While Turkey is focusing on the local elections that will take place on March 31, certain foreign policy developments are continuing to dominate Turkey’s agenda. Syria is still at the center of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. However, it is best to lower the expectations for Syria particularly in the context of the U.S. withdrawal. Every player in Syria has its account, priorities and game plan. Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the U.S. are the main actors that can make an impact on the ground, but their agendas and priorities certainly differ from one another, not only towards some specific issues in Syria but also against each other. Turkey’s position is exceptional in this regard as Ankara has to deal with two major interrelated problems, simultaneously.

First and foremost, the PKK issue is still the primary concern of Turkey. Ankara was able to eliminate the PKK threat through Operation Olive Branch and Euphrates Shield in the western part of the river. However, the threat emanating from the PKK is remaining in the eastern part of the river. There is a clear strategic objective of Turkey to eliminate the PKK’s military, political, economic and even territorial power. However, the problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, rather it has been gradually becoming a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington. Therefore, each time Turkey has to consider its strategy of engagement against the PKK in Syria by taking into consideration the U.S.

The problem for Turkey is that the PKK is not only an issue between Turkey and the PKK, but rather a geopolitical antagonism between Ankara and Washington.    

More than two months after the withdrawal decision, it is still unclear what kind of order will be established in the east of Euphrates after the U.S. withdrawal. There are three ways for the United States. The first one is to make a deal between Turkey and the U.S. on establishing a safe zone alongside Turkey’s Syrian border under the control of the Turkish Military Force and Turkey-backed military groups. For sure, the U.S. wants to establish a mechanism to ensure that the PYD-YPG is protected by a small international protection force by creating other safe areas where the PYD can survive. With this plan, the U.S. wants to satisfy both Turkey and the PYD at the same time. One of the primary strategic goals of the U.S. in this context is to promote a “dialogue” between Turkey and the PKK if Turkey accepts a safe zone in which the PYD will be protected, as well. However, it is well known that this offer is not accepted by Turkey. 

The second way for the U.S. is to establish an order based on SDG areas outside the safe zone. It doesn’t have to be under the name of SDG. This order consists of three pillars: political, economic and military (security). In other words, in the long term, the U.S. wants to establish a governmental structure consisting of Kurdish, Arab and other ethnic elements with a strong autonomy. The only thing that the U.S. cannot trust in the long term is the Arab community. For the U.S. it is not clear whether the Arab communities, especially the major tribal ones, will accept to share the power with PYD-YPG, as it would make them lose their geopolitical superiority over the Turkish-initiated safe zone.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time.

The third way can be more complicated and costly for the U.S. A group from the Pentagon and State Department think that the YPG should completely eliminate Turkey’s safe zone proposal by coming to terms with the Syrian regime in one way or another. For this purpose, the U.S. is carrying out negotiations with both Russia and the Syrian regime. So, the essence of the work is that on the one hand, the United States is carrying out an intense negotiation process with Ankara while keeping in touch with all the other actors involved in the case. The fact that CENTCOM’s top official, Votel, has been communicating with Mazlum Kobani, one of Turkey’s red-listed PKK’s ground leaders, proves this point.

Of course, in such a scenario, it is quite clear that Russia constitutes the main target actor to be negotiated. However, it is hardly possible for Russia to trust a process carried out by the U.S. On the other hand, Turkey is reluctant when it comes to U.S. premises. The fact that the negotiations on the safe zone has been taking more time than wanted is putting pressure on Turkey instead of enabling the country to save time.

Conditions in Northern Syria may force Turkey to follow “first act then deal” option.

The U.S.’s core objective in the negotiation process is not to withdraw from Syria after forming a safe zone as Turkey wishes. In fact, the U.S. wants to appease Turkey via the negotiation process to gain time. In this case, Turkey needs to create its own options. Turkey may be forced to create a ground plan for itself eventually, which makes the “first act then deal” mindset one of Turkey’s policy options. Besides that, the idea of ​​including Russia in the process towards the east of the Euphrates should not be underestimated. This also seems to be related to the process in Idlib soon.

For Idlib, the formula is simple: strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution. At the end of the day, no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

These two issues are directly impacting Turkey’s policy options. How the Idlib issue is going to be resolved remains unclear despite that Turkey has gained time via the Sochi Summit. Idlib offers significant opportunities for Turkey, but also contains the risk of turning into a problem. First of all, Russia is creating pressure on Turkey through Idlib. Moscow’s “either resolve it or consent to an operation” policy has impacted Turkey’s negotiation process with the U.S. unavoidably.

In sum, Turkey can provide rapid progress in both if it can create a de facto situation both in Idlib and in the east of the Euphrates by taking more initiative and producing authentic solutions. For Idlib, the formula is actually to strengthen moderate opposition, oppress and persuade HTS for a solution process! At the end of the day, it is clear that no other state but Turkey has serious plans for the east of the Euphrates.

