Interestingly, there was not even one ditch in the Diclekent or Kayapınar districts of Diyarbakır, where many prominent figures like Selahattin Demirtaş, Altan Tan live.

Most of the PKK’s funders are businessmen living in Diclekent and Kayapınar, where you can find very luxurious restaurants, coffees and houses. In a sense, the PKK could not touch their lives, their comfort zone. While these financiers were responsible for the PKK’s operations, they lived in neighborhoods far removed from the consequences of their funding.

Sociological Gap in Diyarbakır

We could not easily say that Diyarbakır’s sociology is fine now. The people of Diyarbakır look a bit tired and confused. Tired of being instrumentalized by the PKK and the HDP. But somehow people are trying hard to return to their ordinary lives.

When we walked around the streets of Sur, we saw that people could finally open their shops up, because the PKK, which used to intimidate them into closing their shops to send a political message, was no longer around. Another interesting situation is that interest in any gatherings or protests has gone down. In 2015, for Nowruz celebrations, almost 200,000 people gathered in Diyarbakır, however in 2016 only 18,000 people gathered to celebrate the festival, despite frequent calls from the HDP and the permission of the Governor of Diyarbakır. Can we conclude that people were afraid of going out and celebrating Nowruz? Absolutely not, we can conclude that people are very tired and from now on they just look for peace in Diyarbakır. Nowruz, a traditional new year celebration, used to turn into a pro-PKK protest praising all types of violence and threats against Turkey’s solidarity. Because of this over politicized and violent discourse at the festival in Diyarbakır, people no longer want to participate in this so-called “cultural celebration.”

One evening during our stay in Diyarbakir, Aysel Tuğluk, HDP’s leading deputy, was taken into the custody. I was around the Diyarbakir Court House incidentally, and surprisingly, there was no one in front of the courthouse for protesting this decision. I checked media coverage to see if people were not aware of it, but in fact there was plenty of breaking news about the detention. Yet there was not even one person to protest. In short, the people of Diyarbakır ran out of patience, and they have no tolerance for any calls for violence or clashes. They just want to return to their normal lives without any terror, any clashes, and any threats from the PKK and HDP.

The people of Diyarbakır ran out of patience, and they have no tolerance for any calls for violence or clashes.

They are silent and passive to all the things happening around them. This current situation in Diyarbakır is a kind of sociological gap. People have some ideological and political hesitations about what they really should do. Some of those I met put lots of stress on the question of what would happens if the government sits at the negotiating table with the PKK again? Despite the all anti-terror operations, all the political discourse against the PKK and HDP, people are still keeping this possibility in their mind. And they are afraid of this scenario, in which the PKK gets control again and takes revenge on the people. The government must gain the confidence of the people about these fears; otherwise this gap could create a boomerang effect against the normalization process of the city.

The Need for a Social Risk Map

To capture the full Diyarbakır picture, there is an urgent need for a social risk map of Diyarbakır. Mapping the social risks in the city, actually in the region as well, is the most important preliminary work before applying social policies. This means putting together a general picture of potential risks to the communities of Diyarbakır. An index could be developed to figure out the most fragile parts of the social structure, which may include: average household income, the unemployment rate (especially for youths), mobility over one year, drop-out rates at schools, crime rates and so on. After this, the most fragile parts can be identified, and social policies can be applied according to this index.

For now, the Governor and the municipality conduct some social projects for youth in particular. To build more sport centers and to renovate youth centers in the city, the Ministry of Youth and Sport has recently provided 16 million TLs. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies also provides similar funds for rehabilitation works. This support is very significant, but still needs to be systematized by the social risk map created, according to the social needs of the city.

Academics living in Diyarbakır point out that young people are radicalized by the racial and violence oriented narratives of the PKK and HDP.

While doing this, there are two important priority areas: education and religious affairs. Almost all people we met in Diyarbakır, academics, public authorities, NGOs pointed out these two significant areas. If the government and local authorities could create long-term coherent policies for education and religious guidance, normalization could be achieved in Diyarbakır. Otherwise in a couple of years, we may witness the same clashes in the city’s ancient streets.

Academics living in Diyarbakır point out that young people are radicalized by the racial and violence oriented narratives of the PKK and HDP. This increases the anxiety of the youth in the city, and makes them vulnerable to being instrumentalized for street clashes. Now families are looking for alternatives to save their children from the threat of the PKK and HDP. Public authorities and NGOs have to put forth alternatives to rehabilitate the young people of Diyarbakır. Actually at this point, Kurdish youth need to have a new dialogue without any type of violence or hatred. What Kurdish youth really needs is to have a positive agenda to focus on their future’s plan, especially in terms of education and employment. In brief, any social policy or project that does not reach the youth will not succeed in ensuring a normalization process for the communities in Diyarbakır.

A New Concept for Counter Terrorism

Turkey has taken conclusive steps to overcome the security concerns created by the PKK. One of these steps, following the words of President Erdogan, was to initiate a constant fight against the terrorist organization. Hundreds of PKK militants have been neutralized with this strategy. The government took control of the transit routes used by the PKK in the mountainous areas. It also largely eliminated the social pressure and the oppression of the PKK’s urban structures in the cities. The second strategic step taken in the struggle against the PKK was to limit its social and political activities. Several media organs and associations that the PKK used as its propaganda machine were closed to reduce its public visibility and to limit its provocations. It was within the same strategic framework that some of the deputies and mayors of the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) were taken into custody. As in the case of Selahattin Demirtaş, the co-leader of the HDP, many of these deputies and mayors were charged with crimes of “establishing an organization to commit crime,” “being a member of a terrorist organization,” and “being a member of an armed terrorist organization.”

Social Anger towards the HDP

In two elections held in 2015, the HDP gained momentum in the east and southeast. The party had significant success at the end of the Turkish general elections on June 7, 2015 and entered the Grand National Assembly with 80 deputies. Although its power partially shrunk, the HDP became the third largest party in the National Assembly with 59 deputies when the results of the compulsory early elections held on November 1, 2015 were announced.

It is appropriate to use the term “power poisoning” to explain what happened after the election. The HDP had become radicalized, hardened, and began to have a similar discourse and policy with the PKK. The statement of Figen Yüksekdağ, the co-leader of the party, was a clear challenge: “We lie our back on the PYD [the Democratic Union Party] and the YPG [the People’s Protection Units].” With the call of Bese Hozat, the co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the PKK had initiated the so-called “Revolutionary People’s War” in the months to follow. The PKK militants and its sympathizers paralyzed the daily life of the Kurds when they brought guns to the cities and dug trenches in the streets.

Dozens of people, including children, elderly, and women were killed after the PKK’s DEASH-style car bomb attacks, which aimed to hit the main cities of the country such as the capital Ankara and Istanbul. The HDP, however, has never shown the expected attitude towards the PKK-initiated violence. The Kurds’ expectation from the HDP was to have a high-level political discourse, which would counterbalance the PKK’s terrorist activities. They were greatly disappointed. Selahattin Demirtaş and other deputies chose to remain silent against the PKK domination that began on the evening of the 7 June, 2015 elections. The HDP thus suffered a great loss of prestige in society.

Voices from the streets

It is important to note that the streets in Turkey’s southeast remained calm in the wake of the steps taken by the Turkish authorities to counter terrorism. I had the opportunity to witness the strong roots of this discreet approach during my recent visit to Siirt and Batman. My interactions with the local population of these cities helped me to understand the discreet attitude of the street at the following four junctures:

When the HDP reached its peak

One should carefully read the reaction of the Kurdish population living in the region to the imprisonment of the HDP co-chairs, some deputies, and mayors, as well as the appointment of custodians to the local municipalities. Regardless of whether it really happened or not, an anecdote that I heard in Siirt demonstrates that the majority of the local population was alienated from the HDP’s politics and politicians. The anecdote tells us that an HDP mayor who was going to be taken into custody in a few minutes looks at the entrance gate from the window of his office and states that “if we had won the hearts of people, there would be tens and thousands at our door, but now there are not even a handful men in front of the door to stop the police officers from entering the building.” He then regretfully said to those around him: “there is nothing to do.”

People tell each other, in the form of urban legends, what some of the custodians who are appointed to the municipalities achieved in just 2-3 months compared with what the DBP municipalities have done in 4-5 years.

Although dozens of mayors have been taken into custody from the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), the HDP’s fraternal party in the region, the locals did not show any reaction. The reason behind the lack of local support for the DBP is the fact that the DBP municipalities have spent their time and energy on PKK propaganda, instead of serving the public. People tell each other, in the form of urban legends, what some of the custodians who are appointed to the municipalities achieved in just 2-3 months compared with what the DBP municipalities have done in 4-5 years.

They also talk about certain groups, which the municipalities have enriched by transferring resources and awarding them the contracts. It seems that there were three interrelated factors at work when it comes to the alienation of the Kurdish population from the HDP and its associates: the HDP had a discriminating attitude in its relations with the society. It transferred the economic resources to certain interest groups, and moved closer to the PKK at the height of its political power. The prevailing public opinion among the Kurds is that if the HDP had moved in an opposite direction and had not received this many seats in the parliament, the situation would be different. They, on the other hand, still consider their votes for the HDP as a positive development since it helped them understand the real intentions of the party and witness how it suffered from “power poisoning.”

The “I voted for peace” discourse

“I voted for peace” is one of the prevailing discourses among the locals in the region. The discourse, often expressed by HDP voters, is pronounced as a sign of regret. “I would never vote if I knew the HDP would follow such a way,” one local told me on condition of anonymity. “We voted since we believed that the PKK would withdraw and the civilian politicians would stand against the armed terrorists. The HDP, however, treated us as an apparatus to contribute to the PKK’s war and used our votes as a demonstration of power to increase its political violence. We expected the HDP leaders to strengthen civilian politics and to contribute to an everlasting peace when the party gained 80 deputies in the June 2015 elections.” On the streets of Batman and Siirt, it is almost common to hear “did you also vote for peace?” statement, which the local Kurds use in an ironic way to make fun of how they were deceived before the elections.

“We won’t make you president”

One of the common arguments people used to criticize the HDP politics is the “we won’t make you president” campaign slogan by Demirtaş, targeting President Erdogan. Demirtaş used this slogan for the first time at a party group meeting in the Assembly amid loud applause. This sharp political move increased the reputation of Demirtaş and opened space for him in the Dogan Media group’s coverage of the elections. It is no doubt that the “White Turks” were very much pleased by this statement. The Kurds, who voted for the HDP, however, had a hard time understanding the basis and the aims of this political move at that time. Now, they realize that this political discourse was detrimental to their interests. Most of the Kurds believe that Demirtaş lost great prestige among the locals with this sharp political move since the expression “we won’t make you president” was wrong and had no rational basis for the Kurds. This statement is now one of the main arguments that the Kurds used to direct their criticism towards Demirtaş.

The PKK terrorist attacks damaged the regional economy

The Turkish economy remains robust in the face of global fluctuations, manipulations, and impositions. The economic conditions, however, have put pressure on people. The implications of the economic struggle are more visible in the Kurdish-populated regions of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. The threatening atmosphere that the PKK terrorism created, the efforts of the terrorist organization to prevent state investments, and the tribute that the PKK had asked from private investors, made the conditions harder for the region’s economy.

In Hasankeyf, a shopkeeper who welcomed us in his carpet shop said that the last time he sold a carpet was one and a half years ago. It was an appalling moment.

The security threat posed by the PKK has squeezed the daily life of the Kurds in two ways: dozens of Kurds, including children, lost their lives during the terrorist attacks. The PKK militants looted their houses, burned their businesses and vehicles. The flow of tourists to the region came to a halt. In Hasankeyf, a shopkeeper who welcomed us in his carpet shop said that the last time he sold a carpet was one and a half years ago. It was an appalling moment. Directing his anger to the PKK and HDP, the shopkeeper told us that one and a half years ago, Hasankeyf was filled with both local and foreign tourists.

There are also other factors that played a role in the collapse of the HDP’s politics: The PKK’s killings on June 6-8, 2014 and the devastation of the trench and barricade warfare that the PKK had launched in southeast Turkey after the June 7, 2015 elections. The terrifying memories of these events are still alive. People tell each other the stories of how the PKK terrorists forced old men to dig trenches in the streets and desperate women to leave their houses when they learned that a tunnel would go through their bedrooms.

Perhaps many of the Kurds have not yet spoken aloud, but the clear majority has deeply buried the PKK in the very trenches that the terrorist organization had dug in their inner worlds. Even in the regions where the HDP has received close to 100 percent of the vote, the Kurds have not abided by the PKK’s calls for street rallies or boycotts. The reason behind this is the fact that the Kurds condemned “trench politics” and denounced it as tyrannical.

