P
resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14 and his bilateral meetings with his counterpart Abdel Fattah Sisi can be seen as a result of the normalization talks that started in 2021 and as a clear statement of a concrete will to reestablish partnerships between the two countries in many fields. Undoubtedly, the potential cooperation between Turkey and Egypt, which are the main actors in regional issues such as Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially on the Gaza issue, can pave the way for the transformation of these crisis areas. However, when regional issues are considered within the framework of global geopolitics, the two countries’ common stance on regional crises has different meanings.
In fact, the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo signals a significant shift in global power dynamics. At this point, the harmonization of Turkey’s and Egypt’s foreign policy approaches can position the two countries as a united center of power against the backdrop of the multipolar world order. This scenario comes to the fore as the U.S. influence in the Middle East diminishes noticeably and the sanctions it imposes through economic, military, and political engagements lose their effect. The evolution of relations between the two countries from competition to cooperation will provide important opportunities to fill the perceived gaps in the regional strategies of the United States, and will allow the development of partnerships with countries that seek to expand the European Union’s influence, especially in the region.
From the perspective of the EU, the emerging Ankara-Cairo axis can be assessed in more than one dimension. First, the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt may provide an opportunity within the EU for joint negotiations on the issue of more coordinated migration flows through the Eastern Mediterranean. The cooperation of two regional powers, which in the past were at opposite poles, means ensuring stability and peace in various crisis spots such as Libya and Sudan, which are seen by EU countries as the source of uncontrolled migration flows.
On the other hand, Turkey’s and Egypt’s control and coordination of migration management, especially for EU countries bordering the Mediterranean, means that the two countries can use their positions as key transit countries to tip the balance in ongoing negotiations with European countries in their favor. The two countries’ chances of gaining concessions or support on other regional issues may also increase.
At the same time, the united front formed by Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean raises various concerns in terms of energy exploration by EU companies and the energy trade interests of the countries concerned. In some respects, however, it also offers strategic opportunities. To elaborate: in the recent past, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, in which Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and France were active, tried to include Egypt in the formation in order to leave Turkey on its own in the regional equation—and was relatively successful in this goal. In fact, the maritime agreement signed between Egypt and Greece damaged Egypt’s interests and priorities in realpolitik, and jeopardized its gains according to international law in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The fact that in the same period the agreement offered by Turkey to Egypt added an area in the Mediterranean Sea the size of three islands of Cyprus to Egypt’s territory was important in that it put the Sisi government in a difficult position vis-à-vis domestic public opinion and showed that national interests would be at risk if Egypt pursued the EU path. Currently, the manifestation of the Ankara-Cairo axis in the Eastern Mediterranean means that Turkish and Egyptian energy companies take the lion’s share of the reserves in the region. At this point, the energy cooperation in question will also enable EU countries to have more reliable access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In this sense, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa are of vital importance to Europe. Since the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February 2022, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a central role in the global energy equation and in import/export supplies. So much so that EU countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas see countries in Africa and the Middle East as the strongest and most realistic alternative, with Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria standing out in this respect. Indeed, the new balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt could make these plans a more rational option in the medium to long term, both politically and commercially.
From the perspective of the U.S., which has minimized its footprint in the Middle East under the Biden administration, the cooperation that is developing between Ankara and Cairo can be assessed under two subheadings. First, it should not be forgotten that throughout history Turkey and Egypt have been traditional and strategic U.S. allies. At a time when Israel’s political, economic, and cultural involvement in the Middle East is decreasing due to the Gaza issue, the U.S. will maintain its sphere of influence in the Middle East at low cost by implementing the “remote balancing” strategy. As is well known, the U.S. has been providing Egypt with serious military aid since the Camp David agreement in 1979.
However, since the day he took office, Biden has distinguished himself from the Trump administration by maintaining a distant attitude towards the monarchies in Egypt and the Gulf countries. This approach is one of the main factors behind Egypt’s move towards regional partnerships. Moreover, the emergence of the Turkey-Egypt bloc as a regional power could provide certain advantages in balancing Iran, one of the United States’ main regional rivals. In parallel, Iran’s recent expansion into Africa and the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea have led to arguments that a space has opened up for Iran in the Middle East after October 7, 2023. In this conjuncture, the fact that two actors—Egypt and Turkey—that have distant relations with Iran are positioned side-by-side in regional crisis areas points to opportunities rather than threats and difficulties in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.
The second issue is the defense industry, which was mentioned during President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo, and military cooperation, which is likely to deepen in the medium to long term. The Turkish defense industry has been continuously increasing its market share by building on its successes in the Libyan and Karabakh wars, and is becoming the first choice of countries experiencing conflicts and civil wars in Africa. The entry of Turkish defense industry equipment into the Egyptian market, which is dominated by U.S. and Israeli companies, could position Turkey as a prominent player in the sector.
The Sisi government’s counterterrorism operations in the Sinai Peninsula require this advanced technology and equipment, adding additional strain to Egypt’s relations with Israel over Gaza. Due to the tensions in Gaza, the city of Rafah, which lies within Egypt’s borders, is frequently subjected to Israeli air strikes. Therefore, the possible cooperation with Turkey to increase Egypt’s armed unmanned aerial vehicle capacity could be another important parameter in the relations between the two countries.
Although the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is mainly examined through regional units of analysis, it has the potential to influence global political dynamics. The move presents both difficulties and opportunities for Western powers including the management of migratory flows, the transfer of energy resources to global markets, the EU’s position in relation to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the U.S. reaction to its relatively diminished presence in the Middle East. With its military, economic, and political dimensions, the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement could usher in a new paradigm in the global geopolitical balance.
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