MIT Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/tag/mit/ Wed, 06 Sep 2023 13:31:36 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, the PKK, and Turkish Elections https://politicstoday.org/turkey-national-intelligence-organization-mit-pkk-elections/ Fri, 05 May 2023 09:25:58 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/turkey-national-intelligence-organization-mit-pkk-elections/

Why is the PKK leadership burnt out despite the US patronage in Syria? The answer is Turkey's counterterrorism doctrine and the operations conducted by Turkey's National Intelligence Organization.

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s Turkey approaches its 2023 national elections, the political parties are campaigning both under their alliances and striving to emerge victorious on their own behalf. The great struggle for both the presidential and parliamentary elections is palpable. In what can be described as a normal process up to this point, an issue that has raised eyebrows is the engagement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance with the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) and the Green Left Party (YSP), which was formed as a backup party for the HDP.

It is noteworthy that after various negotiations with Kılıçdaroğlu, the HDP/YSP, the legal extension of the PKK/KCK, decided not to field its own candidate and showed support to Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy. Moreover, an adjunct development is the PKK/KCK terrorist organization’s all-out commitment to the election process: a terrorist organization, which by its very nature should be kept away from any legitimate political process, has begun to conduct a political campaign.

The organization’s top leaders have been issuing statements almost every day, propagandizing that President Erdoğan must be toppled. From Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan, and Mustafa Karasu to Duran Kalkan, Remzi Kartal, Helin Ümit, and Sabri Ok there is almost no leader of the organization who has not issued a statement.

In fact, immediately after the earthquake, the PKK/KCK made a declaration of non-conflict until the elections. In the declaration, PKK co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union Besê Hozat emphasized that the May 14 elections were unlike any other elections. She stated that she supported the HDP’s decision not to field a candidate in favor of Kılıçdaroğlu and announced that the organization had stopped “military actions’’ until the end of the elections. According to Hozat, “If a strong struggle is waged together in the election process, this fascist government will be overthrown on May 14.” Later, similar statements from the so-called leadership cadres followed.

Read: The Lion Tattoo on Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s Back and Turkey’s Elections

Duran Kalkan’s statements, which appeared in the press on April 18 and were especially striking, elucidated the PKK/KCK’s related course of action. Kalkan stated, “Erdoğan mobilized the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to kill us. They have announced our names on a list, and no one says a word. We are under attack everywhere: the media, defense areas, in the tunnels in Bakur. We are being killed in Qandil, in Shengal, in Rojava. He kills every day. No one says a word. They have created lists about our leadership. Red list, yellow list, green list, grey list, that is, they put 30 or 40 names on each list. They put pictures. These are not wanted lists; it is a list of those who will be killed publicly.” His statement revealed how the PKK/KCK is under pressure, how the leading cadres have become unable to act and manage the organization, and clearly painted a picture of the PKK’s exhaustion.

The rise of the MIT in the eradication of the PKK

So why is the so-called leadership of the organization burnt out despite the U.S. patronage in Syria, the support of Iran, Hashd Al-Shaabi, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, and all the aid provided by European countries and Israel? The answer is Turkey’s counterterrorism doctrine and the MIT’s operation against the organization. In the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey changed its paradigm with a new security doctrine and adopted a proactive approach in the fight against PKK terrorism, seeking to eliminate the terrorist organization through military and point operations.

One of the most important pillars of this doctrine is undoubtedly the MIT. Especially after the July 15 coup attempt, there have been significant developments in the organization’s capabilities: the MIT, whose human capital and technical capabilities have significantly increased, started to assume important roles in carrying out pivotal operations both within Turkey and across the border in Iraq and Syria, such as Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation Peace Spring.

Read: Why Does the Turkish Left Adore the PKK?

Under the leadership of Hakan Fidan, the organization, which has renewed itself in the face of changing world conditions and security threats, increased its effectiveness by expanding its legal infrastructure, technical, cyber, and human capacity. It has also accomplished great tasks in the context of identifying and neutralizing senior figures of the PKK terrorist organization. Kalkan’s statement that “we [the PKK] are being targeted in all regions, we are being killed,” in fact refers to the MIT’s effective strategy known as “decapitation”—the process of neutralizing the organization’s leadership cadre.

The MIT started to carry out very important operations against the PKK and its subcomponents in Syria and Iraq. While the organization’s leadership cadres were purged and the organization’s command-and-control structure was weakened, the move also aimed to collapse morale and motivation. These aims were met with great success. Since 2016, more than 500 names, including key PKK/KCK central executive committee members from Diyar Garip, a member of the so-called presidency and executive council of the PKK to Sinjar commanders such as Mam Zeki Şengallı have been neutralized in Iraq and Syria thanks to MIT operation units.

Some operations were carried out hundreds of kilometers away from the Turkish borders. These operations, in which UCAVs are used effectively, are managed by agents in the field. While Turkey conducts conventional military operations, the MIT, whose capabilities have been improved in every sense and which has gained a new strategic mission, eliminates elements threatening Turkey’s national security through simultaneous operations. The MIT has become a rising organization in the global context and a very important multiplier for Turkey, reaching a capacity enjoyed only by a few intelligence agencies in the world.

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The PKK’s weakening position and Kılıçdaroğlu

The PKK/KCK leadership is burnt out and has largely lost its ability to act within the above framework. It is now focused on targeting the political will led by Erdoğan rather than achieving results through terrorism, thinking that it can escape its predicament with the change of the current government. This is the motive behind the PKK’s decision to be inactive and its systematic statements during the election process. The leadership has instrumentalized its structures such as the HDP and YSP in the legal field to prevent Erdoğan from coming back to power at any cost and, in this way, it hopes to prevent the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the MIT, and other security bureaucracies from continuing their current successful work.

Unfortunately, the position of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his staff has vicariously allowed this idea to emerge. While the PKK’s leadership cadres are being purged one by one and the organization is being rendered unable to carry out any action in Turkey and is under great pressure in Iraq and Syria, taking steps to revive the organization would be a betrayal of Turkey’s future.

The post Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, the PKK, and Turkish Elections appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The Killing of DAESH Leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi by Turkey’s Intelligence Explained https://politicstoday.org/killing-isis-daesh-leader-alqurashi-turkey-intelligence-syria/ Thu, 04 May 2023 06:41:18 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/killing-isis-daesh-leader-alqurashi-turkey-intelligence-syria/

The aim of the Turkish intelligence's operation was to capture Abu Hussein Qurashi, the leader of Daesh, alive.