Reporting for Anadolu Agency, Levent Tok and Muhammad Mislo wrote in an article, “Excluding the west of the Euphrates, YPG sits at the top of a square that deepens 45 thousand kilometer square from the line between the east of the river and Iraqi border.” According to the article, this area is one-third of the total lands of Syria.

With the intense help of U.S. airstrikes and weapon support, the YPG/PKK has been able to spread to the east of the Euphrates River.

The article adds that the biggest settlements at the east of the Euphrates are Aleppo’s Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), Rakka’s Tel Abyad and Tabka, Al-Hasakah’s Qamishli, Amude, Rasullayn towns and the north parts of Deir ez-Zor; approximately 70% of the population in this zone are still Arab. Terrorist elements intend to control the occupied lands easier in the process of state-building by forcefully re-designing the demographic structure. The YPG has forced Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens from their lands and has prevented those that want to return as the Daesh threat has been eliminated.

According to the data provided by the High Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, the YPG/PKK has forced approximately 1.7 million people to migrate.

The U.S.-backed YPG/PKK has seized Syria’s richest energy sources in the name of ‘fighting Daesh.’ For example, YPG/PKK terrorists seized the biggest natural gas facility in Konoko in the north-east of the petrol-rich Dier ez-Zor in September 2017. The terrorists also captured the Jafra petrol field as well as the biggest petrol field in Syria – Al-Omar.

The article in discussion claims that the terrorist elements in the region have also taken control of the three biggest dams of Syria with the air support provided by the U.S. 70% of the total electricity need of Syria is provided by these three dams.

According to Joseph Dunford – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – “(In YPG area) We are estimating 35-40 thousand local force to be trained and equipped in order to provide stability.”

Abdulkadir Selvi provides some details from the operation. According to his sources, the operation that will be launched does not carry the same pattern as previous operations, and a different strategy will be applied. Regarding the question of ‘facing Americans,’ according to Selvi’s sources, the military presence of the U.S. is within the plan and that the U.S. military will not be a target.

The main goal of the operation is to pull 1.200 Free Syrian Army soldiers from the area of OES and placing them in Akchaqala, just across Tel Abyad. In addition to this, Turkish Armed Forces have sent reinforcement troops to the Ceylanpinar area across Ras al-Ayn. The main reason for the Turkish military to enter these is the fact that, like pulling Afrin apart from Ayn al-Arab, with the operations conducted from these two points, Ayn al-Arab will be pulled apart from the Jazira at the east. This will be a huge blast to the YPG’s attempt of state-building; while enhancing Turkish dominance in Syria, it will destroy the unity of YPG.

In response to President Erdogan’s announcement of the operation, the U.S. defense ministry has stated that a one-sided military operation towards the northeast of Syria is “worrying” and “unacceptable.”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared an expansion of Turkish military operations in Syria and pointed to the east of the Euphrates.

During his speech at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit yesterday, President Erdogan stated that a military operation will begin in the area controlled by the YPG in the west of the Euphrates River. Erdogan said: “While 80-85% of Manbij used to belong to the Arabs, at the moment there are terrorist groups there. In that case, we will take them out. It is our responsibility now.”

Further criticizing the U.S. administration, Erdogan stated, “We have not yet achieved any result in Manbij. Mr. President says that we will clear those (terrorist groups) in 30 days. We’ll see. We wish they would clear all the terrorists.”

“An undeniable diversion tactic has been carried out in Manbij. And at this moment it is still being carried out.”

Global media outlets have confirmed that the U.S. has taken a step to train 30,000 YPG terrorists in northern Syria. And President Erdogan asks the U.S. government “Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

“The north of Syria is our south. They are trying to build a corridor there. We say ‘these are terrorists,’ but our strategic partners, especially the U.S., say that ‘they are not terrorists.’ These are (referring to the terrorist organizations) a branch of the PKK, and all the proof is exposed. Why don’t you act with us, but act with them?”

“While the Americans speak positively to our faces, they preferred to use elements of these terrorist groups on the ground. Recently, they have taken the step to train 30,000 terrorists in the area. They say ‘there is no such thing.’ However, the global media has confirmed this. They have this information. Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

What will be the scope of Turkey’s operation to the east of the Euphrates?

According to Abdullah Agar, terror and security expert, the operation will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Turkey’s new military operation to the east of the Euphrates will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Regarding the possibility of Turkish and U.S. forces crossing each other, Agar highlighted the possibility of this risk but stated, “If the risk is big for Turkish soldiers, it is bigger for American soldiers. The U.S. has made a huge mistake by taking a path with terrorists.”

Confirming the importance of President Erdogan’s speech for reflecting the will of Turkey, Agar said, “An operation that will be executed in stages is ahead. We are talking about a process of 550 kilometers along the border and 40 kilometer square in depth. This means that the Turkish Armed Forces will conduct an operation in an area of 20 thousand kilometer square.”

The operation, announced yesterday by Erdogan could further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and the United States.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi