Last week this column listed four results of the June 24 elections for Turkey’s electorates in the eastern cities, where the country’s Kurds live en masse and which are included in the maps of the imaginary PKK state. They were firstly, the AK Party and the HDP still dominate Turkey’s elections in the east, secondly, the HDP continued its loss in the region – as was the case in the last general elections of November, 2015, thirdly, pre-electoral alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP, and finally, Turkey’s Kurdish votes do not act as a block but intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the region.

The first one was discussed but the second and third are for this week’s analysis. To begin with, the HDP continued its loss in the region, as was the case in the latest general elections of November, 2015. When compared to the November 2015 elections in the region, the HDP lost most votes in Sirnak (a decrease from 85% to 70%) and Hakkari (from 83% to 70%). In the June elections of 2015, the HDP had received more than 60% of the votes in eleven cities, which dropped to 8 in the November 2015 elections, and finally dropped to 5 in the elections that took place two weeks ago. The most striking drop took place in Bitlis where the HDP received over 60% of the votes in the preceding elections but where the AK Party has become the leading party this past June.

 

The AK Party, on the other hand, could not reach to vote rates over 60 in the region in the general elections, but it did receive more than half of the votes in Kilis, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Adıyaman, Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, and Erzurum. In the presidential elections, which took place on the same day, AK Party’s candidate Erdogan received over 70% of the votes in Kilis, Elazig, and Erzurum, and over 60% of the votes in Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Adıyaman, Bingol, Erzincan and Malatya.

 

Together with last week’s analysis you read here, these results show that the AK Party and the HDP still dominate the region, where the balance of power tilted towards the HDP during the June 2015 elections, but is now even – if not towards the AK Party. Nevertheless, there is more to the story. Another finding of the June 2018 elections is a novel one.

The pre-electoral coalitions cost the HDP seats in Parliament

The June 24 general elections were bipolar elections both nationwide and in the east. In the east, as it is obvious now, the real race took place between the AK Party and the HDP. For the rest of the country, the elections were mostly between the people’s bloc (cumhur ittifakı) of the AK Party, MHP and BBP and the nation bloc (millet itifakı) of the CHP, Iyi Party and the Felicity Party.

While the race in the eastern cities was not between the AK Party-led and CHP-led blocs, the blocs still made an impact. For example, the HDP could not win a seat in the city of Adiyaman where it got 15,41% of the votes. The CHP, on the other hand, obtained a seat with a vote rate of 12,05. The reason was novel but simple. As a result of the pre-electoral coalition forming process, the Iyi Party and Felicity Party votes were also added to the CHP’s, which in total surpassed the HDP votes.

The examples are not limited to Adiyaman or to the HDP. The other parties also switched seats depending on the total votes of the blocs in different cities but the HDP –which did not take place in any pre-electoral coalition- had nothing but losses with this new regulation.

A final finding of the June 24 elections in Turkey is that neither Turkey’s eastern votes nor its Kurdish votes act as a bloc but intra-eastern and intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the country. Since this findings reaches deeper levels of the region’s sociological facts, let’s tackle it in the next column.

Even though it’s not comprehensively taken into consideration in Turkey, it’s a fact that the country has a diaspora which is of great importance. The members of the Turkish diaspora have been able to vote in elections that take place at home since 2014. In addition to being able to vote in countries that they reside in, Turkish citizens that live abroad also have the right to cast their vote at custom gates in Turkey.

In regards to the recent June 24 elections, the turnout rates of the Turkish diaspora has increased. More than 50 percent of all diaspora members headed to the polls during the recent election period, which symbolizes a new record – despite continuing accusations, provocation attempts and insulting statements by some foreign voices. Nevertheless, in contrast to the previous general election in November 2015, the number of Turks abroad going to the polls had increases by 5 percent and 2 percent compared with the April 16, 2017, referendum. The number of diaspora members, who had voted, has been counted as approximately 1,5 million, that is to say, 50,05 percent of all members of the Turkish diaspora. (1,35 million Turks voted abroad and 170 thousand at Turkish custom gates). While, for instance, in Germany 811 thousand, in France 185,6 thousand, in the Netherlands 144,9 thousand and Austria 60 thousand Turkish citizens went to the polls, 46,1 thousand Turks in the United States voted as well.

By focusing on the results of the presidential elections, we see that the People’s Alliance’s candidate, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, received approximately 900 thousand votes. That is to say, 59,4 percent of all diaspora votes. This also means that the number of votes favoring “Yes” during the last referendum on April 16, 2017, has recently been exceeded by nearly 60 thousand votes. Erdogan’s party, on the other hand, has also received more than 50 percent of the votes from the Turkish diaspora (51,8 percent) while in Turkey the AK Party got circa 42 percent. In Germany, where the majority of the Turkish diaspora are living, currently 1 million 443 thousand 585 Turkish voters exist (apart from a total number of 3 million people with Turkish origin in Germany).