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ho was the leader of DAESH, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi? What path did DAESH follow after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? What are the details of the MIT operation? Why are all DAESH leaders nuteralized in Syria? What is MIT’s operational capacity and what are its implications?

Who was the leader of DAESH, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi?

If we take the declaration of DAESH as a milestone, Abu Hussein al-Qurashi is the fourth leader of this terrorist organization. After the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on October 26, 2019, the second leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was neutralized in February 2022 and the subsequent leader Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was neutralized in October 2022, again by U.S.-backed operations. The last DAESH leader was neutralized by Turkey with a special team of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT).

There is no detailed information on DAESH leaders after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As a matter of fact, there is no data even on the real name of Abu Hussein. However, according to a report by Anadolu Agency, he joined the organization in 2013 and rapidly rose in the ranks. This may be a clue that the younger generation in DAESH is more ambitious and proactive.

What path did DAESH follow after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

On October 26, 2019, with the neutralization of DAESH leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the decline of DAESH, especially in Iraq and Syria, commenced. Although succeeding leaders tried to preserve the terrorist organization’s operational capacity, by 2019, it was long gone. With the killing of Abu al-Hassan in 2022, three DAESH leaders were neutralized within fifteen months. Although DAESH tried to carry out a restructuring process as it had done in the past (2010-2013), it has seemingly failed to do so.

In addition, not only the terrorist organization’s leadership but also its senior figures have been captured or neutralized. Despite these developments, the failure to rehabilitate the families and children of DAESH members, particularly in al-Hol Camp, and the refusal of their countries of citizenship to repatriate them have fostered the potential to create a new generation of DAESH members. Indeed, numerous local and international reports indicate a DAESH presence in these camps, especially in terms of ideological diffusion.

Read: DAESH: Documenting a Modern Heresy, Interview with Belkıs Kılıçkaya

What are the details of the MIT operation?

It is known that the operation against Abu Hussein, the third leader to be neutralized after Baghdadi, was carried out on April 29. The public, both in Turkey and the world, was made aware of the operation by President Erdoğan’s statement on April 30. Afterwards, the details of the operation were shared through Anadolu Agency. It is reported that the operation against Abu Hussein lasted four hours and a call for surrender was made. It is understood that the operation was launched upon intelligence that Abu Hussein, who was in a building in the Afrin/Jindires region, was going to relocate.

The aim of the operation was to capture the terrorist organization leader alive. Examining the footage of the building where the operation was carried out, it is obvious that it was not subjected to aerial bombardment. The fact that the operation lasted four hours is proof that the MIT went to great lengths to capture Abu Hussein alive. It was also reported that Abu Hussein blew himself up to avoid capture. The previous leaders of DAESH, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Ibrahim also blew themselves up with suicide vests. It is understood that this has become a common practice within the terrorist organization.

Why are all DAESH leaders neutralized in Syria?

It is a remarkable statistic that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and all subsequent leaders of DAESH have been killed in Syria. As is known, although DAESH is an Iraq-based terrorist organization, since 2012-2013, it has spread to Syria where it has taken root, especially in terms of its leadership. What is more, except for Abu al-Hassan, who was neutralized in Daraa in the south, all the other leaders were neutralized in northern Syria. This indicates that DAESH elements think that they can camouflage themselves more easily in the liberated regions.

Indeed, these regions have been the epicenter of chaos and war for years. However, the facts that the borders have not changed since 2020 and that the war has continued as frontline clashes have allowed local security elements and the MIT to turn their attention to targeted killings. As a matter of fact, in recent years, the MIT has carried out many counterterrorist targeted killing.

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What is the MIT’s operational capacity and what are its implications?

The MIT’s neutralization of Abu Hussein is not widely discussed among the public, especially with Turkey approaching election day; however, it is certainly a sensational achievement. The last three DAESH leaders were killed by the U.S. with its decades of experience in the field, and this last neutralization showcases the MIT’s emergence on this stage and demonstrates its rapid progress. In addition to the MIT’s success against the PKK’s leadership cadre, especially in Iraq and Syria, the neutralization of Abu Hussein has made its targeted killing even more visible. The increasing number of unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) operations in Syria, especially after 2021, not only demonstrate the MIT’s operational capacity, but also its increasing dominance in Syria. The neutralization of Abu Hussein was a sign of this development.

The MIT’s success stories against terrorist organizations ranging from FETÖ to the PKK/YPG and DAESH are, in fact, among Turkey’s greatest institutional achievements. The MIT’s ability to capture terrorists from abroad, rescue hostages in Somalia, its contributions in Azerbaijan and Libya, and its neutralization of high-level terrorists in Iraq and Syria through targeted killing demonstrate its operational success. With the attention it has received from the international press, it is also evident that the MIT, like other intelligence services, has entered a process of international branding.

The post The Killing of DAESH Leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi by Turkey’s Intelligence Explained appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> To Whom It May Concern: Turkey’s Counter-Spy Operations Send Messages https://politicstoday.org/to-whom-it-may-concern-turkeys-counter-spy-operations-send-messages/ Thu, 18 Nov 2021 10:42:30 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/to-whom-it-may-concern-turkeys-counter-spy-operations-send-messages/

MIT counter-espionage activities against Iranian, Israeli, and Russian intelligence services were deliberately revealed to the public.

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Recently, successive counter-espionage operations conducted by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) have become widespread public knowledge. Let’s recall these operations briefly: MIT exposed a Russian espionage network of six people on October 21, 2021, who were planning to provide critical information about Turkey to Russia and to carry out assassinations on Turkish soil.

On September 24, 2021 MIT disclosed the Iranian secret service’s attempt to kidnap an Iranian pilot via a counteroperation. Most recently, on October 7, 2021, MIT unmasked a network of 15 people operating under Israel’s secret service, Mossad, who were gathering information about Palestinian and international students in Turkey.

Since the Turkish public is not accustomed to the disclosure of such espionage activities, MIT’s successive operations surprised many. In fact, MIT has been conducting such operations for years to detect possible espionage activities by foreign intelligence services in Turkey through its counter-espionage departments.

Read: NSO’s Pegasus Scandal Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg of Israeli Spyware

Generally, MIT’s custom was not to reveal such counter-espionage operations publicly as long as they didn’t pose a serious, direct treat to Turkish interests. In such cases, issues are resolved when the intelligence services of the states involved, with the permission of the related political authorities, resort to secret bargaining and barter agreements.

MIT counter-espionage activities against Iranian, Israeli, and Russian intelligence services were deliberately revealed to the public.

However, this time, it is different, and three MIT counter-espionage activities against Iranian, Israeli, and Russian intelligence services were deliberately revealed to the public. To understand why MIT publicized the details of the recent operations, it is necessary to look at the course of relations with Iran, Israel, and Russia, and to analyze each case separately.

There is a serious disagreement between Turkey and Russia over Syria. Russia accuses Turkey of not giving enough support to end the alleged presence of jihadist groups in Idlib. On the other hand, Turkey premises its desire to launch a new military operation against the YPG terror group in northern Syria as part of its counterterrorism strategy – an argument that has yet to convince Russia.

Read: Facebook’s Lawsuit against Israeli Spy Firm NSO Reveals Its Dirty Work

It is rumored that a consensus between Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not be reached at the summit held in Sochi last October. Moreover, in the past month, terrorist attacks from Russian-controlled parts of Syria targeted Turkish troops. When evaluated altogether, the MIT’s revealing of a counter-spying operation against Russian intelligence can be read as a message to Russia.

Details of the MIT’s operation against the Iranian intelligence tell another story.

Details of the MIT’s operation against the Iranian intelligence tell another story. Iran violated Turkey’s sovereignty by trying to kidnap a regime opponent in complete disregard of international law. For example, Iranian opposition Habib Chaab was allegedly kidnapped in Turkey by Iranian intelligence in 2020. Indeed, the Iranian intelligence service’s kidnapping and assassination attempts against regime opponents are nothing new.

The Turkish public, too, is well aware of MIT’s counter-espionage operations against Iranian intelligence cells. Yet, for Turkey, this is unacceptable and therefore, by unveiling the Iranian intelligence service’s espionage activities and making several arrests of Iranian agents, MIT sent messages to both the Turkish and Iranian publics. It also sent a clear message to the Iranian government that “we will never allow espionage acts in Turkey and follow each possible situation with determination.”

One of the last MIT operations in Turkey against Mossad, the Israeli intelligence, carries its messages as well. The Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated since the Davos Economic Summit in 2009 when then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan interrupted Israel’s president Shimon Perez, criticizing Israel’s killing of Palestinian children on the beaches of Gaza.

This crisis deepened with the Israeli army’s intervention against the Mavi Marmara aid ship en route to Gaza in 2010 in international waters, an incident that resulted in the death of 11 Turkish nationals and which drew international condemnation. In the aftermath, Turkish-Israeli relations followed a tense course, culminating in Israel’s aggression over Jerusalem and the Israeli-Greek rapprochement in the Eastern Mediterranean. There have been some contacts recently to soften the tense relationship, but they have not developed into a rapprochement.

For example, it is rumored that Hakan Fidan, the MIT director, visited Israel in November or October 2020 and held covert talks as part of his intelligence diplomacy. According to a public statement by Turkey’s Directorate of Communications in July 2021, President Erdoğan held a phone conversation with Israeli President Yitzak Herzog, in which he said, “Despite all differences of opinion, we attach importance to the continuation of contact and dialogue.”

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It is clear that both Israel and Turkey have a common interest to improve bilateral relations. Then, the question is why there is Israeli espionage activity against Turkey despite the positive atmosphere. The answer is on a postcard: the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government’s sensitivity to the Palestinian issue.

Information was made public to the media that a 15-people-strong network, connected with the Israeli intelligence, was collecting intelligence about Palestinian students in Turkey.

Information was made public to the media that a 15-people-strong network, connected with the Israeli intelligence, was collecting intelligence about Palestinian students in Turkey. The people who were targeted by the Israeli intelligence may be in contact with other Palestinian groups that expose Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. Mossad is probably gathering information about Palestinian students living abroad in coordination with the Shin Bet, the Israeli domestic intelligence service. As known, the Shin Bet closely follows the activities of Palestinians, especially those who are politically active.

The question is still there. Why does Israel carry out espionage activity despite recent constructive moves between the two countries? Turkey and Israel may want to normalize relations and negotiate under which conditions this normalization could take place. Certainly, the covert meetings held by Fidan in Israel took place in line with this approach. However, with going public with Israel’s espionage activities on Turkish soil, Ankara is sending the message that the country is both in favor of reducing tensions but remains sensitive in regard to Palestine. Turkey is also asserting that it will not allow any espionage operations on its soil.

VIDEO: Why is Turkey a hub for global intelligence agencies?

The new spy crisis between Israel and Turkey is about an Israeli couple arrested for photographing the president’s residence in Istanbul on November 11, 2021, with local authorities saying they suspected them of espionage. It is too early to make a comment on the details of this possible espionage case as no clear statement has been made to the media regarding the details.

Following Turkish intelligence and security circles pursuing of the investigation, the couple were released on November 18, 2021. One can assume that the Israeli couple’s electronic devices such as mobile phones, laptops, and cameras have been analyzed in depth by Turkish cybersecurity experts. When these processes have been completed, the case will become clear.

All these operations demonstrate MIT’s counter-espionage capacity. The operations also prove that MIT’s young and qualified officers along with their senior executives contribute considerably to Turkish foreign policy.

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]]> FETO and its Role in Stoking the Kurdish Issue https://politicstoday.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/ Mon, 21 Aug 2017 06:37:55 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/feto-and-its-role-in-stoking-the-kurdish-issue/

How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people's objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır.

The post FETO and its Role in Stoking the Kurdish Issue appeared first on Politics Today.

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The Turkish government had commenced to negotiate with the PKK in order to resolve the most prominent issue that it inherited since the very first years of the Republic: the “Kurdish issue”. As a result of Erdoğan’s initiative in 2009, negotiations between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the PKK started. After a while, transcripts of proceedings between MIT and the PKK in Oslo were published in a daily. At the time, nobody knew that these were leaked by FETO, which had infiltrated the state and established a parallel structure over 40 years. Only two things were known about this organization then: firstly, it was a religious congregation with a significant financial power that opened schools all around the world and possessed multiple media outlets and business associations. Secondly, they had racist tendencies towards Kurds that were made apparent by their media outlets and speeches by Fetullah Gülen.

Known for being comparatively more sensitive towards Islam than western parts of Turkey, not many in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions really liked Gülen’s congregation due to their racist tendencies. Moreover, the majority of Kurds who still preserved the medrese and dergah traditions (traditional educational and religious institutions) inherited from the Ottomans didn’t perceive the said congregation as “religious” and didn’t find its leader’s residence in the US ordinary. Even though FETO infiltrated the bureaucracy, military and universities in the region, they were only able to gain a few followers among the people.

On February 7, 2012, during the early hours of the day, a news flash: Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya who was conducting an investigation into the PKK-linked KCK organization, requested MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to come to the courthouse on Thursday. I have to repeat this as it isn’t a situation that could be comprehended at the first. Try to think of this event occurring in the UK. The then Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government initiates a reconciliation and peace process and a prosecutor in Istanbul calls the head of MIT to the courthouse as a suspect!

http://thenewturkey.org/fetos-civil-administrators-and-their-trips-abroad-before-the-coup-attempt/

Istanbul’s Specially Authorized Prosecutor Sadrettin Sarıkaya personally called MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former Undersecretary Emre Taner, former Deputy Undersecretary Afet Güneş and two other former MIT employees and demanded they give statements as a part of the KCK investigations. The prosecutor was accusing Fidan and his colleagues of having committed a crime for being part of the negotiations with the PKK in Oslo. There was another interesting situation. On the same day, the Prime Minister was in Istanbul to undergo a medical operation, which the public did not know about. However, due to security concerns, the time of the operation was changed. For this reason, when Hakan Fidan called the Prime Minister he was able to talk with him. Erdoğan sensed something foul about the situation and told Fidan not to go to the courthouse and give a statement. Even though Erdoğan said on TV after the incident, “They would first arrest the head of MIT and then me. I had authorized the head of MIT. So, they should personally call me to the courthouse”, nobody – with the exception of those who were interested in the Kurdish issue – cared much about this statement. It was widely known that the prosecutor was close to FETO. However, the incident was perceived by many as the group’s exaggerated sensitivity towards the Kurdish issue rather than a Gülenist attack on Erdoğan and the state.

The Gezi Park incidents in June 2013 followed this event. The protests were initially started by people whose concerns were environmental and who objected to a construction project that was to take place in a park in Taksim. Yet, it didn’t stay as a protest by environmentalists. After a little while Kemalists, later joined by the Alevis, joined the protests alleging that “their lifestyle was under threat.” It became apparent that FETO had a finger in this incident. Gülen and his organization tried to provoke the protesters with their associates within the police force through the use of violence. Zekeriya Öz, a fugitive Gülenist and a former prosecutor, tweeted the following on this subject: “If the PKK had participated in the Gezi Park protests, those who are governing now wouldn’t be in their seats. I don’t know who ordered them, but the PKK didn’t join.”

There were other prominent Gülenists that were trying to spark new conflicts by provoking the protesters that were completely organized over social media. For instance, a renowned Gülenist fugitive Emre Uslu, who now lives in the US, tweeted that PKK militants turned a car over which had female passengers with headscarves in Maltepe, Istanbul (however, such an event didn’t transpire). Efforts to evolve street protests into a civil war through constant provocations were apparent. While Gülen’s media outlets openly supported the Gezi Park protests, the Gülenists changed their tune towards the end when a group in İzmir vandalized their school. Participating in the Gezi Park protests with various reasons and motives, the majority of the youth seemed unaware of this effort to exploit the situation.

We started to hear that a new wave of street protests similar to the Gezi Park protests were to take place in November. These could’ve been just a rumor, of course. Still, I had heard this from an academic who lived in the US and from a journalist that had ties with FETO. The Gülenist journalist had said “I don’t know if 10 or 15 soldiers will be killed, but something will happen and Erdoğan will go.”

6 months after the Gezi Park protests, on January 9, 2013, three women including Sakine Cansız, who was one of the founders of the PKK and who supported the peace process, were killed at the Kurdish Information Bureau in Paris. These killings took place right after the government announced that they were negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan for the resolution of the Kurdish issue. This incident pitted the two sides against each other. It was a sensitive and fragile issue as after all there were negotiations with a terrorist organization and the Turkish public’s top enemy Abdullah Öcalan. The person who was caught by French security forces had a trace of gunpowder on his coat. His name was announced as Ömer Güney. According to the information gathered from the French security forces, Güney was close with the terrorist organization to an extent that he could be deemed a PKK sympathizer. This information consolidated the theories that it was an intra-organizational execution. There was great outrage and this outrage poured onto the street. The funeral of Cansiz in Diyarbakır was attended by tens of thousands of people.

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Eleven months after the murder, the December 17-25 operation that was conducted by the Gülenists within the judiciary, security forces and media aiming to depose the government with the accusation that it was corrupt took place. For the first time, regardless of their political views, all witnessed and became aware of the intimidating operational capacity of FETO. During those days, Gülenist media outlets started to spread disinformation that MIT was responsible for the murder in Paris. Moreover, they alleged that Ömer Güney was actually a member of MIT. Yet, almost nobody cared about this subject as there were more pressing issues present.

In January 2014, PKK-affiliate KCK stated that the murder of the three women was carried out by FETO’s members within the state and that Ömer Güney was actively engaged with Gülenists. Ömer Güney, who was to be tried after a two-year long investigation by the Paris Prosecutor’s Office, was taken to a hospital for an ailment in his brain. In January, just one month before his trial, he died. It was later discovered that Ömer Güney was visited by three individuals from Turkey and that those individuals were FETO members.

Then, the terrible event known as the Kobane incident took place. Using Daesh’s attack on Kobane and the alleged inaction by Turkey as excuses, the leader of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş and his colleagues called for countrywide streets protests on October 7. I said to myself “this must be the second Gezi Park protest that was being discussed.” Protesters built barricades and engaged with the security forces. 50 died and 682, 139 of them police officers, were wounded. 1,113 buildings, including 25 district governor offices, 67 police headquarters and 29 political party offices, were damaged.

One of FETO’s media outlets, Zaman Daily’s Editor-in-Chief Ekrem Dumanlı visiting Diyarbakır’s Mayor Gülten Kışanak and their open support for HDP while the aforementioned events were taking place were intriguing. When news of the visits by HDP deputy Ahmet Türk and former HDP deputy Nazmi Gür’s paid to Fetullah Gülen in 2014 in Pennsylvania was heard, it astonished many. There were many news pieces on FETO providing intelligence to the PKK and deciphering the code names of state operatives within the PKK. How the PKK dug trenches in many cities, especially in Diyarbakır, in order to start a war despite the people’s objections was made clear after the July 15 coup attempt. The FETO-member military officers and pilots bombed the Parliament with F-16s that flew from Diyarbakır. FETO militants did whatever they could to both provoke the public and enable the PKK.

Two years after these events two HDP deputies, one of them in prison, made two statements. These two statements are unprecedented, considering HDP’s disposition in the last two years. In his interview with journalist Ruşen Çakır, HDP deputy Sırrı Süreyya Önder said the following: “October 6-8 Kobane events might have never taken place, because the ‘prevalent state perspective’ [AK Party] was foreseeing solidarity with Kobane. I will be extremely clear about this; the said solidarity was obstructed by FETO-affiliated generals whose roles in the July 15 coup attempt is apparent. They put an extreme pressure on Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Now, generals who commanded the units in Sur, Nusaybin and Cizre are being tried as the perpetrators of the coup attempt. I have seen how these generals obstructed the solidarity between Turkey and Kobane-Rojava.”

Accused of “being a member of a terrorist organization,” “inciting to commit crime” and “inciting the public to unlawful meeting and demonstration,” HDP deputy Ayhan Bilgen made a similar statement very recently during the session of his trial at Diyarbakır 5th Heavy Penal Court:

“October 6-8 was a demonstration of a civil war in this country. Who incited these conflicts must be investigated thoroughly. It should be investigated whether these were the same people who wanted to depose the elected government on July 15.”

The fog of war is slowly fading, yet unfortunately it isn’t possible to talk about a social base that would support the reiteration of a peace process, not in the short-term. FETO is an important component of this issue and so is the PKK. How these two terrorist organizations came together after years and their role in all that transpired must also be taken into account.

The post FETO and its Role in Stoking the Kurdish Issue appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The Rise and Fall of FETO in Turkish Politics https://politicstoday.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/ Thu, 27 Jul 2017 09:00:53 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

FETO, a religious criminal cult and led by the US based cleric Fetullah Gülen, is a bizarre political phenomenon. It is ostensibly a religious community located in civil society, yet in reality it is a shady and aggressive organization whose activities and political ambitions can easily be branded as terroristic. It has a definitely Janus-faced structure, which can only be grasped by understanding the context of secular authoritarianism in Turkey. Indeed, FETO has found fertile ground to blossom within a social order where democratic politics had been precluded.

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FETO, a religious criminal cult and led by the US based cleric Fetullah Gülen, is a bizarre political phenomenon. It is ostensibly a religious community located in civil society, yet in reality it is a shady and aggressive organization whose activities and political ambitions can easily be branded as terroristic. It has a definitely Janus-faced structure, which can only be grasped by understanding the context of secular authoritarianism in Turkey. Indeed, FETO has found fertile ground to blossom within a social order where democratic politics had been precluded.

The collapse of an ancient Ottoman regime and traditional socio-political structures in the 1920s precipitated a feeling of identity loss in Turkish society. This trauma was exacerbated with the establishment of an oppressive secular authoritarian regime in the following decades. More specifically, the erection of republican regime in 1923 was to bring a radical change in the symbolic order of the society. The break with the old order created a political situation within which both a democratic and an authoritarian order could take hold.

A democratic regime refers to a political order within which the place of power is kept indefinite and open, which means that power is open to all political actors and none of them can occupy it forever. An authoritarian regime, on the other hand, comprises the closure of the place of power to societal opposition and identifying it with a quasi-transcendental ideological content. This cancels out the contingent nature of power, thus renders democracy obsolete.

The young Turkish Republic took the latter path. The secular bureaucratic elite monopolized power in their hands by pushing aside the political opposition and identify the place of power with secular-nationalist ideology. This authoritarian political order formed around single-party rule with no popular elections. Besides, the bureaucratic elite by deploying the state’s enormous power embarked on a systematic policy of “purifying” the society in line with its secular-nationalist ideology.

The Democratic and Authoritarian Options

In the face of this authoritarian turn, society has reacted in two alternative yet competing forms of political struggle. One of these has taken the path of forcing the authoritarian regime to democratize by dislocating the bureaucratic elite from the state apparatus. This has served to empty the place of power by consolidating and enlarging the sphere of democratic politics, where agonistic political actors can compete freely, vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

The Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Motherland Party in the 1980s, the Welfare Party in the 1990s and lastly the AK Party in the 2000s have walked thorough this path and struggled to restore the democratic republican ideals of 1923. This democratic option has evolved in three steps. First of all, it has sought to establish and sustain a multi-party political system with free elections. This was achieved in 1950 and despite intermittent suspensions it has been maintained since. Secondly, it has strived to roll back the civil and military bureaucracy’s influence in the political system through democratic reforms. This took place in the 2000s. Lastly, it has struggled to institutionalize a governmental system that assured to materialize the democratic republican ideals. This was carried out in April 2017.

The other strand of political struggle has parted significantly from the democratic option in terms of its ways and political objectives. It has mainly sought to conquer the state from within by infiltrating it thorough various channels. Its course of action has followed the objective of controlling critical state institutions, expanding aggressively in the sphere of civil society and infiltrating into political parties by using whatever means necessary. Thus, its main objective is to replace the secular authoritarianism with a seemingly more society-friendly and conservative one. Instead of keeping the place of power empty, this obscurantist form of politics tends to fill it with other content and block the opposition.

FETO represents this authoritarian option. It has taken advantage of alienation and the widening gap between a relatively conservative society and the oppressive secular regime. It has considerably succeeded in channeling society’s energy and frustration against the authoritarian state. Moreover, society’s resentment has escalated after each incident of military and civil bureaucratic intervention in democratic politics in the second half of the twentieth century. These interventions have weakened some segments of society’s backing for the democratic option in its struggle to bring the oppressive regime down and geared them to shift their loyalty to FETO’s authoritarian option.

Exploiting the Democratization Process

The 2000s witnessed an extensive democratization process. It extended political and cultural rights and freedoms to the ostracized sections of society. It achieved democratization in civil-military relations. It enhanced economic and cultural equality to a degree and thereby boosted the standards of political participation. All these boiled down to the dislocation of secular bureaucratic actors and secular-nationalist ideology from the state.

This was a critical development for Turkish democracy. At last, the essential criterion of a democratic regime was in place: the place of power has grown empty. Yet the occurring vacuum in this transition posed a great danger for it would be abused by political forces that had no respect for democracy. This was what happened in Turkey in the 2000s. FETO took advantage of the displacement of secular-nationalist actors from the state apparatus. Thus, the 2000s testified to two synchronized and opposing developments. The AK Party-led democratic bloc struggled to democratize the political system in the face of the secular-nationalist status quo whereas FETO accelerated its policy of infiltration and invasion of the state institutions and capturing control of civil society.

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Since the struggle between the democratic bloc and the secularist status quo lay at the center of political struggle and FETO’s capability of manipulation through its vast sources of media outlets and control of the intelligence, FETO’s invasion of the state went unnoticed by both the AK Party and the larger public, or not taken seriously enough till the threat it posed to Turkish democracy reached a critical stage. Indeed, FETO, a religious criminal cult, cloaked its real intention and activities behind a discourse of democracy, peace and dialogue and skillfully presented itself as a benevolent force.

FETO’s Path to the Coup

2010 marked a turning point in Turkish politics. From the 1950s onwards Turkish politics had been determined by a polarization between the secular bureaucratic elite and the conservative and liberal social forces. The secularist elite had struggled to sustain the control of the state whereas the conservative social forces had strived to democratize the political system. Nevertheless, after 2010, the conflict between two conservative social forces, the AK Party and FETO, became the defining feature of Turkish politics.

FETO, which had struggled for almost four decades to get hold of the state, now found itself in a situation where the AK Party blocked its long-term political objectives. Controlling the majority of the state apparatus, FETO has endeavored to push the AK Party aside by deploying various discourses and strategies in the period of 2010-2016.

One method was that FETO was at pains to show Turkey has become an authoritarian or “one-man rule” country under the AK Party rule. For example, the discourse of polarization and authoritarianism peaked during the Gezi protests in June 2013. FETO motivated and manipulated this incident to de-legitimize and marginalize the AK Party in both the society’s and the international community’s eyes.

FETO also sought to portray that the AK Party had been involved in terroristic activities by especially alleging that it harbored and supported terrorist groups such as DAESH. It attempted to create an image that Turkey had become a rogue state under AK Party rule. This was meant to bring then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the International Criminal Court. For this aim, FETO-affiliated officers stopped a truck which was owned by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Adana in January 2014. FETO’s media outlets leaked news that it was loaded with weapons that were sent to so-called terrorist groups in Syria.

Moreover, FETO tried to portray the AK Party as a deficient power that failed to rule the country. In order to fuel a psychology of insecurity in society and to alienate the electors from the AK Party before the upcoming local elections in March 2014, FETO-affiliated prosecutors filed lawsuits against the AK Party, accusing some high-ranking party members of organized corruption, in December 2013.

Failing in all these attempts, FETO resorted to military intervention. FETO-affiliated officers attempted to take hold of the government, attacked key security buildings and the Turkish Parliament, and killed 250 people during the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. Yet the coup attempt was foiled by a heroic civilian resistance.

Quo Vadis?

On 20 June 2016, Parliament declared a state of emergency, which has started an extensive purge of FETO members from the state apparatus. It has also dealt a deadly blow to its financial and human resources base. Many FETO members have been jailed or fled the country. This crackdown on FETO has devastated its organizational structure and its morale.

This figures as much a crucial development as the discard of the bureaucratic elite from the place of power for Turkish democracy. The disqualification of two authoritarian options consecutively in the last two decades has prepared a suitable ground for the country’s flourishing democratic regime. Today Turkey opens up a new page in its political history. It needs to restructure the state apparatus and bring its political system in line with democratic norms. The main challenge in front of the AK Party is to lead and complete this historic process.

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]]> How FETO works as an Intelligence Network and Criminal Enterprise https://politicstoday.org/how-feto-works-as-an-intelligence-network-and-criminal-enterprise/ Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:56:56 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/how-feto-works-as-an-intelligence-network-and-criminal-enterprise/

On July 15, 2016, Turkey foiled a military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO), which has infiltrated every sphere of public life in guise of a simple religious congregation for decades. Motivated to seize power in the country, this insurrection was organized by brainwashed FETO operatives who can use every means possible to reach their goals and have neither discernment nor respect for any values.

The post How FETO works as an Intelligence Network and Criminal Enterprise appeared first on Politics Today.

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On July 15, 2016, Turkey foiled a military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Gülen Terror Group (FETO), which has infiltrated every sphere of public life in guise of a simple religious congregation for decades. Motivated to seize power in the country, this insurrection was organized by brainwashed FETO operatives who can use every means possible to reach their goals and have neither discernment nor respect for any values. The FETO cult has been revealed to have a peculiar organizational structure that is unprecedented over the course of the Republican period. On July 15, the Turkish nation was confronted with the most dangerous and shadowy criminal enterprise in its history. Abusing the legitimate means of the state in order to reach their illegal goals and ideals under the protection of global power groups, this cult now poses a threat not only to Turkey, but also to Islam and to the future of the Muslim world.

Along with infiltrating every sphere of life, FETO has also designed and controlled the country’s political life with numerous masterful perception operations that shaped opinions in public and private sector for years. The terror group seized power by manipulating the business world and using intelligence organizations, security-related institutions and the judiciary in line with their own goals and interests. But how could FETO obtain such widespread influence? What kind of tactics and methods did the terror group employ to grow to such an extent? To put it otherwise, how was the groundwork of this deception laid? And most importantly, how could the group’s infiltration activities and coup and chaos plans remain covered for years? How could it be unraveled that FETO is actually a criminal enterprise in guise of a religious congregation?

So far, much has been said with regard to the plotting and deceiving skills of FETO and its leader Fetullah Gülen. FETO’s former attempts to wreak havoc on Turkey include the Roboski sabotage in 2011, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) operation in 2012, the Gezi Park incidents in 2013, the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempt case in 2013, the operations on MIT trucks in Hatay and Adana provinces on Jan. 1 and 19, 2014, and the Kobani uprising on Oct. 6-8, 2014.

The retrospective inquiries conducted in the archives of the judiciary and the security directorate and the confessions of several FETO members following the Dec. 17-25 judicial coup attempts revealed that FETO had developed a chain of ploys to stage a coup as of the year 2008. Having designed and controlled almost all the political movements in the country including the main opposition party, FETO was eventually confronted with the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has constituted the greatest impediment to the terror cult so far. When the chronology of the FETO’s operations and plots are examined in retrospect, this is the first aspect catching the eye in the picture. Also, in the chain of ploys unraveled in the Tawhid-Salaam Jerusalem file that was uncovered subsequently.

