The Turkish Armed Forces commenced its third cross-border military operation against the PKK/PYD in northern Syria on October 9, 2019. As the first incursion into the eastern part of the Euphrates River, this operation began in the wake of a series of fruitless bilateral negotiations between the US and Turkey over a projected safe zone in northeast Syria. Turkey’s security concerns grew considerably following US assistance to the PYD, which had strengthened its ability to build a potential PKK/PYD-led statelet on Turkey’s borders. The vast majority of Turks and Kurds (except in HDP circles) regard this as an existential threat.

It is once the PKK/PYD’s strategy is analyzed that Turkey’s security concerns can be better understood. Firstly, the PKK/PYD should be regarded as a holistic threat and did not separately emerge. For this reason there is no distinction between the YPG (the armed wing of the PYD) and the PYD, and between the HPG (the armed wing of PKK) and the PKK. The threat facing Turkey comes from the combination of the PKK and PYD (PKK/PYD) emanating from their shared ideology, organization, and methodology.

Over the past few years, the PKK/PYD approached the Syrian Civil War in a pragmatic way to achieve its objective of securing a vast area in Syria and Turkey. This involved a new strategy composed of four different elements: affiliating with state actors in Syria by leveraging the fight against Daesh (ISIS), achieving territorial aspirations in Syria, radicalizing youth, and increasing violence in urban areas across Turkey.

The PKK/PYD’s first strategy was to seek out military and political support in order to gain international sympathy and legitimize its territorial aspirations. The rhetoric of fighting against Daesh was instrumental in putting diplomatic pressure on Turkey and causing a postponement of a possible military offensive against the PYD in Syria. The PKK/PYD has managed to maintain the U.S. support until Turkey conducted Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in 2018. This operation signaled for the first time that the PKK/PYD could not be too certain of the future longevity of its tactical relationship with the US.

The security threats of a potential PKK/PYD statelet in northern Syria were brought to the forefront after rocket and mortar attacks on Turkish territory from PKK/PYD held areas in northeast Syria. These attacks targeted the Turkish border towns of Suruç, Akçakale, and Ceylanpınar in Şanlıurfa, and Kızıltepe and Nusaybin of Mardin provinces over the last few weeks. Moreover, modern weapons, ammunition and explosives sourced from the U.S. forces in Syria were said to be smuggled into Turkish territory. Furthermore, as part of their territorialization project, the PKK/PYD caused a demographic change in northeast Syria, forcing local non-PKK affiliated Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens to flee to Turkey as refugees.

The third strategy of the PKK/PYD is to achieve self-determination by using intimidation and coercion tactics in southeast Turkey. The PKK committed violent acts both in rural areas and urban centers with the help of municipalities run by pro-PKK political parties. Despite the fact that the PKK’s urban atrocities, which were clearly manifested during the “trench wars” in 2016, were crushed by Turkish security forces, and pro-PKK municipality mayors and staff were jailed, but the PKK’s desire for a future resurgence in Diyarbakır, Mardin, Van and Hakkari remains. These strategies and the U.S. support for the PKK/PYD made Turkish intervention in northeast Syria inevitable.

Tactical aspect of Operation Peace Spring

Unlike the deployment of numerous fighter jets for intensive airstrikes as was the case during Operation Olive Branch in Afrin, Operation Peace Spring began with a limited number of aircrafts providing constant airstrikes, which forced the PKK/PYD to hold on to their positions.

Meanwhile, Turkish artillery shelled predetermined target locations in order to render the PKK/PYD’s ability to use in-depth defensive tactics impossible. Turkish and Syrian ground forces were also supported with precise airstrikes from combat drones while they maneuvered to encircle the urban towns of Rasulayn and Tal Abyad.

The high fire power and mobility capability of the maneuver forces helped the Turkish Commandos and Syrian National Army break through the PKK/PYD defense lines easily. Under this continuous fire and with the quick maneuver of Turkish operation forces the PKK/PYD could not succeed, and eventually failed to confront the Turkish operation forces. In retaliation, the PKK/PYD fired a series of mortar shells in Turkish border towns.