When Turkish courts arrested some pro-PKK politicians of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a group of PKK supporters took to the streets in Brussels and gathered in front of the European Parliament. I took my camera and went to the area to witness it myself, for the first time, how banners and flags of a listed terrorist organization were being waved before an institution that claims to advocate for democracy and fight against terrorism. When I arrived to the scene, I observed that some of the protesters were cautiously watching those passing near them. Thus, I decided to do live broadcasting via my mobile phone from a distance of some 10 meters. There were only two police officers in the area and they were sitting in their car quietly until I reached their door to ask if the crowd had permission to hold a demonstration. The officers opted to remain silent and took the advice of a PKK supporter who wanted me to stay at a far distance. Probably, my press card was not as worthy as the PKK flag the terror supporter had in his hands. It is worth noting that according to regulations, an online application is needed at least 10 days prior to a planned demonstration. However, this rule does not seem to apply for PKK supporters.

Several weeks passed and I started to better understand how things with the PKK work in Europe and this was pretty disturbing. The double standards on responding to terrorist organizations pushes the people of Turkey further away from Europe, and this is borne out in recent studies showing that up to 65 percent of the population does not think positively of the EU.

I realized that hundreds of questions and doubts raised by Turkish society and politicians do not get asked directly to European officials. When commenting on the PKK or Turkey, EU officials repeat the same words each time: “PKK is a terrorist organization for us.” However, their actions portray a different picture.

Two days after the PKK’s twin car-bomb attack in Istanbul killed 44 people and injured 155 on December 10, I went to a press conference at the European Commission (EC) and asked the deputy spokesperson a question that we are still unable to get an answer for. “We have recently witnessed France arresting people for browsing terrorism-linked content online. Following Saturday’s terrorist attack in Istanbul, there were dozens, or probably hundreds, of PKK supporters in Europe celebrating and glorifying the attack. Are we finally going to see Europe taking action against these people who celebrate a terrorist attack in an [EU] candidate country?” The spokesperson said these are questions the EU’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini would be happy to answer. However, I have still not been given the chance to raise the question.

I went on to remind the EC spokesperson that the EC’s Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn had met with some pro-PKK figures. These included Faysal Sarıyıldız, an HDP deputy who is accused of supplying weapons to the PKK and entrapping security forces in a curfew held district, Tuba Hezer, who once shouldered the coffin of a PKK terrorist, and Eyüp Doru, a name with an Interpol red notice, who has been on active duty at the PKK’s Qandil headquarters for five years. “Is this the new approach towards enlargement of the EU or we are going to see steps against these terror-linked people?” I asked and questioned whether the EU is planning to enlarge with close relations with terror suspects or sit at a table with representatives from Ankara. Again, there was no answer.

The EU is not only allowing PKK propaganda at its institutions or staying silent over the PKK’s terror activities, it also demands Turkey soften its counter-terrorism laws to grant the country visa-free travel to the Schengen zone. In a sensitive time when the country fights against many branches of the PKK at home, in Syria and Iraq, European demands only further frustrate the people of Turkey. Since all the European countries have their own counter-terror laws, what exactly is it that the EU wants from Ankara? Turks are also curious whether if these European standards would allow the state to confiscate assets of terror suspects without a court verdict like here in Belgium, or if social media users will end up in jail for their supportive messages to terror groups, like we witness across many EU member states. If the answer is yes, there is not much to fuss about.

EU Council President Donald Tusk recently said that it was still difficult for Ankara to change its anti-terror laws. “I know that this is not a sign of a bad intention, but objectively they [Turkey] are in a very difficult situation,” he confessed.

The ordinary people in the street that I talk to have either very little knowledge about how the PKK ended the recent ceasefire, with an announcement on July 11, 2015 and the killing of two police officers while they were asleep in their beds on July 22, 2015. They are also unaware that so-called politicians use the terrorist organization for propaganda, even attending the commemoration ceremony of a suicide bomber. Thanks to the mainstream Western media, the biased portrayal of incidents has led PKK members sought with Interpol red-notices to carry on their propaganda at the EP.

On the other hand, the majority of the Turks in Belgium – including those of Kurdish origin who oppose the Marxist ideology of the PKK – are aware of the realities on the ground and they also seem to be losing trust in Belgium and Europe. A Turkish-Belgian man in his 60’s told me that he grew up here and some of his friends were “martyred” while digging metro tunnels in Brussels. “We have served and help to build this country for many years and we cannot understand why Belgium tolerates and supports this terrorist group.” Another question that flies into space.

Europeans need to come to their senses and think again. Just because the PKK or the DHKP-C are secularists, does not mean they can be tolerated. They kidnap children, they train and send suicide bombers to cities, they do not want to lay down arms and get into politics, they continue making money over drug trafficking. The list can continue and we may witness a time when Europeans regret their direct or indirect support to this poisonous group.