargement on the agenda and accession negotiations officially opened with Ukraine and Moldova, the question arises as to what will happen to the accession negotiations with Turkey. Although Turkey has recently expressed its willingness to take steps to revive its EU membership process it has not been included in these new enlargement perspectives of the EU.

Ukraine and Moldova’s EU Accession Process

We are witnessing that the EU, long suffering from enlargement fatigue, has begun taking important steps in the enlargement process. In a changing world and in the new European security environment, the EU has put aside its longstanding anti-enlargement approach. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath, as well as the changing conjuncture, have given a new impetus to EU enlargement, with both Ukraine and Moldova and the Western Balkans on the EU agenda.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled this change in her State of the Union speech on 13 September. In her speech, von der Leyen said that a new group of states, including the Western Balkans, would be admitted as new member states of the EU. The date for this enlargement scheduled to 2030. On 7 May 2024, the EU member states took a decision to support the Western Balkan countries with 6 billion euros, 4 billion euros in loans and 2 billion euros in grants to make them economically ready to join the Union. The fulfillment of this support based on two conditions: achieving political reforms and foreign and security policy alignment with the EU against Russia.

Ukraine and Moldova, previously part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), began to be considered in new enlargement policy. The relationship between Ukraine and the EU evolved into a different process with the Association Agreement, negotiated between 2007 and 2011 and signed in 2014, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych’s reluctance to sign the DCFTA led to pro-EU protests in November 2013, the so-called Euromaidan uprisings, and Yanukovych’s removal from power, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is called as “special military operation” by Russian government, became the factor that accelerated Ukraine’s accession process. On 28 February 2024, 4 days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine applied for EU membership and on 23 June Ukraine was granted candidate status by the EU.

Although relations between Moldova and the EU began in 1994, when Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, the main obstacle to Moldova’s membership in the EaP under the ENP was the fact that the country’s economy did not meet EU standards and, most importantly, the situation in the Russian-backed Transnistria region.

Moldova, like Ukraine, applied for EU membership on 3 March following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Together with Ukraine, it was granted candidate status on 23 June 2022. Ukraine is currently at war with Russia, while Moldova is concerned about a possible war situation due to Russia’s support for the Transnistria region.

The start of negotiations with Ukraine on 25 June was only possible after convincing Hungary, which was opposed both because of the war in Ukraine and because of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova were officially launched before Hungary took over the rotating EU presidency on 1 July, thus avoiding a potential stumbling block. But there are many other features of this wave of enlargement that make it different from the others.

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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”