As of October 17, the Turkish Armed Forces have operated in the area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad, an area around 120 km in length and 10 km in width. The area captured reached 30 km in width with a total area of approximately 1200 km2. Following Turkey’s military advance, U.S. forces withdrew from Ain Issa, 700 Daesh (ISIS) members were released from prison in Ain Issa by the YPG terror group, 702 PKK/PYD members were killed and 24 others surrendered to operation forces according to Turkey’s Defense Ministry.

In response to the operations, many European countries including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, declared a ban on weapons sales to Turkey. In a speech by President Erdogan, Turkey’s reaction to Europe’s hostility towards the operation might be to open the borders to allow Syrian refugees to enter Europe. The fear of hosting further refugees could urge European countries to have greater cooperation with Turkey and encourage the return of refugees back to their homes in northeast Syria. The area between Rasulayn and Tal Abyad was not chosen randomly by the Turkish government. Turkey aims to clear the PKK/PYD from an overwhelmingly Arab populated area. This was the first area where the demographic change was carried out by the PKK/PYD terror group when they seized the territory in 2015.

The US-Turkey deal over Northern Syria

While the operation was in the process of capturing Ain Issa, Rasulayn and the surrounding areas, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Turkey in Ankara on the evening of October 17. The agreement meets Turkey’s operation objectives and there will be no further military push except for emerging contingencies that may develop. Although, the US handover of Manbij was anomaly in the western part of the Euphrates River, the race to control Manbij caused no major security instability in the region, and expected to result in further cooperation by Turkey with Russia in northeast Syria.

The deal with the U.S. has surely helped Turkey keep the U.S. involved in Syrian geopolitics in a manner that might give Turkey an upper hand to balance Russian influence in Syria’s constitution-making process. Beyond that, the successful implementation of the deal might pave the way for the dissolution of the PKK/PYD. However, a set of technical preparations are needed for the implementation of the deal. The technical elements of the deal are expected to relate to the following:

Withdrawal of PKK/PYD members in a timely manner: the locations of the withdrawal and re-location destinations should be determined.

Rules of engagement: this is related to Turkey’s disengagement rules.

Arms collections: this requires a technical study of the designation of the weapons, platforms and systems to be collected. In this regard, a concrete designation of the types of ammunition, explosives and vehicles and military systems is needed.

How to implement the safe zone: Turkey may need to re-calibrate its military missions in Syria for bringing quicker stability in the region. In this context, new recruitments and a changing power composition may cause a contention between the US and Turkey, as a further attachment of Syrian National Army and non-PKK SDF fighters to the Turkish forces is expected.

Sub-military missions: the missions may include patrolling, observation, surveillance, supervision, investigations of complaints and other implied tasks.

Turkey should focus on its legitimate cause of its counter-terrorism operation while also implementing its plan for a safe zone. It is expected that the PKK/PYD might try to shift its focus of violent acts to other areas amid the disorientation of the withdrawal process. There is the likelihood that Operation Peace Spring might be resumed in the projected safe zone area if the PKK/PYD withdrawal is not successfully implemented as promised by the U.S.

If a student of civil-military relations in Turkey were to write a paper on the evolution of the civil-military relations before the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, s/he would have questioned, “What happened to the military in Turkish politics?” The conclusion drawn from this paper would probably be that the military was pushed out of politics through many structural changes undertaken by the AK Party government and a judgment made within the public sphere that the military should not play a prominent political role in society. A final finding could be that the contributions of the EU had played an external role in consolidating Turkish civil-military relations in favor of civilian supremacy.

Regardless of how the central question is stated and what the answers are, civil-military relations in Turkey and the place of the military in the socio-political domains throughout the history of modern Turkey have been a controversial subject. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the country has experienced four military coups. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were able to perform a full-scale overthrow of the civilian governments and took over temporary rule during the 1960 and 1980 coup, it relied on more indirect means to bring about the forced resignation and replacement of the governments during the 1971 and 1997 coups. Due to the success of these four coups, it is not a surprise that Turkish politics has historically been dominated by the preferences of the military, and thus the nature of civil-military relations has been problematic in terms of improving democratic civilian supremacy over the military.

As a result of the ideological conflict between the military and AK Party, which has grown since the party rose to power in 2002, as well as a series of significant events since the beginning of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials in 2008, there has been a substantial shift in the balance of civil-military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, the question of how this rapid transformation of Turkish civil-military relations was achieved needs to be analyzed by looking at the external and internal dynamics of the AK Party era.

The AK Party government has made significant structural and political transformations in terms of civil-military relations and the military’s institutional and socio-political role, which have decreased the involvement of the military in politics since 2007. However, civil-military relations had not yet been fully civilianized before the July 15 military coup attempt. Following the suppression of the July 15 coup attempt, the unfinished democratization project of civil-military relations entered a new phase.

The June 24 presidential elections and the establishment of the new government model brought radical changes in civil-military relations as well. Initially, President Erdogan appointed his Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulisi Akar as Minister of National Defense. Following that, by presidential decree, the Chief of General Staff was positioned to operate under the Ministry of National Defense. Thirdly, by decree, the structure of the Supreme Military Council was re-designed in terms of the president’s autonomy over the final decision to determine promotions and assignments of colonels and generals and the number of ministers who can participate in Council meetings. Now, the decision regarding the promotion of the colonels and generals will be determined according to the absolute majority within the structure of the Supreme Military Council. The number of ministers who attend the Council meeting has also increased. The Vice-President and Ministry of Economy will be part of the Council meetings. But the question of whether Turkey reached a balance in civil-military relation remains due to the exceptional nature of civil-military relations in the country.

Ankara’s Four-Dimensional Strategy to Reconstruct Civil-Military Relations

To, ultimately, end the civil-military imbalance in post-July 15 Turkish politics, Ankara has attempted to restructure its entire state apparatus, in which security agents including the TAF will be positioned at the center. At the same time, the government has been trying to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for the newly emerging threats stemming from the regional insecurities in the Middle East. After the July 15 military coup attempt, the new period has entailed three crucial phases: lustration (de-Gulenization of the state) period, rehabilitation, democratic reconstruction of civil-military relations and modernization of the Turkish military. Ankara followed four-dimensional strategies in the post-July 15 coup attempt:

• Civilianization dimension is focused on democratic consolidation of the civil-military relations and requires that the TAF undergoes a full-fledged civilian control.
• Control-balance dimension sought to create a balance between the security forces in order to prevent a monopoly by the Chief of General Staff’s over the decision-making process within the army; and aimed to separate the security forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Corps) from the chain of command to the Chief of General Staff to obtain a counter-balance.
• Ideological dimension sought to build ideational diversity within the officer core, but within the limits of their loyalty to the Constitution.
• Strategic dimension sought to redefine the national, regional, and international strategic mission of the TAF.

It is now that President Erdogan accomplished his first task by cleaning almost all the members of FETO within the TAF and other critical security institutions. The perception of TAF among the Turkish people has gained a very positive stance due to the increasing role of TAF in providing internal and regional security against threats emanating from the PKK and other terrorist organizations. TAF is more active militarily in Syria and Iraq to prevent terrorist activities against Turkey.

The second part of the post-July 15 civil-military relations is redesigned by civilian supremacy. But it does not necessarily mean that Turkey solved all its problems regarding civil-military relations. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Ministry of National Defense will probably play a vital role in shaping Turkey’s military strategy and normalizing civil-military relations. The National Defense Ministry was in full control of the Chief of General Staff and responsible for daily military activities of TAF due to the exceptional status of Turkish military above its politics. Currently, the new minister has an important influence over the military institutions, and he has been closely working with the civilian authority in the post-July 15 Turkish atmosphere. Especially, TAF played an essential role in terms of recalibrating Turkey’s political strategy in Syria and Iraq and Turkey began to recalibrate its overall influence over the Syrian crisis.

President Erdogan’s central plan in the mid-term is to transform the Turkish military in accordance to the new regional and global geopolitical realities. TAF also wants to consolidate its adaptation capacity in order make the Turkish military more effective, deterrent, and professional. Therefore, the new minister Gen. Akar is seen as the most acceptable figure for TAF to make this transformation possible. However, since each of the aforementioned processes will take a long time to accomplish, there is a need for a comprehensive strategic roadmap for Turkey’s civil-military relations and for the strategic transformation of the military in order to increase the credibility of the TAF and minimize the security risks for Turkey in national, regional, and international security environments.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a surprise visit to Turkey’s southern Hatay province last Thursday. As Operation Olive Branch continues to take ground, the visit was welcomed by a sizable audience, with the participation of some celebrities ranging from singers to national athletes.

Prior to the speech given in the late hours of the evening in the southern region of the Hatay Province, President Erdogan, accompanied by the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, Defence Minister Nurettin Canikli and Land Forces Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Gen. Yasar Guler, visited the Turkish military units to inspect the progress and congratulate the military men for their celebrated efforts.

The operation in Afrin, beginning in January of this year and ending last month, has been hailed by people in Turkey and those in the northwestern regions of Syria as not only a success against the PKK/PYD tyranny, but also on the fact that it has become one of the numbered peaceful places within the calamitous ongoing Syrian Civil War.

During his speech at the central police station, Erdogan adulated the wholeness of the people as being the foundation to protecting collective sovereignty, praised the solidarity of the public figures and celebrities for their presence, and thanked all the civilian care networks such as AFAD (The Disaster and Emergency Management, Republic of Turkey) to the Health Ministry for their support and determined efforts to help those in need. Lastly, while displaying his gratitude and respect towards the indispensable efforts of the Turkish Military, he quoted Gazi Mustafa Kemal in saying “There is no such thing as protecting the line, there is only protecting the ground, and a unified ground is what makes a nation.”

In recent years the YPG, the Syrian branch of the internationally recognized terror organization PKK, has increased its activity emanating from Syria since they took advantage of the Civil War and occupied the northern regions in 2012. The PKK/YPG has mostly focused on carrying out cross-border missile attacks on the Provinces of Hatay and Kilis, having fired more than 90 rockets in 2018 alone.

So far, two Syrian and three Turkish citizens have been killed, with over 100 casualties, of which numerous are still in critical condition. Together with human deaths, some of those who have survived are effected by a slow bombardment that their homes, vehicles and neighborhoods were destroyed.

With the Afrin operation coming to an end, direction has now turned to the Manbij. Separated by the Euphrates river from the rest of the YPG/PKK controlled areas of northern Syria, Manbij is another important territory in which Turkey seeks to relieve the areas inhabitants from unwanted occupation while protecting Turkish lands from further terrorist threats.

While recently there has been speculation of French intervention in the region as a mediator between Turkey and the YPG, Ibrahim Kalin, the spokesperson for the Turkish Presidency has firmly indicated that Turkey “rejects any efforts to promote ‘dialogue,’ ‘contact’ or ‘mediation’ between Turkey and terrorist organizations.”

When compared to Turkish endeavors, both Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch have not only conformed with International Law, U.N. Security Council resolutions and her right to self-defense under the U.N Charter, but has been an effective and efficient method in maintaining the unity of Syria’s territorial integrity.

The successful completion of Afrin operation seems to have ruffled some international feathers however, bringing previously absent players into the spot light. Considering much of the brutality is over when compared to the bulk of the civil war, Macron’s attempt to enter Syria through the back door not only remind us of the ignominious policies during the French Mandate for Syria, but suggest he still has some road to travel before becoming a man in international politics.

Turkey has long been in search of strengthening its border security and protecting its military bases, and for sure high value facilities, scattered in the mountains of south eastern Anatolia. Terrorist organizations based in Iraq and Syria, including the PKK/KONGRA-GEL/PYD/YPG/DEASH, frequently attempted to infiltrate Turkish territory either for attacking Turkish citizens or in a quest for gaining local support in the region. Turkey deployed its military and security forces along the border to prevent such undertakings while equipping troops with high-tech surveillance systems.

However, Turkey failed to enrich its UAV inventory via foreign procurement through Western, in particular Israeli, aviation firms as the primary suppliers, at the beginning of the 2000s. This era was a disappointing period for Turkey as the country had to confront a highly politicised Western defence industry. Without doubt, the invasion of Iraq, by US-led coalition forces, was a clear challenge for Turkey’s quest to procure intelligence and security assets. Turkey’s democratic choice not to participate to the invasion of Iraq hampered its desire to acquire these assets to counter terror threats. Persistent Threat Detection Systems (PTDS), or in Turkish military literature “surveillance balloons,” were one of these kinds of assets.

The initial efforts to acquire PTDS for the Turkish Army’s inventory were based on importing these systems from foreign suppliers, mainly US-based manufacturers. But the project could not be finalized until because of bureaucratic challenges stemming both from the US and Turkish decision-making mechanisms. A security expert claims that, in order to defend against casualty risks, there was an increasing demand on military intelligence assets to provide security for outposts facing imminent terror threats. This concern encouraged young and talented officers as well as non-commissioned officers of Turkish Armed Forces Intelligence School to build their own surveillance balloons by recycling scrapped equipment with a budget of just 1,100 TL (about $450 at the time). They had aimed to construct a cost-efficient system with simplified operating procedures that could be operated by regular soldiers with basic training.

Initially, dedicated Army soldiers conducted an experiment with a weather (meteorology) balloon on which they mounted re-purposed camera parts. They attached the balloon to a simple ground station with a cable that was bought in a local market. Although this first try was a failure, it was a big step. They replaced the balloon with the one made of a stronger fabric and upgraded the equipment with something more functional. The aim was simple: to have the altitude of the balloon be fixed at maximum of 500 meters and monitor any individual within a distance of 6 km. After unofficial consultations with the young soldiers, the Turkish technology giant ASELSAN agreed to sponsor the local amateur project.

ASELSAN provided old domestically manufactured equipment such as video cameras at no expense. With the aid from ASELSAN, a more sophisticated surveillance balloon could now be designed with a higher altitude and increased payload capacity. One problem left to be solved was having the balloon continue its surveillance task even if it was shot by light rifles. The shooting test was very successful after a private Turkish company in Ankara, OTONOM, manufactured a persistent and long lasting balloon. The balloon, which stayed aloft despite seven bullet holes in it, was also stabilized against harsh weather conditions by integrating additional fixing materials and software. Actually, the adventure of Turkish soldiers in building a surveillance balloon has pushed domestic private companies to start partnerships and pool their manufacturing capabilities to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. Hence, the project was in the hands of these companies afterwards.

The ASELSAN and OTONOM partnership produced surveillance balloons named “Global” (Küresel), a small balloon with 500 meters altitude, and the “Water Drop” (Su Damlası) with a maximum altitude of 1,000 meters. Apart from the ASELSAN-OTONOM partnership, Turkish satellite and cable network firm TURKSAT also developed another surveillance balloon with 800 meters altitude, which might be described as a medium-size PTDS in the defence market. TURKSAT, making deals with the foreign firms, enriched the competition in the emerging balloon sector.

The payloads of these Turkish surveillance balloons can be enhanced depending what the surveillance mission requires. Standard payloads include day and night cameras, laser pointers and radio relay systems. It is possible to integrate them to early warning systems used by ground troops in order to compliment, in other words “cueing,” other information collection efforts by integrated software. Furthermore, acoustic radar can also be mounted to detect explosions and movements of any sorts of vehicles. ASELSAN offers a great inventory of surveillance systems that can be integrated to any sort of these balloons.

Another option for the Turkish Army is the procurement of the PTDS from the Western defence market. In this context, Turkey is about to acquire two PTDS assets from the U.S. Army as a pledge. The U.S. Government granted two PTDSs from Lockheed Martin to the Turkish Army for countering illegal border crossing, especially by DEASH terrorists. The deal entails U.S. donation of the two PTDS assets at no expense for Turkey, but leaves maintenance responsibilities to Turkey. These PTDSs, most probably, will be have been used previously in Iraq or Afghanistan, and can be described as old and worn out. In order to maintain these systems, Turkey will need to meet their costs, and will be dependent on importing spare parts from abroad for them. Besides, the huge size of the balloon requires a huge amount of helium gas to run it, which reveals another challenging problem for the Turkish Army. However, this dependency creates an unwillingness within the circles of the Turkish Army to include these systems into its inventory or at least accept using them for urgent short-term needs until they are no longer functional.

The exploitation of the U.S. PTDS in Afghanistan is an indicator for whether it will meet the needs of the TAF and to see its efficiency. The PTDS was a distinguished intelligence asset for monitoring urban areas with its sensitive payload.  On the other hand, similar to small surveillance balloons, the PTDS of Lockheed Martin was strictly limited by harsh weather conditions; mainly wind, humidity, atmospheric pressure, cloud, and atmospheric electrical charge (including thunderstorms). Due to these shortcomings, the balloons were often grounded and fixed to command trailers. As in Afghanistan, harsh weather conditions along the border of Iraq and to some extent Syria, will hinder the effective exploitation of the U.S. PTDS.

Although the same weather conditions will certainly effect the functionality level of the Turkish surveillance balloons, their loss would be much more tolerable because they are domestically manufactured and cheap. The affordable cost of Turkish systems makes them more attractive than other PTDS products in the Western market. For instance, the cost of a PTDS manufactured by Lockheed Martin is around $15 to $20 million, which is prohibitive when it comes to usage in the rugged terrain conditions of Turkey. Thus, in order to cover the harsh terrain, security forces would probably demand additional PTDS assets over time. A comparison of terrain features of the U.S.-Mexican border and the Turkish-Iraq border illustrates this dilemma. The U.S. border is rather flat, so PTDS can serve for detecting illegal border crossings. On the contrary, the Turkish border with Iraq is full of rugged creeks, therefore several PTDS assets cannot provide either physical or border security since imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets require line of sight. Hence Turkey needs cost-efficient of surveillance balloons that could cover wide ranges that excludes the expensive PTDS.

As the Turkish Army’s priority is not solely based on border security, but also the force protection of ground troops, the needed surveillance balloons should be positioned for monitoring roads, neighbouring villages, and key terrain in the vicinity of military bases. For this purpose, the Turkish Army needs to procure small, mobile, easy to use surveillance balloons in large numbers. Basic military tasks such as target acquisition, directing fires, and location capturing ought to be the main capabilities of the surveillance system. The Turkish surveillance balloons offer such functions using simplified software. Software can be enhanced depending on the regional needs of Turkish Army in comparison to complicated and fixed software. Another advantage of the Turkish PTDS is the small number of operating personnel it requires. Just three personnel for each shift can run the system, which makes the entire 24 hour crew just nine personnel. On the other hand, the U.S. PTDS needs at least 10-12 personnel for each shift to run properly, corresponding to 30-36 operators over a 24-hour period, excluding team leaders.

Consequently, the indigenously developed surveillance balloons by ASELSAN-OTONOM, and to some extent TURKSAT, seem appropriate for the operational needs of the Turkish Army in comparison to the ones of outer market. They are mobile, small and simple systems to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance tasks in potential combat zones. Turkey’s technology is respondent to develop surveillance balloons and export to the other countries in need. Additionally, coast guard, police and gendarmerie forces, can also acquire these Turkish surveillance systems to complement existing threat detection systems, in order to monitor critical urban areas while countering crime.