According to the non-official results, 421 thousand 845 Turks voted in favor of Recep Tayyip Erdogan (64,8 percent of all votes in Germany). His party received 362 thousand 543 of the votes (55,7 percent) which is also more than the number the party received in Turkey. If one concentrates on some other European countries with a high number of members of the diaspora, one observes that similar preferences have occurred (Belgium – Erdogan: 74,9 percent / AK Party 64,3 percent; the Netherlands – Erdogan: 73 percent / AK Party: 63 percent; Austria – Erdogan: 72,3 percent / AK Party: 62,5 percent; France – Erdogan: 63,7 percent / AK Party: 55 percent).

But if one concentrates on the reactions right after the election results became public, some general and estimated biases, for instance, in Germany can be observed. While German Chancellor Merkel and President Steinmeier congratulated President Erdogan by stressing the future intention “to further support and deepen the cooperation between our two countries,” some German politicians with Turkish roots once again elaborated the results in a negative tone. Even a member of the Turkish diaspora who is working for the CHP in Germany stated that Turks living in Germany and voting for Erdogan should leave Germany. While these statements belong to a member of a political party – who call themselves social-democrats – this kind of rhetoric only resembles the mentality of the far right and extremist parties, such as the AfD.

Furthermore, discussions about the integration process of Turks became popular as several commentators and politicians once again accused Turkish voters due to their preference in favor of President Erdogan. German conservative and rather nationalist circles do not try to analyze the results in depth while all opposition parties in Turkey are –falsely– considered as one democratic bloc against the incumbent government. However, whether German analysts or Turkey experts want to accept this or not; Turkey’s dynamics are not that easy to reduce to these kinds of generalizing opinions.

Apart from the known positions of nationalists, it’s an interesting phenomenon that left-wing German politicians and above all Germans with Turkish roots are taking very extreme positions with regard to the recent election results in Turkey. As if one has to prove oneself most likely in order to guarantee a continuation of a successful political career. For instance, it’s very confusing that a politician like the former chairman of the Green Party, Cem Ozdemir, stated that Turks in Germany, who voted in favor of Erdogan, are living in “parallel societies” while comparing them to AfD voters. On the other hand, however, other high-profile German politicians from the same political party, such as Baden-Württemberg’s minister-president Kretschmann, do rightly reject these kind of statements by addressing the need of an in depth analysis of the preferences of Turkish voters by using empirical methods of social research. I think it’s understandable what I want to stress.

Thus, the elections showed us that members of the Turkish diaspora are willing to participate in democratic elections. It’s presumable that Turks abroad would also participate in elections concerning German politics if there weren’t obstacles with regard to their political participation – however this topic goes beyond the borders of this column piece.

Another issue which once again became obvious during the election period is the fact that most of the Turkish population living in Germany, who’re obviously conservative-oriented, are not represented in German political circles. On the contrary, most German politicians with migration roots are totally against the opinion and preferences of these majorities. This seems to be a serious problem for German democracy from a participatory point of view. Nevertheless, the election results are considered as a chance by the Turkish diaspora to initiate new and stable bilateral relations for the upcoming future.

After the June 24 elections a critical question has arisen: what’s next in Turkish politics? The June 24 elections constitute a significant step in Turkey’s long history of democratization. The transition to a presidential system has now been consolidated with the victory of the AK Party-MHP alliance. This will precipitate a new wave of institutionalization, which will strive to achieve unity and stability at the state whereas the state remains open to society and societal differences. This means a fine balance between two contradictory forces of political life: identity and difference.

It is mostly due to the empowerment of democratic politics in the last 16 years that links society and its demands with the state. However, we should still insist that the political situation in Turkey begs to be analyzed in order to shed light on the question of what’s next in Turkey. The wisest start may be to spend some time on the issue of social cohesion.

Friends, Rivals or Enemies

There are three degrees of social cohesion that can be found in society. At the top of it lies consensus on the social good. All society may gather around a certain set of ethical-political values. Members of society perceive each other as “friends” and each define their identity and interests not independent of others in society.

This is followed by another situation where society is divided into multiple social groups on the basis of value or identity differences. Here, members of society perceive each other as “rivals.” Despite the fact that individuals define their identities different from each other, they share some form of interest, such as accepting the rules of competition among each other. In this type of society, one can at least testify to fair and open elections and peaceful transfer of power among rivals.

And lastly, there is a form of society in which members of society perceive each other as “enemies.” In this situation, individuals or social groups neither share a common identity and interest nor the rules of competition among each other. Here, what members of society share is a common understanding not to attack each other. One can easily put that the balance of threat keeps society from dissolving or from plunging into a bloody civil war.

Turkey characterizes the second form of society where individuals and social groups perceive each other as rivals. Since 1950 Turkey has conducted free and fair elections and despite intermittent military involvement into politics it has observed peaceful transfers of power. Increasing polarization during election times is a fact yet it has not degraded the country to a lower level of social cohesion so far.