In 2009, FETO also influenced the opposition parties. The terror group heavily influenced the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) administration and then intervened in the inner affairs of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to a serious extent. The MHP establishment could recover from FETO’s harm only after the July 15 attempted coup. Nevertheless, FETO could never achieve its goals regarding the AK Party administration. When the group failed to intervene in the AK Party, it planned to topple Erdoğan during his term as prime minister by sabotaging the government’s Syria policy through wiretapping Erdoğan’s meetings at his Dolmabahçe office with former Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (SNCORF) President Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib and Hakan Fidan, the chief of National Intelligence Service (MIT). All their ploys were interrelated and complementary to one another. The ploys eventually upset President Erdoğan but never managed to impact his power or determination. Understanding that they would not achieve their goals with their plots in guise of legal case files, the global deception group FETO executed its ultimate plan on July 15 but failed once again.

Intelligence Repository

The most important feature of FETO that turned the group into a global power is its ability to effectively use the intelligence it obtains in accordance with its own agenda. FETO particularly stands out with its high competence in intelligence and espionage activities. The group managed to organize and form networks at every spot promising power, strategic information or money. By organizing within the civil service, MIT, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the General Directorate of Security, FETO founded a deep intelligence network in the realm of “security bureaucracy.” All the collected data were accumulated in a major intelligence repository. To achieve their goals, FETO used and manipulated the data and documents available in the repository against the persons or groups they wanted to eliminate.

Millions of Wiretapping Cases

FETO’s wiretapping activities across the country reached several million lines. Wiretapping international and national communication traffic of the state administration, the terror cult irrevocably destroyed the data stored in a total of 2,003 computers at police departments in December 2013 and January 2014. The data and servers at the Istanbul Security Directorate were deleted with no possibility of return. Still, some vital data was obtained with regard to the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors endeavoring to justify the illegal wiretappings of FETO, which was motivated by the goal of absolute power. The FETO-linked judges and prosecutors were the key operatives of the terror cult who abused legal means for the sake of the group’s interests.

In the inquiries which began prior to the July 15 and were completed in the aftermath of the coup attempt, it was found that the FETO-linked judges and prosecutors had direct or indirect contacts with other FETO operatives based in the U.S., Spain, Germany, Austria, British Indian Ocean Territory, Sudan and France. More interestingly, it was revealed that the FETO-linked judges and public prosecutors who worked at different units had conversations with the same international telephone numbers. It was also found that some relatives of these judges and prosecutors, who were in charge of Turkey’s most significant investigations over the past 15 years, had economic ties with the business circles now being investigated for financing FETO.

The terror group has a colossal archive which includes technical surveillance and wiretapping records acquired with advanced devices, illegal recordings of public personnel, and information on the students affiliated with the group, including their families. This archive partakes of the group’s memory, encompassing data on each spot inside and outside the country where the terror group has been active. The data recorded by every operative with regard to their own unit are much more profound and detailed than the data found in most intelligence agencies. The comprehensiveness of their archive stems from the fact that each FETÖ member has operated as an intelligence agent.

Liquidation and Occupation

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FETO liquidated the targeted persons or groups through a three-phased strategy that has used the personal information available in the intelligence and archive records.

In the first phase, intelligence was collected about the person to be liquidated. The data regarding the targeted person or group was conveyed to the writers holding sway over public opinion and then announced to masses that was merely an allegation.

The second phase was employed after these allegations had a broad repercussion through the journalists affiliated with FETO in the mainstream media. The allegations became controversial topics across the country by means of the reports released by certain media outlets, such as the daily newspapers Taraf, Zaman, Bugün and the TV station Kanaltürk.

In the final phase, some operations to manipulate and shape opinions were made through social media and press organs with an aim to “spur anti-government sentiments,” “mobilize the masses” and “undermine state institutions and bureaucracy.” In the summons issued for intelligence chief Hakan Fidan on Feb. 7, 2012, and in the Dec. 17-25 process, professionally executed strategies were pursued to overthrow the government with these methods.

FETO has innumerable illegal methods to use against its targets, which vary according to the targeted person’s profession, family life, personal weaknesses or social status. The group tried to economically damage its self-employed targets in a way contradicting the free competition conditions in the market or had them audited on various pretexts by its members who had infiltrated the civil service. FETÖ exerted pressure on its targets mainly through its disciples in the civil service.

Some of their methods can be listed as follows:

1- Sending anonymous letters or e-mails regarding the personal or professional life of the targeted person which contain aspersions on the person to discredit them before the public or the institution they work for. Opening civil or penal lawsuits against the persons, imprisoning them based on the aspersions, defaming them in their personal, social or professional life, impeding their appointment or promotion, disrupting their family order, etc.

2- Asserting various claims against the targeted institution or its administrators and employees via internet by using various servers that hide the claimer’s identity. Releasing footage or tapes of the targeted persons which pry into their private life and cannot be verified. Announcing such leaks to the larger masses through their legal offshoots who give credit to the relevant website.

3- Announcing doctored digital data to public that is obtained with illegal methods through the medium of FETO offshoots in security units or strategic institutions.

4- The targeted person is forced either to pay large amounts of “himmet”, the word referring to donations to Gülen charities, or fulfill another demand compelled by FETÖ with threats and blackmail such as releasing digital data on their private life or ostracizing them from their professions by filing a penal or civil lawsuit against them.

All these practices demonstrate that FETO is a terror group which has become organized in civil society for years, infiltrated key state institutions by using different guises and has operated like an intelligence organization connected to international power groups. This is the structure of the terror cult Turkey has been fighting against.

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]]> The Status of the July 15 Coup Trials https://politicstoday.org/the-status-of-the-july-15-coup-trials/ Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:49:36 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-status-of-the-july-15-coup-trials/

Conducted by the Ankara 17th Heavy Penal Court and known to the public as "the July 15 coup attempt lawsuit" or "General Staff main lawsuit", the first hearing of the case commenced on May 22.

The post The Status of the July 15 Coup Trials appeared first on Politics Today.

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Conducted by the Ankara 17th Heavy Penal Court and known to the public as “the July 15 coup attempt lawsuit” or “General Staff main lawsuit”, the first hearing of the case commenced on May 22. Defendants’ defenses are being heard in subsequent sessions. Similarly, “the main coup trials” were commenced in Istanbul on May 29. As the defense was covered by the media, Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar submitted a statement to the Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission, and the National Intelligence Organization’s (MİT) revealed the July 15 Coup Report to the public, making it the hottest topic of June.