Domestically, the coup attempt has complicated Turkey’s fight against terrorism. The Turkish fight against terrorism has two fronts, and involves three terror organizations within Turkish territory. On the rural domestic front, Turkish security forces have been fighting against PKK terrorists for decades in eastern Turkey, and as a well-settled organization the fight against PKK is rather effective. Special Operation Units, which are composed of police, army special forces, and gendarmerie and village guards, have the initiative to carry out operations under the supervision of provincial governor offices. The good news about these units is that although a few military commanders and police chiefs in eastern Turkey did get involved in coup-related plots, the main body of the counter-terror forces seems to have no affiliation with supporting the coup. On the other hand, given the upheaval within the TAF, this composite force will be deprived of much of the aerial support it previously enjoyed in its rural operations. Considering the lack of sufficient reliable rural operational forces and close air support, these counter-terror forces should opt for surge strikes rather than major operations. Such quick military operations require precise human intelligence and should be carefully planned to strike only the intended targets in order to destroy the terror elements with the minimum chance of security casualties.The effective use of operational sustainability until the PKK’s rural elements return to their hideout in wintertime is crucial and will save time for the government and the security forces to pursue their reorganizing efforts. Special operation units and the army aviation elements are expected to carry on enormous efforts while suffering long period of rotations. These elements, together with more active village guards, should shoulder the burden of counter-terrorism during the reorganization period. The key rural locations in which the PKK are assumed to be active are Hakkari-Van-Sirnak and Diyarbakir-Bingol-Bitlis with its HPG terrorists, and the Tunceli-Gumushane-Giresun triangle with its HBDH affiliates. During the wintertime, the PKK is expected to engage in classical urban attacks such as assassination, intimidation, suicide- or vehicle borne improvised explosive (VBIED) attacks. Many more police SWAT operations supported by valuable intelligence are needed to foil the wintertime attacks.

On the urban domestic front, the PKK, DAESH and the DHKP/C are expected to be active in initiating armed attacks, particularly suicide or VBIED attacks, even before the wintertime. Security forces should watch over Adana and Mersin provinces with extra care for a potential urban attempt by the PKK. PKK affiliated TAK, and DHKP/C forces and DAESH should be targeted with more police operations in Istanbul and Ankara. More importantly, it was the people who were behind the success of ousting the coup attempt. A pseudo civil defense organization against any attempt threatening state and democracy is worthy of considering.

In the larger, regional dimension, Turkey should reinforce its relations with local actors in Syria and Iraq. Turkish security starts beyond its borders and a policy change toward Syria seems probable. Even if this policy conflicts with the interests of the USA, methodologically, the armed elements in Syria could be treated in the same way that the United States treats the PYD/PKK elements. More concrete international support for those pro-Turkey local actors in Syria should be considered. The local partners in Iraq also should be encouraged in fighting with the PKK on the basis of shared interests.

All of Turkey’s security circles found themselves surprised when the sophisticated weapon systems used by coup plotters took the streets of Ankara and Istanbul. According to logical threat assessments, the most powerful defense systems should be deployed to high risk areas, not clustered around the metropolises. Two of the most modern tank models in the Turkish Army inventory played a significant role in the attempted coup; the M60T and Leopard 2A4. The Turkish Army has four M60T battalions in total, and two of them are in Ankara and Istanbul, far away from the Syrian and Armenian border or eastern Turkey. Similarly, the Leopard 2A4 battalions are all located in Trace. Ankara hosts the Army Aviation School and Command, while Istanbul has an Army Aviation Regiment equipped with AH-1W helicopter gunships. Those units could be moved to eastern Turkey, specifically close to the Southeastern borders. Relocation of the units with modern weapon system should be undertaken immediately.

Internationally, Turkey can also revise its relations with NATO for a stronger position in the alliance. Traditional NATO policies over Turkey should be critically analyzed and alternative security alliances can be sought. At all dimensions, Turkey is capable of designing a perfect check and balance system. The current threat is not only the terrorism itself but also terrorist proxies within the state structure and regional security environments.