The Erosion of European Political Consensus: The 2026 Elections

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he year 2026 is shaping up to be a year of intense electoral activity across Europe. Elections at various levels have taken place in numerous European countries, including Portugal, Slovenia, Denmark, Hungary, Bulgaria, Malta, Sweden, Latvia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. In Germany, meanwhile, elections have been held for five state parliaments.

In Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026, the Student List (Studentska lista), backed by the student movement, finished ahead of the United Serbia list supported by President Aleksandar Vučić. According to preliminary results announced by Serbia’s Electoral Commission, the Student List received 52.65 percent of the vote, compared with 39.22 percent for the United Serbia list. Voter turnout stood at 68.7 percent. With this result, the Student List secured enough seats to form a government on its own.

In the first round of Bulgaria’s presidential election, held on the same day, turnout was approximately 22 percent. According to the announced results, President Iliana Yotova came first with 34.76 percent, followed by former caretaker Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov with 31.95 percent. In the election held on November 1, in which two candidates competed, Iliana Yotova became Bulgaria’s new president.

Although the two elections differed considerably in turnout, both point to a common trend: weakening ties between voters and established political actors. This trend also supports the argument that the gap between political parties and society is widening across the West. In some countries, that growing distance has resulted in changes of government; in others, it has led to declining political participation.

An Overview of the election results

Election results across Europe are often interpreted primarily through the rise of far-right parties. While the outcomes of the 2026 elections partly support this assessment, they also demonstrate that it is insufficient as a stand-alone explanation. In Germany, for instance, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) increased its vote share, while the far-right Sweden Democrats lost support for the first time since entering parliament. Similarly, in Portugal, the far-right presidential candidate André Ventura, the leader of the Chega party, secured only around one-third of the vote in the presidential runoff. In Hungary, meanwhile, Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule came to an end.

A more consistent common feature of the election results has been fragmentation within party systems and the resulting delays in forming governments. In many cases, finishing first in an election has no longer been enough to secure the ability to form a government.

Another indication of this fragmentation is the entry into parliament of political actors established only recently. The Student List in Serbia, which emerged from protests that began in late 2024; Direct Democracy in the Greek Cypriot Administration, founded just months before the election; and Resni.ca and Demokrati in Slovenia are among the most prominent examples. Similarly, Progressive Bulgaria, a coalition established in March 2026 following Rumen Radev’s resignation from the presidency, won approximately 44 percent of the vote in the April elections. The ability of newly established political actors to attract such a large share of the vote in a short period is a striking example of what is known as electoral volatility. This volatility is therefore weakening both the stability of national governments and the foundations of consensus at the EU level.

Implications for EU decision-making

The political landscape emerging across Europe has increased the influence of national political preferences and disagreements on the EU’s decision-making processes. In areas such as foreign policy, security, sanctions, and enlargement, where unanimity is required, member states have the power to block or delay common decisions. Hungary, for instance, has repeatedly used this leverage in recent years, particularly over decisions concerning support for Ukraine, making it more difficult for the EU to formulate a common position.

Against this backdrop, the Tisza Party’s victory in the April 12, 2026, elections, in which it won 141 seats in the 199-member parliament and secured a constitutional majority, marked a significant development that could alter Hungary’s position within the EU. The new government, led by Péter Magyar, has pledged to reduce the country’s dependence on Russian energy and redefine Hungary’s role within the EU and NATO. These commitments have strengthened expectations that Budapest will adopt a more conciliatory approach to European policy.

However, Orbán’s departure from power does not mean that consensus has been restored within the EU. The potential to exercise a veto is now spread across several member states. Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for example, had sought exemptions from the €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine alongside Orbán. In Slovenia, Janša, who has returned to power, supports Ukraine’s EU membership but remains close to Orbán’s position on many other issues. In Bulgaria, meanwhile, Radev has argued that Europe’s claim to moral leadership has become a casualty of an international environment in which rules no longer apply. President Yotova, backed by his party, also opposes military assistance to Ukraine and advocates dialogue with Moscow.

The structure in which one member state stood against the other 26 during the Orbán era is therefore giving way to a more unpredictable pattern of opposition, with disagreements varying according to the policy area. Given the EU’s long-standing inability to develop a common position on the Middle East and the persistent reservations surrounding enlargement, it would be unrealistic to expect foreign-policy alignment to emerge automatically in the post-Orbán period.

Moreover, if the Spanish snap election scheduled for November 29 results in the People’s Party (PP) and Vox securing a joint majority, a far-right party will enter the national government for the first time. This would add another major member state to a political landscape already marked by the erosion of consensus.

Examples from different countries show not only that the erosion of Europe’s political consensus is not taking place in a single direction, but also that it is producing different consequences in each country. It is therefore worth examining several national cases more closely.

Hungary

Hungary offers a paradoxical example of the erosion of political consensus. The dominance of Fidesz, which had relied largely on a constitutional majority since 2010, has come to an end. At the EU level, this means that the bloc’s most systematic veto-wielding actor has been replaced by a government more aligned with the majority of member states.

Magyar has pledged to reduce Hungary’s dependence on Russian energy and restore the country’s constructive role within the EU and NATO. The new government is also expected to abandon the policy of blocking decisions concerning Ukraine.

However, Hungary’s experience also demonstrates that alignment at the EU level depends on the outcome of national elections rather than on lasting, structural consensus. There is no guarantee that Orbán will not return to power in the next election.

Serbia

The SNS, which had been in power since 2012, lost power after protests that began following the November 2024 disaster at the Novi Sad railway station, where 16 people were killed, evolved into an electoral movement over the course of nearly two years.

The most striking aspect of the election result was that victory went not to established opposition parties but to a movement organized outside the traditional party system. The Student List, whose candidates were selected by the student movement and which consisted largely of academics and professionals, succeeded in mobilizing voters who had previously been reluctant to support established opposition parties.