Collectivity, Intersubjectivity or Hegemony

Another issue is the dominant way of sustaining social cohesion in society. There are three models to bring society together. One of them is to acknowledge that society remains in a form of collectivity of subjective realities. Here the individual is seen more significant than society, political community is put behind civil society, and economic relations override political and cultural ties.

The second one is to channel society to create an intersubjective reality. This model accepts each as equal and emphasizes a rational deliberation among members of society. Here a common ground in society is searched in a non-political manner.

The third model is hegemony. Here society is brought together through a hegemonic project that aims to carve up the largest and most inclusive social whole by integrating free-floating societal demands. It involves a struggle of transforming the interests and identities of others by applying various ways of persuasion.

Turkish politics seems to adopt the hegemonic model. Political relations overweigh economic relations. Rational deliberation among members of society appears to be scarce. Conflict and competition determine political life. Political actors mainly strive to create the most inclusive identity or social whole in order to hold on to power.

The post-June 24 elections era in Turkey will not nurture the character of a society of rivals. If anything, it will most likely boost society’s current state and decrease the likelihood of devolving into a society of enemies. However, it is also likely to intensify hegemonic rivalry among political actors, especially due to the increasing primacy of democratic politics in holding on to power. One should not forget that the opposition in Turkey has searched for alternative ways until recently – other than democratic politics – to hold on to power.

The June 24 elections are over. As for the big picture, there is no surprise. Many analysts in Turkey predicted the results before the election day. The day before the elections, you also read in this column that Erdogan was likely to win the elections in the first round but with a divided parliament; the HDP votes, for the first time, would pass the MHP’s, and other projections as such. Nevertheless, the results are still full of depth to analyze, and here we go with a focus on ethnic voting patterns in Turkey.

Kurdish votes were expected to play a key role in the June 24 elections. As for the parliamentary elections, whether the HDP would exceed the 10% threshold would determine the AK Party’s chance to hold a majority in parliament. As for the presidential elections, the Kurdish votes mattered as well, which is natural because in an election that requires %50+1 votes to win, you cannot neglect any significant social segments. These novelties make it necessary to analyze the voting pattern in Turkey’s eastern cities where Kurds are thought to be significant demographically speaking.

The main results of the June 24th elections on these terms are:

• The AK Party and the HDP still dominate Turkey’s elections in the east.
• The HDP continued its loss in the region – as was the case in the latest general elections of November, 2015.
• Pre-electoral alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP.
• Turkey’s Kurdish votes do not act as a block but intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the region.

The AK Party and HDP still dominate Turkey’s elections in the east

In the eastern cities of Turkey, where the ethnic Kurdish population is in significant numbers, the competition took place between the AK Party and the HDP in this election. In the region, speaking of the parliamentary elections:

• The AK Party and the HDP shared the first spot in all the cities of the region. Whereas the AK Party won the first spot in 13 cities, the HDP came first in 11 (see map 1).

* these cities are chosen because they appear on the maps of the imaginary PKK state to be separated from Turkey. In other words, this is the area that the PKK calls Bakur (Northern) Kurdistan. In fact, the map is even conservative because some PKK maps also include cities such as Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Sivas where the HDP has no promising results at all.

• While the AK Party won 62 seats from these cities in total, the numbers for the HDP, CHP, and MHP seats are, respectively, 46, 11 and 7.
• The CHP and MHP have not topped the race in any of the cities in the region. Nevertheless, the CHP reserved second rank in Ardahan, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Hatay, Malatya and Tunceli. The MHP, on the other hand, came second in Elazig, Erzurum, Igdır and Kilis (see map 2).

• The AK Party came third and, hence, is not amongst the top two parties in Igdir and Tunceli. The HDP was not among the top three parties in Elazig, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis and Malatya (see map 3).

• In the cities of Erzincan and Kilis, AK Party won all the seats.
• As for the poorest performances, the HDP could receive only 2.3% of the votes in Kilis while AK Party stayed at 14.7 % in Tunceli.
• Hüda-Par can be seen to be successful compared to other minor ethnic Kurdish parties such as Hak-Par. Hak-Par candidates entered the elections with independent candidates yet its candidates could not exceed several hundred votes. When its independent candidates in Diyarbakir and Batman are also included, Hüda-Par received over 200,000 votes.

This column has addressed only one leg of the 24 June elections, parliamentary elections. If we had analyzed not the parties in the parliamentary elections but in the presidential elections, then the AK Party gets even brighter results. Given that Erdogan received more votes than his party whereas Demirtas below his party’s vote, the presidential elections in the region are much better off for the AK Party.

The other findings of the election results are as follows and will be analyzed in the upcoming column:

• The HDP has continued losing vote rates in the region as it was the case in the latest general elections of November, 2015.
• Pre-electoral alliances of other parties cost seats to the HDP.

Eastern Turkey includes a multiplicity of ethnic groups. Other than ethnic identification, political salience of ethnicity also differs across cities in Eastern Turkey. Hence, Turkey’s Kurdish (and non-Kurdish) votes do not act as a block but intra-Kurdish differences prevail in the region.

After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.