Meanwhile, Parliament’s Coup Inquiry Commission also revealed its report and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) prepared a 300 page long comment on the said report. While the CHP doesn’t clearly contest the idea that the coup was perpetrated by FETÖ, the main opposition party continued to allege that “the July 15 coup attempt was a foreseen, but an unavoidable coup that was controlled for an outcome.” Considering that the trials are at full throttle and the anniversary of the coup is drawing closer, it could easily be said that these discussions will become increasingly heated.

The Fight against FETÖ/PDY after July 15

Before talking about the course of cases and the prominent parts of indictments and defenses, it would be more beneficial to provide some information about the judiciary’s fight against FETÖ/PDY and the July 15 coup attempt. Firstly, it should be noted that the judicial process and trials against FETÖ/PDY had commenced prior to July 15. A day before the coup attempt, the joint indictment was completed and was accepted by the Ankara Heavy Penal Court. Moreover, new cases against FETÖ/PDY were opened in almost all cities and districts of Turkey.

Although the figures change by the day, according to the statement of Minister of Justice Bekir Bozdağ, today more than 160,000 people are part of these trials; 50,402 of them have been arrested, while 47,136 people were released under judicial control. 7,963 people were first detained and later were released. Civil servants like judges, prosecutors, military personnel and police officers constitute the majority of those who are arrested.

Besides these court cases against FETÖ, there are numerous cases and inquiries directly concerning the July 15 coup attempt. Among these cases, the most prominent one is the class action lawsuit against 221 suspects, including some members of the Peace at Home Council, on the events that took place at the General Staff Compound in Ankara. On the other hand, the case on the events which transpired at the Akıncı Airbase, the case on the attempted assassination of President Erdoğan in Muğla, and the case on the coup in Istanbul are other prominent class action lawsuits related to the coup attempt. There are also separate cases opened for each individual incident in cities like Ankara, Istanbul, Malatya, Diyarbakır, Sakarya, Kars, Ardahan, Edirne, Kocaeli, Manisa, Isparta and Şırnak. Therefore, the cases on the coup and FETÖ/PDY are being conducted simultaneously from two channels.

The indictments and evidence of prominent court cases in Ankara and Istanbul came to be known by the public and defendants’ defenses are being covered by the media. Considering the investigations and the court cases, it can be said that the judiciary is conducting challenging lawsuits with a superhuman effort. The challenge is twofold; while FETÖ/PDY’s emphasis on secrecy is one side of the problem, the other is the loss of personnel in the judiciary following the July 15 coup attempt. Almost one third of judges and prosecutors, amounting to around 4,000, were discharged from duty. Despite the gap and the lack in the numbers of senior judges and an ever-increasing work load, the judiciary’s handling of the process is above the standard.

Indictments and FETÖ/PDY’s Defense Strategy

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It should be said that the general structure of FETÖ/PDY, their organization within the Turkish Armed Forces and all phases of the coup attempt, along with the perpetrators and their crimes, are mostly identified and clarified. Moreover, some cases are being concluded by now. The first lawsuit to be concluded in Ankara was of the Secretary-General of President Fahri Kasırga’s abduction and the suspect of this case were punished with an aggravated life imprisonment on June 15. On May 27, the first acquittal decision was given in Adıyaman; however, it should be expressed that the Court of Cassation is yet to approve both of these lawsuits.

Regarding the defense strategy, the suspects are acting in unison with a common narrative. Unlike any normal defendants, they are not only trying to save themselves; they are also trying to convey some sort of messages to other FETÖ members and both to the domestic and international public. They are conveying the message that FETÖ members are yet to be deciphered and they are still alive and kicking. They are trying to erase the traces of FETÖ and consolidate the opinion that it was a controlled coup. To achieve their goals, they are rejecting every accusation, with the exception of a few defendants, despite the findings and evidence. Secondly, they are refraining from accusing others. Lastly, they are refraining from mentioning FETÖ as the perpetrator of the coup.

All of the defendants are talking about their past services to the Turkish Armed Forces and their successes, drawing analogies to Ergenekon and Sledgehammer defendants who were victimized by FETÖ and trying to tap into the sympathy that is felt towards the victimized military personnel. Moreover, they are claiming that they aren’t FETÖ members; they are even alleging that they have fought against FETÖ for many years and were victimized by the organization in the past.

Despite being in the middle of the coup, they are refraining from accusing other suspects, and claiming that they have no information about who conducted the coup attempt or implying that the high-ranking officers of the Turkish Armed Forces were behind the coup attempt. Even though rejecting all claims may be considered as a natural reflex, their efforts to save other suspects and whitewash FETÖ are definitely unnatural. Furthermore, there is an impression that the suspects are forming groups and are trying to play certain roles. The common narrative itself indicates the existence of a prepared and orderly organization. Similarly, their leniency to deception and deceit through the distorted understanding of taqiyya also points out the involvement of FETÖ.

Those who are members of the Peace at Home Council and were active in the conducting of the coup are seen to be rejecting physical evidence such as clear recordings, witness testimonies and their confessions at the prosecutors’ office, ridiculing the court itself. Commander of the Akıncı Airbase Hakan Evrim, who was at the base where aircraft lifted off and landed for hours and who saluted FETÖ’s civilian imam Kemal Batmaz, alleges that there wasn’t a coup attempt and that he is not a FETÖ member. Similarly, Sinan Sürer, who fired on civilians entering the General Staff Compound, used ByLock and participated in the coup preparation meetings led by Adil Öksüz, rejects all claims despite recordings and hard evidence, even alleging that the gun he was holding was actually a phone. Former Staff Colonel Doğan Öztürk, on the other hand, asserts that he never saw Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Güler on the night of coup, even though he was recorded by security cameras while escorting Güler to the headquarters. There are many other defenses that are in the same vein as these.

It could be said that the main aims of these defenses are to whitewash FETÖ and to consolidate the notion that the coup was actually a ploy or it was a controlled coup attempt. It is clear that they are trying to create a perception in accordance with Fetullah Gülen’s previous claims about the coup. For this reason, they are making statements which accuse high-ranking military officers and the MİT.

With the condition of protecting the rights of defense and fair trial, FETÖ suspects should be barred from managing the judicial process and the public perception. Taking the sensitivities of the public, families of martyrs and veterans into consideration, the suspects must be prevented from showing off; however, legal errors that might cast a shadow on the trials and bring about Turkey’s condemnation at the European Court of Human Rights must be averted. Prejudiced circles and existent negative public opinion should be granted no quarter in this matter.

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