The movement has also transcended ethnic divisions. In Novi Pazar, the center of the predominantly Bosniak Sandžak region, the Student List received approximately 40 percent of the vote, outperforming the combined vote share of the three largest Bosniak parties. Adem Mavrić, a Bosniak political scientist from Novi Pazar who graduated from Sakarya University’s Department of International Relations and speaks fluent Turkish, ranked sixth on the list. The participation of students from Novi Pazar State University in the protests from the outset also demonstrates that the movement has built a coalition extending beyond ethnic-based political representation.

Nevertheless, Serbia’s experience also shows that the collapse of an old consensus does not necessarily mean that a new one has been established. The common ground uniting the Student List is based less on a specific policy program than on opposition to the incumbent government and demands for the rule of law and an end to corruption.

The movement’s positions on issues such as EU membership, Kosovo, and Serbia’s traditionally close relations with Russia and China remain unclear. The extent to which this broad coalition can preserve its unity while assuming the responsibilities of government will determine the durability of Serbia’s transformation and, consequently, the course of its relations with Europe.

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria, prolonged political instability has come to an end through a majority built around a single leader. The country had been unable to form a stable government even after its eighth parliamentary election since 2021. Following protests that began in December 2025 in response to a budget proposal and allegations of corruption, the government resigned and the country once again headed to early elections.

Following President Rumen Radev’s resignation, Progressive Bulgaria, established in March 2026 with his backing, won approximately 44 percent of the vote in the April 19 elections, securing an outright majority in the 240-seat parliament. As a result, the search for consensus through coalition governments has given way to a political majority centered on a single leader.

Bulgaria’s EU policy is also likely to be affected by this shift. With Bulgaria having joined the Schengen Area in 2025 and the eurozone in early 2026, the need for the cautious approach previously adopted out of concern that these processes could be blocked has diminished.

In this context, the Radev government is expected to maintain its Euroskeptic stance, oppose unconditional military support for Ukraine, and raise the possibility of easing EU sanctions against Russia. It is also expected to maintain a hard-line, identity-based position on North Macedonia’s EU membership. These developments demonstrate that achieving the benefits associated with EU membership does not necessarily mean that member states will be more willing to align themselves with common policies.

In the second round on November 1, President Iliana Yotova, backed by Progressive Bulgaria and an advocate of dialogue with Moscow, will face Andrey Gyurov, who is supported by the pro-Western reformist opposition. If Yotova wins, the presidency and government will be held by the same political bloc. A victory for Gyurov, on the other hand, could turn disagreements over EU policy into a source of tension between the presidency and the government.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turnout in the October 4 general elections fell to the lowest level in the country’s history, while ethnically based nationalist parties maintained their positions. The electoral system also remained unchanged, continuing to deny citizens who do not belong to one of the three constituent peoples the right to stand for office, despite rulings by the European Court of Human Rights.

The indirect election of the Federation’s House of Peoples is expected to be followed by a prolonged government-formation process. In this respect, Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates that institutionally mandated power-sharing, in the absence of even a minimum level of political consensus among the actors involved, can produce persistent deadlock rather than improve decision-making capacity.

Southern Cyprus

The Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus stands out as a case in which two major parties have maintained their presence while the political center has collapsed. In the May 24 elections, the Democratic Rally (DISY) and the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) retained their seats, but their combined vote share fell from 68.7 percent in 2001 to 51 percent.

Centrist parties suffered heavy losses. The Democratic Party (DIKO) recorded the lowest vote share in its history, while EDEK and DIPA failed to enter parliament. By contrast, the far-right National Popular Front (ELAM) increased its parliamentary representation from four to eight seats, winning 10.9 percent of the vote.

ELAM’s rise points to a weakening of the consensus among the main Greek Cypriot parties around a settlement based on the UN framework. The party, which advocates the island’s unification with Greece, has become the third-largest political force, deepening political divisions over the Cyprus issue. This could make it more difficult for the EU to maintain a common Cyprus policy among its member states and could also create new tensions in relations with Türkiye.

It is not only the far-right

The 2026 elections have shown that the erosion of European political consensus is a far more complex process than can be explained solely by the rise of the far right. Fragmentation within party systems, growing electoral volatility, prolonged government-formation processes, and the rapid rise to power of newly established political actors are undermining stability at the national level while also limiting the EU’s capacity to reach common decisions.

Against this backdrop, three main trends are likely to shape European political consensus in the near future.

Firstly, decision-making is likely to become even slower in areas such as foreign policy, sanctions, and enlargement, where unanimity is required. Common positions will increasingly be built around the lowest common denominator. In particular, countries such as Slovakia and Bulgaria are likely to gain greater bargaining power each time EU sanctions against Russia come up for renewal, while support for Ukraine may continue subject to exemptions and exceptions.

Secondly, the EU is expected to make greater use of flexible mechanisms to overcome these deadlocks, including enhanced cooperation, coalitions of the willing, and a shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting. While these approaches may increase the bloc’s ability to act in the short term, they are likely to institutionalize differences in opinion and policy over the longer term.

Thirdly, alignment at the EU level is expected to become increasingly dependent on national election cycles. As Hungary’s experience demonstrates, a member state’s alignment with the EU can change following a single election, without any lasting structural guarantees. In this respect, Bulgaria’s presidential runoff on November 1, Spain’s snap election on November 29, and France’s presidential election expected in 2027 stand out as critical turning points that could shape the future of Europe’s political consensus.

A far-right victory in France, would be particularly significant, given that recent polls suggest this is becoming increasingly likely.. If one of the EU’s founding and most influential members were to adopt a more distant stance toward common policies, the erosion of consensus would move from the bloc’s periphery to its very center.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)